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Abstract  
 
The period between the end of the Russian Civil War and Turkish War of 
Independence (1922) and the start of the Great Terror (1937) was one of social and 
political upheaval, as well as state formation according to bold new patterns across 
Eurasia. As part of this dynamic, both the Turkish and Soviet governments sought to 
refashion the self-identification of their citizens through new national histories. 
These meta-narratives were intended to educate as well as indoctrinate, setting new 
rules and boundaries for inclusion and participation. Through my doctoral project, I 
problematize the role of state ideology (Gökalpian nationalism in Turkey; Stalinism in 
the Soviet Union) in the writing of the pre-Islamic history of Central Asia, with a 
particular focus on issues of nationhood and belonging. I seek to explain why the 
two narratives diverged sharply by the mid-1930s, despite having access to roughly 
the same body of primary sources and scholarly research. Turkish accounts stressed 
cultural and racial unity among Turkic-speakers, while Soviet histories emphasized 
miscegenation and the historically contingent nature of nations. They were 
articulated in school textbooks, conference presentations, monographs, popular 
histories and propagandistic publications, and were therefore available to all levels 
of society. By making use of a wide spectrum of all of these materials in Turkish, 
Russian, Kazakh, Azerbaijani, Crimean Tatar, Turkmen, Uzbek, Tatar and Kazakh, I 
explore the development of the narratives, their content and language of 
enunciation from the consolidation of Soviet and Turkish statehood until the eve of 
the Second World War. In doing so, I demonstrate the manner in which history 
became a tool of the state and its efforts to influence a rigid and highly controlled 
worldview on Turkish and Soviet citizens respectively. 
 
  
 4 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ................................................................................................................ 2 
Declaration on Plagiarism ...................................................................................... 3 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................... 8 
Introduction .......................................................................................................... 9 
Literature Review ................................................................................................ 26 
Interpreting the remote past ........................................................................................... 26 
Soviet historiography ....................................................................................................... 27 
Central Asian historiography ........................................................................................... 27 
Turkish historiography ..................................................................................................... 28 
Ancient History and Archaeology ................................................................................ 28 
Nationalist Archaeology, the State and Ideology ............................................................ 29 
Archaeology in Anatolia ................................................................................................... 32 
Archaeology, Anthropology, Race and History ................................................................ 33 
Nationalist Historiography ......................................................................................... 34 
The Nationalists according to the Marxists ..................................................................... 36 
Marxist Historiography .............................................................................................. 37 
East Asia: a Fusion of Marx and the Ancient Nation........................................................ 38 
Soviet Historiography ................................................................................................. 40 
The Friendship of Peoples ................................................................................................ 41 
A Soviet View of Soviet Historiography ........................................................................... 43 
Central Asian Historiography ...................................................................................... 46 
Kazakhstan ....................................................................................................................... 47 
The Great Patriotic War and Kazakh History ................................................................... 48 
Azerbaijan ........................................................................................................................ 50 
Broader Trends ................................................................................................................ 51 
Turkish Historiography ............................................................................................... 53 
Behar on the Influence of the State................................................................................. 54 
Turkish History in Context................................................................................................ 54 
A Nietzschean View of Turkish Historiography ................................................................ 56 
Alternatives to the Turkish History Thesis ....................................................................... 57 
A Lone Comparison .................................................................................................... 58 
History, Language and Archaeology ..................................................................... 60 
Language and Proto-Language .................................................................................... 61 
Language, Land and Culture ............................................................................................ 62 
Ecologies and Economies of Language ............................................................................ 64 
Endogenous Change......................................................................................................... 66 
Family Relations ............................................................................................................... 68 
Typologies and Mythologies ............................................................................................ 69 
Alternative Attempts ....................................................................................................... 72 
Sifting through the Evidence ............................................................................................ 75 
Archaeology............................................................................................................... 76 
Archaeology in the Era of Extremes................................................................................. 77 
New Archaeology ............................................................................................................. 79 
The Intangible versus the Material .................................................................................. 81 
 5 
A Synthesis of Archaeology and Linguistics ..................................................................... 82 
Museums, Exhibitions and Retinal Narratives ................................................................. 85 
Post-Modernism and the Museum .................................................................................. 87 
Anthropology............................................................................................................. 89 
The Ecological Push .......................................................................................................... 91 
Historical Anthropology ................................................................................................... 92 
Postcolonialism in the Pre-colonial Era ........................................................................... 94 
Bible Study ....................................................................................................................... 95 
Israel Reboot .................................................................................................................... 97 
Last Stand at Masada ....................................................................................................... 99 
Nonobjective Objectivity ............................................................................................... 101 
A Return to God’s Country ............................................................................................. 103 
Ideation and the World ............................................................................................ 104 
Ideology 101 ...................................................................................................... 106 
Ideology: A Definition for Historiography ...................................................................... 107 
Marx’ Contribution......................................................................................................... 108 
The First Marxists’ Debate ............................................................................................. 110 
Lukács and History and Class Consciousness ................................................................. 111 
Gramscian Creativity ...................................................................................................... 114 
Alternative Hypotheses: Durkheim and Weber ............................................................. 117 
Soviet Ideologies ...................................................................................................... 121 
Lenin, the Party and the Importance of Ideology .......................................................... 122 
Leninism or Marxist-Leninist Ideology ........................................................................... 124 
Lenin and the Second International ............................................................................... 126 
The Nation According to the Austrian Socialists ............................................................ 127 
The Stalinist Theory of the Nation ................................................................................. 129 
The Russian Context ....................................................................................................... 130 
Marxism and the National Question .............................................................................. 131 
The Four Components of a Nation................................................................................. 132 
Stalin’s View of Historicity ............................................................................................. 134 
Leninism vs. Stalinism .................................................................................................... 136 
A Brief Window of Pluralism .......................................................................................... 138 
Group Hierarchy ............................................................................................................. 139 
The Asian Mode of Production ...................................................................................... 140 
The Ideological Vice Tightens......................................................................................... 142 
Turkish Ideologies .................................................................................................... 145 
Late Ottoman Ideology .................................................................................................. 146 
Populism and the Narodnik Connection ........................................................................ 148 
Northern Turkic Influences ............................................................................................ 149 
The Tide Turns ................................................................................................................ 150 
Enter Ziya Gökalp ........................................................................................................... 152 
Gökalp’s Conversion ...................................................................................................... 154 
Gökalpian Nationalism................................................................................................... 155 
Nation by Education ....................................................................................................... 157 
Civilization versus Culture .............................................................................................. 160 
The Endurance of National Characteristics.................................................................... 162 
Ağaoğlu’s Contribution and Proto-Anatolianism ........................................................... 164 
The racialization of Akçura............................................................................................. 166 
The State Looms Large ................................................................................................... 167 
The Use of Anthropology and Archaeology ................................................................... 168 
Hittites, Sumerians and Anatolia ................................................................................... 169 
 6 
Onwards and Upwards ............................................................................................. 171 
Turkish Historical Narratives .............................................................................. 173 
Ottoman Turkic Studies ................................................................................................. 174 
Ottoman Turkic Identity and History ............................................................................. 175 
Asiatic Pride.................................................................................................................... 176 
Young Turk Turkism and the Rise of Gökalp .................................................................. 178 
History and the Gökalpian Nation ................................................................................. 179 
Stabilization and Hegemony ..................................................................................... 181 
Early Government Intervention ..................................................................................... 183 
Turkist Publications and Societies.................................................................................. 183 
Who is a Turk?................................................................................................................ 186 
Closure of the Türk Ocakları .......................................................................................... 187 
Of Two Türkiye Tarihleri ................................................................................................. 188 
Azerbaijan in the Turkish Imagination ........................................................................... 192 
Sadri Maksudi’s Legal History ........................................................................................ 193 
The Turkish History Thesis ........................................................................................ 195 
Turco-Soviet Relations ................................................................................................... 200 
Reşit Saffet and the Origins of the Turks ................................................................... 201 
Turco-Hungarian Connections ....................................................................................... 202 
A Rude Awakening on the Hittites ................................................................................. 204 
Skull Sizes ....................................................................................................................... 205 
National Science, Scientific Nationalism ........................................................................ 206 
From Root to Branch ...................................................................................................... 208 
The First Turkish Historical Congress ......................................................................... 210 
Laicism and Rationalism ................................................................................................. 210 
Afet Hanım’s View of the Ancient Turks ........................................................................ 212 
Modern Examples of Ancient Prototypes ...................................................................... 213 
A Guide to the Turkish Race........................................................................................... 215 
Epistemologies, Ontologies and National Goals ............................................................ 217 
Silenced Opposition ....................................................................................................... 219 
Of Drafts and Dogma................................................................................................ 223 
Sumerians and Bulgars ................................................................................................... 225 
The Second Turkish Historical Congress .................................................................... 228 
The Master Speaks ......................................................................................................... 235 
Race: A State of Mind .................................................................................................... 239 
An Ill Wind from the North ............................................................................................ 242 
Arsal’s Legal History Returns ......................................................................................... 244 
Moving On ............................................................................................................... 248 
Soviet Historical Narratives ................................................................................ 250 
The Change of Groupings ......................................................................................... 250 
Walikhanov’s Proto-Nationalism ................................................................................... 254 
Education Wars .............................................................................................................. 256 
The Language Question ................................................................................................. 257 
Azerbaijan’s Contentious Origins ................................................................................... 259 
Historic Revolutions and Revolutionary Histories ...................................................... 261 
Soviet Scientific Reorganization ..................................................................................... 264 
Central Asian Historiography ......................................................................................... 269 
V. V. Bartol’d .................................................................................................................. 269 
Bartol’d and Race ........................................................................................................... 272 
Bartol’d’s Views of Turkic Origins .................................................................................. 273 
 7 
Chuloshnikov : a Brief Sideline ....................................................................................... 276 
Of Soviets and Locals................................................................................................ 277 
Turkic Intellectuals and Their Languages ....................................................................... 279 
Soviet Ethnography ........................................................................................................ 282 
Finding Local Histories ................................................................................................... 284 
Azeri Hangovers ............................................................................................................. 287 
Effusive Epistemologies ................................................................................................. 291 
Professionalization and Objectivization......................................................................... 296 
Uzbekistan the Urban, Uzbekistan the Rural ................................................................. 301 
Uzbek Origins ................................................................................................................. 305 
Turkic Hands, Russian Tongues ................................................................................. 309 
Race, the Superstructure Supermodel........................................................................... 313 
The First All-Union Turkological Congress ................................................................. 315 
Planned Science ............................................................................................................. 322 
Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev .................................................................................... 324 
Kazakh Ethnonyms ......................................................................................................... 326 
Political Motivations of National Identification ............................................................. 328 
The Material Past ..................................................................................................... 329 
Russian Preferences ....................................................................................................... 334 
Ethnography, Anthropology, Sociology ......................................................................... 337 
A Decade of Eclecticism ................................................................................................. 339 
The Vise Tightens ..................................................................................................... 340 
Turkmen Linguistic Unification ...................................................................................... 341 
Karakalpakia and the Travails of the Undocumented ................................................... 343 
The Return of Çobanzadǝ .............................................................................................. 345 
Asfendiiarov and the Kazakh Experiment ...................................................................... 348 
Stalinist Repression .................................................................................................. 352 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 355 
The Historicity of the Nation .................................................................................... 356 
Markers of Identification and Inclusion..................................................................... 359 
History as a Means of Social and Political Cohesion ................................................... 364 
Works Cited ....................................................................................................... 372 
 
 
   
 8 
Acknowledgements 
A three-year project is never completed by the effort and stamina of one 
individual alone. Over the course of planning, researching and writing this doctoral 
thesis, I have had the support, encouragement, criticism (always constructive!) and 
understanding of a number of people whom I would now like to thank. My 
supervisory committee – Yorgos Dedes, Owen Miller and Yair Wallach – have been 
exceptionally helpful in this respect. To them, I extend my sincere gratitude. In 
addition, I say a hearty thank you to all the journal editors, conference organizers, 
session moderators, audience members and random strangers who read or listened 
to my ideas and provided their honest feedback. Their contribution played no small 
part in putting me on track, or opening up new avenues for me to pursue. 
 A doctoral program isn’t just a piece of writing; it’s a commitment that 
impacts on all aspects of a student’s life. My family, both in Canada and elsewhere, 
have been tremendously caring, understanding and supportive throughout this 
process; I only hope that I have the opportunity to repay their kindness. I must also 
thank Monika, whose steady hand and calm approach have helped me grow as a 
person, and not just as a student. And I could never forget Sammy, who always had a 
healthy dose of silliness and good cheer to help me out in the last stretch of the 
doctoral program.  
 On the institutional front, I would like to recognize the pecuniary support of 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, whose Doctoral 
Fellowship made study and life in London financially feasible. More than just a 
practical boost, SSHRC’s belief in my project and my ability to complete it was a 
source of inspiration over the three years of the program.  
My gratitude also goes to the British Library, which, as both my employer and 
my host, has afforded me both flexibility and boundless opportunities to work on 
this project, and thus to make my own small contribution to the mountain of 
knowledge of which it is the custodian. The Kazakh National Library and Russian 
State Library (forever “in the name of Lenin” in my mind) are also owned thanks for 
their help.  
 Finally, copious good vibes to the good people at both Attendant Shoreditch 
on Great Eastern Street, and the Members’ Lounge at the Tate Modern. Your 
patience and understanding allowed me to spend countless hours working on this 
document while powered by your coffee and food, and inspired by your creativity.   
 9 
Introduction 
 
“And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the 
earth, and the difference of your languages and 
colours. Lo! Herein indeed are portents for men of 
knowledge.” 
(The Holy Qur’an, The Romans, 
30:22) 
 
 To belong is not a choice that one makes through one’s own agency alone. 
Inclusion is a two-sided process, one that involves both action on the part of the 
individual, and acceptance on the part of the group. This ideal scenario, however, 
requires consciousness on the part of the group that it constitutes a group, as well as 
by the individual that she might exhibit the characteristics and qualities necessary 
for belonging. This knowledge comes from many sources, the most obvious being 
family and friends, who utilize genealogy, family mythology and urban lore to inform 
and reinforce individual identities, convincing someone of her place inside or outside 
of a given group. In the modern era, the state became another actor in this drama of 
social existence. Mandatory education, propaganda, invented traditions, military 
conscription and systems of social insurance and welfare have all contributed to the 
State’s power in shaping and harnessing individuals’ consciousness of their place 
within communities and societies. For much of the 20th century, these societies were 
not portrayed to be contractual communities under the umbrella of a benevolent 
state, but rather nations united through more than just voluntaristic participation. 
The nation, loosely speaking, was a society based on common history as well as 
common intangibles: language, religion, morality, race, descent and other attributes, 
depending on the context. The state, the nation and the individual became entwined 
 10 
in a triangle of mutual support: the state utilized the nation as a means of accessing 
legitimacy and compliance; the individual had recourse to the nation in her dealings 
with and opposition to the State; and the nation relied on the actions of both the 
individual and the state in its continued existence and development over the course 
of the last century. 
 States, however, are not all created the same. Some, such as the British and 
French ones, emerged from long periods of dynastic rule and pre-modern 
consolidation. The polity sought its legitimacy in an extant tradition of cooperation 
between subjects or citizens in the construction of society. Other states were born 
through conscious efforts to create a polity based on shared ethnicity, language or 
political goals. Germany and Italy are the best-known of these experiments, arising 
out of cultural movements in the late 18th and 19th centuries. Culture was the basis, 
but not the only means, of creating a political society with sovereignty over its own 
lands and rights vis-à-vis other States and nations in the international arena. These 
polities created a unique challenge to another form of state: the Empire. Similar to 
Britain and France, Empires could rely on long traditions of existence and suzerainty, 
if not sovereignty, to buttress their quests for continued importance and vitality 
within the modern world. On occasion, the nation and the Empire largely coincided, 
permitting a smooth transition from one model of statehood to another, as in the 
case of Japan. On Europe’s eastern fringes, however, the birth of the nation-State 
struck deep at the raison d’être of three large Empires whose foundations were rife 
with ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, arguably 
the most economically sound of the three, was the first to feel the pressure of 
national movements, and was forced to recognize their potency with the creation of 
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the dual monarchy in 1867. This development would serve as both a model and a 
warning for Imperial powers further to the east. 
 In Russia and the Ottoman Empire, national movements were later to arrive 
and less deeply rooted in the diverse populations of the State, but they did prove to 
be considerable challenges to the continued sovereignty of both the Romanovs and 
the Ottomans. Poland and the Polish national movement – based on a pre-existing 
tradition of statehood – proved to the Russian crown how vulnerable it remained to 
national pressures and their exploitation by other European powers. Given the 
plethora of ethno-linguistic communities throughout the Russian Empire, particularly 
on its southern and western boundaries, mobilization of the National Question and 
Russification became exceptionally important aspects of modernization and state-
building in the Romanovs’ lands. In the Ottoman Empire, the national idea and a 
new, loosely conceived ideology known as nationalism resulted in a rapid shrinking 
of the areas under Istanbul’s sovereign reach. Here, too, quasi-national and national 
ideas began to be employed either as means of linking subjects and citizens to the 
crown, or as enemies against which to elaborate state policy. In Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire, the nation and nationalists harangued both the government and 
its opposition, creating unexpected rifts and alliances in the fight for the levers of 
power. Eventually, both Empires would collapse at the close of the First World War 
for reasons that can only be partially attributed to nationalist movements. The 
national idea mixed with economic, social, political and international pressures to 
produce cataclysmic effects for the ancien régime in both countries, initiating 
periods of bold new state-building endeavours across Eurasia.  
 12 
 With the end of the Russian Civil War in 1922 and the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic on October 29, 1923, the issue of the State’s sovereignty was 
largely resolved. Borders would not be stable until 1938 for the Republic of Turkey 
and 1945 for the Soviet Union, but in both countries the drive moved from territorial 
consolidation to the consolidation of citizenry in the early 1920s. The era of national 
movements informed greatly both States’ approaches to sovereignty and citizenship, 
albeit differently. In Turkey, the nation became the foundation of the State, 
encouraged in part by the Wilsonian 14 Points, according to which world leaders 
drew the post-World War One map of Europe. In the Soviet Union, nationalism was 
one of Moscow’s bête noires, a force to be reckoned with in some parts of the 
Union, and one to be nurtured in others as a means to the end of Socialism. In both 
cases, the nation took its appropriate place in the régime’s worldview. It was 
understood and explained according to largely cohesive ideologies espoused and 
developed by State and parastatal apparati in Ankara and Moscow. The State, 
however, was not just concerned with its rights and privileges in the international 
arena. With the collapse of the imperial order, citizens, too, were called to 
participate in the experience of sovereignty through the various organs of political 
life. Mass participation in society had its dangers, especially given the recent 
creation of the two polities, and both the Soviet authorities and the Kemalists took 
great pains in order to ensure that citizen involvement did not pose a threat to the 
stability and persistence of the new order. A pre-condition for mass participation 
was therefore mass education; or mass indoctrination and coercion, as some 
opposition members would claim.  
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 Education served many practical purposes, including increasing literacy and 
numeracy rates among the population at large, but it also functioned as a conduit for 
inculcating citizens with State-sanctioned ideology. In the Soviet Union, this ideology 
was Marxism-Leninism, quickly turning into Stalinism as Joseph Stalin, né 
Dzhugashvili, tightened his grip on power in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The 
reigning worldview in Turkey is much more difficult to pin down, especially given the 
fact that the Republic’s first President, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, did not produce the 
same volume of philosophical or theoretical tracts as his Soviet counterpart. For the 
purposes of this study, however, I have opted to qualify the dominant worldview in 
Kemalist Turkey as Gökalpian Nationalism. I provide a detailed approach to this 
ideology, as well as its ontology and epistemology of the nation, in a later chapter. 
Similar to Stalinism’s relationship to Marxism, Gökalpian Nationalism is not merely 
an application of Ziya Gökalp’s thought to a later period, but rather a community of 
scholars’ and intellectuals’ posthumous elaboration of an existing corpus of texts and 
ideas. Stalinism and Gökalpian Nationalism were both living, dynamic systems of 
thought that informed and were informed by the political, economic and social 
realities of the first half of the 20th century.  
 The examination of ideology and its transfer through education is a broad 
subject; one that can and should be undertaken from multiple angles. I intend to 
contribute to this endeavour by looking at two particular examples through the lens 
of historiography. More specifically, I will investigate the manner in which State 
structures in the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey utilized historical 
narratives about the pre-Islamic history of the peoples of Central Asia in order to 
inculcate their citizens with the ideologies of Stalinism and Gökalpian Nationalism 
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respectively. For the Soviet Union, such historical works were important tools of 
linking the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and Siberia to Soviet socialist statehood. In 
Turkey, they were means of binding Turkish-speakers to a regime that sought 
legitimacy through ethno-territorial continuity. I will focus upon issues of race, 
ethnicity and belonging to demonstrate the manner in which the worldview of the 
two régimes appears in their respective explanations of physical appearance, 
language, custom and lineage, as well as these categories’ relationship to inclusion in 
or exclusion from the object known as the nation. In doing so, I raise a number of 
questions to whose answers I contribute through the completion of this project: to 
what degree is history, and indeed epistemology, responsive to the dictates of 
ideology? Is historical truth accessible through intellectual investigation, or are all 
scholarly activities tainted by the demands of the present? How malleable are our 
visions of ourselves, our families and our communities in the face of intrusive State-
directed pedagogy, patronage and propaganda? 
 Why choose these sets of narratives about the pre-Islamic history of the 
Central Asians? It would be, admittedly, far easier to track the development of 
ideological infiltration into history texts by examining one set of histories on its own. 
Indeed, as we will see, similar studies have been conducted for both the Soviet 
Union and Turkey. They have not, however, been compared in a meaningful manner 
that highlights the inconsistencies arising in both corpi of historical accounts of pre-
Islamic Turkic groupings. I do not intend to simply compare the results of existing 
historiographical studies. Rather, I propose to return to the original texts and 
recontextualize them in dialogue with each other and with the prevailing political 
and ideological climate of the 1920s and 30s. Both Soviet and Turkish authorities 
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faced considerable domestic and international challenges to their legitimacy, and 
history was a convenient and powerful tool in buttressing their sovereignty against 
internal and external attacks. Both Turkish and Soviet scholars claimed to be 
employing rigorously objective and scientific approaches to the investigation of 
historical truth, but their focus on a period of Central Asian and Turkic history before 
the production of a large amount of documentary evidence meant that 
interpretation of material and human remains featured heavily in their end products. 
The problematization and interrogation of these products in relation to one another 
and the tenets of the respective ideological systems help us to understand just how 
far State-sponsored scholarship went in justifying and legitimizing the status quo and 
attacking real and imagined threats to it. 
 This study consists of seven chapters, including the current introduction. This 
chapter introduces the topic and provides some, although not all, definitions for the 
concepts employed in this work. Chapter two is a review of the relevant scholarly 
literature pertaining to historiography. As my investigation touches upon two 
otherwise unrelated metanarratives, I seek to provide overviews of both 
Turkological and Sovietological studies in a meaningful and informative manner. 
Chapter three provides a methodological review of linguistics, archaeology and 
anthropology. Although I am concerned primarily with historical narratives, I cannot 
ignore the important contribution made to their writing by the output of these three 
disciplines. To this end, I have attempted to provide the reader with an 
understanding of the current state of the three sciences, as well as their relation to 
history and the major issues that have arisen over the twentieth century as 
linguistics, archaeology and anthropology were used to explain the remote past. 
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Chapter four is an extended definition of the concept of ideology and of the two 
worldviews under investigation in my project: Stalinism and Gökalpian Nationalism. I 
remain ontologically agnostic towards the concept of the nation, and thus rely on 
this chapter to provide my readers with a view to the epistemic systems’ own 
perceptions of the nation and its content. Chapter five is the first corpus of 
narratives under review: those produced in the Turkish Republic. Chapter six 
provides a similar approach to Soviet narratives. Finally, chapter seven consists of a 
comparison of the two metanarratives and concluding remarks.  
 And so, prior to moving on to an overview of the existing literature, I will first 
address three important concepts that appear frequently in the course of my study: 
the state; race; and ethnicity. I will begin with the state, as it is, in many ways, the 
least controversial of the three. Throughout this work, references to pre-20th century 
states will be made, especially in the primary sources from Turkey. In such cases, I 
take the usage of the word as it appears: if the author defines it, I will make such a 
definition explicit; if not, I will leave the term undefined. More pressing, however, is 
a definition of the state in the 20th century, as this is a concept to which I have 
recourse on a frequent basis. Throughout the last hundred years, philosophers, 
anthropologists, political scientists and other scholars have sought to provide us with 
an understanding of what the state is and from where it came. Antonio Gramsci, 
whose writings we will review in the section on ideology, viewed the state as having 
arisen from a “will to class power”, the desire of a specific section of society to 
exercise “political-cultural hegemony” over the whole of that society. It was thus the 
“historical unity” of these dominant groups and the manner in which they exercised 
power over social segments that might be classified as the state. As later scholars 
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carried on this definition, they articulated more clearly the imagination of the state 
as a mass of relationships, both those in the form of institutions – such as ministries, 
cultural institutions and universities – as well as informal and intangible mechanisms 
such as patronage, cultural programming and language reform (Hansen and 
Stepputat 2001, 3–4). 
 In the 1970s, Foucault turned such an understanding on its head, putting the 
state after rather than before the emergence of social governance. In other words, 
the state was merely an expression of the gradual rise in disciplinary functions and 
relationships within society, rather than a mechanism of imposing them for the end 
of gaining and reproducing political power (Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 4). Indeed, 
Foucault’s interpretation of the state was a highly fluid one in which an exact 
definition could not be pinned down precisely because of the fluidity of governance 
and discipline within society as a whole. Our idea of the state might be an image of a 
monolith, controlling and guiding our behaviour and interactions, but in truth those 
mechanisms of control and guidance depend on what we see as being controllable 
and guidable, and therefore change throughout time (Migdal 2001, 18–19).  
Foucault’s deviation, however, runs into problems when looking at newly 
formed states, or those in which the culture within which the institutions of 
governance operate is radically different from the culture of large parts of the 
population. Wilson and Nugent have both exposed such issues in Peru, where core 
and periphery are markedly distinguished within the borders of a sovereign polity 
(Nugent 2001; Wilson 2001). Fiona Wilson’s work on schools as outposts of the state 
in Peru is particularly useful in relating these definitions to the current work, as 
conditions in the Latin American country – where much of the population was 
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estranged from the language, culture and institutions of the colonial administration 
in Lima for centuries – can be compared to Anatolia and Central Asia in the early part 
of the 20th century. Here, the state is represented by relations that come from the 
top down, similar to those of Gramsci’s definition, and that do not find immediate 
resonance within all levels of the society over which the dominant class seeks 
political power (Wilson 2001, 313–14). In particular, Wilson relies on Gupta’s 1995 
work to come out with two different processes that problematize the state as part 
of, rather than above, society: “One is the production of the state as a translocal 
presence, a shared imagination of the state spreading like a color wash across the 
map and distinguishing one national homogenizing space from others beyond its 
borders. The other process involves the implanting of institutions and agents that 
constitute networks through which messages and directives can flow between 
central state and province. Color washes and flows need to be conceived as 
potentially involving two-way exchange, though these may be blocked or ineffective 
under reigning constellations of power.” (Wilson 2001, 316) 
 From this, I propose that we view the state, for the purpose of my study, as a 
two-tiered entity. The top tier is what we traditionally associate with the state: the 
institutions of government that are tasked with the organization of life and 
development in a given territory. In the case of both Turkey and the Soviet Union, 
the distinction between party, government and state is too complicated a nexus to 
unravel as a component of my own research. As one-party states building a new 
governance order following revolution, such a task might prove impossible in any 
case. The second tier represents the interface between citizens and those 
institutions. Teachers, orators, bureaucrats, police officers; all these people are 
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responsible, in some way, for the implementation of the first tier’s vision of the 
world and its policies for the populace. While they might not make decisions 
regarding the direction of the country, they do indeed influence the country’s 
progress towards the enunciated goals of the upper tier. Their willingness to accept 
the policies of the first tier and enact them, or their refusal to do so, will be taken as 
a marker of their inclusion in, or exclusion from, the state itself. In many cases, they 
are the only representatives of the state for those living far from its core institutions 
of power and governance. This conceptualization is not terribly different from that of 
Migdal, who sees the state as both idea and practice (Migdal 2001, 15–18), with the 
exception that it allows for the reality of domestic core and periphery to be 
integrated into the composition of the state.  
The state, of course, is ultimate composed of people; people who are to be 
counted, categorized and labelled according to one of many different typologies, 
including race. When speaking of the academic debate about race, ontology, even 
more than epistemology, is at the crux of the matter. While historians and 
historiographers might spend their time arguing over the means of accessing 
historical truth, those who study race and racial differences have expended 
considerable amounts of energy debunking, or at least radically reimagining, the 
very existence of the concept as an element of the physical sciences. For much of the 
post-modern period, race was largely conceived of as a purely social construct. That 
is, apart from its sheer retinal manifestations (skin, hair and eye colour; hair type; 
nose, eye, lip and cheekbone shapes), the other information encoded in race is a 
product of social dynamics and hierarchies of power (Ware 1992, 118–19; Jones 
2005, 613–14). Race comes into consideration more as a binary between same and 
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other, or us and them, than as a unitary object to be defined in its own right (Ware 
1992, 122). Advances in genetics and the biological and medical sciences, however, 
have opened up vast new possibilities for understanding race. A much more nuanced 
approach to it is now encouraged, with the caveat that “race” might not be anything 
close to what it is popularly imagined to be. Race as purely physical appearance or 
characteristics is too simplistic; race as an exclusively social construct misses the 
biological truth of communities defined by common traits, many of which are 
invisible to the naked eye (Jones 2005, 612–17). Some have gone so far as to suggest 
that the biological sciences have, in part, coopted the social construct of race as a 
convenient shorthand for clusters of genetic and biological markers unrelated to its 
social, cultural and political meanings (Lorusso 2011, 535–36). With this in mind, I 
divide conceptualizations of race into two separate categories: the 
physical/biological and the social/psychological. 
 The physical/biological aspect of race encodes largely what is most latent: 
that a group of people tend to have darker or lighter skin; curly or straight hair; slim 
builds or wide frames. To this we may add the very modern understanding of a 
group of people with a high propensity for common genetic markers. Descriptive 
categories of physical or biological race, while often giving way to generalizations 
and stereotypes, are nonetheless based on visual observation. On occasion, I will 
make explicit definitions and characterizations of this type in citations from the 
various primary sources of interest, with reference to both the ancient populations 
of Central Asia and the region’s contemporary inhabitants. Although I have included 
biological components in my definition, for the most part these do not come into 
play, given the developmental stage of genetics in the 1920s and 30s. At most, they 
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appear as discussions of blood types, although these claims are very limited in their 
appearance in the literature of 1930s Turkey or the Soviet Union.  
On the social/psychological side, the social constructs referred to by Vron 
and other scholars come into play. Here, the question is not so much what an 
individual or a group of individuals look like, but rather what the appearance of 
individuals tells us about their society, their history, their culture and their 
propensity for specific activities and emotions. Conversely, these may also take the 
form of statements of a deductive nature: what the qualities and characteristics of a 
certain person or people tell us about their physical appearance. This understanding 
of the connection between the physical and the psychological had its start with the 
19th century French writer and statesman Arthur de Gobineau, whose The Inequality 
of Human Races was quickly taken as proof of the supremacy of white Europeans 
over other peoples (De Gobineau 1915; Gobineau 2009). Such thinking found its 
heyday, and indeed was developed most thoroughly, during the 1930s and 40s, but 
it has since been roundly discredited (Jones 2005, 44–51). Race in the proscriptive 
sense is now understood to be yet another part of individuals’ identity formation, a 
category that operates in an unending dialectic with class and gender, reproducing 
itself and morphing as social conditions evolve (Ware 1992, 121–23).  
 A second, and more difficult, concept to define is that of ethnicity. Yinger 
himself has recognized that race and ethnicity often overlap, with little clarity 
offered by scholars of either, or both, topics, regardless of their field of knowledge 
(Yinger 1985, 158–59). Moreover, the boundaries between social group, caste, 
ethnos and nation are murky at best, and more than a few scholars have argued for 
contextualized definitions, rather than universal ones (see Khazanov 1983, 405–6; 
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Stovel 2013, 9). Rather than focusing on the immutable and essential, these scholars 
prefer to tie ethnic identity to the voluntaristic and subjective selection of 
components of an extant, supra-ethnic culture in response to exogenous socio-
political or economic pressures. They see the outward manifestations of ethnicity – 
linguistic variation; dress; architecture; cooking; customs – as being conscious 
selections from or variations upon the options available to a wider population at any 
given time (Stovel 2013, 13). This, of course, clashes with the so-called “objective” 
school of thought, which assigns hard and fast boundaries to ethnic groups, albeit 
ones that might shift diachronically. Jones in particular highlights the problem with 
this as being the shaky theoretical grounds of objective criteria chosen subjectively, 
as well as the propensity of scholars and others to make pronouncements on 
authenticity based on objective markers rather than self-declaration (Jones 2005, 
57–58). Yinger defines the group as follows: 
 
“[An ethnic group is] a segment of a larger society whose members are 
thought, by themselves and/or others, to have a common origin and to 
share important segments of a common culture and who, in addition, 
participate in shared activities in which the common origin and culture are 
significant ingredients. Some mixture of language, religion, race, and 
ancestral homeland with its related culture is the defining element. No 
one of these by itself demarcates an ethnic group.” (Yinger 1985, 159). 
 
It is important to stress that ethnicity is, in many ways, an action that is both 
reflexive and transitive. While I have emphasized the idea that ethnic identity is 
formed through the usage of existing material and intangible objects to create a 
group sense of self, it is also borne from the denomination or characterization 
imposed upon a group by outsiders. This is important in situations of contact 
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between two groups – such as between neighbouring communities of sedentary and 
nomadic peoples – and in those of domination and submission (van der Vliet 2003, 
258). Barth put the accent on the bidirectional nature of ethnicity as early as the late 
1960s: 
 “[A] population which: 
1. is largely biologically self-perpetuating 
2. shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in cultural forms 
3. makes up a field of communication and interaction 
4. has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as 
constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same 
order.” (Barth 1970, 10–11) 
The idea of a “biologically self-perpetuating” community has provided, to some 
degree, the basis for a primordialist conceptualization of ethnicity that is not entirely 
out of line with many of the components of the voluntaristic definition. In short, it 
stems from the fact that kinship bonds (i.e. family bonds) often determine certain 
aspects of a given individual’s culture, such as her name, language, social customs 
and religion, which in turn underlie the ethnic affiliation of the person. Scholars of 
this camp therefore argue that ethnic identity is a part of human nature and, while 
not coded in our genetic makeup, is nonetheless our reflex mechanism of relating to 
other individuals (Jones 2005, 64–66). Those researchers who hold an entirely 
voluntaristic view fall into the instrumentalist camp, which includes such authors as 
Barth and Yinger, and which has been the dominant strand of thought for the last 
few decades. It has a number of different threads and understandings, but contrary 
to the proponents of primordalism, its champions all agree on the fluidity of identity 
and the situational nature of ethnic expressions (Jones 2005, 72–79). Whether 
primordial or instrumental, however, anthropologists, ethnographers and others 
generally seek to avoid the romanticization of blood and the essentialization 
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inherent in the archaeology, anthropology and ethnography of the 19th century and 
first half of the 20th century. Even for those individuals who argue in favour of a 
quasi-deterministic model of ethnicity, change and mutation are still possible; they 
just happens at a much slower pace. 
When seen in this way, there is no basis for extrapolating contemporary or 
recorded ethnic phenomena to a distant, unrecorded past; nor can they be linked to 
some sort of essential and durable core of ethnic identity. Contemporary 
archaeology and historical anthropology therefore hold that ethnicity is a historically 
contingent process directed more by human volition than by natural forces or innate 
characteristics. For the purpose of my study, then, I will utilize a conception of 
ethnicity that, similar to the definitions of Yinger, Stovel, Barth and others, sees it as 
a collective expression of temporal traits – both material and immaterial – that, 
while perhaps relying on durative objects such as language, place of origin or a 
shared historical experience, are in no way immutable or essential. 
 These brief definitions will help to bound our discussion of the nation in the 
following chapters. They are intended only as guidelines, and for this reason have 
been left vague: my purpose here is to provide a distinction between the nation, the 
race (whether descriptive or prescriptive) and the ethnos. In all three cases, I am 
agnostic as to controversies over the ontologies of the three objects. Just as I do with 
the nation, I will take the authors’ own understanding of the terminology, whether 
implicit or explicit, at face value. In a similar vein, I do not adopt a preference for 
whether peoples are described as Turkish or Turkic; a distinction routinely made in 
Russian works, but not entirely current in Turkish. While we understand Turkish to 
refer to the people, language and culture of Anatolia, and Turkic to be the broader 
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ethno-linguistic community stretching across Eurasia (similar to Italians, French, 
Spaniards on the one hand and Latins on the other), I generally take their authors’ 
use and misuse of these terms as given. Nevertheless, there are times at which I 
must make a distinction between different objects of study, or refer to a concept 
that is not made explicit by the author him or herself. In these cases, what will be 
most important is the three-way distinction between the physical characteristics of a 
broad grouping of people (race); the process of distinguishing oneself from one’s 
neighbours through selective expressions within the established culture (ethnicity); 
and something in between, a loose collectivity whose boundaries are more fluid than 
race but still more sharply defined than the ethnos (the nation). The three-way 
division will not be of uniform importance throughout this project, as different 
binaries were of greater or lesser importance at different times in the period in 
question in both Turkey and the Soviet Union. 
 There are a few steps remaining before delving into the appearance of these 
three topics in the primary literature. The first is a review of the extant literature 
regarding these topics, followed by broader definitions and an exploration of 
dominant ideologies.  
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Literature Review 
 
 The very nature of scholarly endeavours that cross disciplinary boundaries 
implies that the scholar does not have one set canon on which to rely. As a result, 
authors of such research must look to various sources and groups of researchers for 
guidance. They select from a variety of literatures in order to build a corpus of prior 
scholarly work. From this, they may then construct theoretical and methodological 
frameworks and analyze collected data. The same holds true for this particular 
project. A structure of some sort is still necessary, and to this end I have organized 
the works reviewed into four distinct collections: the interpretation of ancient 
history and archaeology; Soviet Marxist historiography; Central Asian historiography; 
and Turkish historiography. 
 
Interpreting the remote past 
On the theoretical level, I draw from established scholarly traditions of ancient 
history, archaeology and historiography. In particular, I seek guidance from 
scholarship on the interpretation of ancient history and archaeological remains, and 
their inclusion in historiographies of either Marxist or nationalist colouring. As my 
geographical area of study is outside of what is traditionally referred to as the 
Classical World, I have expressly, although not exclusively, sought to rely on works 
concerned with the interpretation of the ancient outside of Greece, Rome and the 
Near East.  
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Soviet historiography 
The first studies that I address relating directly to my objects of investigation belong 
to the corpus of research on Soviet historiography, a subsection of the once-thriving 
discipline of Sovietology. Cold War-era Sovietological works come from both NATO 
countries and Soviet scholars, with differences evident in both access to resources 
and the sensitivity of the author to the dictates of political élites. Since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991, the study of this former superpower as a single, 
cohesive entity has undergone a process of self-criticism. Researchers now ask how 
an entire field devoted to the study of the USSR could have failed to detect the 
phenomena that would eventually lead to its demise.  
 
Central Asian historiography 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has also provided for the creation of another 
domain of scholarship from which I draw, which I call Central Asian historiography. 
The scholars who participate in this field are distinguished from Sovietologists by the 
influence of a multipolar world order; their increased access to resources in the 
former Soviet Union; and their tendency to investigate and analyze aspects of the 
historical sciences that had been suppressed for political reasons during the Soviet 
period.  
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Turkish historiography 
Finally, the last subset of sources relates to Turkish historiography. In this section, I 
have sought to balance works by Turkish writers with those of foreign ones, in order 
to allow for an exposition of the peculiarities of history writing praxis in Turkey. 
 Thus I begin this review with an overview of studies relating to ancient 
history and archaeology, and their interpretation for modern ends.  
 
Ancient History and Archaeology 
It is the written record, in whatever form it might be found, that distinguishes 
the realm of ancient history from pre-history. The latter may only be investigated 
through the use of archaeology and related social sciences. Archaeology, however, is 
not solely the preserve of pre-history, and may indeed be employed in the study of 
the age of writing. The interplay of the material (archaeology) and the immaterial 
(content of the written record) appear both explicitly and implicitly in studies of pre- 
and ancient history. In his study of the 16th century BCE Edict of Telipinu, Liverani 
delves directly in the question of whether such documents should be taken at face 
value, or understood as tools of political legitimization and myth-making (Liverani 
2004). Simiarly, Soekmono’s discussion of archaeology and Indonesian 
historiography (Soekmono 2007) tracks competing interpretations of Muslim graves 
and their significance for the spread of Islam and Islamicate culture in the Indonesian 
archipelago. His own interpretations depart from those of previous, Western 
scholars, demonstrating both the flexibility of interpretation, and the sensitivity of 
material evidence to competing politicized readings (Soekmono 2007, 43). Both 
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scholars bring to the fore – explicitly in Liverani’s case, implicitly in Soekmono’s – the 
manner in which reading and interpretation can be powerful forces in shaping our 
understanding of pre- and ancient history, and its implications for modern life. 
Individual, subjective interpretations are not the only means by which the 
scholar can affect our reading of the historical and pre-historical past. On an abstract 
level, the application of modern theoretical constructions to the interpretation of 
ancient history is not, a priori, problematic. Indeed, the use of theoretical models to 
understand ancient history with or without the complementary evidence of 
archaeology and other social sciences is an idea that is developed at length in Neville 
Morley’s Theories, models and concepts in ancient history (Morley 2004). Morley 
discusses the often controversial application of theoretical models to analyses of 
Ancient Greece and Rome. He provides ample evidence of this occurrence in writings 
by scholars identified with both conservative and progressive political ideologies. 
Indeed, his exposition is clear and readily applicable, albeit restricted to traditional 
Anglo-American, French and German studies of the Classical World. Morley’s work is 
intended to be an introduction, rather than an exhaustive study of the historical and 
archaeological sciences the world over. As such, it is an apt starting point for any 
study that seeks to problematize both the writing of history in a particular time and 
place in the past, and this activity in its contemporary manifestations.       
 
Nationalist Archaeology, the State and Ideology 
 A passionate plea for reflexivity in order to forestall such personal biases in 
the analysis of archaeological data is found in Fowler’s work on nationalist uses of 
archaeology (Fowler 2008). The author employs three examples of nation-states’ 
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(Mexico, Britain and China) use and abuse of archaeology as a parable for 
contemporary archaeologists. Fowler’s choice of Aztec Mexico is puzzling, given the 
anachronism of applying the concept of the nation-state to a pre-Columbian polity. It 
nevertheless exemplifies the process of attributing national characteristics to pre-
modern communities, a frequent occurrence in Republican Turkish historiography. 
Although his case study of the People’s Republic of China is lacking in evidence of 
nationalist ideology, it does provide valuable insight into the manner in which 
archaeological findings can be massaged to legitimize government dogma. Fowler 
quotes Qian et al.’s explanation of recent findings as follows: “The sculpture of the 
Qin [dynasty] is wholly based on reality and draws its material from actual life. It 
reflects the spirit of the times of the First Emperor of Qin as he unified China with his 
powerful army, and it brings out a national style of lucidity and grandeur.” (Fowler 
2008, 114) It is easy to draw parallels between the praise for the presence of 
“reality” and “actual life” in Qin artwork and the contemporary aesthetic doctrine of 
Socialist Realism (Lahusen 1997, 5). Although Fowler fails to make the point 
explicitly, his quote highlights the manner in which archaeological work has been 
used to weave the values of the Maoist régime into the history and traditions of the 
Chinese masses. 
 A more pointed analysis of the (mis)use of archaeology and prehistory for 
political ends is conducted by Arnold in her work on the National Socialist régime’s 
appropriation of the discipline (Arnold 2008). She problematizes the cooperation and 
collusion of German pre-historians with the Nazi state, investigating both practical 
and theoretical issues surrounding the evolution of prehistory in Germany from the 
end of the First World War until 1945. Of particular interest are the questions that 
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Arnold raises regarding the degree to which symbiosis was established between a 
government seeking scientific support for its extreme views on racial supremacy and 
a discipline yearning for greater recognition and legitimacy among related historical 
sciences (Arnold 2008, 125–26). Her analysis deals largely with the presentation and 
interpretation of findings, rather than the methodologies and philosophies of 
contemporary archaeology, and is thus suitable as a springboard to the study of 
other examples of archaeology and prehistory conducted under totalitarian and 
similarly non-democratic, ideologically-driven régimes. This is of particular use in the 
study of both the Soviet Union and Republican Turkey, where archaeological findings 
were frequently utilized by the State as a propaganda tool for the legitimization of its 
historical, political and ideological agenda among the masses. 
 Recent scholarship on the display of Roman artefacts by the Italian state 
conducted by Arthurs (Arthurs 2007) adds further credence to the validity of 
querying the relationship between the disciplines of prehistory and archaeology, and 
the ideologues of the state. Arthurs tracks the evolution of the Mostra archeologica, 
a showcase of Roman artefacts organized by the Italian government, from its 
inception in 1911 to its re-emergence as the Mostra Augustea della Romanità in 
1937 and its post-WWII incarnation. His analysis allows for a comparative approach 
to the use of antiquity and archaeology as a tool of inculcating state ideology in 
Liberal, Fascist and post-War Liberal Democratic Italy. It is particularly instructive on 
the manner in which not just the explanation of the artefacts, but their exposition 
and organization were used as means of encouraging the adoption of ideologically-
tinged historical narratives. Arthurs explains how both the 1911 and 1937 exhibitions 
were part of a largely state-sponsored teleological framework that connected 
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Roman greatness, European civilization and the contemporary Italian state’s drive 
for modernity. The two events can also be used to contrast the respective ideological 
values adopted by the contemporary Italian state. In 1911, science and technology, 
whether found in Roman remains or in the advances of modern Italian archaeology, 
were on display (Arthurs 2007, 33–35). In 1937, on the other hand, uniformity, 
hygiene and martial virtue were all incorporated into the displays of Roman daily life, 
encouraging the view that the core values of Mussolini’s fascist régime had always 
been central to Roman, and therefore Italian, civilization (Arthurs 2007, 36). Similar 
to Arnold, Arthurs’ study provides a model framework with which to problematize 
attempts by the Turkish government to utilize archaeological remains from Anatolia 
to promote its own values of nationalism, laicism and loyalty to the state among its 
population, and to establish its inalienable right to the land of Asia Minor. 
 
Archaeology in Anatolia 
 Indeed, Tanyeri-Erdemir has explored similar lines of analysis of the use of 
archaeology and ancient history by the contemporary Turkish state during the 1920s 
and 1930s (Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006). Here, the author seeks to contextualize early 
Republican endeavours in the field of archaeology within a state-sponsored drive to 
encourage national pride and ethno-national self-identification. She makes particular 
usage of the concept of archaeology as a signifier of modern scientific and 
technological achievement. Unfortunately, in her zeal to demonstrate such 
phenomena, Tanyeri-Erdemir omits, grosso modo, the important contribution of 
German archaeologists and classicists to the development of Turkish social sciences 
and humanities, as well as assessments of the relevance or soundness of Turkish 
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scientific pursuits and scholarship according contemporary criteria (Tanyeri-Erdemir 
2006, 384–85). Indeed, the logical incongruence of claiming that the guiding 
principle of historical research in the 1930s, the Turkish History Thesis, was intended 
both to demonstrate the manner in which ancient civilizations had contributed to 
the creation of the Turkish nation and how the Turkish nation had been the origin of 
such civilizations (Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006, 382) casts doubt over the salience of 
Tanyeri-Erdemir’s conclusions.  
Nevertheless, the relevance of the study of ideological content in Turkish 
archaeology and ancient history remains intact thanks to the work of other scholars. 
These include Eisuke Tanaka, whose research has elucidated the complex 
relationship between the modern Turkish state and the ancient patrimony of 
Anatolia (Tanaka 2007). He explores the means by which Anatolianism, an 
intellectual construct that identified the modern Turkish nation with the historical 
development of Anatolia, has been manifested in the state’s adoption of all cultural 
patrimony present in the peninsula – whether created by ethnic Turks or not – as the 
heritage of the current population (Tanaka 2007, 67–68). Tanaka’s research provides 
an insight into conflicting concepts of locality, ethno-national identity and state that 
overlap in the official historical narrative of the Republic of Turkey.  
 
Archaeology, Anthropology, Race and History 
 The Turkish state was not the only one that sought to use the physical and 
human wealth of the Eastern Mediterranean to support its political claims. In her 
study of Greek concepts of nationhood, race and ethnicity, Sevasti Troumpeta tracks 
the manner in which ideas of belonging and the purity of the Greek people evolved 
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over time, from a loose collectivity based on faith to a racialized and deterministic 
conceptualization fuelled by eugenics (Troumpeta 2013). She describes in detail the 
delicacy of issues of miscegenation and assimilation, during the period when racial 
differences became more important for West European, and particularly German, 
scholars (Troumpeta 2013, 160–61). In this way, the difficulties of connecting the 
great civilizations attested by the ruins that dot the Peloponnese to the modern-day 
Hellenes are thoroughly documented and explained in her work. This exposition is 
important for the parallels that can be drawn with Turkish attempts at appropriating 
the physical patrimony of Anatolia. Moreover, it begs the question of what impact 
Greek efforts to document and classify the non-Greek populations of Asia Minor 
during the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922) might have had on Turkish imaginations 
of national belonging (Troumpeta 2013, 157–58). At the very least, Troumpeta’s 
study contextualizes Turkish historical narratives within a wider Balkan phenomenon 
of the use of ancient history for nationalist projects. 
 While all régimes might be accused of massaging or twisting narratives of 
pre- and ancient history to suit their own needs, the manner in which they do so 
varies in tandem with the ideology of the state. The state’s guiding principles affect 
the interpretation of all historical evidence, and it is to these various systems that I 
turn next.  
 
Nationalist Historiography 
 One of the most powerful concepts in the modern era to influence the 
formation of historical narratives has been the nation. It has also had a profound 
impact on the ordering of political thought, producing, among other results, the 
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ideology of nationalism. Similar to other political ideologies, nationalism has altered 
the manner in which history has been written and interpreted. The existence of two 
similar but distinct disciplines of national and nationalist historiography, then, begs 
the question of the nature and depth of the differences between the two.  
This topic is treated in detail by John Breuilly in his overview of the genesis of 
nationalist histories and their defining characteristics (Breuilly 2007). He tracks the 
emergence of national history from the 18th century as a new paradigm in which 
history was categorized according to national groupings. Historians became 
concerned with the manner in which wars, revolutions, agreements and other 
historical events were to be interpreted within the context of the nation, rather than 
a ruling dynasty or a complex of individuals. Breuilly lays particular emphasis on the 
fact that national histories become nationalist when the nation is elevated to a 
status above all other values and institutions present in a particular period and 
society (Breuilly 2007, 2–3).  
Breuilly’s analysis is particularly useful in its attempt to find common 
characteristics for all nationalist historiographies, a topic he takes up in a study 
published in 2009. In this later work, he explains that considerable differences exist 
between the civic-nationalist historiography inspired by the French Revolution and 
the culturally-based one that first emerged in Germany (Breuilly 2009, 10). He also 
clarifies that the importance of a people’s past in encouraging national 
consciousness and the forging of a sense of common destiny has allowed for 
historiography to be closely linked to nationalist political projects. This results in an 
inverse relationship between diversity in historical narratives and authoritarianism 
among the political élite (Breuilly 2009, 15). Such dominant models are taken up in 
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Stefan Berger’s nation-by-nation study of European historiographies (Berger 2009). 
Berger categorizes the various meta-narrratives according to their broad 
characteristics (victor nation vs. oppressed nation; proletarian nation vs. bourgeois 
nation; etc.), establishing a convenient framework within which the student of 
national histories might begin to compare and contrast competing accounts of 
historical events. 
 
The Nationalists according to the Marxists 
 A critique of the clean dividing lines drawn by scholars such as Breuilly is 
offered by the Hungarian historian Jenő Szűcs in his The Nation and History (Nemzet 
és Történelem) (Szűcs 1974). The work contains a number of essays on the concept 
of the nation and its historicity, with particular attention paid to France and 
Germany and the emergence of a proto-national consciousness in the Middle Ages. 
Its publication in Hungary during the Socialist period makes it especially useful, as 
Szűcs’ analysis of nationalist historiography is tinged with the dominant Marxist 
school of thought. According to Berger, this was often mixed with nationalist 
proclivities in the countries of Eastern Europe (Berger 2009, 31). Szűcs takes the 
modern origins and contingency of the nation as given, arguing that it is a Romantic 
concept that has been backdated by nationalist activists in order to motivate 
contemporary political movements (Szűcs 1974, 27). He also argues that all 
nationalist historiographies contain elements of both civic and cultural nationalism, 
with east-west differences a matter of proportion (Szűcs 1974, 30). Finally, he takes 
a critical look at the nationalisms of Eastern Europe in the inter-war period, and finds 
that where the concept of the nation as a political unit has failed to be popularized 
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and fully implemented, nationalist history will often be used to legitimize 
extraordinary political situations and restrictions on access to power (Szűcs 1974, 
38). Although Szűcs was writing about Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania, it is 
easy to extrapolate this insight to Turkey, where the birth of the Turkish History 
Thesis coincided with the beginning of the one-party period. 
 
Marxist Historiography 
 Similar to nationalist historiography, the analysis of Marxist historical theory 
must grapple with the existence of a plethora of schools and trends, as well as 
regionally-based differences. Of particular interest is the utilization of Marxist 
interpretations of history in agrarian and semi-industrialized non-European 
territories during the first half of the 20th century. Historians and other scholars from 
such peripheral regions struggled to reconcile the realities of their own existence 
with the precepts of a theory developed to explain the historical development of 
European societies. The result was highly nuanced interpretations of Marxist 
historical theory, some of which demonstrate a fusion of Marxist and nationalist 
principles.  
 Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Marxist historiography of non-
European societies was the Asian Mode of Production (AMP). The AMP was 
mentioned briefly by Marx as one stage of socio-economic development in his 1859 
writing (Fleischer 1973, 18). It was characterized by a hegemonic bureaucratic class 
allied to a despotic state, and a dominated class of peasants (Mommen 2011, 92). In 
his 1976 work on the controversy surrounding the AMP, Sawer provides a detailed 
and thorough account of the use and development of the concept in Russian and 
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Soviet circles, as well as its demise in the 1930s and its reappearance in the 1960s 
(Sawer 1979). His study is an exceptionally useful tool in understanding the origins of 
the Stalinist aversion to the AMP and the possibilities of its usage as a means of 
adapting Marxist historical models to non-European regions. Sawer’s concentration 
on the early years of the debate (1900 to 1937) is supplemented by later Soviet 
accounts that focus primarily on the rehabilitation of the theory in the 1960s 
(Nikiforov 1977). The AMP, however, was not the only problematic aspect of the 
application of Marxist ideas on history to non-European societies, as studies on 
attempts at creating Marxist histories of Asian peoples readily attest. 
 
East Asia: a Fusion of Marx and the Ancient Nation 
The historiographies of Korea and Japan from the period between the two 
World Wars provide telling examples of this attempt to make contemporary Marxist 
interpretations coalesce with nationalist ideas. Ki-jung Pang explores the efforts of 
Paek Nam’un, one of the founders of Korean Marxist historiography, to find such a 
balance (Pang 2005). He pays particular attention to the manner in which Nam’un 
charted a course between orthodox Marxist interpretations of the nation as a purely 
historical construct and contemporary Korean nationalist and Japanese colonialist 
historians, who sought to imbue the Korean nation with essentialist, and therefore 
anti-materialist, qualities (Pang 2005, 271). Nam’un’s solution was a reordering of 
the historical stages developed by Marx and Engels according to the evolution of 
Korean society, which he argued was an organic product of the cultural and 
economic processes documented in the Korean peninsula (Pang 2005, 278). Pang 
therefore provides a succinct introduction to the manner in which Korean Marxist 
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thought managed to preserve the notion of the historically constructed nation – 
crucial to Marxist interpretations of history – while adapting the Marxist stages of 
historical development to the idiosyncrasies of Korea’s evolution. 
 Periodization of historical development was not the only aspect of Marxist 
historical sciences that non-European writers and thinkers sought to reconfigure. 
Inter-war Japanese Marxist historians struggled with the concept of the nation and 
its historical formation, as this was a topic of prime interest for nationalist historians 
seeking to justify aggressive Imperial expansion. Gayle explores this aspect of 
Japanese Marxist thought as an introduction to his study of post-War Japanese 
Nationalism (Gayle 2002). He investigates these historians’ conceptualizations of the 
Japanese nation’s emergence in order to contrast this with post-War Marxist 
responses to Japanese Imperial nationalism. Gayle focuses on the manner in which 
left-wing Japanese intellectuals navigated the narrow straits between Marxist 
Orthodoxy on historically constructed nations and nationalist propaganda on the 
assimilation of non-Japanese Imperial subjects into the dominant culture. The 
Stalinist definition of a nation, therefore, was a welcome development for Japanese 
Marxists, as the presence of territoriality as an identifier of a nation – together with 
common language, economic life and psychological cast of mind – provided a ready-
made means of differentiation from the nationalists (Gayle 2002, 26–27). 
The author goes on to explain that racial homogeneity was also embraced as 
a significant variable explaining the development of national solidarity and 
communal identity amongst the Japanese in the feudal period, rather than the 
capitalist period when the state emerged as a strong national institution. This 
considerable departure from orthodox Marxist interpretations of the emergence of 
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the nation was a significant challenge to Imperial and nationalist theorizations of the 
state and nation as organically intertwined, and thus is further evidence of 
manipulations of Marxist theory in the face of highly contextualized confrontations 
(Gayle 2002, 31). Such theories provide counterexamples for both the Soviet Union, 
where the nation was believed to be a product of the capitalist age, and Turkey, 
where state-formation was seen as a defining characteristic of the Turkish nation 
(see (Kurat 1992; Merçil 1985; Turan 1980). More importantly, however, both the 
Korean and the Japanese cases demonstrate the much more delicate process of 
nativizing Marxist thought and praxis in societies profoundly different from that of 
Marx and Engels. These phenomena appeared throughout Eurasia, and will be seen 
quite clearly in primary literature produced in Central Asia in the 1920s.  
Pang and Gayle’s studies, therefore, provide an important point of contrast in 
comparing the practice of Marxist historiography inside and outside of the Soviet 
Union. Until the 1950s, the Soviet Union was the guiding light for Marxists on 
matters both practical and theoretical. This does not mean, however, that all Soviet 
interpretations were strictly Marxist, a fact made obvious by the ample scholarly 
work devoted to the study of the historical sciences in the Soviet Union.  
 
Soviet Historiography 
 Sovietology – the study of the Soviet Union – is a rich and multifaceted 
discipline that continues to capture the attention of scholars across the world. 
Within Sovietology, the study of national minorities (i.e. the non-Russians) is a 
particularly active field, spurred both by academic interests and the presence of 
diaspora organizations in Western Europe, North America and Israel. While work on 
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nationalities (национальности) often focuses on their political and socio-economic 
status within the Soviet Union, inter-ethnic relations, and dissent, a number of 
scholars have also written on Soviet historiography of the national minorities. 
Among other subjects, the political history of the absorption of these groups’ 
territories into the Russian Empire and/or the Soviet Union has produced much 
scholarly output. The spectrum of topics is a reflection of the diversity of motivations 
for the study of such historiographies: while some authors are interested in the 
nexus of Marxist historical sciences and Russian colonialism, others seek to 
comprehend better the manifestations of national identity and belonging that have 
emerged in the successor states of the various Soviet Republics. The result has been 
an exceptionally diversified set of hypotheses on and expositions of the manner in 
which centralized institutions of power in the Soviet Union shaped and directed the 
emergence of contemporary identities over the course of its history. 
 
The Friendship of Peoples 
The impact of the Friendship of Peoples – the late-Stalinist ideology that 
stressed historical harmony and mutual assistance between the peoples of the 
Soviet Union – on Soviet historiography has been thoroughly examined by Lowell 
Tillett (Tillett 1969). Tillett provides considerable background on nationalities policy 
and minority historiography from the inception of the Soviet Union until the 1960s, 
despite the fact that his main period of interest begins in 1947. His analysis is not 
strictly chronological, and neither does it focus on one particular national 
historiography, although the lion’s share of the first half of the book is devoted to 
the North Caucasus and Kazakhstan. Rather, he selects specific episodes in the 
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evolution of the historical sciences in the Soviet Union and uses them as case 
studies, correlating the changes in official nationalities policy with controversies in 
scholarly attempts to write national histories for the non-Russian peoples of the 
USSR. Tillett’s work is a product of its time, and bears the hallmarks of the 
ideological biases of the Cold War (Suny 2011, 8–9): Party bosses are boorish and 
conniving; historians who refuse to toe the Party line are heroic or, failing that, 
martyrs to scientific integrity; and compliant historians are nothing more than Party 
hacks. Many of the case studies address the historiography of national heroes and 
episodes of rebellion or insurrection from the 18th century onward, and Tillett does 
not question why some historians chose to defy official Communist Party ideology 
and lionize the insurgents. Despite this, his accounts of the historical sciences in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as the wealth of resources used for his study, 
provide invaluable guidance in the field of Soviet historiography of the Turkic 
peoples. 
Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush’s work on Muslim nationalism 
in the early decades of the Soviet Union can be interpreted in the same way. 
Bennigsen and Wimbush relied on the writings of Sultan Galiev, the Tatar Muslim 
Communist, as well as those of Kazakh, Crimean Tatar and Azeri figures from the first 
half of the 20th century, to provide an overview of the ideology and political 
programs of Turkic intellectuals who survived the Revolution and Civil War and 
remained in the Soviet Union after the Bolsheviks’ consolidation of power 
(Bennigsen 1979). The account, however, exemplifies the monumental changes 
witnessed in Sovietology and historiography since it was written nearly forty years 
ago. To begin with, the authors do not seek to explain the nuances and evolution of 
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Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist doctrine on the issue of nationality, and thereby fail to 
educate the reader on the manner in which both Lenin and Stalin saw class, social 
organization and ethnicity as overlapping in the production of nations (Bennigsen 
1979, 11). As a result, their study is overtly biased against Soviet theorists, making it 
difficult to discriminate between aspects of theory and failings of practice. Secondly, 
their understanding of the nation does not take into consideration the complex 
approach now employed by historians, ethnologists, political scientists and 
anthropologists. By taking for granted the existence and self-consciousness of Tatar, 
Kazakh, Bashkir and other national groups, they do not problematize the crucial role 
that Muslim intellectuals played in shaping such identities, particularly through the 
usage of historical narratives. Similar issues arise in the scholarship of Dumont, a 
Cold War predecessor of James Meyers, who investigated pre-Soviet Muslim Turkic 
writings, albeit with a heavy reliance on works available outside of the Soviet Union 
– most notably Turkey – rather than those from Soviet Turkic spaces themselves 
(Dumont 1974).  
 
A Soviet View of Soviet Historiography 
 In contrast to Tilett’s and Bennigsen and Wimbush’ thematic and critical 
approach, Kulagina and Kuznetsova, in their review of fifty years of oriental studies 
in the Soviet Union, analyze the development of this branch of the social sciences 
from a strictly chronological point of view (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970). Their 
study is meant to provide an overview of the establishment and consolidation of 
Soviet research on the “peoples of the East”, including the Caucasus, Central Asia 
and Siberia. Much of the work reads as if it were an inventory of organizational 
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changes within the Institute of Oriental Studies, or of the reports published between 
1917 and 1967, but there are crucial elements of criticism that can be gleaned from 
the chapters on the 1920s and 1930s. The authors attack the output of the period 
from a methodological point of view, criticizing particular scholars or groups of 
scholars for the unsound assumptions and hypotheses on which they base their 
research. These episodes of disapproval, however, neatly coincide with the 
politically- and ideologically-motivated purges described by Tillett. Although the 
influence of Pokrovskii, the leading Soviet historian of the 1920s, is not mentioned, 
both Barthol’d and Marr are subjected to criticism, the former for his opposition to 
the centralization and agglomeration of the various branches of oriental studies 
(Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 54), and the latter for his unscientific hypotheses on 
the formation of languages (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 58–59). Similarly, the 
scholars of the 1930s are singled out for their “ignorance” of Asian history and for 
their “insufficient assimilation” of Marxist theory, particularly the Asian Mode of 
Production (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 98). The authors’ criticism provides 
important evidence of the fact that, long after the end of Stalinism, contemporary 
writings continued to be considered anathema to official Soviet policy on the history 
and identity of the peoples of Soviet Union.  
 Such criticism of the histories that were written in the inter-war years 
continued well into the 1980s. This was the decade when Glasnost and Perestroika, 
the movements credited by some Sovietologists with the ultimate demise of the 
USSR, were creating spaces in which the ideology of the state could be contested 
openly. Nevertheless, historiographical works on Central Asia continued to deny the 
validity or acceptability of histories produced during the height of Stalinism. In his 
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review of Soviet Kazakh historiography (Nusupbekov 1989), Nusupbekov pays scant 
attention to these historians, except for a short explanation of their cardinal sins. His 
criticism is important for confirming that the most serious transgression involved the 
lionization of the “Warrior-khans” at the expense of the masses (Nusupbekov 1989, 
324–25), but clarifies little else. He makes specific mention of the histories written 
by Chuloshnikov in the 1920s (but not his critic, Tynyshpaev), and of Asfendiiarov in 
the 1930s (but not his execution for alleged pan-Turkist sympathies in 1938), while 
also recounting the compilation of the History of the Kazakh SSR by Pankratova et al. 
during the early 1940s. Apart from the misuse of local archives by Pankratova and 
her colleagues, Nusupbekov leaves his reader with few details on the theories, 
hypotheses and discoveries of nearly three decades of Soviet historiography of 
Central Asia (Nusupbekov 1989, 334–35).  
In contrast to Nusupbekov, Kozybaev engages in a franker discussion of the 
reasons for the suppression of non-canonical history texts and uncooperative 
historians in his historiography of Kazakhstan, published immediately following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (Kozybaev 1992). He conducts a detailed analysis of the 
implantation and growth of Soviet historical sciences in the Kazakh SSR from the 
post-Civil War years until the 1980s, providing ample statistics on the blossoming 
and transformation of the Academy system in the Republic. With respect to the 
1930s, archival materials had still yet to surface regarding the extent of suppression 
and denial perpetrated by Stalinist officials. Nonetheless, the author problematizes 
the study of nationalist movements and histories during this period. Kozybaev thus 
transforms a significant gap in the understand of Soviet Kazakh historiography into a 
passionate plea for a more critical investigation of history-writing under Stalin 
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(Kozybaev 1992, 19). It is precisely this call that was heeded by the historiographers 
of the newly independent republics of Central Asia. 
 
Central Asian Historiography 
Since the end of the Cold War, scholars of the historiography of the Soviet 
Turkic peoples have generally benefitted from greater access to Soviet archives (see 
Rittersporn 2004; Khlevniuk 2004), as well as regional sources of information in both 
Russian and Turkic languages. Some scholarship has sought to track the evolution of 
the Friendship of Peoples and Soviet historiography into the post-Soviet period 
((Akiner 1995); (Lowe 2003); and (Kudaibergenova 2013)), providing a long-term 
historical perspective on the establishment of national histories. Others have 
focused on the Soviet historical sciences during the 1940s and 1950s, including 
studies devoted to histories on Kazakh national heroes ((Kendirbaeva 1999); (Fruchet 
2003), (Yilmaz 2013a)), or on issues of ethnogenesis and the boundaries of national 
identity ((Subtelny 1994); (Auezova 2011); (Yilmaz 2013b); (Abashin 2014)). 
Knowledge of Central Asian languages among Western scholars is still not 
widespread, and thus there is a marked tendency among authors such as Lowe, 
Fruchet and others to rely on resources in Western European languages or, 
occasionally, in Russian. In contrast, authors with access to such material, such as 
Auezova, Meyers, Sabol, Subtelny and Yilmaz, have opened up new vistas in 
understanding the effects of Stalinist nationality and educational policies on the 
elaboration of histories of the Soviet Turkic peoples. The sharing of such research 
has been facilitated by a number of conferences that bring together scholars from 
disparate academies, such as that held by the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul 
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in 2015 (Nilsson Schlyter 2014). And all researchers have, in many ways, purged the 
discipline of some of the more overt ideological biases present in Tillett’s work. 
 In order to explore these trends, I will look specifically at the literature on 
two different former Soviet spaces: Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. 
 
Kazakhstan 
 As intimated in the section on Tilett, and as shall be seen in the primary 
materials, Kazakhstan was a rich terrain for Soviet historians, and is thus a profitable 
object of investigation for contemporary historiographers. Auezova’s study, entitled 
Conceiving a people’s history: The 1920-1936 discourse on the Kazakh past (Auezova 
2011), provides a detailed overview of three histories of the Kazakhs written 
between 1920 and 1936. Unlike Tillett, whose work focused on histories of the 
relationship between Russians and national minorities, and among the national 
minorities themselves, Auezova investigates a wider spectrum of scholarship dealing 
both with the formation of the Kazakh ethnos and the relations of Kazakhs with 
neighbouring peoples. Her analysis centres on the writings of three particular 
historians (Chuloshnikov, Tynyshpaev and Asfendiiarov), with an emphasis on the 
differences between indigenous and Russian historiographies. She brings to light the 
degree of diversity that existed during the 1920s and 1930s, particularly with respect 
to the manner in which history was conceived (dynastic vs. popular, written vs. oral, 
Western vs. traditional methodologies) and thereby provides a background against 
which the post-1936 elimination of plurality and initiative can be judged.  
When Auezova’s research is combined with the work of other scholars who 
study the period, a clear picture of Kazakh intellectual development emerges. In 
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particular, Kendirbaeva provides a crucial view of the evolution of national identity 
movements among Kazakh intellectuals in the half century immediately preceding 
the October Revolution (Kendirbaeva 1999). Although a considerable portion of her 
paper focuses on literary and educational trends in post-1905 Kazakhstan, her 
descriptions of competing secular-nationalist and religious-nationalist groupings are 
invaluable in explaining the development of Kazakh historical narratives in the 1920s 
and 1930s. They also aid in understanding the relationship between Kazakh 
intellectuals and other Turkic peoples during the Tsarist constitutional period and 
the first years following the February 1917 revolution (Kendirbaeva 1999, 6–16). 
Kendirbaeva’s anachronism of attributing a widespread national identity among the 
19th century Kazakhs and her failure to discuss the limited reach of intellectuals 
during the period are addressed by Steven Sabol in his study of Kazakh national 
consciousness (Sabol 2003). Sabol provides a succinct overview of the structure of 
19th century Kazakh society and the impact of Russian colonization on the Kazakhs, 
before investigating the lives and contributions of three turn-of-the-century Kazakh 
intellectuals. His research is largely pertinent to the pre-Revolutionary period, but it 
does elucidate greatly the intellectual climate of the region at the onset of Soviet 
hegemony. Together, Kendirbaeva and Sabol describe in detail the notions of 
identity within the nationalist Alash Orda movement, and the schools of thought 
that competed with Marxism in 1920s Kazakhstan. 
 
The Great Patriotic War and Kazakh History 
At the other end of the time frame in question, Stalinism and its nefarious 
effects on intellectual life in the late 1930s and early 1940s have provided another 
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rich nexus of study for Sovietologists and historians. Within this, the issue of 
rehabilitation of Soviet figures and responsibility for Soviet rule is often a critical 
component of current Central Asian historiography, especially when addressing the 
works of Soviet-era historians and their validity in the study of Central Asia's past. In 
his study of the 1943 History of Kazakhstan (Yilmaz 2012), Yilmaz addresses the 
rehabilitation of the First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party, Zhumabai 
Shaiakhmetov, by the government of the independent Republic of Kazakhstan. This 
posthumous revival of Shaiakhmetov’s reputation is based in part on his role in the 
compilation of the 1943 history of the Kazakh SSR and the protection he extended to 
Kazakh historians in the face of Moscow's displeasure with their writings. Yilmaz 
provides an in-depth view of the socio-political environment present in Kazakhstan 
during the Second World War, and the importance afforded to Kazakh history by 
Soviet authorities in their agitprop efforts. Nevertheless, the stinging indictment of 
Shaiakhmetov that he promises in the introduction is lacking in bite and appears to 
condemn him more by the absence of evidence of his involvement than by any sort 
of exposition of his meddling in the compilation of a historical narrative (Yilmaz 
2012, 414). Yilmaz's analysis, therefore, provides the reader with a view of the war-
time trends discussed by Tillett that includes a broader consideration of the nexus 
between history and propaganda throughout Kazakh society. It fails, however, to 
elucidate the degree to which the Marxist, nationalist or other ideological 
convictions of particular actors or groups might have influenced the content of the 
work or the interpretation of Kazakh history. 
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Azerbaijan 
 Such convictions are on full display in Yilmaz’s analysis of the 1937 history of 
Azerbaijan, written at the height of the Stalinist purges (Yilmaz 2013b). Here, the 
author tracks the evolution of both a national consciousness and ethnonym for the 
Turkic people of Azerbaijan from the final days of the Ottoman Empire until the 
height of the Stalinist period. Yilmaz explores the influence of the emerging nation-
state idea in both Turkey and Iran in the 1920s and 1930s on Azeri and Soviet 
concepts of national identity. He ties these into a broader Soviet dynamic in which 
the historical and linguistic sciences gradually came to fall under the tight grip of the 
Stalinist bureaucracy. He queries the influence of Nazi Germany in Turkey and Iran as 
a motivation for Soviet attempts to distance the Azeris from both countries. Yilmaz, 
however, ultimately decides on the application of the Stalinist concept of the nation, 
in which territoriality is a defining aspect of nationhood, as the main driver in the 
adoption of the 1937 thesis that linked the Azeri people to the Medes (Yilmaz 2013b, 
527). He sees competition with the Armenians and Georgians over claims to the 
resources of the Caucasus as a key factor in this decision, but given the role of exiled 
Russian Turkic intellectuals in the composition of the Turkish History Thesis, it is 
difficult not to inquire on the importance of Turkish developments in the formation 
of the 1937 thesis of Azeri ethnogenesis. 
 In 2015, Yilmaz returned with a comprehensive volume that incorporated all 
of these theses and areas of interest, as well as comparative material regarding 
Ukrainian historiography. Although this expanded scope of interest allows for the 
construction of a pan-Soviet dynamic, little new information regarding Turkic 
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historiography is added to the work; neither does it provide more in-depth analysis 
of the interplay of Stalinist ideas and the praxis of history-writing (Yilmaz 2015).  
 
Broader Trends 
Other scholars in both the former Soviet space and the old Atlantic Treaty 
countries have continued to deepen their approaches to Soviet Central Asian history 
writing. Among the most prolific is Al’frid Bustanov, a student of Michael Kemper, 
whose interests are wide and varied. Bustanov has provided us with views of the 
dynamics operating in the centre, particularly with respect to the division of labour 
between Leningrad and Moscow (Bustanov 2015), as well as the changes underwent 
in the academies of the individual republics – specifically Kazakhstan – over the 
course of Soviet hegemony (Bustanov 2017). Bustanov’s work is an important 
contribution to the field, and an invaluable guide for the present project. 
Nonetheless, his concern for the long-term, as well as his particular interest in the 
internal politics of the academy, rather than the interplay of ideology and history 
writing, marks his scholarly pursuits as belonging to a related, although distinct, 
discipline from the current one.  
Scholars are also expanding their interests beyond simply academic 
historiography in order to apply the methods of post-modern historical investigation 
to Central Asia as well. Dadabaev, in particular, has been keen to utilize oral history 
methods in investigating the Soviet past in Central Asia. In the process, he has 
uncovered fascinating results about respondents’ attitudes towards the 
historiography and identity formation dynamics of the Stalinist period, as well as 
their own relations to academic subjects in Russian versus their native langauges 
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(Dadabaev 2014). Others, such as Emre Gürbüz (Gürbüz 2014) and Gasimov 
(Gasimov 2014) address changes in post-independence Turkic historiography, with 
copious reference to the texts and processes of the Soviet period. Language and 
history in contemporary Uzbekistan are investigated by Schlyter (Nilsson Schlyter 
2014), while their complex interaction in the Qing Empire, with specific reference to 
Uyghur communities, is taken up by Schluessel (Schluessel 2014).  
Other researchers have touched on historiography through problematizing 
other aspects of early Soviet society. Arne Haugen’s insightful study of the division of 
Central Asia into national republics is a prime example of this. Although he is most 
interested in the contemporary political dynamics of territorial division, he 
necessarily explores as well the conditions necessitating the elaboration of national 
histories (Haugen 2003). To this we may add the work of Marianne Kamp on women 
and nation-formation in Uzbekistan in the 1920s (Kamp 2007); Adeeb Khalid’s 
scholarship on the dynamics of Empire in early Soviet Central Asia (Khalid 2006); as 
well as Lynn Edgar’s comprehensive and incisive study of nation-building in 
Turkmenistan in the same period (Edgar 2006). 
Indeed, Breuilly’s own observation that each nation-state feels the need to 
demarcate its own history, no matter how short or long a period of political 
independence it has experienced (Breuilly 2007, 8), reflects the post-1991 explosion 
in studies on all the Turkic republics and federal subjects within the Russian 
Federation. In the case of Turkey, the field might not have widened, but it has 
indeed deepened over the last thirty years. It is to this that we now turn as the final 
stage on our tour of secondary literature.  
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Turkish Historiography 
Since the return to full electoral democracy in Turkey at the end of the 1980s, 
there has been an increased interest in the writing of the past. In part, this has been 
spurred by an opening inside Turkey itself, allowing for greater critical analysis of the 
late Ottoman and early Republican periods. Authors have taken new tracks in 
approaching the seminal texts – often forgotten or neglected – of Turkish national 
consciousness. Among these, Umut Uzer has provided us with a much-needed 
updated look at the genesis of Turkish nationalism and Turkism, along lines similar to 
those of Jacob Landau (Uzer 2016). His An Intellectual History of Turkish Nationalism 
gives to us an in-depth view to the writings and activities of some of the greatest 
names in Turkish intellectual life, including Namık Kemal, Yusuf Akçura (Uzer 2016, 
56–63), Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Ziya Gökalp (Uzer 2016, 63–91). Uzer does so, however, 
more in the vein of political histories rather than historiography, tracking the 
infusion of Turkish political life with nationalist rhetoric and ideas, rather than 
problematizing those ideas and their usage by the very authors Uzer investigates. A 
more detailed analysis of Gökalp’s transition from Islamist to Turkist, and his views 
on the belonging of Turks within European civilizational frameworks, is provided by 
other scholars, including Mehmet Kaan Çalen. Çalen’s most recent publication, “Yeni 
Hayat”tan “Millî Hayat”a, Intihardan Terkîbe Ziya Gökalp (Ziya Gökalp from “Yeni 
Hayat” to “Milli Hayat” and from Suicide to Synthesis) explores this development and 
the importance of the transition from an imperial system to the world of nation-
States in Gökalp’s thinking (Çalen 2016). 
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Behar on the Influence of the State 
 Most important for the current study, however, is Büşra Ersanlı Behar’s 
comprehensive and critical analysis of the Turkish History Thesis, İktidar ve Tarih: 
Türkiye’de “resmi tarih” tezinin oluşumu 1929-1937 (Behar 1992). The first section of 
her work is a thorough examination of the philosophical and ideological influences 
that shaped Ottoman and early Republican historical sciences, with a particular 
emphasis on Romanticism, Positivism and German Historicism. Behar then provides 
her readers with an overview of the first history textbooks of the Republic and a 
detailed account of the proceedings of the First Turkish Historical Congress. She 
stresses the opposition of historians to the state’s leadership in the establishment of 
a historical narrative, and the gradual suppression of dissent in academic circles. Her 
work also asserts the continued influence of the Russian Turkic nationalist debates of 
the period 1905-1917 on Turkish historical sciences in the 1930s. Ersanlı’s 
conclusions focus largely on the nefarious effects of political repression and the 
state’s dominance in the public sphere on the content and robustness of Turkish 
history. Nevertheless, her critical examination of the emergence of a thoroughly 
Republican historical narrative, and its inclusion in school texts and curricula, 
provides an invaluable resource for the study of Turkish historiography as a whole 
and the Turkish History Thesis in particular.  
 
Turkish History in Context 
 Étienne Copeaux follows Behar’s general line by problematizing Turkish 
historiography within the context of history textbook production in the Republican 
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period (Copeaux 1997). His study admits a broader range of topics than just the 
Turkish History Thesis, and a longer time period, than does Behar’s, and thus does 
not provide as detailed an analysis of the socio-political and ideological context in 
which Republican historiography came into being. Nevertheless, his outsider’s view 
of Turkish historical sciences allows for a positioning of the discipline’s dynamics 
within regional trends, particularly in comparison to the development of a new 
interest in Turkic history in the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s (Copeaux 
1997, 49). Such comparative explorations create a valuable framework for 
comprehending the evolution of Turkish historiography in the face of innovations in 
a variety of European scholarly circles, especially the work of the Swiss 
anthropologist Eugène Pittard and the Russian Turkologist V. V. Bartol’d (Copeaux 
1997, 52–67). This discussion also highlights contemporary Turkish views on sources 
perceived as influenced by Marxist, fascist or other European ideologies. 
As Behar and Copeaux both make clear, the Turkish History Thesis was largely 
based upon European sources, but its formulation and enunciation were entirely in 
the hands of Turkish and Turkic thinkers. One influential intellectual to be involved in 
this process was the Azeri Ahmet Ağaoğlu, whose ideas on the Turkish nation and its 
historicity are thoroughly treated in two studies. Gülseren Akalın contextualizes 
Ağaoğlu’s writings on Turkish nationalism within broader intellectual trends before 
and after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 (Akalın 2004). She 
describes how race and religion were both of key importance for Ağaoğlu’s definition 
of the nation in his earlier works (Akalın 2004, 69), establishing a point of contrast 
for later conceptualizations analyzed in a paper by Can Erimtan (Erimtan 2008). 
Erimtan tracks Ağaoğlu’s early intellectual development in Russia and Paris before 
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focusing on his shift of interest to the Turks of Anatolia around 1920. Of greatest 
importance to the current study, he dissects Ağaoğlu’s Pontos Meselesi (The Pontos 
Question), a historical tract written in support of Ankara’s claims to sovereignty over 
Anatolia based on the history of the Turkish nation. As such, Erimtan highlights the 
Azeri’s decision to drop religion from his defining characteristics of the nation, 
focusing on race and language instead, and his appropriation of the Hittite 
civilization, which would become part of the Turkish Historical Thesis and state 
dogma in the 1930s (Erimtan 2008, 164–65).   
 
A Nietzschean View of Turkish Historiography 
 The production of official history theses and history texts for state-run 
mandatory education places the state directly into the creation of historical 
discourse. A Nietzschean analysis of the role and motivation of the state in such 
endeavours is the focus of a study conducted by Edward Webb, who seeks to explain 
ninety years of Republican Turkish historiography through the categorization of 
history established by Friedrich Nietzsche (Webb 2011). Nietzsche identified four 
different approaches to non-scientific (i.e. value-laden) history employed by both 
individuals and states: monumental, antiquarian, critical and amnesiac. His analysis 
is useful in its abstraction away from specific interpretations of historical events or 
trends towards an understanding of the ideological motivations of the state in 
concentrating on some aspects of Turkish history, while ignoring others.  
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Alternatives to the Turkish History Thesis 
This does not imply, however, that the historical sciences were completely 
dominated by the state and its agents early on in the history of Turkish Republic. 
Behar described in detail the opposition of some members of the establishment 
towards the dominant themes of the Turkish History Thesis, and a short monograph 
by Frank Tachau provides further evidence of alternative nationalist histories that 
rejected the emphasis on Central Asian origins (Tachau 1963). Tachau’s discussion of 
early versions of Anadoluculuk, or Anatolianism¸ which partially eschewed Ziya 
Gökalp’s concept of nation through education by emphasizing connection to a 
territorial Fatherland, demonstrates the existence of nationalist currents opposed to 
the focus on Central Asian ethnogenesis. The group’s concentration on Seljuk 
Anatolia as the locus of emergence of an “Anatolian nation” and its insistence that 
“Turk” referred to a race rather than a nation, establishes the existence of 
alternative visions of national identity in the intellectual milieu of the 1920s (Tachau 
1963, 167). When combined with the persistence of pan-Turkist statements by 
prominent members of the Turkish Hearths as late as 1927 (Tachau 1963, 171), this 
more complete view of the Turkish historical sciences encourages further study of 
the motivations of the Turkish History Thesis’ architects in their decision to pursue a 
historical narrative predicated on the emergence of a Turkish nation in Central Asia, 
when alternative currents, including those that would eventually be adopted in the 
1940s and 1950s (Tanaka 2007, 68), were readily available. 
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A Lone Comparison 
The literature on both Soviet and Turkish historiographies is not lacking 
entirely in comparative approaches. One work, in particular, has addressed the 
similarities and differences between the Turkish and Uzbek cases of national history 
writing in the 1920s and 1930s (Segars 2003). Segars investigates the use of both 
language and national history as a means of creating and encouraging national 
consciousness. His work, however, suffers from a lack of any local-language sources 
from either Central Asia or Turkey. Moreover, Segars fails to touch upon 
contemporary debates and scholarship on the nature of modernization and 
nationalist trends in both the late Ottoman period and the first decades of the 
Turkish Republic. One wonders, therefore, how he comes to the conclusion that 
“[t]he Turkish History Thesis sought to provide a clear distinction between the Turks 
of Anatolia and Turks elsewhere, in an attempt to forestall the growth of pan-Turkic 
sentiment” (Segars 2003, 89–90) without having read contemporary work on the 
Thesis or Turkish government pronouncements on educational policies. 
Nevertheless, the author’s work does provide a convincing basis for further study of 
the indigenous and imported intellectual trends that led to the enunciation of the 
first national histories in both Turkey and Central Asia. 
 
Thus, we come to the end of a brief overview of the secondary literature pertinent 
to my comparative study. It should now be evident that such a multidisciplinary 
approach requires the construction of a new space bounded by definitions and 
concepts created and expanded upon within a broad set of, at times, disparate 
scholarly fields. With this in mind, we now pass to the creation of such a space 
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through an examination of linguistics, archaeology, anthropology, and their 
politicized interactions throughout the 20th century.   
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History, Language and Archaeology 
The interactions of history, language and archaeology have been complicated 
and troubled since the various disciplines emerged. At times, scholars have clashed 
over their interpretations of the past. On other occasions, contrived interdisciplinary 
research in the interests of legitimizing non-academic hypotheses and theories left 
the practitioners of the historical sciences wary of closer cooperation (Blench 1997, 
3). This does not mean, however, that such cross-boundary studies are without 
value. In fact, in recent decades, the breakdown of paradigms dominant in linguistics 
through much of the late 20th century has allowed for greater investigation of the 
pre-history of language. In order to broaden their scope of analysis, scholars 
engaged in such projects have relied on other fields of the social sciences, 
humanities and natural sciences (Robins 1989, 396–401). Once these studies are 
divorced from the nefarious aspects of extremist political thought, they can excite 
great interest among researchers reopening century-long polemics, including those 
involved in the debate around monogenism (a single origin for the human species) 
and polygenism (Bouissac 1997, 53–54). 
This chapter is intended to be a compass, a means of locating my own study, 
and our wider academic community, along the coordinates of time and space within 
our contemporary plane of scholarly production. In it, I will investigate the broad 
links established between the disciplines of linguistics, archaeology and 
anthropology throughout the twentieth century, as well as the milestones of change 
and evolution in the same period. In order to do this, I will begin with linguistics, 
perhaps one of the most important disciplines for both Turkish and Soviet 
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historiographies, followed by archaeology and anthropology. I will end at a case 
study based on Biblical studies in the eastern Mediterranean region. The course of 
the linguistics section is determined, in large part, thematically, while those on 
archaeology and anthropology, as well as the case study, are chronological.  All 
sections depart at some point from these schema, as is appropriate for further 
explanation of particular topics. The purpose of the chapter is to contextualize my 
problematization of Turkish and Soviet studies the origins of the Central Asians. 
Rather than provide an exhaustive review of these developments, I will instead 
highlight trends in the convergence and divergence of the various epistemologies, as 
well as past and present questions regarding such approaches. In doing so, I will use 
several questions as heuristics: What is the goal of employing a cross-disciplinary 
methodology? Are intra-disciplinary projects less prone to political and ideological 
interference than inter-disciplinary ones? Are the disciplines nothing more than 
artificial categories that have been constructed for political purposes, or are they 
philosophically and universally meaningful? It seems fitting, given the semantic and 
socio-linguistic implications of this last question, to take historical linguistics as the 
starting point of my journey. 
 
Language and Proto-Language 
 Beyond issues of the origin and development of the human species, studies 
of proto-languages – the ancestors of the languages and lects spoken today – can 
provide valuable information about the lives and societies of people prior to the 
advent of writing. If we assume that the corpus of words that makes up a language’s 
lexicon reflects the environment within which its speakers live, we can then 
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extrapolate from a core hypothesized vocabulary towards the living conditions of 
such peoples (Pejros 1997, 149–50). This assumption, however, is a controversial 
one, a direct challenge to Chomskian arguments about the universality of language 
(Blench 1997, 19). Cultural reconstructions based on hypothetical proto-languages 
are attacked on the basis of more than just theory. On the most basic level, 
reconstructions cannot take into account the diversity in both language and culture 
that might have existed at any given point in time (Pejros 1997, 149). If multiple 
dialects of a given language exist today, why would they not have done so in the 
past? A dearth of evidence, moreover, implies that such constructions are based on 
small linguistic samples at best. The absence of lexical elements pertaining to 
specific activities – whether social, economic, political or religious – does not 
necessarily mean that these activities were not practiced in a given society. In the 
past, such limitations have not prohibited linguists or anthropologists from arriving 
at such conclusions (Pejros 1997, 153). In spite of all of these drawbacks, it is widely 
accepted that paleolinguistics – the study of languages in the remote past – can 
provide innovative approaches to prehistory when combined with the data of other 
disciplines. 
 
Language, Land and Culture 
 It is important to stress that while contemporary historical linguistics 
recognizes that a connection between the speakers of a language and a particular 
territory can be made, the establishment of similar connections between the 
material culture of a region and a linguistic community remains beyond the frontier 
of current possibilities. In other words, historical linguists, working in conjunction 
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with paleobotanists, geographers and other social and physical scientists, can 
determine whence a group of speakers originated and some of the characteristics of 
their society (basic familial and social relations, dress, food, economic activity). They 
cannot, however, specify that the material remains of a culture unearthed by 
archaeologists were left by a specific language community. This is true even when 
they have proven that such a community originated from the same region as the 
particular remains (Pejros 1997, 156–57). Such caution was not always exhibited by 
linguists, archaeologists, or anthropologists, and the history of the development of 
these disciplines is dotted with examples of what now appears to be egregious 
extrapolation. 
 In the following chapters, then, there are two broad issues related to 
historical or paleo-linguistics and the writing of historical narratives that I will 
highlight. The first regards attempts at identifying homelands and territories of 
ethno-linguistic genesis. As Viktor Shnirelman has pointed out, these can be 
delineated through the usage of comparative historical linguistic studies of the 
names of flora and fauna, albeit in conjunction with material evidence supporting 
any hypotheses. Scholars must tread cautiously in this endeavour, however, as only 
generic terms for plants and animals can be identified. Even these may be 
misleading, as the process of semantic shift implies that the names of plants in the 
original homeland may be applied to unfamiliar subspecies or species encountered 
in areas of migration (V. Shnirelman 1997, 162–63). One need only consider the use 
of the word robin for a variety of different subspecies around the world to see 
modern examples of this phenomenon.  
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The second issue concerns mass movements of peoples and language 
acquisition or loss. Once the tenuous connection between proto-language and 
ethnicity is recognized, the capacity of peoples to retain the lects of their forbearers, 
as well as the decision to adopt new languages, become concepts of great 
importance in the use of historical linguistics to reconstruct the past. For languages 
that have been carried great distances from their original homelands – including the 
Turkic languages – contact with new peoples and idioms is inevitable. Such 
interactions lead to intensive language borrowings or the complete absorption of 
linguistic groups. If these occur early enough, determination of substrata (the 
language originally spoken by a community) versus superstrata (the new language 
encountered by a group) and the genetic relationships between seemingly distinct 
communities can become exceedingly difficult to determine (Fortescue 1998, 2–3). 
 
Ecologies and Economies of Language 
 In both concerns, the natural environment plays an important role. With 
respect to the location of a linguistic homeland, knowledge of flora and fauna, as 
well as ecological changes, is crucial to correlating proto-language elements with 
specific climatic zones and regions. Given the length of time involved in 
reconstructions of proto-languages – occasionally ten or fifteen millennia – such 
information is gleaned from more than just botanical and zoological studies. The 
fundamental changes to the earth’s landscape and climate during and since the Ice 
Age require that archaeological and paleological data be consulted in order to 
confirm the likelihood that specific species inhabited particular regions, and that 
particular economic activities, such as hunting, gathering, fishing and sedentary 
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agriculture, were possible in a given climatic zone (Renfrew 1987, 120–44; Campbell 
and Poser 2008, 332; Fortescue 1998, 204–42).  
 The natural environment, however, is important for more than just the 
knowledge that it provides about the location of linguistic genesis. Landscape and 
climate are crucial factors in determining the probabilities of contact and interaction 
between different linguistic groups. Ecological change can also be interpreted as a 
push factor for the migration of large groups of people out of their regions of 
habitation. In the past, models based on the hypothesized movements of the Indo-
European and Semitic peoples were blindly applied to other proposed proto-
linguistic communities, thereby influencing concepts of genetic or areal relationships 
among the languages of Africa, Asia and the Americas (Fortescue 1998, 2). Such 
models did not account for the peculiarities of life in the outer reaches of Eurasia, for 
example, where resources were scarce and population sparse. In northern Eurasia, 
then, it was more likely for linguistic groups to remain isolated from one another, 
unlikely to influence each other’s modes of expression or ways of life except in 
extraordinary circumstances (Fortescue 1998, 19–20). Ecological change and 
geography can also impact the likelihood of absorption of unrelated language 
groups, creating a substratum effect that further complicates the search for a proto-
language. In so-called bottlenecks – relatively narrow points of passage between 
natural obstacles such as glaciers or bodies of water – language contact is likely to be 
intense and may result in the assimilation of linguistic communities. By contrast, in 
expansive regions of migration, such as the Central Asian Steppe, language contact is 
likely to result in borrowing and convergence, but not necessarily absorption or 
assimilation (Fortescue 1998, 19). An accurate picture of climate and geography at 
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the time of migration, then, is essential for the historian seeking to determine when 
and how a proto-language might have first underwent structural changes induced by 
exogenous shocks. 
 
Endogenous Change 
 The modelling of contact with other linguistic communities is important for 
understanding the sources of convergence and divergence that occur throughout the 
evolution of a language family. Exogenous shocks, however, are only one of a 
number of motors of linguistic change. Isolated groupings, whether previously 
affected by interactions with speakers of other lects or not, can also exhibit 
considerable innovation in phonology, morphology, syntax and lexicon. Even “Stone-
age” groups should not be assumed to be speaking languages that are closer to the 
original proto-language than communities with a long history of sustained contact 
with outsiders (see, for example, Chacon 2014, 301; Haiman and Benincà 1992, 99; 
Edelman and Dodykhudoeva 2009, 775–777). Indeed, earlier assumptions of the 
ahistoricity of isolated language groupings and communities that had failed to attain 
European levels of socio-economic development have only served to compound 
hypothesized primordial homogeneity (Blench 1997, 23; Bouissac 1997, 54). There 
are, as well, cases in which languages that have been in contact with related lects 
have changed through internal processes in order to differentiate themselves from 
those around them (Foley 2000, 359). Indeed, historical linguists have observed that 
central dialects – those in the middle of the geographical spread of a language group 
– tend to exhibit far greater innovation than the more conservative dialects on the 
edge of the linguistic territory (Blažek 1999, 53). Isolation does not imply 
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conservatism, and those linguistic communities living in close contact with unrelated 
languages cannot be discounted as being without value in the reconstruction of the 
proto-language. 
The assumption of ahistoricity has important impacts on hypotheses about 
the proto-language. The belief that “Stone Age” communities provide the key to 
prehistoric linguistic constructions has the potential to skew hypotheses about the 
origins of a particular language family, and to create false assumptions about 
relationships between seemingly unrelated languages. When ample historical 
evidence is present to attest to population movements, social organization and 
economic and political development, the sub-discipline of socio-linguistics can 
advance greatly our understanding of the means by which contemporary language 
and dialects appear. We can then pick apart, to some degree, the evolution of 
speech patterns, a far more rigorous means of investigation than the serendipitous 
discovery of “virgin” dialects. Processes of koineization, whereby various dialects and 
languages merge into one cohesive speech community, can be contextualized and 
correlated to similar processes of social mobility and poli-economic change (Tuten 
2000, 97–99). Such heuristics, however, are not accessible to scholars of 
communities without traditions of written history. As there is no means of assessing 
whether the isolated group might have completely absorbed another linguistic 
community in the distant past, there is similarly no means of proving that their 
unique patterns of speech are remnants of a forgotten time, rather than the product 
of synthesis between two language families (Chacon 2014, 278). 
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Family Relations 
This leads to the question of how linguists determine relationships between 
two or more different language groups. In general, scholars recognize two different 
types of relationships: genetic, or descent from a common proto-language; and 
areal, or relationships arising from intensive linguistic contact resulting in borrowing 
and convergence. Given the length of time involved, distinguishing between the two 
can be challenging, especially if the daughter languages of a hypothesized proto-
language are themselves quite distant from one another (Foley 2000, 358–59; Enrico 
2004, 230). In such cases, the presence of isolated family members can assist in 
discriminating between genetic and areal affiliations. In the case of the Uralic 
languages, for example, Samoyed – which remained in Siberia and did not migrate 
westward, as did other proto-Finnic, -Hungarian and other languages – provides a 
useful benchmark. Its isolation allows specialists to distinguish linguistic features 
shared between Indo-European and Uralic languages that came about from 
prolonged contact between speakers, from those that are candidates for proof of 
genuine genetic affiliation (Hajdú and Domokos 1978, 61). Geography, paleontology 
and archaeology thus feed into the classification of relationships by determining 
when or if linguistic communities might have come in contact with one another; in 
which circumstances; and for how long. 
The most basic type of relations – whether genetic or areal – are established 
through typologies. Languages are grouped together according to types of sounds, 
words or structures that they employ in expression and then classed according to 
similarity. In some cases, similarities are borne by characteristics so common 
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amongst the world’s languages as to provide no conclusive evidence regarding the 
affiliation of one lect to another. The use of postpositions in subject-object-verb 
languages is a case in point. It is therefore from a substantial accrual of unique or 
uncommon similarities that the hunt for a common ancestor or common mixing-
ground begins (Fortescue 1998, 1–2). Word-lists and grammars compiled before the 
profound impacts of colonial language penetration and enforced migrations of the 
19th and 20th centuries have been especially useful in this respect (Hajdú and 
Domokos 1978, 11–20). From these similarities, linguistic evolution can be 
hypothesized: differences in pronunciation and usage are woven into a model 
seeking to explain not only how the various languages and lects developed, but also 
what the probable components of the proto-language were (Fortescue 1998, 36–37). 
 
Typologies and Mythologies 
 Part of the problem that has arisen in the establishment of language families 
is the manner in which the first such family was constructed. Historical linguistics, or 
comparative philology, arose at the end of the 18th century. It was sparked by an 
interest in the relationship between Latin, Ancient Greek and Sanskrit, as noted by 
Sir William Jones, an English judge at the High Court in Calcutta. His scope was 
gradually widened and Jones sought to show the similarities and genetic affiliations 
between a host of dead languages, effectively creating a linguistic web across Eurasia 
that defied contemporary knowledge of the landmass’ history. A comparative 
approach was utilized to come to this conclusion, and it was soon applied to the 
languages of north-east Africa and the Levant in order to demonstrate their relations 
to one another as well (Renfrew 1987, 9–11). Jones was not the only pioneer in this 
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field: Jäger engaged in similar speculations about the Indo-European languages in 
the 17th century, while Edwards pointed out connections between indigenous 
American languages in the 18th. What all these studies have in common is that, 
unlike modern linguists, many of the first comparative philologists were concerned 
with racial connections between peoples, of which language was one aspect 
(Campbell and Poser 2008, 6–10). A much more self-contained linguistic science, 
therefore, would have to wait until the 19th century. 
 Comparative philology began with the correlation of lexical components 
between distinct languages in order to assess the similarity between them, and their 
potential genetic relations. The faults inherent in such a system became easily 
apparent in the study of the Indo-European languages, particularly isolated variants, 
such as Armenian. Here, heavy borrowing from Persian created the appearance of a 
close genetic relationship between the two, until Hübschmann demonstrated that 
such proximity was produced through loans rather than common descent (Campbell 
and Poser 2008, 80). In addition, the assumption of semantic shift muddied the 
waters further. It is often employed by those who seek to utilize lexical comparisons 
alone in order to establish relationships between distant languages. Semantic shift 
implies that a word from the proto-language has undergone changes in meaning in 
the daughter languages, and necessarily implies speculation on the evolution of a 
term or expression. Occasionally, such shifts are easily explained – consider the 
French term, bœuf “cow” and its modern English equivalent beef, which was 
borrowed from Norman – but more often they are not. Such tools introduce an 
element of stochasticity into historical reconstructions that is not readily tolerated 
by the wider community: “When semantically non-equivalent forms are compared, 
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the possibility that chance accounts for the phonetic similarity is greatly increased.” 
(Campbell and Poser 2008, 195) 
Eventually, historical linguists began to understand that lexical comparisons 
could be only one part of a three-pronged approach in which lexicon, phonology (the 
sounds of a language) and morpho-syntax (the structure of expressions) would be 
compared. The American linguist Edward Sapir was among the first to call for an 
investigation into “submerged” similarities between languages. Sapir recognized that 
the components of proto-language grammar might mutate over time in the form of 
the daughter languages, but that “what is most fundamental” would be retained 
(Campbell and Poser 2008, 168–79). In other words, a means of understanding the 
world and the expression of such comprehension – such as in the use of moods, 
divisions of time, systems of classification or a propensity for nouns over verbs – 
would remain relatively fixed within the descendants of a given linguistic 
community. 
  These approaches have proven relatively successful when applied to 
languages spoken by communities that have well-attested histories, whether in 
written or non-written material form, such as the Indo-European or Semitic families. 
When one investigates the linguistic communities of indigenous America or 
Australia, however, their revelatory power begins to diminish. In Australia in 
particular, the passage of time since the existence of the proto-language might 
render the search for it futile. The result is not just an ontological gap; an admission 
that we may never know if one or more languages were spoken at the time Australia 
was first populated by humans. It also impacts the epistemology of Australian 
historical linguistics. The assumption of a single proto-language promotes the search 
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for genetic relationships between languages rather than areal ones. It implies that 
shared innovations in supposed daughter languages give clues to the time since 
divergence, rather than the periods at which two different linguistic communities 
came into sustained contact (Campbell and Poser 2008, 155–58). This purely 
linguistic conundrum has obvious implications for the usage of language and 
comparative philology in wider historical narratives about ancient peoples; a 
phenomenon that will become readily apparent in my investigation of Turkish and 
Soviet histories of pre-Islamic Central Asia.  
 
Alternative Attempts 
Comparative philology has not always been immune to attack on a 
theoretical level, in addition to its shortcomings on a practical one. Even among its 
earliest proponents, there were those who saw it as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for establishing linguistic relationships between communities. Wilhelm von 
Humboldt, the Prussian linguist who was a champion of the aforementioned 
methodologies, also espoused philosophical methods for the division of languages 
into groups. In particular, he believed that the grammar of a language was an 
expression of the Volksgeist (the spirit of the people) of the nation that spoke it 
(Campbell and Poser 2008, 232). Humboldt’s combination of objective methods with 
subjective ones should not be seen as an early rejection of the standard 
methodology now in place, but rather as a reflection of the idealist environment in 
which he lived. The collective spirit of the nation, a Romantic and idealist reaction to 
the universalism of the Enlightenment, was particularly important in the study of all 
aesthetic, moral and religious systems, and thus could not be neglected in the study 
 73 
of language as well (Antoni 1962, 78). Humboldt’s failure to reject the universalist 
approach, however, implied that his deviations from comparative philology were not 
as radical as later attempts in other parts of the continent.  
In the 1920s, the Soviet Marxist linguist Nikolai Marr introduced a new means 
of grouping and categorizing languages. His theory was so revolutionary as to be 
accused of contradicting the fundamental principles of comparative philology as a 
discipline (Marr 1926b, 286). It relied on the Marxian understanding of the economic 
base’s importance in determining changes in the non-economic superstructure 
(Marr 1931, 12), as well as that of mixing and cross-pollination, rather than splitting 
and fusion (V. A. Shnirelman 1995, 121). What was most important to Marr was 
avoiding the traps caused by viewing language development through the lens of 
European languages. To do this, he proposed turning to the material existence of 
pre-historic man (Marr 1926c, 193). As such, language became an object similar to 
ideology, a representation of the consciousness and cognitive processes of humans 
at given stages of development. Those who had achieved a particular socio-
economic level passed from cognition and expression in forms (Japhetic) to language 
based on ideas and reason (as evidenced in the languages of the Indo-European 
group) (Marr 1926b, 301–5). Language, similar to religion, politics and gender 
relations, could not escape the dialectic between base and superstructure.  
Marr demonstrated this through an eclectic sampling of Eurasian languages’ 
phonemes, morphology and syntax. Morphemes that appeared phonetically and 
semantically similar between languages – such as laḥm ‘meat’ in Arabic and ‘bread’ 
in Syriac and Hebrew – demonstrated semantic shift through gradations of socio-
economic development (Marr 1931, 27–30). In contrast, purported lexical 
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borrowings between languages were remnants of the influences of different classes 
participating in social conflict within a single linguistic grouping (Marr 1931, 25; V. A. 
Shnirelman 1995, 122). More broadly, Marr believed that the Caucasian and Semitic 
languages were the remnants of an older family called the Japhetic – relying on the 
established tradition of using the Biblical narrative to provide scientific classification 
– which had been displaced by Aryan migrations (Marr 1926d, 8–9). The homeland 
of this linguistic group was in the Caucasus mountains, a fact that had, thus far, gone 
unnoticed by other specialists, despite the importance of the Japhetic peoples in the 
development of Mediterranean culture (Marr 1926a, 35–36). This theory was meant 
to fill in the gaps created by language isolates, such as Etruscan and Basque; ancient 
and contemporary languages that did not fit the Indo-European, Turkic, Semitic or 
Uralic mold, but that needed to be accounted for in terms of a regional history (Marr 
1926a, 73–80). 
The Japhetic theory was intended to be anti-racialist and anti-bourgeois; a 
means of encouraging the study of all the languages of the world on an equal basis, 
regardless of their connection to the nations of Europe (Marr 1926c, 190–91). As 
such, it was opposed to the metaphysical and idealist traditions represented by both 
Humboldt and the modern followers of his “doctrinaire” and “scholastic” approaches 
to the topic (Marr 1926b, 287). Marr refused to countenance the division of 
languages according to ethnicities and nations, and the idealist insistence on “seeing 
in the masses pockets of virgin nations” (Marr 1931, 18). Eventually, his theory fell 
out of favour with the Stalinist authorities too, and by the early 1930s proponents of 
Marr’s hypothesis of language change were clearly on the defensive against the 
ideological purges of the Stalinist era (Marr 1931, 13). Indeed, the profession on 
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both sides of the Iron Curtain has largely remained faithful to the belief that non-
linguistic evidence cannot be employed as the bedrock of language family 
construction (Campbell and Poser 2008, 205–6). 
 
Sifting through the Evidence  
Marr’s diversion notwithstanding, language classification can provide a 
window onto the past, albeit a partial one. Even in the event of borrowings, valuable 
information about the history of both languages can be gleaned from this 
comparison. For example, in the case of Aramaic loanwords in 7th century Arabic (as 
attested by early written versions of the Qur’an), sound changes vis-à-vis Imperial 
Aramaic provide data on the dating and circumstances of linguistic contact between 
the two Semitic languages. They also inform the researcher of the linguistic expanse 
of given lects of a particular language at specific points in time; confirming, in this 
case, distinctions between the Aramaic of Nabatean communities in the Arabian 
Peninsula and those of the Levant (Retsö 2015). Historical linguistics, therefore, does 
provide some answers to questions posed about the past. In the absence of the 
ultimate benchmark of truth or falsity – native speakers of ancient languages – the 
discipline is nonetheless capable of enriching our vision of the linguistic landscape of 
the pre-historic world. The example of 7th century Aramaic, however, points to its 
limitations. Although we might be able to say, on the basis of written and other data, 
that two distinct dialects existed in Palestine and Nabatea, to what extent did these 
linguistic bonds imply cultural similarities or differences? After several centuries of 
activity, it appears that historical linguistics is not well-equipped to provide an 
answer one way or another; at least not on its own. In order to move closer to a 
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determination, it must be combined with other studies from the realms of the 
historical sciences, including archaeology. 
 
Archaeology 
 Archaeology, more than linguistics, has been embroiled in political and 
ideological scandals through both the 19th and the 20th centuries. Archaeologists 
themselves made the remains of material culture into valuable tools for explaining 
and legitimating Western European cultural and political hegemony during the age 
of imperialism. Moreover, archaeology and archaeologists were often employed in 
state-sponsored drives for control over political, economic and cultural power in the 
periphery. The last decades of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th are 
particularly rich in examples of the use and abuse of this historical science by those 
both inside and outside of the academy (Fowler 2008, 110; Arnold 2008; Marchand 
2008, 259–64; Klejn 2008). Such dynamics stemmed, in part, from perceived 
imbalances in public and state views of archaeology vis-à-vis other historical 
sciences, particularly the writing of history (Levy and Higham 2005, 4–5). As the 
discipline struggled to gain recognition and support, it fell prey in some countries – 
especially, but not exclusively, Nazi Germany – to the intervention of ideologically 
racialist and nationalist elements (Arnold 2008, 124–26; Klejn 2008, 325; Troumpeta 
2013, 172). The power of archaeology to serve the interests of the state can be 
intuited from Levy and Higham’s explanation of the role of archaeology within 
modern society: 
“Archaeology’s most precious commodities have been 
the control of ‘time’ and ‘space’. Time – to clarify 
historical events and processes, and space – to isolate 
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the material remains associated with history in 
meaningful social and temporal contexts.” [original 
emphasis] (Levy and Higham 2005, 6) 
 
The discipline provides the material support for imagining historical narratives as 
they unfold along the temporal and spatial dimensions. Given the manner in which 
régimes and their competitors have coveted the tools of rewriting the past, it is no 
wonder that archaeology, too, has been a prized possession of the powerful. 
Although Levy and Higham were writing at beginning of the 21st century, their 
understanding is of considerable benefit when applied to an investigation of early 
20th century archaeological endeavours as well.  
 
Archaeology in the Era of Extremes 
 Between the late 19th century and 1945, statesmen and ideologues made 
considerable use of archaeology in order to bond the citizen to the state in a variety 
of countries. That it was viewed as an eminently political tool by élite classes is 
undeniable in a broad swathe of polities, particularly those that adhered to 
authoritarian or totalitarian ideologies. In Nazi Germany, where the superiority of 
German science and scholarship were perceived as unquestionable, archaeology 
became a participatory venture, a means by which the citizen could take part in 
proving the glorious past and divining the illustrious future of the Germanic race 
(Arnold 2008, 128–29). As the 1930s progressed, state intervention grew: the Nazi 
Party delineated official terminology, and the various party organs engaged in 
“pseudo-archaeological” expeditions to shore up public support for official ideology, 
thereby alienating academic practitioners (Arnold 2008, 131–39). In nation-states 
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self-conscious of their failure to achieve specific levels of socio-economic 
development, archaeology and the interpretation of material remains were also 
tightly controlled by the state. This mirrored both a desire to apply rigid connections 
between the remains, science and the guiding principles of the state, as in Fascist 
Italy (Arthurs 2007, 35–36); and a belief in the need for top-down standardization 
and industrialization, as in the Republic of Turkey. In the latter case, a conviction that 
popular interference would sully the credibility of official interpretations was a 
strong impetus to present archaeology as a highly specialized and esoteric pursuit 
suitable only for experts and the initiated (Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006, 385). 
 In many ways, we can summarize contemporary interpretations of pre-World 
War Two archaeology as being naïve, colonial, unscientific and downright 
ideological. This is evidenced by the fact that descriptions of this period are often 
relegated to histories, rather than guides to the practice of archaeology. The late 
19th century concern with Biblical narratives and ancient Greek and Near Eastern 
epics is often glossed over quickly in the rush towards the New Archaeology of the 
1960s (Kohl and Fawcett 1995, 14; see also Renfrew 2004, 26–40; Härke 1995, 49–
50). Peter J. Ucko’s qualification in the introduction to his Theory in Archaeology: A 
World Perspective speaks volumes about perceptions of such periods:  
“At another level, also, comments on nationalist 
archaeology, and the theory which drives such 
archaeology, are still all too often presented at an 
acceptable level of generalization. In the hands of 
some (particularly British?) archaeologists, all 
archaeologists within such regimes are patronized and 
stereotyped […] In reality, of course, where 
archaeological theory is considered a worthwhile 
pursuit at all […], it will be discussed with intelligence 
and sophistication by those who attempt to practice it, 
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whether within the constraints of Nazi Germany or the 
former Soviet Union.” (Ucko 1995, 9) 
 
Even when valorizing individual actors, Ucko still tends to paint the entire period 
with a broad brush, recognizing, to some degree, the considerable challenges that 
faced practitioners during this period.  
We can, despite these obstacles, establish a few different trends that 
emerged before the onset of the Cold War. The first is that archaeology as a 
discipline emerged in Western Europe and the United States, and gradually bled out 
into other countries and regions. This was partially due to the view of colonial 
possessions as ripe for archaeological study, and the assumed cultural and scientific 
superiority of the West (W. M. K. Shaw 2003, 213–16). In semi- or post-colonial 
countries (of which there were admittedly few prior to 1945), archaeology and the 
preservation of the past was often seen as a means of asserting an indigenous and 
independent national identity (Rejwan 1974, 57; W. M. K. Shaw 2003, 209–10). Here, 
the concern was with the creation of a definitive and palpable link between the 
ancient past, as represented by material culture and its interpretation, and a modern 
political project designed to transform society. The success or failure of this 
instrumentalization of archaeology often rested on the ability of political and 
scholastic figures to convince the public of both the saliency of their arguments, and 
the immediacy of the ancient culture (Dekmejian 1971, 89–92; Pizzo 2002, 9–10).  
 
New Archaeology 
 Whereas the historical sciences of the first half of the 20th century were 
marked by overt subservience to the state, or cloaked subversion of its agenda, the 
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latter half of the last century saw the rise of a self-consciously objective approach. 
This new brand of archaeology drew upon the positivist belief in the importance of 
the material and the scientific, rather than the idiosyncratic and subjective. Ann 
Killebrew explains it in the following manner in the introduction to her study of 
ethnicity in the ancient Near East: 
“New Archeology and its later developments, often 
termed processual archaeology or Middle Range 
Theory, can be considered as a quantitative and 
scientifically-based approach to interpreting the past. 
New Archeology focused on methodologies that were 
‘objective’ or measurable and on uncovering universal 
laws that govern human behaviour and material 
culture deposition in its environmental context. By 
using scientific approaches to the past that entail a 
research design and hypothesis testing, the past is 
knowable and it is possible to formulate paradigms and 
construct universal systems that reveal the relationship 
between behaviour and material culture as well as 
between causes and effects.” (Killebrew 2005, 3) 
 
In this respect, the archaeology of the 1950s onwards can be seen as being more 
robust in its methodology and hypothesis-testing, aided, as it were, by the 
technological advances of carbon-dating and related means of analyzing material 
remains (Trigger 2003, 18–19). The conclusions that it drew from such results, 
however, were challenged in the decades from the late 1960s onwards, as post-
structuralism and post-modernism chipped away at the glossy veneer of objectivism. 
Practitioners of the New Archaeology were now accused of ignoring the agency of 
those who lived in the societies they studied, and the importance of non-material 
components such as ideology and religion (Killebrew 2005, 4). 
 Even if the process-oriented practices of archaeology consciously sought to 
ignore the subjective and the immaterial, they were rarely successful in escaping one 
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particular ideology: nationalism. In some cases, chauvinism and racialist approaches 
to the builders of past cultures and civilizations did indeed persist. More often, 
however, this nationalist legacy continued on in a much more mundane manner, 
allowing for contemporary national labels to be applied to pre-modern peoples, or 
through the search for ancient equivalents to modern communities (Kohl and 
Fawcett 1995, 15). This has been reinforced by the dictates of the post-colonial 
period, in which every nation-state is expected to have its own past and its own 
archaeology. It is often incorporated into state structures and organized along the 
same lines as the discipline in the Euro-Atlantic arena, where state-sponsored 
national schools are the norm (Silberman 1995, 256–57). The evolution of 
archaeology thus largely mirrors similar developments in the writing and teaching of 
history during the process of decolonization (Breuilly 2007, 8). The difference 
between pre- and post-World War Two historical sciences, however, is that the 
intellectual revolution of the 1960s has allowed for the greater problematization and 
investigation of all the non-material inputs that flavour the writing and 
interpretation of the past around the globe.  
 
The Intangible versus the Material 
 Today, both New Archaeology and post-modern approaches to the material 
remains of past cultures exist side by side. Neither system has demonstrated its 
ability to solve all of the obstacles that continue to face the use of archaeology in the 
pursuit of truth about the past (Dever 2005, 413). A topic such as ethnicity – a core 
component of my project – is recognized as containing both material and intangible 
components, and thus neither stream of archaeology is capable of revealing on its 
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own a full understanding of individuals’ ethnic identities in past cultures. For the 
most part, objective schools of thought frowned upon the reconstruction of ethnicity 
through the use of material remains. Recently, however, a more nuanced approach 
has sought to combine ideological components with aesthetics – that is, the stylistic 
aspect of material remains – in order to understand, at least in part, manifestations 
of identity in the past (Killebrew 2005, 8–10). This too is a fine balance, however, as 
too forceful an emphasis on ideology and the intangible aspects of a past culture 
carries with it the danger of implying a wholly volitional character to ethnicity. Such 
an action might either ascribe particular decisions to members of that society that 
were never contemplated, or gloss over the importance of lineage and kinship in the 
process of identity-formation. 
 
A Synthesis of Archaeology and Linguistics 
 If I previously problematized the usage of archaeological data and 
methodology by linguists, it is only fair that I investigate the reverse formulation: 
when might archaeologists borrow inspiration from linguistics, and how does this 
impact their conclusions? Archaeology has, in the past, allowed historical linguistics 
to lead, albeit not always with promising results. The most infamous of these 
syntheses occurred with the adoption of the Indo-European language group as a 
broader cultural and racial grouping, motivated first by the German historian Gustav 
Kossinna, and then encouraged by the National Socialist (Nazi) régime. The tragic 
events of the Nazi period and the Second World War have largely discredited this 
experiment, as well as some of the methodologies used to pursue it, such as 
craniometry (the study of skull sizes). Nevertheless, some scholars, including Colin 
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Renfrew, have, in the age of New Archaeology, called for revisiting the possible clues 
that historical linguistics might uncover for further archaeological research (Renfrew 
1987, 3–5). Renfrew sees these as a means of imbuing studies focused on purely 
material remains with some sort of understanding of the ideology and belief systems 
of early communities. The problem here, however, is once again remembering that 
there are “differing rates whereby languages and genes move through space and 
time” (Fortescue 1998, 2). Thus when Renfrew argues for the use of language to 
inform archaeology and concludes that “Many of the features, then, which define 
the Irishness of the Irish, or the Spanishness of the Spanish, or the Britishness of the 
British, go back very much deeper [than is widely thought]”, we ought to ask 
ourselves if he is not perhaps looking too hard for modern concepts of linguistically 
defined nations in periods in which they did not exist (Renfrew 1987, 6; Davies 2000, 
57). His ultimate hypothesis is that supposedly Indo-European cultures predate the 
arrival of proto-Indo-European speakers to the European continent, but even this 
neat division of language, culture and genes might be too simplistic a formula – one 
influenced by modern boundaries of identity – to represent the reality of the pre-
historic period. 
 Added to this conundrum is the fact that what we do have in terms of 
linguistic evidence from peoples who were not literate often comes to us in second-
hand form. Greek or Roman historians occasionally compiled wordlists of 
“barbarian” languages. Early names also survive in the forms of toponyms and given 
names, or through oral histories and folklore (Renfrew 1987, 20–21). These 
fragments are combined with material remains in order to shed greater light on pre-
historic societies. They encapsulate, however, the worldview and understanding of 
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the later peoples through whom we received this information. The word barbarian, 
from the Greek barbaros, meaning one who is not Greek, or does not speak Greek, is 
evidence of the way in which these communities were perceived as Others and were 
therefore conceived in opposition to the culture and civilization of the scribe. At 
times, such descriptions may prove more instructive of the self-image of the 
recording culture than of that of recorded one (Davies 2000, 115).  
 Even when the scribes depict their own cultures, however, archaeology and 
linguistics are not quite congruent disciplines. As Schniedewind explains with 
reference to Near Eastern ceramics: 
“…whereas pottery is mass-produced and 
circumscribed by this [mass] mode of production, 
inscriptions represent the idiosyncrasies of individual 
scribes, unique social locations and historical 
circumstances.” (Schniedewind 2005, 405) 
 
The paucity of epigraphic evidence – effectively the meeting point of archaeology 
and historical linguistics – combines with post-modernist understandings of the 
agency and individuality of the subject to create considerable ambiguity in the 
interpretation of material evidence. Materiality, the supposed foundation of 
objectivity within archaeology, is now disturbed by the arbitrary and highly 
subjective nature of humanity. It reminds us of Dever’s warning that: 
“Archaeology is not an ‘objective science’, because it 
deals with that most intractable of all phenomena – 
the human psyche, which is not the object but the 
subject, in the investigation.” (Dever 2005, 414) 
 
Material remains provide us with concrete and unchanging objects upon which to 
focus. The expressions contained therein – especially those of a linguistic variety – 
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belie, however, the same difficulties of interpretation and comprehension that can 
be found in any other human or social science. With respect to epigraphy, this is 
made all the more complicated by the absence of standardized linguistic and 
orthographic norms, which are inherently modern phenomena (B. R. O. Anderson 
2006, 80). Such concerns, however, as we shall see, were far from pressing in the 
rush to create master narratives in both Turkey and the Soviet Union. 
It would be disingenuous to pretend that linguistic and para-linguistic 
components of material remains are the only subjective components of archaeology 
as a discipline. In addition to interpretation within a scholarly setting, the 
presentation of findings and hypotheses have proven to be exceptionally important 
in the validation of archaeology and its function as an epistemology in the hunt for 
historical truth. These endeavours have been far from value-free, and are now 
understood to be just as influential in the narration of the past as written histories.   
 
Museums, Exhibitions and Retinal Narratives 
 Archaeology, similar to linguistics and history, has experienced a degree of 
popularization. The methodology and findings of the discipline have, at various 
points in time, been made accessible to an audience broader than just the academy. 
While part of this process relies on the publication of texts and written explanations 
of the historical sciences, this particular branch of study concerned with the 
investigation and analysis of material remains benefits from another means of 
dissemination: the exhibition. The origins of the contemporary Western museum lie 
in 15th-century Italy, where they were seen as a means of collecting and 
understanding nature and natural history. As such, they acted as a scholarly forum 
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for the enlightened and rationalistic élite (Findlen 2010, 1–3). It was the 19th century 
that saw the advent of a public exposition space endowed with educational as well 
as narrative functions, intended to explain the material remains of cultures 
proximate and distant (Hooper-Greenhill 2000, 16–17). As Eilean Hooper-Greenhill 
puts it: 
“The modernist museum shares many of the cultural 
and epistemological functions of maps. It unifies and 
rationalises, pictures and presents relationships. The 
modernist museum depicts ‘reality’ and ‘shows the 
way things are’ in an apparently neutral way… 
Relationships between people, nations, and ideas are 
produced thought the objects selected, the way they 
are displayed and the relationships between them. 
Hierarchies of value are constructed, inclusions and 
exclusions made, the self and others separated.” 
(Hooper-Greenhill 2000, 17–18) 
 
The study of these institutions, termed museology, has delved into the economic, 
social, political and ideological content bound up in “the treasure house of history”, 
to use the title of one guide (Li 2002). The overt manipulation of these collections 
during the first half of the 20th century is well documented for a number of 
countries. Joshua Arthurs, for example, has explored the manner in which the 
exposition of Roman artefacts was exploited by both the Liberal Democratic 
government of pre-World War One Italy as well as by the Fascist régime of Benito 
Mussolini. The former sought to highlight the country’s place in Europe and the 
progress of its historical sciences, while the latter strove to justify martial discipline, 
Social Darwinism and extreme nationalism (Arthurs 2007, 32–35). What was 
nominally the same exhibition, then, proved to be exceptionally malleable in its 
ideologically-driven presentation to citizens and guests.  
 87 
 
Post-Modernism and the Museum 
 The advent of self-avowedly objective science in the second half of the 20th 
century, however, does not mean that today’s museums and related institutions are 
bereft of manipulation. Art critics and philosophers have exposed the manner in 
which modernism’s supposedly neutral and objective approach to the visual can 
indeed result in subconscious associations outside of the realm of logic. The appeal 
to the rational and scientific can therefore have the consequence – whether 
accidental or intentional – of calling upon the irrational and emotive in the mind of 
the viewer (Krauss 1994). Moreover, the eminently rational action of collecting, 
collating and indexing the various components of the museum has the effect of 
creating schools, styles and trends. In other words, curators, through their 
organization of the museum, bring into being the supposedly organic developments 
in artistic endeavor that they have uncovered for the enlightenment of the masses 
(Krauss 1986, 141–42). Riegel helps to extend this to the ethnographic museum and 
other nominally non-artistic institutions: 
“Under the guises of philanthropy, value-free 
knowledge and a certain patina of ‘culture’ and 
civilization, museums have made it their business to 
reproduce other cultures for the visual consumption of 
their visitors.” (Riegel 1996, 83) 
 
Here, the historical and social sciences cross over into the realm of art, 
semiotics and psychology, combining a myriad of disciplines on the scholarly side in 
order to produce, or to explain, the uniquely human experience of sensory 
interaction with material remains. Spatial organization, lighting, auditory 
accompaniment, labeling and the production of written guides can have profound 
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impacts on the interaction of visitors with a narrative of the past. It should not be a 
surprise, then, that some of those involved in the historiographic projects described 
in the following chapters, including Nikolai Marr, also had considerable experience in 
the organization and exposition of physical remains in their regions of expertise. 
Unlike the curators of exhibits of contemporary art, museum curators are painfully 
aware that their creations may induce sensations of proximity or distance, similarity 
or difference, and continuity or rupture, none of which were actually contemplated 
at the time when the material remains were first produced (Riegel 1996, 84). Within 
the context of “banal nationalism”, to paraphrase Michael Billig (Billig 1995), the 
encoding of exhibits with national qualifiers and characteristics can help to project 
backwards an anachronistic notion of identity in a seemingly uncontroversial and 
benign manner. A poignant example of this is the decision to include the artistic 
creations of Canadian and American indigenous peoples in ethnographic museums 
rather than art galleries. These communities are thus alienated from dominant 
national culture to such a degree that even their aesthetic expressions are perceived 
as being outside of the realm of art (McMaster 2007, 71–72). The museum, then, 
through its mission of spreading clarity, knowledge and objectivity to the hoi polloi, 
can effectively void the studied attempts of archaeologists, linguists, historians and 
others to rid their respective disciplines of the nefarious influences of contrived 
identity-formation (Gable 1996, 178–79). 
From this exposition of the exhibition and its encoded ideological 
components, it should be obvious that post-modernism and post-structuralism have 
shaken profoundly the notions of objectivity and neutrality within the historical 
sciences. The past and our representations of it are now seen as considerably more 
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human and flawed. In coping with our humanity and that of our ancestors, it is not 
the study of language or material culture that helps us grapple towards truth, but 
another discipline: that of anthropology.  
 
Anthropology 
 Anthropology is concerned with the study of humanity, particularly human 
cultures and civilizations, whether in isolation or in comparison. For the most part, 
anthropologists focus on the present, investigating current cultural phenomena or 
those of the recent past. Throughout the twentieth century, however, there have 
been individuals who have applied their knowledge of the field to the study of 
civilizations in the remote past, with a keen interest in discovering the origins of 
human civilization and its spread around the world (Trigger 2003, 23). As Bruce 
Trigger has explained: 
“Archaeological findings supply valuable information 
about technology, subsistence, circulation of goods, 
settlement patterns, and the distribution of wealth, 
and data of this sort are becoming increasing abundant 
and comparable for early civilizations. It is, however, 
very difficult to infer social and political organization 
from archaeological evidence alone… A holistic 
understanding of early civilizations such as is necessary 
for this study also requires information about religious 
beliefs, cosmologies, and secular and spiritual values. 
While religious structures and tombs loom large in the 
archaeological record, the beliefs that inspired these 
monuments can be recovered only from written or 
verbal records.” (Trigger 2003, 31–33) 
 
In other words, a culture or civilization is more than simply the sum of its material 
components. Archaeology, then, cannot provide us with a complete view of people 
who lived thousands of years ago, including how they conceived of themselves and 
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the world around them. In order to fill this gap, then, we must turn towards 
anthropology and its related disciplines. 
Anthropology has not been immune from the main dispute to affect all other 
social sciences and some humanities over the second half of the 20th century: the 
battle between objectivity and subjectivity, or relativity, in the approach of individual 
scholars towards their objects of study. The former insists on the ability of measuring 
cultures against a transcendental and objective benchmark. It is, therefore, quite 
similar to positivistic interpretations of history and the social sciences. The latter is 
not entirely novel, as relativist approaches to the social sciences are easily found in 
the late 19th century and early 20th century works of such pioneers as Max Weber 
(Antoni 1962, 183). The current iteration, however, rests largely on post-modern and 
post-structuralist understandings of the relationship of the individual to others and 
to herself (Trigger 2003, 6–8). While this split has had a wide-ranging impact on the 
field as a whole, its importance in diachronic studies manifests as the discussion on 
the origins of culture and civilization. Claude Lévi-Strauss, the famous French 
anthropologist, argued that culture was born through the universal process of binary 
creation, with different binaries selected by different groups. The linguist Edward 
Sapir claimed that culture was the product of the constraints imposed by a language 
group’s grammar on the worldview of its speakers. Both men believed that these 
were universal stimuli to which humans were responding, in outwardly different 
forms, when their cultures first formed. Those of the post-modernist camp, on the 
other hand, insist that culture comes about through individualized response to 
unique and specific phenomena, with change occurring because of reinterpretations 
of such responses, rather than exogenous shocks (Trigger 2003, 9–10). They see it as 
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an intensely personal and idiosyncratic process, one that cannot be theorized and 
replicated ad nauseum.  
 
The Ecological Push 
From the 1950s onwards, the relativist – later post-modernist – point of view 
began to gain ground within the wider anthropological community. In part, 
relativists claimed that those who employed universalist approaches had de-
contextualized components of various societies, and had therefore drained their 
own hypotheses of explanatory power. Added to this was the particular difficulty, as 
discussed in the section on linguistics, of differentiating similarities based on a 
common origin (in this case, a common response to the same stimulus) from 
similarities resulting from cultural contact. As improvements in historical and 
archaeological techniques and methodologies would have allowed for greater 
application of anthropological comparisons across time and space, the appetite for 
comparative studies diminished greatly (Trigger 2003, 18–21). When anthropology 
turned its gaze on the past, however, the materialist camp held sway, thanks in part 
to the profound impact of the work of Julian Steward in 1949. Steward argued that 
ancient civilizations should be divided into primary ones and secondary ones. The 
former arose in arid climates, as the need for social and political organization was 
more pressing in those areas in which large-scale agriculture was only possible 
through irrigation. These societies developed first as priestly theocracies, only to be 
replaced by military autocracies, whose use of force ensured the necessary labour 
supplies for major infrastructure projects. Secondary societies were derivative 
collectivities relying on the development of primary ones, and were therefore not 
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worthy of consideration as generators of early civilization. Steward’s analysis was 
based on flawed methodology and incomplete data, but it continued to influence 
those interested in similar topics of the chronological origins of civilization for some 
time (Trigger 2003, 24).  
This desire to see similarities across time and space is about more than just 
monogenism and polygenism. It implies a classification of civilizations according to 
their primary or secondary nature, linking the historical value of those cultures 
arising in naturally fertile or lush regions directly to the accomplishments of a nearby 
arid-zone culture (Trigger 2003, 24–25). Although it might not have been Steward’s 
goal, his classification scheme could be used to bolster chauvinistic claims of a 
particular society to the title of generator of all human civilization. Moreover, such a 
search for origins has also raised the question of what types of political organizations 
– city-states, territorial states or federations – were the first to arise as guarantors of 
the stability needed for large-scale socio-economic development (Trigger 2003, 26–
27). If such disputes raged after the period of liberalism’s temporary suppression 
(Hobsbawm 1995, 124–29), it should be no wonder that state-formation was a 
crucial component of pre-historical narratives in the 1930s, particularly in 
authoritarian Turkey, as we shall see.  
 
Historical Anthropology 
From the 1960s onwards, the sub-discipline of historical anthropology came 
into its own. Roughly speaking, it sought to introduce the concept of time and the 
practices of historians into the realm of anthropology. This was not simply an 
apolitical attempt at adding a temporal aspect to the spatial one. It also implied a 
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shift of the core focus of anthropological studies from the metropolis to the 
periphery, reclaiming anthropological knowledge for the peoples of post-colonial 
societies. The original mission of this new sub-division was to dismantle notions of 
the ahistoricity of colonized societies, while also explaining their development in the 
post-colonial order. As Brian Keith Axel explains: “Rather than the study of a people 
in a particular place and at a certain time, what is at stake in historical anthropology 
is explaining the production of a people, and the production of space and time.” 
(Axel 2002, 2–3) It was briefly coopted by the American government during the Cold 
War as a means of studying the behaviour of diasporic communities, seeking to 
measure their distance from their spatial and temporal origin, and the likelihood of 
their assimilation into American patterns of behaviour (Axel 2002, 5). The original 
intention has since been reclaimed by practitioners in both North America and 
Europe, and has led to the problematization of the use of the archive, the main 
source for ethnographic and anthropological research of the colonial period and the 
years immediately preceding it. 
Apart from this, and far from the archive, means of uncovering knowledge 
about individuals’ behaviour and the process of self-identification have also been 
applied to the analysis of texts from the remote past. Such research demonstrates 
the manner in which written records can help us to understand the structure and 
functioning of a society even when it appears to be contradicted by material 
evidence. In the case of the Hittite, Marco Liverani does this through a re-reading of 
the Edict of King Telipinu, a 16th century BCE document that tells the story of King 
Telipinu’s ascent to the throne.  Previous historians had accepted the Edict as a 
historical account of the reigns of the monarchs prior to King Telipinu, an 
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interpretation that stands to be either confirmed or repudiated by archaeological 
excavations. By contrast, Liverani argues for an understanding of the document as an 
attempt at régime legitimization, utilizing history to justify and sanctify the current 
monarch as the restorer of divine favour upon the Hittites (Liverani 2004, 51–52). In 
this process, however, it is easy to see how a more refined approach to the cultural 
and religious sensitivities of a past society might allow for contemporary emotions 
and practices to seep in, whether through interpretation or judgment. Similar 
examples abound in Turkish historiography of the end of the period under study, 
reflecting the ease with which such processes can be read into ancient texts, only to 
then be utilized as historical legitimation of the current regime. 
 
Postcolonialism in the Pre-colonial Era 
 Indeed, it can be difficult to determine where the line is drawn when deciding 
just how robust a hypothesis is. On the one hand, the expansion of archaeological 
study from the monumental to the mundane banality of quotidian existence – which 
necessary implies theorizing about the lives of average citizens through the use of 
historical anthropology – seems justified. This relies on an understanding of the 
process of identity-formation and the influences it undergoes from contact with 
intra- and extra-communitarian Others. With reference to the material remains that 
form the core focus of archaeology, it reformulates the question in terms of a 
dialectic between product and producer, insisting that material goods are shaped by, 
and shape, ethnic and other identities in a dynamic fashion (Izzet 2007, 209–11). In 
order to do this, anthropologists and archaeologists draw from pre-existing 
theoretical constructs, including those relating to the construction and performance 
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of identity in colonial and post-colonial societies, referred to as Post-Colonial Theory 
(Izzet 2007, 213–15). Although these approaches do provide us with parallels that 
are believed to have existed between pre-historic societies and modern ones, it begs 
the question of whether recourse to Post-Colonial Theory for pre-historic studies 
ignores one of the most central components of colonial expansion and interaction: 
capitalism. How is it that the identities of the colonized and colonizers of the 
Classical period interacted and mutated in ways similar to those of 19th century 
Nigeria or India, when pre-Christian Etruria or Anatolia lacked the essential 
components of colonial infrastructure, such as the division of labour, 
commoditization, marketization, state-supported trading companies and trade 
barriers? Theoretical overreach is something well-documented and understood in 
the realm of history (Morley 2004, 33–50), and may point to the limitations, or the 
dangers, of diachronic interdisciplinary approaches.  
The preceding discussion has relied, to a large extent, on an overview of the 
theoretical advances and challenges in linguistics, archaeology and anthropology 
most pertinent to the current study. As a concluding section of this chapter, I will use 
their longest nexus of interaction – the investigation of the Bible – as a form of 
bridge into the core of the doctoral project.  
 
Bible Study 
 Although archaeological endeavours in South-West Asia have at times 
focused on other periods and topics, the narratives of the Bible – both the Old and 
New Testaments – have been powerful impetuses for the undertaking of excavations 
and research in modern-day Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon 
 96 
(Fowler 2008, 96). As Carlo Antoni explains, the study of the Bible as a historical 
document emerged in the 19th century, as secularism gradually voided the text of its 
divine and revelatory nature. In the hope of salvaging at least some of the 
foundation of the Western Churches, historians, philologists and other scholars 
sought to prove the veracity of the narrative itself, moving it from the realm of 
parable to that of objective history (Antoni 1962, 44). In the first half of the 20th 
century, Biblical Studies were largely based on a literal reading of the sacred text, 
and thus intellectual endeavours were guided by the words themselves, interpreted 
with the help of philologists and theologians (Killebrew 2005, 3; Ziadeh-Seely 2007, 
328–29; Silberman 1998, 178–81). Indeed, although this approach has been 
weakened greatly in the latter half of the 20th century, it continues to hold 
considerable sway over the investigation of the ancient Near East: 
“From its 19th-century beginnings until today, the 
primary force that still drives the major excavation 
projects in this area [the southern Levant] is the 
ancient scriptures – first the Hebrew Bible or Old 
Testament, then the New Testament and finally the 
Koran.” (Levy and Higham 2005, 4) 
 
When New Archaeology came to the fore, such passions were associated with an 
older school of thought. During the last two decades of the last century, the term 
“Biblical Archaeology” itself was perceived to be a charged one, carrying with it the 
implications of an archaeology guided by, rather than corroborating, the sacred texts 
(Levy and Higham 2005, 5). 
 The solution to these difficulties – the apparent tainted nature of Biblical 
archaeology and related fields – was the recontextualization of the discipline within 
a broader geographical and chronological framework. In particular, it involved the 
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adoption and study of non-Biblical texts from the same region and roughly the same 
period in order to connect Biblical societies with their neighbours (Levy and Higham 
2005, 6). 
 
Israel Reboot 
 Had the study of the Bible and Near Eastern archaeology remained a 
scholarly or erudite concern, its direction likely would have remained far less 
controversial than it currently is. The Zionist movement, however, and the 
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, radically changed the meaning of Biblical 
research and material remains. While archaeologists of the latter half of the 20th 
century might have discovered the use of para- and non-Biblical texts as a means of 
balancing their investigation into the veracity of Biblical accounts through 
excavations, early 20th century political Zionists tended towards the opposite 
direction. In particular, they sought to centre Jewish identity and Zionist belief on a 
de-sacralized Old Testament, privileging the story of Jewish inhabitation in the 
Levant over diasporic literature and memory. With Zionist control over the land of 
Mandatory Palestine, the importance of linking text and materialization became ever 
more apparent. Through the institution of Moledet (Motherland) studies, children 
and the general public were introduced to the Bible as a source of historical truth 
and ideological motivation made real through excavated and preserved 
archaeological sites (Ram 2011, 21–23). Near Eastern archaeology had gone from a 
staid and sterile approach seeking confirmation of the Biblical narrative to a 20th 
century adaptation of Dilthey’s Verstehen; an experience of land and architecture as 
explained via a Zionist take on the Old Testament. 
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 The important role played by Biblical archaeology and related historical 
sciences during the crucial decades of nation-state construction is put into relief by 
Michael Feige: 
During the 1950s and 1960s, biblical archaeology was 
considered to be a central part of Israel’s ‘civil religion’ 
(Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983) and was even hailed as 
‘the national pastime’ of the newly-established state. 
The excavations of Hatzor, Masada and the Judean 
desert caves were headline news. Professional 
archaeologists, most notably Yigael Yadin, became 
popular heroes. Academic conferences of the Israel 
Exploration Society attracted audiences of thousands, 
among them top political leaders. Coins, stamps, and 
other national symbols expressed the country’s 
interest in the field. By the 1970s, though, the popular 
enthusiasm for archaeology had dwindled, and today 
few nonarchaeologists follow developments in the field 
with interest.” (Feige 2007, 277) 
 
Until the eruption of post-modernism onto the academic scene in the late 1960s, 
then, archaeologists and other practitioners of the historical sciences worked largely 
in sync with government and state bodies in the construction of the nation. The 
perception of a relationship between politics and archaeology was not seen as being 
either unproblematic or unidirectional. Political figures and archaeologists alike 
recognized the importance of professional discipline and rigour, even if there was a 
desire to support the dominant historical narrative (Feige 2007, 290–91). The dawn 
of the post-modernist and post-processual age in the 1970s opened up a fissure 
between the political establishment and the scholarly community, which allowed for 
the nationalist archaeological project to be captured by other, non-specialist groups 
(Feige 2007, 278–79). To be certain, this process was also motivated by regional 
factors, the most notable of which is the outcome of the 1967 Six Day War and the 
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subsequent movement to settle the newly-conquered territories with Jewish Israelis. 
As such, the influence of both popular, or populist, phenomena, and changes in the 
intellectual climate in Israel and the world at large helped to radically alter the 
meanings of archaeology, anthropology, history and the control of land (Ziadeh-
Seely 2007, 327; Feige 2007, 292).    
 
Last Stand at Masada 
 A particularly poignant example of this use of archaeology, Biblical narrative, 
and pre-history is the site of Masada. The story of Masada revolves around a Jewish 
revolt against Roman soldiers occupying the province of Judea in the year 66 CE, 
leading to the sack of Jerusalem in 70 CE and the last stand of a band of rebels at a 
mountain redoubt in 73 CE. When it became apparent that they could not withstand 
the siege, the hold-outs decided to commit mass suicide rather than submit. It is not 
a story from the Old or New Testaments, but does represent a component of the 
cultural and historical context within which the New Testament was elaborated. The 
Zionist interpretation of the events paints this as an example of Jewish national 
consciousness, as well as historical proof of Jews’ defense of their residence in Judea 
against foreign – notably European – occupation and dispossession. The narrative 
contained within the Roman documents of Josephus Flavius, however, paint the 
occupiers of Masada as a band of brigands, thieves and murderers known as the 
Sicarii, who chose death over facing Roman justice for their crimes against Jews and 
non-Jews alike (Ben-Yehuda 2007, 254–56). 
 Excavations took place at Masada between the 1960s and 1980s. 
Considerable effort was undertaken by Israeli archaeologists to interpret the 
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material finds at Masada as lending proof to the idea that resistance at Masada was 
led by patriotic and nationalistic zealots, rather than murderous Sicarii. In part, this 
involved the use of para-Biblical texts such as scrolls from nearby Qumran to lend 
credence to the claim that the people at Masada were from various different 
religious and sub-ethnic groups, rather than being predominantly Sicarii (Ben-
Yehuda 2007, 258–59). Moreover, the groups of skeletons found were described, 
prior to the 1990s, as being consistent with family units likely composing the nuclei 
of the rebellious Jews. Later investigations and interpretations of the human remains 
would suggest that there is no evidence for familial relations, let alone participation 
in the siege. Interpretation, then, was conducted according to exceptionally liberal 
criteria, allowing for the excavations to confirm and propagate one of the state’s 
founding myths (Ben-Yehuda 2007, 264–66). What is important here is that 
discoveries are not fabricated but rather re-contextualized through the usage of 
flippant anthropological interpretations, in order to provide added credence to a 
particular view of history as expounded by official sources.  
 In the last decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, Masada 
gradually lost its symbolic importance for the State and the political establishment. It 
continued to be seen as a powerful magnet for tourists, prompting further 
development of the site with tourist infrastructure. However, it is no longer used as 
a means of bonding new and old citizens to the state and its narrative (Baram 2007, 
311–12). Today, Masada is less interesting for both the academic world – which is 
concerned with introducing “more cultures into the narrative of the Israeli past, the 
uncovering of ‘forgotten periods’ and minorities within the dominant archaeological 
epochs, and the presentation of other peoples’ histories” (Baram 2007, 311) – and 
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mainstream, secular Israelis, who “are almost as apathetic about Jewish history as 
they are about Jewish theology” (Feige 2007, 281).  
 
Nonobjective Objectivity 
 The objectivity and scientific nature of the historical sciences of the 1950s to 
the 1970s provided an important boon to the State of Israel in more than just the 
confirmation of foundational myths. As in other newly-created states, a thriving and 
respected academic community was a means to international recognition as a 
modern, industrialized and Western state. Neutrality is thus as much a political asset 
as it is a mark of scholarly rigour (Feige 2007, 290). The degree to which those who 
continue to believe in an objective and value-free archaeology oppose attempts at 
infusing post-modernist and literary approaches into the study of the material 
remains from the Levant is therefore not surprising. Its importance is palpable in 
William Dever’s polemic against such experiments: 
“I [William Dever] have fought all of my professional 
life to keep religion, politics, and nationalism out of 
Near Eastern archaeology, and now I see zealots and 
demagogues (what a colleague calls ‘cultural 
beserkers’) dragging these pernicious elements in via 
the back door.” [original emphasis] (Dever 2005, 419) 
 
What prompts this outburst are the attacks leveled by some sections of the 
discipline against the mainstream narrative of a 10th century BCE United Kingdom in 
Israel. Dever admits that some of these criticisms are based on literary and non-
traditional approaches to the Biblical narrative, but that others have been produced 
by contemporary political and ideological positions as regards the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict (Dever 2005, 415–16). The salience or soundlessness of his critics’ points of 
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view notwithstanding, it is apparent that Dever himself is taking a value-laden 
position with respect to critiques of the traditional chronology, qualifying those who 
promote them as “zealots and demagogues” rather than dissident scholars. 
Objectivity, too, can engender flaring passions normally reserved for the subjective 
and emotional. 
 It is not just the tone of Dever’s comments that raise the question of 
ideological neutrality’s supposedly objective stance. In addition to bemoaning the 
infiltration of ideology into Biblical archaeology, Dever has also decried the 
discipline’s turn away from American dominance and expertise (Silberman 1998, 
177). A diversification of narratives and opinions has been accompanied by a 
widening of practitioners and schools, ending American preponderance in the 
human capital responsible for both the excavation of Biblical sites and the 
interpretation of material remains found therein (Silberman 1998, 185). Objectivity 
has long been the gold standard of the American historical sciences; a monumental 
pursuit that guaranteed the apolitical nature of the discipline and its continued 
professionalization (Novick 1988). We can thus question if objectivity as a belief is 
not a particularly American one, expressive of American views of the world and 
evaluations of source materials and interpretations. A defense of objectivity thus 
becomes a fight for the continued American grip on our understanding of the Bible 
and its historicity, not a struggle for the soul of the discipline and academia in 
general. As this hold loosens, so too does the secular vulgarity of the once-sacred 
text.  
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A Return to God’s Country 
 The de-sacralization of a religious text implied by objective approaches is, of 
course, not an irreversible process. Texts remain in public circulation and can always 
become the objects of contention and struggle between disparate social forces. The 
Bible, as one of the most, if not the most, widely published books on Earth is far 
from immune from this process. Despite the considerable efforts of the Zionist 
movement in the pre-1967 period to temporalize and concretize Biblical narratives 
as a basis for the State of Israel’s contemporary existence, post-1967 Israeli society 
saw the reinvigoration of their holy nature within public political discourse. As Rabbi 
Kook, the spiritual leader of Gush Emunim (a group dedicated to the settlement of 
the occupied West Bank by Jews (Feige 2007, 280)) and son of the Chief Rabbi of 
Mandatory Palestine, justified the settlement movement: “We find ourselves here 
by virtue of our forefathers’ inheritance, the foundation of the Bible and history, and 
there is no one that can change this fact.” (Masalha 2000, 115) In the second half of 
the 20th century, then, the Bible had once again been separated from the temporal 
discipline of history and divested of the earthly interpretations accorded it by 
philology, archaeology and anthropology. The process is not much different from 
that experienced by other holy texts, including the Qur’an (Ziadeh-Seely 2007, 342–
43). 
 To be certain, a return to idealism and mystically-infused Biblical narratives is 
not the only trend that is noticeable in contemporary treatments of the Scriptures 
and related physical sites. As Silberman has pointed out, a neo-liberal push to exploit 
the hard-currency earning potential of historical attractions has given birth to a 
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different interpretation of the value of archaeology and the past. This “strictly 
utilitarian archaeology” is no longer intended to act as a tool of ideological 
movements or as a purge of non-objective elements of the social and human 
sciences. Rather, it is to be ideologically ambivalent and epistemologically agnostic, 
responding instead to “domestic politics and the hope for economic benefit.” 
(Silberman 1995, 259–60) Here, neutrality and objectivity in archaeological and 
anthropological praxis might find a convenient bedfellow in profit-maximization 
motivations, as the desire to avoid offending potential tourists and clients induces 
those responsible for excavations and the interpretation of material results to 
eschew views perceived as highly controversial or prejudicial (Baram 2007, 306–
307). Capitalism, ever dependent on positivism and materialism, may prove to be 
more successful than Marxism or scientific neutrality in providing a counterweight to 
a return to tendentious uses of the historical sciences.  
 
Ideation and the World 
 This chapter has explored the manner in which changes in linguistics, 
archaeology and anthropology relate directly to ideational components inherent in 
the human and social sciences. Some practitioners have openly embraced these 
components, engaging in post-modernist critiques of the disciplines and 
endeavouring to make explicit the subjective nature of interpretation and 
hypotheses. While not a core component of modern historical linguistics and 
comparative philology, the worldview of past civilizations and cultures is now 
understood by both archaeologists and anthropologists as being a crucial aspect of 
understanding both the social organization and material remains of communities 
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now long disappeared. This perception of life and reality can be broadly subsumed 
under the term ‘ideology’, a word that is rife with controversy and dispute. Rather 
than tackle the definition of the term within the context of this brief outline of the 
human and social sciences, I will address it in a much more comprehensive manner 
in the next chapter, in which its evolution and appearance in both the Turkish and 
Soviet cases are explored in full. 
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Ideology 101 
“But why call this unity of faith ‘religion’ 
and not call it ‘ideology’ or ‘politics’?” 
(Gramsci 1977b, 2:868) 
 
 In structuring my research question, I have emphasized that it is the impact 
of state-sponsored ideology, rather than political goals, that I seek to track through 
historical narratives. Such a structure begs the question: what exactly is ideology? In 
this chapter, I will seek to provide an answer. My purpose is twofold. First, I will 
explore the definition of ideology and its evolution up to the 1930s. This is indeed 
ambitious, and the scope of my exploration will be heavily biased towards Marxist 
sources as both a heuristic for the concept, and groundwork for the second aim of 
this chapter. More specifically, the last two-thirds of this section will construct the 
conceptual framework for the histories I examine in the core of the thesis. It will 
outline the dominant ideologies of both the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey 
prior to and during the period in question. Again, such topics are broad and merit 
several doctoral projects in their own right. I have opted to focus, in my creation of a 
cohesive definition, on the peculiarities of dominant ideologies with respect to the 
history and historiography of the nation. Questions of the ontology, epistemology 
and historicity of the nation will be brought to the fore in the search for a theoretical 
structure upon which to understand and evaluate the interplay of ideology and 
history writing in the Soviet Union and Turkey. 
Throughout this chapter, I have consciously omitted contemporary analysis 
of ideology; this omission extends back to 1945. This is because the thinkers who 
shaped our understanding of ideology prior to 1937 also contributed considerably to 
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the enunciation of Stalinism and what I call Gökalpian nationalism. While 
contemporary analysis of ideology would be helpful in positioning us vis-à-vis the 
objects of study, and reveal our own biases and prejudices, it would not, in my view, 
enrich the methodological framework upon which I dissect the two metanarratives. 
Our journey towards this end begins with a brief definition of ideology for the 
purposes of historiography. It is followed by a historical contextualization of ideology 
that will examine both its development and the evolution of our understanding of 
the concept. This provides a gateway into the discussion of Soviet Marxist, and 
eventually Stalinist, ideology, and Turkish nationalist worldviews. By the end of the 
chapter, we will have sufficient knowledge of the ideological frameworks in both 
countries to proceed to an examination of the historiographies themselves.   
 
Ideology: A Definition for Historiography 
 Ideology, similar to many other objects of academic investigation, is a 
concept for which competing definitions exist. By and large, I accept the one put 
forward by Peter Novick in his study on the quest for objectivity in American 
historiography. In it, he calls ideology “an overarching, and at-least-tacitly-coherent 
outlook on the world.” This world-view or Weltanschauung, to use the German 
expression, is multifarious, and includes components that extend into science, the 
arts, gender relations and roles, philosophy, governance, justice, economics, religion 
and a host of other realms. In order to make the application of the concept to 
historiography more manageable, Novick describes its mapping to the social and 
political components of a polity as consisting of three components: “(1) a picture of 
the way the world is; (2) a picture of the way the world ought to be; (3) a set of 
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propositions about the relationship between the first and the second. (The third 
element has several dimensions: sheer distance, getting closer or getting farther 
apart, moving slowly or rapidly, evolving smoothly or requiring ruptures, etc.)” 
(Novick 1988, 61–62). To be certain, this scheme is influenced by the area in which 
Novick constructs it; namely, the late 19th and 20th century United States. 
Nevertheless, I believe that it is loose enough to be applied to my regions of interest 
when a fourth aspect is included in the set: a statement about the acceptable 
sources of technologies to measure the gap between (1) and (2). With this, we can 
say that ideology includes an ontology (the first two parts of Novick’s definition), an 
epistemology (part three) and a mechanism of evaluation that permits the evolution 
of the epistemology in a fairly coherent fashion.  
 
Marx’ Contribution 
 As an ideal object, ideology has been the subject of debate by philosophers 
and other theoreticians throughout the 19th and 20th century. Its origins can be 
found in the French Enlightenment thinker Antoine Destutt de Tracy, for whom its 
definition was far from uniform. It vacillated between a science of ideas and a 
particular political framework associated with liberal, anti-clerical bourgeois 
elements in France. Eventually, it was adopted as a term of derision by Napoléon 
and his cadres for those intellectuals more concerned with theory than actual 
practice (Vincent 1992, 1–3). 
Even within broad intellectual currents, such as Marxism, disputes regarding 
the nature and evolution of ideology exist. As Tom Rockmore explains, “there are at 
present some 100 distinguishable views of ideology, many of which are 
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incompatible.” (Rockmore 2002, 80) Across the various strands of Marxism, too, 
there is no consensus on what ideology might be. This is, in part, the result of a long 
delay in the publication of a coherent and explicit text in which Marx analyzed the 
concept. In those publications that were available to the general public, he 
addressed a variety of aspects of ideology, occasionally using the term itself and 
occasionally not. This has given rise to a confused grouping of references that do not 
appear to give a wholly satisfying definition of ideology free from contradiction. 
Nevertheless, students of Marx and his writings have managed to piece together a 
reasoned guess regarding his view of the concept (Larrain 1991, 7–8). By and large, 
Marx’ approach to ideology was a critical one, intended to dissect components of 
specific historical periods and to explain their role within the development of 
productive forces and the latent class struggle. It was a negative one, which Jorge 
Larrain describes as follow: 
“[T]his negative dimension is always utilised for the critique of a specific 
kind of error which is connected in one way or another with the 
concealment or distortion of a contradictory and inverted reality. It is in 
this sense both a restricted and historical concept: restricted because it 
does not encompass all kinds of errors and because not all the ruling 
ideas are affected by it; historical because it depends on the evolution of 
contradictions… It [ideology] only emerges when ideas are related to 
changing contradictions in specific ways. So non-ideological ideas may 
become ideological and vice versa.” (Larrain 1991, 42) 
 
In Larrain’s reading, then, Marx envisioned ideology as a mystifying factor intimately 
tied to the conditions of a specific, historical society. We see then that if ideology is 
meant to conceal the contradictions and paradoxes of a given time, it must 
necessarily be described in historical terms: 18th century French ideology; 19th 
century Sicilian ideology. Beyond this, the components of that ideology are varied: 
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while God might be a core ideological concept in Mediaeval Rome, it might be 
replaced by the nation, and de-ideologized, in 19th century Bremen.  
 
The First Marxists’ Debate 
 In the decades following Marx’ death in 1883, Marxian writers did not 
immediately latch onto the concept of ideology as one in need of elaboration, 
preferring instead to focus on the development of historical materialism and the 
dialectic. Engels did expand it to include a class component, implying that ideologies 
were not only restricted by place and time, but also by the social class that employed 
them to mystify the contradictions chipping away at its own hegemony (Larrain 
1991, 53). Successive Marxists again touched on the issue, but were in agreement 
neither on the need for consensus nor for a deep and comprehensive study of the 
topic. In large part, ideology was analyzed in conjunction with other components of 
the superstructure and was discussed within the context of debates over economic 
determinism, social and political Darwinism, and the role of consciousness in 
historical development. The inaccessibility of Marx and Engels’ The German Ideology 
is largely to blame for this state of affairs. Confusion between the terms ideology 
and idealism also created difficulties in determining whether discussants were 
arguing over a component of the superstructure or the dichotomy between 
materialism and idealism. To this we might add a confusion between ideology as a 
particular form of thought, and ideology as the totality of consciousness in a given 
society; a common feature of some late 19th century Marxists’ writings, such as 
those of Plekhanov (Larrain 1991, 55–63).  
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 In order to see how the concept of ideology truly became an issue of Marxian 
creativity, rather than interpretation, we must turn to The German Ideology, 
published for the first time in Moscow in 1932. As its name would suggest, it 
contains the closest we have to a Marxian definition of ideology. This definition 
stemmed from Marx’ theory of alienation, whereby man is alienated from his true 
nature through the division of labour and the commodification of the fruit of his 
productivity (Fleischer 1973, 15). As Rockmore paraphrases from the work, “ideology 
is a theory of the production of false consciousness tending to mislead observers 
about the nature of the social world.” (Rockmore 2002, 78–80) Marx believed that 
ideas are linked to the social surroundings in which they are produced. Ideology, 
then, is the result of an alienation of ideas from their social supports, resulting in an 
inversion of reality. In other words, rather than empirical facts being used to inform 
abstract ideas, ideology represented the application of abstract concepts to shape 
our understanding of the empirical world (Rockmore 2002, 84–85). From this it 
should be apparent that what writers gleaned from available works prior to 1932 
was not terribly different from that which appears in The German Ideology, although 
the latter was much more self-evident than bits of information pieced together from 
various texts. Moreover, it implies that positive definitions of ideology, such as those 
that will be explored below, would have been quite controversial had they been 
enunciated when The German Ideology was freely available.  
 
Lukács and History and Class Consciousness 
 An important turning point in the Marxist understanding of ideology came 
through the writings of Vladimir Ilich Lenin during the last five years of the 19th 
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century and the first two decades of the 20th (Larrain 1991, 63). Nevertheless, Lenin’s 
contribution to the debate is of even greater importance for the development of 
Stalinism, the dominant ideology of the Soviet Union that I will investigate in detail 
below. For this reason, I will now turn to another figure whose intellectual products 
helped establish the transition from the Second to the Third Internationals: the 
Hungarian Marxist Lukács György. 
 Lukács’ greatest work of Marxist thought, History and Class Consciousness, 
provides us with an insight into his understanding of ideologies and, more 
importantly, Marxism’s position vis-à-vis the ideal concept. Lukács rejects the idea 
that Marxism’s value lies in its propositions, focusing more on the method inherent 
in Marxian approaches: dialectical materialism. The dialectic teaches individuals that 
both subject and object influence one another, and thus that the categories, 
typologies and theorems employed in bourgeois science – and, by extension, every 
other type of science – are malleable and fluid. Marxism is not an ideology similar to 
fascism, liberalism or Catholic action, because it insists on the ephemerality and 
permeable nature of definitions and explanations. Epistemologies and ontologies 
uncovered by any other means are historically contingent and mystify the true 
contradictions underlying the social order (Lukács 1971, 4). It is important to point 
out, at this juncture, that Lukács does not limit his criticism to expressions of a purely 
philosophical nature, but takes aim directly at the supposedly neutral and objective 
sciences. These, he argues, are necessarily ideological in their insistence that the 
contradictions in capitalism are the product of a still incomplete body of scientific 
knowledge, rather than being inherent in capitalism itself (Lukács 1971, 10). Unlike 
Novick, then, he sees objectivity as more than just a fallacious heuristic, but also as a 
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weapon in the class struggle destined to continue until humanity achieves full and 
real consciousness. 
 It is later in History and Class Consciousness, in the essay “Legality and 
Illegality”, that we have Lukács’ explicit statement about Marxism and historical 
materialism as an ideology: 
“Marxism is the doctrine of the revolution precisely 
because it understands the essence of the process (as 
opposed to its manifestations, its symptoms); and 
because it can demonstrate the decisive line of future 
development (as opposed to the events of the 
moment). This makes it at the same time the 
ideological expression of the proletariat in its efforts to 
liberate itself.” (Lukács 1971, 258–59) 
 
Ideology is now an entirely positive concept, a tool to be used by the proletariat in 
breaking through capitalist order and realizing its own liberation. No longer is it 
merely a means of obscuring the true social relations underlying a communal 
existence, but it is a weapon wielded in the name of oppression or freedom, 
obscurantism or consciousness. It is here, too, that Lukács exposes the difference 
between politics and ideology with particular reference to those Marxists who 
engage in parliamentarianism and opposition activities. Novick divides ideologies 
into dominant, accommodationist and oppositional, but Lukács clearly lumps the 
first two into the arena of political conflict. Those who accept the system maintained 
by the ruling class – including its concepts of legality and illegality – inherently accept 
its ideology. A true shift in ideology does not mean reacting to the system imposed 
by the dominant class as much as refusing to accept its perpetual legitimacy. Rather 
than a delusional refutation of the actuality of the dominant and reified concepts, it 
implies a belief in the inherent mutability of one’s understanding about the world 
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and how one might explain it (Lukács 1971, 262–63). Ideology, therefore, is not a 
priori a mystification of the world, as much as a frame of mind that might be harmful 
or helpful in quickening the pace of historical social development. 
Nevertheless, Lukács’ own conception of ideology and the role of the 
dialectic in exposing it appears to belie an inherent universalism that would become 
part and parcel of later Stalinist understandings of history. In returning to Marx, he 
argues that all of the partial components of society can be found, in isolation, in the 
totality of any given society. It is their arrangement and presentation – which in part 
implies the ideology of the society – that is historically contingent (Lukács 1971, 8–
10). In this manner, the apparent absence of a particular phenomenon in a particular 
society, such as slavery, tithes, guilds or patriarchy, is a matter of ideology, and one 
need only to dig deep enough, to apply the dialectic rigorously enough, to make 
them appear. Lukács’ understanding, then, appears to contain a particularly 
troublesome contradiction, as it insists on the finality of the definitions and 
typologies arrived at in the final stage of human development, Communism. This 
contradiction, however, would either be accepted or ignored by future Soviet writers 
on the concept of ideology. 
 
Gramscian Creativity 
 The final non-Soviet Marxist, or Marxian, thinker whose writings on ideology 
that I will treat is the Italian Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci is unique in part because of 
his relative isolation from the debates on Marxist interpretations of concepts in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s. It was during this period that he was imprisoned by the 
Fascist authorities in Italy and was forced, therefore, to reflect on society without 
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the interference of political squabbles (Gramsci 1977a, xxiii-xiv). Similar to Lukács 
and Lenin (as we shall see later on), Gramsci conceived of ideology in positive terms, 
positing it as both a system of beliefs or views of the world, as well as a code of 
conduct that motivates individuals to act in accordance with the system. This had 
been missed, according to Gramsci, because scholars had split ideology in two, 
seeing it as either “the necessary superstructure of a given base” or “the arbitrary 
elucubrations of a given individual” (Gramsci 1977b, 2:868). He thus identifies 
ideology as not simply a product of the mind, but one of action, too, that manifests 
itself in the daily interactions of individuals with their fellow humans (Gramsci 
1977b, 2:1217). He provides us with a fairly concise definition when writing on the 
topic of religion: 
“It can be called an ‘ideology’, if by ideology one gives 
in fact the meaning above of a conception of the world 
that is manifested implicitly in art, in law, in economic 
activity, in all of the individual and collective 
manifestations of life.” (Gramsci 1977b, 2:1380)  
 
This conceptualization of the world is not immaterial to the course of history, 
contrary to the belief of those Marxian thinkers, such as Bernstein, who interpret 
dialectical materialism to imply that only the base, and not the superstructure, can 
be of importance to the unfolding of human destiny. Gramsci points to the fact that 
untangling base and superstructure in reality is nearly impossible and can only be 
achieved post factum. Indeed, as Marx argued, ideology is as important as a material 
force, and should be treated together with material factors. As the two cannot be 
separated from one another, Gramsci proposes that the material forces are content 
and ideology the form: the former cannot be physically manifest without the latter, 
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and the latter is meaningless without the former. The distinction that should be 
made, then, is between organic ideologies, which spring from a need of the base, 
and those that are “arbitrary” and “desired”, and serve only to cause polemics 
(Gramsci 1977b, 2:868–72). 
Gramsci further expanded this concept of ideology by introducing new 
gradations in the levels of ideological influences on everyday life. Rather than simply 
a system for the élite – which he labelled “philosophy” – Gramsci proposed that 
ideology could be found in various forms at various echelons of society (Gramsci 
1977b, 2:1378). In its manifestations, it appeared as religion, common sense and 
folklore (Larrain 1991, 80–82). The role of politics, then, was to ensure that the 
system of beliefs and the associate code of conduct remained unified and uniform 
across social classes, inhibiting the sort of schisms that induced the heretical 
movements of the Middle Ages (Gramsci 1977b, 2:1383). In the modern era, political 
structures achieve this through the use, first and foremost, of the press. In addition 
to newspapers, book publishers, pamphleteers and other aspects of the press, 
schools, the courts, religious institutions and other implements of mass socialization 
are key in ensuring that the worldview of the hegemonic classes is inculcated in all 
sections of society, making revolution and radical social change an issue of a 
conscious opt-out rather than opt-in (Gramsci 1977a, 1:332–33). Gramsci might not 
have influenced the course of Stalinist thought, but his elucidations certainly bring 
home the idea that political agents might use the tools of mass information and 
education to reinforce the reproduction of an ideology. 
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Alternative Hypotheses: Durkheim and Weber 
 Discussions on the nature of ideology were not the preserve of Marxian 
thinkers in the 19th century. Marxists have, of course, engaged in considerable 
discussion of the topic because of the importance of distinguishing between base 
and superstructure. Other intellectuals who did not identify as Marxian or Marxist, 
however, have also approached the subject. The French social scientist Émile 
Durkheim provides us with an early example, one that will be important for later 
developments of ideology in Turkey. From Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological 
Method, we see that he did not conceive of the term ideology as an internally 
coherent world view, but as a reliance on ideas and reasoning, rather than empirical 
facts and objective analysis (Durkheim and Lukes 1982, 86–87). The “ideological 
method” of understanding society, history and the workings of the world engages 
only with the “surface of ideas”, a film that obscures the real forces and motivations 
impelling actors to engage in meaningful changes in their lives and those of the 
members of their communities (Durkheim and Lukes 1982, 168). 
 This is not to say that Durkheim did not conceive of something close to some 
of the Marxian conceptions of ideology, particularly when writing on the topic of 
religion. When describing the perfect society that is the end goal of religious 
practice, he argues that  
“this society is not an empirical fact, well defined and 
observable; it is a fancy, a dream with which men have 
lulled their miseries but have never experienced in 
reality. It is a mere idea that expresses in 
consciousness our more or less obscure aspirations 
towards the good, the beautiful, and the ideal. These 
aspirations have their roots in us; since they come from 
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the very depths of our being, nothing outside us can 
account for them.” (Durkheim and Fields 1995, 423)  
 
Nevertheless, this view of the perfect world also contains the evil and the ugly, 
thereby mirroring the gamut of phenomena and experiences of reality. The 
difference lies in the fact that these phenomena are intensified in their character 
and attributed qualities and powers that are far beyond the possibilities of ordinary 
humans. For Durkheim, this comes from the “effervescence” of conscious thought 
and morality borne out of social existence: “the collective ideal that religion 
expresses is far from being due to some vague capacity innate to the individual; 
rather, it is in the school of collective life that the individual has learned to form 
ideals.” (Durkheim and Fields 1995, 425) Unlike the cruder Marxians, however, he 
sees this as more than simply a reflection of material forces. Religion – and thus 
other conceptions of the world – represents the fusing and synthesis of individual 
consciousnesses, a playing field on which humans, the ultimate social animal, 
express their collective personality and imagination in the formation of an ideal of 
the perfect society (Durkheim and Fields 1995, 426). Rather than a smokescreen 
intended to mystify and blind the oppressed, religion, and by extension ideology, is 
the positive output of humanity’s desire for better.  
 Max Weber, too, exercised considerable influence on the formation and 
development of the social sciences in Germany and in Europe. Weber belonged to 
the German intellectual tradition that produced disputes about objectivity and the 
role of historians, social scientists and philosophers in the determination of truth 
about past and present societies (Bentley 1999, 90–91). It should not be a surprise, 
then, that in Weber’s works we find a distinction between objectivity and 
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subjectivity, with the former the preserve of science and the latter the domain of 
politics, including ideology (Midgley 1983, 31). The social scientist believed himself 
to have been successful in draining his own intellectual activity of insidious 
ideological taints through the application of a scientific method (Midgley 1983, 19). 
This, of course, is not to say that he did not believe there to be a particular role for 
ideology in society, but rather that it was entirely in the realm of the subjective: 
politics. As such, ideology was the set of arbitrary values and ideals that were the 
basis for choices; “extraneous value judgments” that cannot be explained through 
the laws of nature (Midgley 1983, 31). Not all ideologies, or value judgments, 
however, are created equal. Indeed, for Weber, there exists an objective standard by 
which to measure the ethical nature of values, one that requires an evaluation of 
both the means and the ends of political decisions (Weber 1994, 355–57; Roth 1984, 
126–28). The internal consistency of a worldview is, in some ways, of little 
importance to Weber, as what matters more is whether it duplicates or flaunts the 
benchmarks inherent in his own objective ethic. 
 A clear distinction that can be made between the Marxians and Weber is the 
latter’s insistence that there need not be class or material bases for particular 
ideologies or worldviews. In his discussion of constitutional democracy in Russia, for 
example, he distinguishes between the “‘bourgeois’ intelligentsia”, who are 
characterized by their “general outlook on life and level of education”, and the “true 
‘bourgeoisie’, and in particular the large industrialists,” who do not seek to exercise 
positions of power within local councils for the sake of promoting their own 
conceptions of the world. The former he calls “radical ideologues”, speaking 
disparagingly of their idealism and “readiness for sacrifice” in the face of opposition 
 120 
from those with actual economic interests in the expansion of local government in 
Russia (Weber 1994, 34–35). Ideologues, and by extension ideology, thus appears to 
be entirely divorced from the objective, empirical basis upon which sciences such as 
economics are founded (Weber 1994, 42). In Suffrage and Democracy in Germany, 
Weber appears to go even further than those Marxists who eschew ideology as a 
positive concept. More than a mystification of reality, ideology is created by the 
dominated or neutral classes who refuse to see the objective truth of society (Weber 
1994, 90). Thus, ideology is subjective fantasy created not to perpetuate a system of 
social relations for the benefit of a given class, but rather as a means of divorcing 
oneself from reality and avoiding the more arduous task of constructing a 
wholesome and productive social ethic. 
 The preceding discussion has provided us with a definition of ideology, as 
well as a flavour of the intellectual climate within which the dominant ideologies of 
the two polities under study – the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey – were 
born. If I have been disproportionate in my emphasis of Marx and his followers in 
outlining a definition of the concept, it is largely because the explicit nature of 
ideology within Marxism allowed for it to be treated openly within the context of the 
Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that ideology was understood to be something 
that could be managed and employed under the Soviet Communist Party’s reign; a 
statement that finds no equivalent in the Turkish case. With this in mind, I will 
continue directly into an examination of ideology’s Soviet manifestations, with an 
ultimate eye on a succinct but coherent explanation of Stalinism. 
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Soviet Ideologies 
 At the outset of this chapter, I stated that I would examine Soviet and Turkish 
ideologies with a particular focus on the nation and its definitions. One might 
therefore ask how, if at all, the national question came into focus in this 
development of leftist intellectual discussions in 19th century Europe. The answer to 
this is, in no small part, Russia. The universalist tendencies of Marxist thought faced 
little practical opposition from Western European contexts, but their expansion to 
Eastern Europe and beyond created considerable tension. While there were 
undoubtedly a number of points of contention, one particularly unresolvable one 
was the application of Marx’ understanding of the development of human society to 
peripheral communities. Within this was the issue of the necessity of those 
communities to undergo the same paths of development as the German, English or 
French proletariat. More specifically, if bourgeois nation-formation was part and 
parcel of the emergence and progress of capitalism to its ultimate demise, would 
every ethno-linguistic group need to go through such a stage to reach Socialism? 
Russia was a core component of this discussion, as Marx had, at different stages, 
identified it as both the leader of the reactionaries and the most promising source of 
revolt and social change (see K. Anderson 2010). Russian ideologues and socialists (in 
the sense of those operating in the Russian Empire), therefore, were key to pushing 
this understanding further, and teasing out its implications for the national question 
and Marxian thought as a whole.  
Russia was important for a whole host of reasons. On the one hand, its 
government was a steadfast supporter of the reaction throughout Europe, and its 
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people seemed, until the latter half of the 19th century, to have been cowed into 
subservience. Beyond this, however, it was a massive, multiethnic and multilingual 
empire, even more so than the Hapsburg one. Its traditions, and those of the various 
communities that lived within it, both majority and minorities, presented unique 
challenges to the understanding of social progress. No dual monarchy existed, as it 
did in Austria-Hungary, to provide an implicit guide to social and communitarian 
reform (Fowkes 2008, 207–8). This diversity gave rise to various currents within 
Russia’s socialist movements: Bolsheviks, including Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky; 
Mensheviks; Bundists and the Jewish labour movements; and other ethnically and 
linguistically-based groups (Carr 1958, 1:8–9). Plekhanov, mentioned above, played 
an undeniably important role in the development of Marxist thought inside the 
Soviet Union, as well as outside of it. As one of the primary theorists of the 
Menshevik faction of the Communist Party, he fought an often losing battle with 
Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky over core concepts that would shape Soviet policy and 
politics for decades to come (Steila 1991, 2). Despite this, his contribution, 
particularly with respect to the concept of ideology, is greatly overshadowed by the 
father of Soviet ideologies, and of the Soviet Union itself, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. 
 
Lenin, the Party and the Importance of Ideology 
 Why is Lenin such a central figure? As the primary instigator of both theory 
and practice in the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDWP) – which 
would become the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) in the course of the 
second and third decades of the 20th century – he was responsible for converting 
ideology into political and social organization. As Larrain has highlighted, the claim of 
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some socialist states that they have overcome class contradictions implies that they 
have achieved, effectively, a post-ideological stage of development (Larrain 1991, 
45). Such an understanding, however, was never applied to the USSR by its first 
leader, and thus ideology was never absent from early Soviet life. Beyond this, 
however, Lenin’s conceptualization of the role of the Party in spurring and 
perpetuating the revolution allowed for the introduction of a new definition of 
ideology, one that was far more positive and active than anything Marx had ever 
conceived (Larrain 1991, 63–64). 
 Lenin’s concept of ideology was intimately linked to the consciousness of 
class interests. In particular, it was an understanding and vision of the world tied to a 
particular class and, most importantly, expressive of that class’ ultimate economic 
interests. In his elaboration of such a definition, however, Lenin makes a distinction 
between “spontaneous” class consciousness, as in that of the syndicalists, and 
“social-democratic” class consciousness, which is enunciated by revolutionary 
intellectuals. A truly revolutionary and Socialist ideology can only ever be 
propounded by enlightened and progressive thinkers, as the workers themselves are 
prone to being coopted by the dominant ideology. It appears, according to this 
explanation, that Lenin’s ideology is something to be created by an élite and 
imposed upon the masses, a criticism that was leveled by both Kautsky and Rosa 
Luxemburg. Plekhanov, by contrast, accused Lenin of idealism, divorcing his ideology 
from praxis and elevating Marxism to the role of a science “outside of social 
determination”. In defense, Lenin insisted that such a worldview would only ever be 
elaborated through a dialectic between intellectuals and the proletariat, ensuring 
that it would never exist within an idealist vacuum or immune from the democratic 
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workings of the Party (Larrain 1991, 65–68). Still, the Party was to be a separate 
force, one that would help correct the mismatch between spontaneous proletarian 
consciousness and the Socialist ideology of the intellectuals, thereby sparking 
revolutionary dynamics (V. I Lenin 1961b, 451–67, 1961b, 375). Lenin’s writings also 
give the impression of a clear hierarchy in the creation of party policy and ideology; 
one that privileged the organization’s upper echelons, and which would be clearly 
exploited following his death by Joseph Stalin. 
 
Leninism or Marxist-Leninist Ideology 
 In order to emphasize the pedigree and unbroken continuity of Marxist 
intellectual history, Lenin’s ideology was generally referred to in the Soviet Union as 
Marxism-Leninism (Марксизм-Ленинизм). Lenin’s role as the founder of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics allowed him to remain a prophet, together with Marx 
and Engels, of Soviet ideology throughout the duration of the USSR’s existence. It 
was not enough, however, to ensure that his writings and ideas would not be 
massaged, manipulated and occasionally ignored as the State’s dominant ideology 
responded to the needs and desires of the country’s leaders and socio-economic 
conditions. Some concepts did prove durable. One was the conception of Marxism as 
an ideology distinguished from bourgeois ideologies by its scientific nature. The 
result was the elevation of Marxist-Leninist ideology from a mere view on the world 
to a component of the only belief system through which true, objective fact is 
attainable. The similarity with Lukács’ ideas is unmistakable, as the Hungarian 
thinker was influenced in no small measure by Lenin’s writings (Larrain 1991, 68–69).  
 125 
 As one would expect from Lenin’s personal history and interaction with a 
pan-European network of socialists, his ideology rests largely on the foundations 
created by Marx and Engels and elaborated by their various disciples throughout the 
latter half of the 19th century (V. I Lenin 1961b, 369). The particular situation of 
Tsarist Russia – on the periphery of Europe, but still participating in its economic 
development – meant that he devoted greater time and effort to certain aspects of 
Marxian theory than others (V. I Lenin 1961c, 339–40, 1961a, 31–34). In What is to 
be Done? (V. I Lenin 1961b, 453–55), we intuit a different approach to revolutionary 
and trade-union struggles because of the peculiarities of Russian autocracy. In 
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, published in 1916, we see a concern 
for both a new stage of capitalist development and the connections between the 
inner and outer rings of European economic structures. Both imply an interest in the 
Russian situation, as Russia had experienced a burst in capitalist development 
through the importation of capital from Western Europe, seeking higher returns on 
investment within the Russian market. This was substantially different from the 
experience of England and France, where industrialization occurred through 
domestic capital accumulation (Vladimir Ilʹich Lenin 1999, 70–74). Among the most 
important of the issues facing Socialists in Eastern Europe, however, and one that 
preoccupied Lenin throughout the first two decades of the 20th century, was that of 
nationalism and self-determination. While the questions of the Irish in Great British 
and the Polish in the Russian Empire were of theoretical importance to Marx (K. 
Anderson 2010), national aspirations were of pressing practical concern to any 
nascent political party in the three empires of the continent’s eastern half: the 
Austro-Hungarian, the Ottoman and the Russian (Holdsworth 1967). Given the 
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relevance of the nation and its manifestations within state ideology to my research 
topic, it is on this aspect of Leninist and Stalinist thought that I will focus. 
 Unlike Marx, the intellectual milieu within which Lenin formulated and 
developed his theoretical positions was dominated by Central and Eastern 
Europeans, rather than Western Europeans. Moreover, he was far from a lone 
outpost of leftist thought in a sea of competing and disparate intellectual systems. 
By the start of the 20th century, a plethora of Socialist parties from across Europe 
and beyond were organized into a Second International, a collection of thinkers and 
activists loyal to the ideas of Marx. Thus, in addition to non-Marxians of the left and 
right, Lenin’s works were also directed at other self-avowed Socialists, many of them 
from Austria-Hungary or the Russian Empire. These debates often focused on topics 
that Marx had not had the opportunity to address, or on competing interpretations 
of the original philosopher’s system of thought (V. I Lenin 1961b, 349–51).  
 
Lenin and the Second International 
Among the most controversial topics discussed by the Second International 
was support for the Polish national liberation movement, which frequently pitted 
Lenin against Rosa Luxemburg (Vladimir Ilich Lenin 1947b). Although the definition 
of a nation was not a core component of this dispute, Lenin did indeed take seriously 
the matter of delineating and bounding the concept. In his dealings with the Bund, a 
Jewish Socialist organization in Tsarist Russia, he made it clear that ethnic and 
linguistic unity might be necessary for the formation of a nation, but that they were 
not sufficient conditions (Holdsworth 1967, 269). Despite his later denunciation of 
Karl Kautsky (Vladimir Ilich Lenin 1970), Lenin expressed his admiration for the Czech 
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thinker’s conception of language unification as a benchmark of the universalization 
of the capitalist market, rather than as a yardstick of ethnic or national cohesion 
(Vladimir Ilich Lenin 1947b, 566). Given Kautsky’s opposition to self-determination 
and his other points of contention with the leadership of the Russian Social 
Democratic Workers’ Party (K. Anderson 2010, 57), Lenin’s explicit agreement points 
to motivations that were more practical than theoretical. He was well aware that the 
issues of nationality, language and democratic revolution were coming to a head in 
the multilingual and multi-ethnic empires of Eastern Europe and Asia, particularly 
Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Persia (Vladimir Ilich Lenin 1947a, 65–66). He was 
also cognizant, however, of active discussions about the nation within Austrian 
Socialist circles, a fact attested by his decision to direct Stalin to study and refute the 
opinions of the Austrians in 1913 (Connor 1984, 30). 
 
The Nation According to the Austrian Socialists 
  The National Question had built up steadily in the Hapsburg Empire 
throughout the 19th century, with a violent explosion during the revolutions of 1848. 
While initial attempts at national liberation were quashed, the decision to transform 
the Empire into the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary in 1867 partly legitimized the 
national principle (Taylor 1948, 130–39). The issue of ethno-national groups’ political 
and cultural demands was complicated by dispersed settlements and widespread 
intermingling (Bauer 2000, 260-261). This led the Austrian Socialists to propose 
cultural rather than political autonomy, implying preservation of the multi-ethnic 
state while promoting the conservation and development of multiple national 
cultures within its borders (Bauer 2000, 281). Cultural autonomy ran directly counter 
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to orthodox Marxist beliefs that the universalization of language within national 
borders was necessary for the construction of a unified market (Nimni 1991, 18). 
Otto Bauer, a prominent Austrian Jewish theorist and member of the Social 
Democratic Party of Austria, elaborated a comprehensive account of the various 
necessary and sufficient conditions of nationhood. He emphasized the importance of 
a common history – the basis on which a common culture and psychology might 
come about – as a crucial component of nation formation. Common language was 
seen only as the tool for dissemination and reproduction of a common culture 
embodying the shared historical experiences of a given people. Bauer dismissed a 
common territory as a necessary condition for nationhood, as modern 
communications technology (at the outset of the 20th century) facilitated the 
retention of an individual’s native culture even in locations distant from her 
homeland (Bottomore and Goode 1978, 102–5). In short, the nation “is the totality 
of men bound together through a common destiny into a community of character.” 
(Bottomore and Goode 1978, 107) Here, then, we see that Bauer imbued the nation 
with more than simply an economic character: he recognized psychological and 
aesthetic qualities that could not be explained by the division of labour and 
unification of market forces alone. 
Indeed, Bauer’s writings further conceded the disjunction between 
nationality and bourgeois capitalism through the historicity of the nation. Unlike 
Marx, he conceived of nationhood as being a component of both primitive 
communism and the final, emancipatory stage of Communism. Class society, 
whether slave-owning, feudal or capitalist, caused cleavages between the various 
socio-economic segments of a given nation, causing it to disappear from the 
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progress of history. The nation was a “process” and its membership, which was fluid, 
a “reflection of historical struggles” (Bottomore and Goode 1978, 108–9). Bauer thus 
accepted the duration of the nation while rejecting primordialism, and recognized 
that national character, similar to all aspects of identity, is malleable. 
On two accounts, this particular juncture is a profitable one for at least a 
partial introduction to Stalinist ideology. The first is the clear connection between 
Stalinist conceptualizations of the nation and the work of the Austrian Socialists. The 
second, however, elucidates the special nature of Stalinism within the treasure chest 
of Marxism. For Erik Van Ree, both Lenin and Stalin deviated from, or elaborated 
upon (depending on one’s point of view), traditional Marxian thought as constructed 
by Marx and Engels. Lenin introduced notions of bureaucracy and the vanguard 
party, while “[Stalin] introduced crucial deviations from Classical Marxism of his own. 
They mostly concerned the national question.” (Ree 2003, 13–14) It is apt, then, to 
begin this study of Stalinism with Joseph Stalin’s definition of the nation, before 
proceeding to contextualize the maturing ideology within the intellectual 
environment of the inter-war period. 
 
The Stalinist Theory of the Nation 
By far, the most important reaction to the Austrians’ works came from the 
RSDWP. In response to their arguments, Iosif Stalin, a Georgian member of the Party, 
wrote what would become a foundational text on nationalities in the Soviet Union. 
The content of the Stalinist theory did not remain unchanged throughout Stalin’s 
reign, either in general or in its application to particular groups and regions (see 
(Tillett 1969; Yilmaz 2013b; Martin 2000; Kozybaev 1992; Auezova 2011; Hirsch 
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2005). Nevertheless, the core components of the nation’s definition and its 
historicity were not altered and thus provided guidance to generations of historians 
documenting the histories of the Soviet peoples (Auezova 2011, 225). Moreover, it 
was these core, unchanging principles that would be used to determine which 
groups were indeed worthy of being called nations, and which would be relegated to 
gradual assimilation into other collectivities (Hirsch 2005, 277–80). 
 
The Russian Context 
It is important to stress that Stalin’s development of a theory on nations 
occurred against the backdrop of two, rather than one, controversies. First, there 
were the disputes among the members of the Second International, which have 
been described above. Secondly, were the historical narratives and 
conceptualizations of identity current in Russia itself. At the end of the 19th century, 
Western European trends in historiography had been adopted by liberal Russian 
historians. A school known as the École russe, which followed French preferences for 
social history, had become well respected inside and outside of Russia. Their primary 
opponents were members of the pan-Slavist, traditionalist élite, the most prominent 
of whom was the historian Danilevskii. Danilevskii argued for the fundamental 
incompatibility of Germanic, Latin and Slavic civilizations, claiming that they each 
followed their own paths through specific laws of rise and decline (Bohn, Thomas M. 
2003, 203-204). It was, indeed, this second school that posed the greatest ideological 
threat to the RSDWP’s bid for power: Lenin himself had made it clear that Great 
Russian chauvinism was a considerable menace to the success of proletarian 
revolution in the Russian Empire (Vladimir Ilich Lenin 1947b, 576). 
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Marxism and the National Question 
The publication of Stalin’s Marxism and the National Question in Vienna in 
January 1913 was against this backdrop of both rising national sentiment in Russia as 
well as the intellectual disputes of the Second International. Indeed, the Austrian 
Socialists’ ideas had gained considerable traction among the activists of the Bund, 
and particularly Vladimir Medem, who conceived of language, rather than territory, 
as being the defining characteristic of the historically-contingent nation (Traverso 
1994, 106). Added to this were competing Marxist interpretations of the nation from 
within Russia. The former RSDWP member and founder of the Socialist Zionist 
organization Poale Zion, Ber Borokhov, published in 1905 his explanation of the 
nation. It was based on an analogy of Marx’ distinction between “class in itself” and 
“class for itself” in order to distinguish between “people and nation.” For Borokhov, 
it was consciousness, rather than mere collectivity, that defined the nation (Traverso 
1994, 114–15). In the end, however, it was Stalin’s work that was to form the 
theoretical basis for the Bolshevik approach to nationhood. Here, Stalin clarified that 
the nation was “a defined community of people” that is “neither racial nor tribal” 
(“определенная общность людей ... не расовая и не племенная”) (I. Stalin 1913, 
2). He thus immediately distanced nations from primodialized and racialized 
communities, a distinction that would become a trademark of early Soviet 
nationalities policy (Martin 2000, 352). 
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The Four Components of a Nation 
Stalin continued by explaining that although the various nations of the 20th 
century were the products of miscegenation, the conglomeration of peoples was not 
sufficient for the production of national groupings. Certainly, the empires of Caesar 
and Alexander would not be considered nations, as their cohesion was based on the 
military success of the élite, rather than a sustainable community of peoples. Nor 
could Russia and Austria have been seen as such, as a “national community is 
unthinkable without a common language” (I. Stalin 1913, 2). Thus a common 
“popular-spoken language” (as opposed to an “official-clerical language”) was one of 
the necessary characteristics of a nation (I. Stalin 1913, 2). 
Similar to Lenin, a common language was a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for nationhood for Stalin. This was because “the nation develops only as a 
result of long and regular communication, as a result of the shared life of the people 
from generation to generation”; and so a common territory was the second 
condition for the formation of a nation (I. Stalin 1913, 3). It was therefore early on in 
Stalin’s enunciation of the nation’s defining characteristics that he came into direct 
confrontation with Bauer. While both recognized the importance of language in the 
creation of national communities, Bauer’s belief in the efficacy of modern 
communications technology led him to different conclusions on the necessity of 
territorial compactness. Stalin’s definition also provided theoretical support for 
Lenin’s attack on the Bund: as the Jews were a dispersed people without a compact 
territorial homeland and common language, they could not have been considered a 
nation (I. Stalin 1913, 4). 
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The third condition that Stalin established was that of a common economic 
life, or economic connectivity (“экономическая связность”) (I. Stalin 1913, 3). This 
component is a clear reference to, yet vague expression of, classical Marxist thinking. 
Stalin provided the example of the Georgian nation, which he claimed did not come 
about until the second half of the 19th century, with the collapse of “the economic 
isolation of the principalities” and the implantation of capitalism. Thus a nation could 
only be formed through economic unification, even if there was a long tradition of a 
common language and territory among its various members (I. Stalin 1913, 3). 
However, Stalin did not go as far as Marx in making explicit the role of the 
bourgeoisie in this drive for economic community, or in explaining the anachronism 
of a “single language” in Georgia despite the lack of market mechanisms and division 
of labour requiring ease of communication. Nor did he provide greater clarification 
for this apparent point of difference from the Western European experience, 
especially given the frequency of its observance among “nations passing the stage of 
feudalism and developing capitalism” (I. Stalin 1913, 3).  
Finally, the psychological cast of a nation “plays no small role” in its 
distinction from other nations speaking the same language. It is the product, similar 
to the nation itself, of the existence of the collectivity through successive 
generations. Thus, the last component of the definition of a nation is the common 
“psychological cast” of a people (“общность психического склада”) (I. Stalin 1913, 
4). It is unclear just how much of a departure from Marx and Engels this is, as Stalin 
does not specify how a change in economic conditions (the base) might affect this 
psychological cast (the superstructure). More importantly, though, it appears to be 
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in direct contradiction to Lenin’s dislike of Bauer’s focus on the intangible, 
immaterial aspects of nations (Vladimir Ilich Lenin 1947b, 566). 
Stalin summarized this with a concrete and compact definition of the nation: 
“The nation is a historically developed stable community of people, arising on the 
basis of common language, territory, economic life and psychological cast [of mind], 
appearing in the form of commonality of culture.” (I. Stalin 1913, 4) This statement is 
closely followed by a comment on the historicity of the nation and its mutable 
nature: “From this it is fully understood that the nation, like every historical 
phenomenon, obeys the law of change, has its own history, beginning and end.” (I. 
Stalin 1913, 4) Although this sentence appears cursory, it carries with it the whole 
weight of Marxist historical materialism: nations are neither timeless nor primordial, 
and should be understood within the appropriate historical context. 
 
Stalin’s View of Historicity 
On the historicity of the nation, Stalin made clear his adherence to the 
Marxist concept of the nation as a product of capitalism, but he also provided an 
important distinction between West and East. In Western Europe, nations came 
about with the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and were largely 
accompanied by the appearance of states. In the East, the nuclei of nations 
(Germans in Austria, Magyars in Hungary and Great Russians in Russia), formed the 
apparatuses of state power, but assembled multinational empires around the 
centre. This process could only occur where feudalism persisted, and the 
implantation of capitalism was weak (I. Stalin 1913, 7). 
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The subjugated nations in these multinational empires were gradually 
“awakened” by aspects of the capitalist mode of production, such as the press, 
theatre and liberal bourgeois politics (I. Stalin 1913, 7–8). Such language is a 
departure from Marxist orthodoxy. If nations are awakening, then they must have 
been slumbering. If they were slumbering, then they existed before the emergence 
of national consciousness. This statement appears to introduce a contradiction 
between the explicit modernity and implied primordiality of the nation in Stalin’s 
framework. Instead of clarifying it, Stalin is explicit about nationalism being the 
product of the bourgeoisie’s desire to create a protected market for its goods (I. 
Stalin 1913, 8). The pursuit of closed markets cannot be explained wholly through 
the standard Marxist interpretation of nations as a means of perfecting the division 
of labour, and so must be considered a Stalinist innovation. Moreover, it precludes 
the appearance of nationalist forces within economic zones bereft of commodity 
production, as it is difficult to imagine the importance of market protection in the 
absence of perfectly substitutable goods.    
Stalin’s Marxism and the National Question thus provided both a definition of 
the nation and a view to its historicity, albeit based mostly, but not entirely, on 
European experience. Despite cursory attempts at application to the peoples of the 
Caucasus (I. Stalin 1913, 29–30), Stalin made no serious effort to address the 
incompatibility of European processes of identification and evolution to the 
collectivities of Central Asia and Siberia. However, the tract was not initially meant to 
provide an all-embracing theoretical framework for academic pursuits, but rather to 
convince non-Russians of the RSDWP’s bona fides about respect for non-Russian 
cultural rights and aspirations (Connor 1984, 34–38). It was only later, after the 
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victory of the Bolsheviks following the Russian Civil War and Stalin’s ascension to the 
head of the Communist Party in the late 1920s, that it was implemented fully as 
intellectual dogma. Prior to this point, however, its dominance was sublimated to 
the supremacy of Leninist, rather than Stalinist, ideology. 
 
Leninism vs. Stalinism 
 It is important to stress that Leninism and Stalinism developed in two very 
different historical contexts. For much of his life, Lenin was in exile or hiding. Many 
of his writings were concerned with the rise of the RSDWP to power. When the 
Bolsheviks did capture the state in October 1917, the next five years were spent 
negotiating with former enemy states for a complete end to the hostilities of the 
First World War, and then seeking to solidify Moscow’s sovereignty, through the 
Russian Civil War, over what would become the USSR. Lenin died in 1924, granting 
him only two years to implement the construction of the proletarian state. Stalinism, 
however, benefitted from the stability of the 1920s and 1930s, with the gradual 
recognition of the USSR by foreign powers (Ree 2003, 33–34). Rather than ascension, 
it was concerned with consolidation, particularly following Stalin’s attainment of the 
highest post in the Soviet Union in 1928. Both Leninism and Stalinism underwent 
changes through the course of their lives as ideologies, but the former did so largely 
as the worldview of the dominated classes, while the latter developed as the system 
of the dominant class in an authoritarian, if not totalitarian, state (Ree 2003, 1–3; 
Fitzpatrick 2000, 2).   
 The nature of Stalinism has long been a source of disagreement among 
Western Sovietologists. The relative ease with which Soviet political and economic 
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statistics could be acquired by American and European scholars, compared to 
cultural and social data, prioritized economists’ and political scientists’ definitions of 
it as a political system. The collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991, however, has 
helped change this picture dramatically, converting Stalinism into a “culture” in the 
eyes of many contemporary researchers (Fitzpatrick 2000, 2–3). This shift in thought 
has re-cast Stalinism as an attempt to radically change Soviet citizens’ perceptions of 
themselves and of the world around them; in other words, a state-sponsored 
ideology. Sovietologists of the 1970s onwards have tended to agree that 1929 marks 
a watershed in the implementation of a new conceptualization of Soviet government 
and society. They generally disagree, however, on whether this was truly socialist 
(i.e. in the footsteps of Marx, Engels and Lenin), or if it represented a reactionary 
movement that cemented a fossilized bureaucracy of former proletariats with 
socially conservative views in a dominant position over peasants and intellectuals 
alike (Kotkin 1997, 2–4). 
 Stephen Kotkin points out that Stalinism can be viewed as a left-wing 
reaction to the gradual drift of Soviet society towards the centre of the political 
spectrum during the 1920s. The New Economic Plan (NEP) had allowed for the 
return of private enterprise and the market, sparking questions about the course of 
the revolution. Stalin was well versed in both Bolshevik bureaucracy and in Leninist 
thought, allowing him to capitalize on this discontent and ascend to the heights of 
Soviet power by 1928, bringing with him a new emphasis on Marxist-Leninist 
ideology (Kotkin 1997, 16–17). It should not be a surprise, then, that the period of 
1928 to 1937 should be marked by a tightening of control over the various aspects of 
state-citizen interaction, both through the bureaucratization of all aspects of Soviet 
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life, and the infusion of ideological orthodoxy – as determined by Stalin – into 
intellectual and popular endeavours (Kotkin 1997, 356–57). Within this, emphasis 
was placed on scientific objectivity, congruent with the régime’s belief in the power 
of the pure sciences for the generation of rapid progress towards Socialism. This, 
however, was not a resurgence of positivism, in which science would influence 
politics and worldview, but a direct and calculated attempt to feed ideology into 
science, which was in turn fed back into society at large as a means of further 
legitimizing the state’s ideological stance (Pollock 2006, 2–3; Andrews 2003, 126–
27). This obsession with objective, scientific approaches to the construction of Soviet 
society was far from absent in ideological considerations regarding the nation, as we 
shall see in the fate of the term throughout the 1920s and 30s (Pollock 2006, 4). 
 
A Brief Window of Pluralism 
In the 1920s, it was far from a foregone conclusion that Stalinist 
interpretations of the nation would become Soviet orthodoxy. During this decade of 
eclecticism in official policy, both Marxist and non-Marxist historical narratives were 
written for the peoples of the Soviet Union (Margulis 1993, 129). Histories of the 
Ukraine were composed by both a Marxist historian, Iavorskii, and a non-Marxist 
Ukrainian historian, Hrushevskii (Tillett 1969, 38–39). In Central Asia, too, the initial 
years following the end of the Russian Civil War (1917-1922) were remarkable for 
intellectual pursuits of a variety of persuasions (Kudaibergenova 2013, 161). 
Historians such as the Russian Chuloshnikov and the Kazakh Tynyshpaev, who had 
been involved with the nationalist Alash Orda movement, sought to replace 
politically suspect works on the history of the Kazakhs by pre-Revolutionary authors, 
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albeit without reference to a strictly Marxist schematic (M. Tynyshpaev 2002, 10–
12). They were complimented by Asfendiiarov, who was a Marxist and a disciple of 
the Russian Marxist historian Pokrovskii (Nusupbekov 1989, 334). It should be 
evident, then, that the eventual dominance of the Stalinist thesis, rather than any 
other formulation of the nation, was not the product of a dearth of alternative 
schools of thought. 
 
Group Hierarchy 
By the late 1920s, however, official circles in the Soviet Union began 
preparing for a stricter implementation of Stalinist ideology throughout society. The 
creation of new terminology, and the cleansing of supposedly bourgeois elements 
from academia, served as a means of constructing a new intellectual infrastructure 
for Stalinist social sciences and humanities (Hirsch 2005, 266). This included a rigid 
nomenclature to categorize the various collectivities throughout the country. A 
nation (нация) was a group that possessed all four different characteristics of a 
nation outlined by Stalin, as well as a state. Below the nation came the nationality 
(национальность), which had a national consciousness but lacked one of the four 
determinants. Finally, a people (народность), had some of the characteristics of a 
nation, but lacked national consciousness (Hirsch 2005, 266–67). The use of these 
words to describe specific groups was closely managed by authorities in the Soviet 
Union, as they had political and economic benefits understood by both the Kremlin 
and national movements (Zabarah 2011, 112; Mironova 2012, 87). Beyond this, 
however, the implementation of the new terminology made conceiving of the world 
in any way other than the Stalinist one significantly harder for speakers of Soviet 
 140 
national languages. This was as much an act of accommodation and survival on the 
part of individual members of the Soviet apparatus as it was an imposition from on 
high. In the words of Matthew J. Payne:  
“As [Shiela] Fitzpatrick’s classic studies of the cultural 
revolution, collectivization and everyday Stalinism 
show, the vision of the Soviet state at the highest levels 
matters, but so too do the desires, strategic calculation 
and contingent responses of those who implemented 
them.” (Payne 2011, 62) 
 
Nonetheless, as the French phenomenological philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
has argued, such interventions in language are often the hallmarks of a desire to 
infuse an extreme form of objectivity into speech communities, and an attempt to 
banish agency and subversion from the use of language by individual members of a 
given society (Merleau-Ponty 1969, 9). In other words, Stalinism’s ideological 
stranglehold on Soviet writers and scholars continued to tighten. 
 
The Asian Mode of Production 
The long tradition of debate regarding Marxian thought implied that it would 
take much more than redefining terms to make Stalin’s interpretation of the world 
the dominant one. With respect to the nation and its historicity, divergence was 
motivated partly by Marx’ reference to an “Asian Mode of Production” (AMP) in his 
description of the various stages of socio-economic development (Fleischer 1973, 
18). This comes from the Grundrisse, in which it is listed along with other, strictly 
historical (as opposed to geographical) types of development, thereby introducing 
ambiguity into the position of the concept with respect to other types of societies (B. 
R. O. Anderson 2006, 155–57). The AMP was characterized by two social groupings: a 
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bureaucratic class within a monopolistic state engaged, benignly, in the provision of 
public goods; and a peasant class that provided labour and surplus (Sawer 1979, 20). 
It had initially caused controversy within the RSDWP because of its adoption by the 
Menshevik faction, who applied it to Russia and argued that it was proof that the 
country would not benefit from a European-style revolution. The Bolsheviks refuted 
this assertion, arguing that Russia still exhibited, grosso modo, European patterns of 
development (Sawer 1979, 16). Within historiography, the champion of the 
Menshevik cause, Plekhanov, eventually lost the battle over theory to the 
Bolsheviks’ preferred historian, Pokrovskii, but the larger dispute in the RSDWP 
refused to die (Sawer 1979, 18).   
The AMP was a difficult fit within the five-period organization of history 
established in the Soviet Union. This schema was drafted based on Engels’ 
elaboration of Marx’ work and included primitive communism, slave-ownership, 
feudalism, capitalism and Socialism (Fleischer 1973, 65). Although Marx had written 
extensively on India, China and the Americas, his general focus when explaining 
history had been with respect to European trends (K. Anderson 2010, 6–7). Part of 
the ambiguity described above, therefore, was whether the Asian Mode of 
Production complemented these five stages, and therefore was compatible with 
their historical presence, or if it was a substitute for the some or all of the pre-
Communist stages of development. The AMP did provide an opening for the 
adaptation of Marxist history to regions outside of Europe (Sawer 1979, 24). Such 
modifications were pursued by the exiled Hungarian Varga Jenő, who was influenced 
by Max Weber’s study of China and proposed alternative models of development for 
non-European societies (Sawer 1979, 19). The AMP also challenged the historicity of 
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the nation that had been proposed according to European models. If Asian societies 
did not develop along the same lines as European ones, then it would only be natural 
to assume that Asian nations, too, did not necessarily appear at the same stages of 
development as their European counterparts. In particular, the importance of the 
state in the pre-capitalist manifestations of Asian societies might have implied 
greater flexibility in an understanding of the reasons for nation-formation; a direct 
challenge to Stalinist orthodoxy. It is no surprise, then, that the period of the AMP’s 
popularity among Soviet intellectual circles was short-lived.  
 
The Ideological Vise Tightens 
The 1930s saw the gradual imposition of Stalinism as the only ideological 
option available to historians. The AMP came under increasing criticism from 
theoretical, methodological and political vantage points in the late 1920s (Sawer 
1979, 34–36), and was eventually expunged from all official histories in 1931 (Sawer 
1979, 25). In 1934, the Soviet People’s Commissariat issued the decree “On the 
Teaching of Civic History in the Schools of the U.S.S.R.”, which effectively made the 
Stalinist interpretation of history, and thus the nation, the only valid one in the 
Soviet Union (Menhert 1951, 26–28). Historians who had previously been seen as 
paragons of Marxist historiography (Auezova 2011, 256), as well as non-Marxist ones 
who had survived earlier witch hunts (Sabol 2003, 115), were caught up in the 
purges of 1937 and summarily executed. Even in post-Stalinist Soviet accounts of the 
historical sciences in the USSR, the 1930s are remembered as a time of great 
production, but one when many scholars demonstrated, in the words of the Soviet-
Tajik historian and apparatchik Bobodzhan Gafurov, an “insufficient assimilation of 
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Marxist methodology … and ignorance of the concrete history of the peoples of the 
East” (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 98). Ideological purity was thus enforced at 
the highest price. 
This was reinforced by the official policy of “Socialism in One Country”, a 
product of the power struggle that followed Lenin’s death and the gradual demise of 
the NEP (Carr 1958, 1:24–26). In Carr’s view, this was a necessary result of realizing 
the pragmatic side of a revolution in all three branches of government. His reading is 
based on a racialized view of history that is highly anachronistic to the modern 
scholar. Nonetheless, it still points to the manner in which ideology and statecraft, 
theory and praxis, were occasionally mutually exclusive principles that had to be 
welded together by the Soviet Strongman. In terms of foreign policy, it meant that 
the Soviet Union would no longer seek to export its ideology or its revolution to 
those struggling abroad. This was a realpolitik reaction to the geopolitical context: 
Soviets had failed in Hungary and Bavaria following the First World War; the Chinese 
Revolution of the 1920s had failed to materialize; and Communist parties were 
banned or in danger of being banned across a wide swathe of European and Asian 
states. However, it also allowed for all control of Communist and Stalinist thought to 
remain in the hands of the Muscovite élite (Vatlin 2008, 62). Inside the Soviet Union, 
too, revolution was fossilized and bureaucratized. An analysis of the country’s 
national composition had been completed along Stalinist lines, and the number of 
constituent nations was now firmly established by Stalin’s personal fiat. Pluralism 
and candid exploration in historical narratives posed a direct threat to this control by 
casting the possibility of doubt and diversity into the past, which would only come 
back to haunt those obsessed with total control.  
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Thus, by 1937, the establishment of Stalinist orthodoxy in the Soviet Union 
was complete. The nation was defined by four characteristics (common language, 
common territory, common economic life and common cast of mind) and was 
limited in its application to the period of capitalist production. It eschewed the 
Eurocentrism of the “bourgeois” historians, and replaced this with Soviet-centric 
discourse. Yet Stalin’s own ambivalence towards the historicity of the nation and its 
importance in human development continued to be felt. In particular, Stalinism 
explicitly eliminated the concept of non-historical nations from Soviet Marxist 
historiography, establishing instead a hierarchy of more- and less-important nations 
(Lukin 1963, 443–45). This decision effectively came down in an administrative 
decree from the central organs of Soviet power, rather than through academic 
debate and intellectual exploration. The level of discussion and argument should not 
be diminished: scholars, politicians and activists inside the Soviet Union took 
opportunities to challenge orthodoxy whenever possible. However, with so much of 
the Soviet system tied to nationality – borders (Hirsch 2005, 165), official languages, 
resource allocations, rights to residency and access to official positions (Martin 2000, 
355–58) all became dependent on it – political forces were quick to co-opt the 
ontology of the nation. This ensured that by the end of the 1930s the only 
acceptable national histories were those of the nations that the State had deemed to 
exist (Abashin 2014, 146). Given the dogmatic nature of this particular State, it was 
upon that part of the dominant ideology first written in 1913 that such decisions 
were ultimately made. 
 In contrast to the case of Stalinism, the Republic of Turkey’s state-sponsored 
worldview is far more ambiguous an object. Centralization, ever a goal of both the 
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Imperial and Republican administrations, was far from perfected with respect to the 
intelligentsia. As such, flexibility is required in tracing out its antecedents and 
ultimate genesis.  
 
Turkish Ideologies 
 Just as the concept of ideology is, in itself, a nebulous one, early Turkish 
Republican worldviews can easily be described as amorphous. Unlike in the Soviet 
Union, neither the men and women who formulated the institutions that would 
become the bedrock of the State, nor scholars studying their efforts after the fact, 
have ever produced the sort of comprehensive guide to early Turkish Republican 
ideology that exist for Stalinism or other ideologies. The Halk Firkası (HF), renamed 
the Cumhuriyet Halk Firkası (CHF) in 1924 and later the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 
(CHP), ruled the country from 1923 until 1950, often as the only legal political party. 
It adhered to the “six arrows” (altı ok): republicanism, laicism, nationalism, statism, 
populism and reformism (cumhuriyetçilik, laiklik, milliyetçilik, devletçilik, halkçılık, 
inkilâpçılık) (Zürcher 2004, 181–82). All six of these items carry the abstract noun 
suffix –lik, an indication of the fact that they floated above the fray of common 
practicalities such as “republic”, “redistribution” or “religious law”. While some of 
these could be described as ideologies in their own right, their selection by a political 
party, and their coexistence within its policies, implies that they were used more as 
heuristics for political decision-making, rather than coherent views of the world; 
contrary to what Neşe Gürallar asserts in her study of Halkevleri (People’s Houses) 
and architecture in late Kemalist Turkey (Yeşilkaya 1999, 44–59). Many of these were 
used in contradictory fashion, or were applied selectively – as in the cases of laicism, 
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statism and populism – which only reinforces the claim that they were useful tools, 
rather than cohesive and coherent visions of reality and aspiration.  
Another candidate for the dominant ideology of the Turkish Republic, then, 
must be sought, and I propose returning to the decades immediately preceding the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate in order to find a suitable 
candidate. In doing so, I will explore the intellectual production of a society at first 
stifled under strict censorship, and then suddenly reanimated with the fall of 
restrictions on expression in 1908. I will track the emergency of worldviews 
particular to the intellectual, and then political, élite of the Ottoman Empire and 
Turkish Republic, with the end goal of reconstructing a coherent system of ideology. 
I call this system “Gökalpian nationalism”, a recognition that it may ultimately be 
traced back to the writings of Ziya Gökalp; but one, similar to Marxism, that 
underwent tremendous changes at the hands of Gökalp’s successors (Kaan Çalen 
2016; Dressler 2015).  
 
Late Ottoman Ideology 
 Élite ideology in the 19th century Ottoman Empire has largely been associated 
with Islam, as explained in Şerif Mardın’s work The Genesis of Young Turk Thought 
(Mardin 1994). To be certain, the State and the intellectuals connected to it 
employed different discourses to encourage identification of citizens with the 
Empire, including both Ottomanism and Islamism, but it was the prism of Islamic 
theology and philosophy through which they saw the world (Özön and Namık Kemal 
1997, 87; Kushner 1977, 41). As the century progressed, however, this began to 
change, and new ways of viewing humanity and the world it created, or sought to 
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create, began to creep into the writings of the Empire’s learned class, both at home 
and in exile. Ethnicity, too, became a means of categorizing and separating the 
peoples of the world, with insinuations about the suitability of particular ethno-
linguistic groupings’ capacity to protect the Empire’s interests coming to the fore 
(Mardin 1994, 119). This should not be seen as a complete abandonment of Islamic 
concepts of solidarity and allegiance based on faith, and the organization of society 
according to divinely inspired rules, particularly given the absence of a coherent and 
self-contained understanding of reality to replace Islam in its entirety (Mardin 1994, 
122–24). Nevertheless, there emerged new analyses of the manner in which society 
functioned, or how it should function, and the suitability of intra-faith divisions 
based on language, shared history, and political allegiance. This much can easily be 
gleaned from the writings of the Persian Islamic modernizer Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, 
whose gradual conversion from a disparager of ethno-national divisions among 
Muslims to a supporter of the supra-confessional nation pre-dated his lectures in 
1890s Istanbul (Amara 1984, 137–39).  
 Opposition to the policies of Sultan Abdülhamit II, which had begun after the 
suspension of the constitution in 1878, gathered pace in the 1890s as territorial 
losses, economic malaise and ethnic conflict seriously undermined the stability of 
the Empire. Opposition figures organized themselves at home and abroad, albeit in 
different fashions. At home, dissent was largely expressed within military ranks, and 
was practically oriented. In exile, intellectuals who gathered in Cairo and Paris can be 
divided into the pro-English, liberal camp led by Prince Sabahettin; and a Francophile 
group centered around Ali Rıza (Mardin 1994, 141–47). In addition to these 
opposition elements, there were nationalist groups such as the Dashnaks, who 
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advocated Armenian demands and only occasionally worked with Muslim Turkic 
elements. Although the relative freedom of association and the press in both France 
and British-occupied Egypt allowed for the publication of manifestos and programs, 
it has yet to be proven that these intellectual products had considerable impact on 
dissidents inside the Empire (Zürcher 2004, 88–90).  
 
Populism and the Narodnik Connection 
 Some foreign elements, however, did indeed impact political development in 
the Ottoman Empire. One such influence was the Narodnik movements among 
Russian intellectuals in the second half of the 19th century, when Russian thinkers 
debated intensely the adoption of European culture and political systems. The 
Narodniki (literally, populists) called on the intellectual élite to return to the Russian 
village and to seek out the essence of Russia in its peasant communities. This form of 
populism was ideologically and politically quite flexible, having influenced both 
Communist and conservative movements throughout the 20th century (Zisserman-
Brodsky 2003, 151–55; Taggart 2000, 55–57). Dostoyevsky accused many Slavophile 
populists of the same sin as the Westernizers: that of attempting to resolve the 
practical problems of Russian socio-economic development through the application 
of theoretical constructs. While the Europeanists were disdainful of the masses and 
their lack of contemporary European knowledge, the Slavophiles derided modern 
literature and society as false and empty (Dostoevskij et al. 1998, 11–15). He leaned 
towards the Slavophiles in his own outlook, having discovered the soul and mindset 
of the masses while in exile in Siberia. It was this experience that had provided the 
author with a metaphysical counterweight to the objective and staid European 
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liberalism that had previously dominated his outlook in the Imperial capital (Lauth 
1996, 365–66). 
For Dostoyevsky, the problem of the Slavophile Narodniki was, essentially, 
their reification of the people. Many were content to rely on outsiders’ impressions 
of the Volk rather than to approach them directly. As Reinhard Lauth has put it, “And 
those who called themselves friends of the people, also saw in them an object for 
theorization, and were obliged to recognize that in the final analysis, they [the 
people] were a riddle for them [the friends of the people].”(Lauth 1996, 367) 
Moreover, they refused to admit the historicity of all human populations, and that 
the peasants’ culture, similar to that of the urbanites, had evolved with Russia’s 
changing fortunes. In short, the Slavophiles proposed a rose-tinted memory of pre-
Peter the Great Russia as a solution to modern problems; a solution that 
Dostoyevsky dismissed as flawed. While the issues of the people were pressing and 
their resolution was crucial to Russia’s development, “renewal could only be brought 
about with the new” (Dostoevskij et al. 1998, 18). These debates, and particularly 
the views of the Narodniki, resonated considerably with Ottoman intellectuals and 
reformers, many of whom did not favour an outright adoption of European norms 
and innovations (Mardin 1994, 119). The contradictions inherent in their program, as 
exposed by Dostoyevsky, however, would not be resolved in the Ottoman context 
until Ziya Gökalp tackled them in the second decade of the following century.  
 
Northern Turkic Influences 
Another source of inspiration from the north were the writings and activities 
of Russian Turkic intellectuals, including İsmail Gasprinski and Yusuf Akçura (Meyer 
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2014, 2). These individuals were doubly influential in their exposure to the polemics 
of the Narodniki and their grasp of the practical difficulties of fusing Western, or 
Russian, culture with that of Muslim communities. Gasprinski was a Crimean Tatar 
who worked tirelessly for the expansion of a new method of education that would 
simplify the spread of literacy among the Russian Empire’s Muslim populations. 
Inherent in this were two revolutionary ideas: that education should be directed 
towards secular as well as religious goals; and that education about participation in a 
non-Muslim polity was preferable for Muslim subjects of the Czar to a passive form 
of resistance (Gasprinskij, Akpınar, and Gasprinski 2004, 93–95). Gasprinski traveled 
extensively to Istanbul and Cairo in order to promote Islamic unity, and his 
journalistic endeavours were also circulated in the Ottoman realms. Yusuf Akçura, on 
the other hand, was a Tatar from Kazan and a subject of both the Ottoman and 
Russian Empires. His most important work was Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Three Forms of 
Politics), published in Cairo in 1904. In it, he explores three different systems of 
governance – Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism – before deciding upon the 
appropriateness of Turkism for the Ottoman Empire (Duymaz 1995, 18–22). 
Although they are nominally called “politics” (siyaset), what is under discussion is in 
fact ideology: whether the basis for social organization in the Ottoman Empire 
should recognize political allegiance, religion or nationality as the most natural and 
durable division of peoples into cohesive polities.  
 
The Tide Turns 
 Whatever ideological rumblings that might have existed at the turn of the 
century and might now be perceptible in hindsight were largely hidden from public 
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view by strict censorship in both the Russian and Ottoman Empires. This changed 
dramatically in February 1905, when a constitutional revolution in Russia forced 
Nikolai II’s hand on civil liberties and created a broad new space in which issues of 
identity and worldview could be brought to the fore: the press. Minority groups, 
particularly the Turkic Muslims of the Russian Empire, suddenly found themselves 
with an opportunity to express their opinions on the operation of the Empire, and of 
their communities, in a much more explicit manner (Köçərli 1976, 107; Malikov 1972, 
149). Many of the issues discussed did not relate directly to the Ottoman Empire, but 
they did address political and social problems similar to those bubbling up in the Well-
Protected Domains. In particular, the clash between ethno-linguistic and religious 
identification featured prominently in the writings of Russian Turkic intellectuals 
(Gasprinskij, Akpınar, and Gasprinski 2004, 118; Köçərli 1976, 85; Novruzov 1988, 89–
90; Uyama 2013, 109). These works gradually made their way to Istanbul, Cairo and 
Salonika, among other cities, influencing Ottoman debates too. More importantly, the 
rapid return of authoritarianism on the part of the Czar, combined with an relaxation 
in censorship in the Ottoman lands, would induce many Russian Turkic intellectuals to 
seek refuge in Istanbul towards the end of the first decade of the 20th century (Akalın 
2004, 24–26; Meyer 2014, 1–2; Usmanova 2009, 413; Dumont 1974, 316). This influx 
changed the philosophical landscape of the Imperial capital greatly just before the 
First World War.  
 In the Ottoman Empire, it was military concerns more than anything else that 
created an environment ripe for revolt. Fears of the imminent loss of Macedonia to 
Great Power machinations, combined with Ottoman officers’ dissatisfaction with 
Imperial bureaucracy, led to a revolution in Istanbul in April 1908. Sultan Abdülhamit 
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II agreed to reinstate the Ottoman Constitution, which had been suspended since 
1878. The result was a restoration of freedom of the press and a veritable explosion 
in Ottoman-language publications. The conspiratorial group that had led the 
revolution, the Committee for Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti; CUP), 
was now able to operate openly and legally. The problem, however, was that the 
main motivator of its members who remained inside the Ottoman Empire was the 
preservation of Imperial sovereignty. There appears to have been little connection 
between them, in their base at Salonica, and the exiled intellectuals who were busy 
working on highly theoretical political and ideological projects in opposition to the 
Imperial government (Zürcher 2004, 93–95). The result was a clear lack of a 
philosophical or ideological basis for CUP activities. Indeed, as Mardin has explained, 
both the exiles and the Young Turks who remained inside the Empire were often 
happy in the pre-revolutionary period to engage in personal attacks on the Sultan as 
a means of distracting the public gaze from their own lack of a consistent program 
(Mardin 1994, 151). The Committee, not yet a fully-fledged political party, was 
therefore forced to seek out an éminence grise who would be able to formulate a 
coherent and convincing set of ideals for future activities.  
 
Enter Ziya Gökalp 
 The CUP found such a source of intellectual legitimization in Ziya Gökalp, a 
schoolmaster in the city of Diyarbakır in eastern Anatolia. Gökalp had been a medical 
student in Istanbul in the 1890s who was arrested for anti-government activities in 
1896, imprisoned, and eventually exiled back to his hometown of Diyarbakır. Despite 
the fact that Gökalp had never travelled outside of the Ottoman Empire prior to 
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1919, his residence in the outer reaches of Anatolia meant that he had come in 
contact with Ottoman thinkers who had been exiled there for their own oppositional 
activities. The result was that he became acquainted with European intellectual 
production, particularly in the realm of sociology, in addition to the traditional Sufi 
philosophy of the region. Gökalp was influenced heavily by the writings of Émile 
Durkheim, the French sociologist of the 19th century whose intellectual system 
shaped greatly the emergence of the social sciences in Western Europe (Heyd 1950, 
24). This intellectual journey would have remained intensely personal, had it not 
been for his sudden activity in support of the CUP and its ideals in Diyarbakır in 1908, 
and again in the following year, when a failed counter-revolution led to the ousting 
of Sultan Abdülhamit II (Heyd 1950, 28). Gökalp and his family were invited to move 
to Salonica, the home base of the CUP and one of the Empire’s most cosmopolitan 
and progressive cities. From this time onward, his fate was linked to that of the 
Committee, and his works became crucial texts for the understanding of the 
Empire’s rapidly changing political landscape (Parla and Üstel 2009, 13).  
Gökalp became convinced, thanks to Durkheim’s works, that groups were 
more amenable to modernization and contemporary European civilization than was 
the isolated individual. Whether in politics, economics, education or religion, Gökalp 
believed that the only means by which a society could face the future and develop 
quickly and harmonious was through group organization (Gökalp 1959, 274–75). This 
point of view is evident from his writings as well as his debates with another leading 
Ottoman thinker, Husri Bey. Husri Bey, who later became Sami al-Ḥuṣrī, a prominent 
figure of political Arabism, was an avowed liberal and supporter of the role of the 
individual in the construction of a modern society (Kenny 1963, 231–32). From early 
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on, then, Gökalp was convinced of the necessity of viewing the world as an 
agglomeration of groups composed of individuals, rather than individuals who, 
through their own free choice, sought to associate freely and ephemerally with 
larger social groupings.   
 
Gökalp’s Conversion 
 It is important to point out that Ziya Gökalp’s writings were not explicitly 
nationalist when he moved to Salonica. Indeed, just as the CUP was largely 
concerned with preserving the sovereignty of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
Empire, so too was Gökalp focused more on social organization than nation-building. 
The turning point came in 1912 with the First Balkan War, in which Greece, Bulgaria, 
Serbia and Montenegro attacked the Ottoman Empire. The result was the loss of 
Macedonia and the shrinking of Ottoman territory in Europe to a small area around 
Istanbul and Edirne. The birth of an independent Albania, the first Muslim-majority 
people to declare their independence from the Ottoman Empire, created an ideal 
opportunity for Muslim Turkic intellectuals in the Empire to begin espousing much 
more overly ethnicist and nationalist opinions regarding the population and 
government of their polity. Upon being evacuated to Istanbul, Gökalp, who had 
already been influenced by the heady swirl of nationalist ideologies in Salonica, was 
no exception (Heyd 1950, 32–33). The dismal performance of the Ottoman army in 
1912-13 led, eventually, to a putsch in 1913 that catapulted the CUP and a 
triumvirate of Pashas – Enver, Talat and Cemal – to the head of the Ottoman 
government (Zürcher 2004, 109–10). Although Gökalp was not identified closely with 
the executive, this change in political climate allowed him to exert considerable 
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ideological influence on the upper echelons of the Ottoman state. It also made him 
acutely aware of the need for radical change in the Empire and its worldview.  
 Ziya Gökalp was by no means the only thinker present in CUP circles in the 
last decade of the Ottoman Empire, and neither was his particular ideology the only 
one espoused by Ottoman, or Turkic, intellectuals. In 1909, Ahmet Aǧaoǧlu, a young 
Azeri liberal who had been a student of the French philosopher and orientalist Ernest 
Renan, arrived in Istanbul. Aǧaoǧlu was exceptionally active in political and 
intellectual milieus and was a tireless advocate of liberalism until his exclusion from 
the State during the period of single-party rule (Ozavci 2012). The Ottoman Socialist 
Party was founded in 1910, but was repressed after the 1913 coup d’état (Şişmanov 
1990, 49–53). And of course, there continued to be Islamically-inspired opposition to 
a wholesale switch to nationality-based governance, both from outside of the CUP 
and its model of governance (Zürcher 2004, 131), and within it (Nur 1967). Despite 
all of this, Gökalp’s writings proved to be the most influential for the triumvirate. His 
general ideas about the formation of modern society were further buttressed by a 
critical mass of other Ottoman and Turkic intellectuals who had now organized 
themselves into the Turkish Homeland (Türk Yurdu), a pressure group that promoted 
Turkist and Pan-Turkic ideas at home and abroad (Üstel 1997, 46). 
 
Gökalpian Nationalism 
 Gökalp’s interests were wide-ranging, and his works belie a preoccupation 
with the various components of social activity: education, gender politics, economic 
organization, political structures, the arts, poetry, and especially religion. What 
unites all of these disparate pieces of his considerable corpus of works after the 
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1913 putsch is a steadfast belief that the nation was the most appropriate form of 
social organization for the modern era. Throughout the 20th century, Gökalp’s 
philosophy has suffered from a serious glut of critical analysis, and, as a result, it has 
been twisted and massaged by groups on both ends of the political spectrum 
(Gökalp 1959, 14–15; Kaan Çalen 2016). He has been portrayed as a secularist, in line 
with the standard narrative of nation-building, despite the fact that a considerable 
proportion of his oeuvre, right up to the end of his life in 1924, was concerned with 
religious affairs (Heyd 1950; Dressler 2015). His primary interest was, however, in 
social organization, rather than systems of morality or state-formation. He saw the 
world as naturally divided into linguistically- and culturally-defined nations, and any 
attempt to organize a society according to other means as working at cross-purposes 
with the modernization process (Gökalp 1959, 81–82). Religion, gender, occupation, 
class and political creed were all seen as serious topics in Gökalp’s writings, but he 
was a true nationalist in Breuilly’s sense, as he subordinated them to the nation and 
national characteristics (Gökalp 1959, 100). 
 Ziya Gökalp’s poetry and prose are rich and varied. Within them, his 
worldview and theory of the nation become complex and resonant objects to be 
studied from various points of view. For the purposes of brevity and pertinence to 
my own study, however, I will examine only three particular aspects of what I call 
Gökalpian nationalism: nation by education; the distinction between culture and 
civilization; and the ahistorical nature of national characteristics. “Gökalpian 
nationalism” is in no way a well-established, or even recognized, ideology. It is a 
heuristic that I have developed for the purposes of this study in order to embody the 
dominant ideology of early Republican Turkey. I have sought, as a basis, the 
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amorphous and vague concept of nationalism, for which no roundly accepted 
definition exists, and qualified it as Gökalpian, to denote the intensely personal and 
bespoke enunciation of this former concept by the man whose works we shall now 
examine.  
 
Nation by Education 
 Among the most controversial aspects of Gökalp’s persona is his ethnic 
identity. Throughout the 20th century, academics and the general public have argued 
over whether he was a Turk or a Kurd (Heyd 1950, 21). In his own words, Ziya Gökalp 
believed himself, and the urban residents of Diyarbakır in general, to be Turks. 
Although he employs various threads of argumentation, including genealogical and 
linguistic ones, the most important comes from the realm of his own personal 
development: “I would not hesitate to believe that I am a Turk even if I had 
discovered that my grandfathers came from the Kurdish or Arab areas; because I 
learned through my sociological studies that nationality is based solely on 
upbringing.” (Gökalp 1959, 44) Unlike later ideologues of Turkish nationalism, racial 
affiliation and genetics were largely inconsequential to Gökalp’s conceptualization of 
the nation. Rather, it was education – including socialization – that created nations 
in the past as well as those found in the present.  
Gökalp’s conceptualization of the nation was concerned mostly with the 
present, and as such he rejected the suggestion that a nation should return to some 
sort of idealized past of racial or ethnic purity. Indeed, the very process by which a 
nation was formed implied a mixing of races and ethnicities, and the creation of a 
culture through shared patterns of living and historical experience (Gökalp 1959, 25). 
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In his Türkçülüğün esasları (Principles of Turkism), published in 1920, Gökalp made 
explicit his definition of the nation: “[it is] composed of individuals who share a 
common language, religion, morality and aesthetics, that is to say, who have 
received the same education” (Gökalp 1968, 15). Gökalp’s idea was akin to the 
Hellenistic ideology of 19th century Greece, which did not deny the intermingling of 
peoples in the production of a nation, but claimed that that the nation’s duration 
and essence relied on its core cultural component that allowed for the socialization, 
or assimilation, of new elements (Troumpeta 2013, 151–54). Both effectively 
recognized the reality of centuries of Ottoman rule, in which peoples of various 
ethno-linguistic characteristics had mixed and mingled without concern for the 
purity of the ethnos. 
As education was the basis of Gökalp’s nation, new nations might arise in the 
future: the Tatars of Russia, seeking to create a language and culture of their own, 
might have been on such a path (Gökalp 1968, 17). For this reason, Gökalp saw 
Turkism and Turanism as separate yet interrelated socio-cultural movements. The 
former was an immediate or medium-range goal that would forestall the split of 
Oğuz Turks – Anatolians, Turkmens, Azeris – into separate nations. The latter, on the 
other hand, was a long-range goal, not dissimilar in its horizons from Communism, of 
the creation of a social, cultural and linguistic union among all Turkic speakers across 
the Eurasian landmass. From this grouping the Hungarians, Finns, Mongols and 
Tunguses would be excluded, as their languages and cultures were too dissimilar 
from those of the Turkic peoples to be reconciled with them (Gökalp 1968, 19–20). 
History, then, was a fait accompli for the ideologue of the Kemalist revolution; socio-
economic development something that could not be overcome through appeal to an 
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ethnic core lost in the mists of time. Turkic unity could only be assured through 
education, through a view to the future rather than the past (Gökalp 1968, 20). 
From this, it is a short step to the general theory of nation-building that 
emerges from Gökalpian nationalism. Rather than expunging the nation’s racial stock 
of foreign elements, a task that Gökalp believed to be impossible, the nation could 
only be constructed through instilling citizens of the collectivity with the knowledge 
of their community’s characteristics (Gökalp 1959, 134–38). Nationality is a 
voluntaristic process, a performance whereby those who are socialized into a 
specific linguistic and cultural group demonstrate their allegiance to it and work with 
their co-nationals to its benefit. Such a conception of Turkish nationality would 
permeate debates regarding Turkishness throughout the last century, and the state 
would largely adhere to a policy of nationalization through education (although not 
always in a voluntaristic spirit), particularly with respect to the country’s ethnic 
minorities (Üstel 1997, 162; Gunter 1988, 391). 
 The process of enunciating and educating the nation, according to Gökalp, 
was not quite as unique as might appear at first blush. Indeed, in many ways, his 
calls for a reconciliation between high and low cultures echo the arguments made by 
Dostoyevsky a few decades earlier (Dostoevskij et al. 1998, 26–28). His writings on 
the village and rural life demonstrate that, unlike the Narodniki, Gökalp did not 
romanticize pre-modern forms of rural social organization. In fact, he associates 
these with the Kurds, arguing that Turks have tended to settle in cities because of 
the relative freedom and equality permitted by urban societies (Gökalp 1959, 138–
41). At the same time, he sees no redemptive qualities of upper-class assimilation of 
European culture. If the nation is culturally and linguistically defined, and a people 
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should remain faithful to their nation, then it is not the cultural production of a 
Europeanized élite that should dominate the nation-state. Rather, Gökalp called 
upon his intellectual peers to turn to the Volk as a source of knowledge and 
inspiration in the revival of a truly national culture. It was up to the nation’s 
intellectuals to go “towards the people” and rediscover the basis upon which the 
modern polity should be constructed (Gökalp 1959, 259). While this prescription is 
unsurprising from the point of view of German nationalist thought (Breuilly 2007, 3), 
its combination with Gökalp’s Francophile leanings adds to the uniqueness of his 
nationalist creed.  
But if the masses provide the content for the term “culture”, what purpose, 
then, do the élite serve? In answer to this, we turn to the second component of 
Gökalpian nationalism: the distinction between civilization and culture. 
 
Civilization versus Culture 
 Among Gökalp’s best-known works is the short tract entitled Hars ve 
Medeniyet (Culture and Civilization). Originally published in 1913, it provides a 
blueprint for the modernization of the Turkish nation within the confines of the 
Ottoman Empire. The crux of the work is the distinction between two concepts: 
culture, which is the essence of the nation; and civilization, the accumulated stock of 
ideas and technologies upon which modern societies are based: 
“Beliefs, moral duties, aesthetic feelings, and ideals 
are, in general, of a subjective nature and are the 
accepted norms of a certain culture-group. Scientific 
truths, hygienic or economic rules, practical arts 
pertaining to public works, techniques of commerce 
and of agriculture are all of an objective nature and are 
 161 
the accepted norms of the civilization groups.” (Gökalp 
1959, 97) 
 
This dichotomy between subjective and objective is far from that conceived by the 
Marxist thinkers. For Gökalp, both are necessary for the proper functioning of a 
society, and neither can be neglected by a modern nation (Gökalp 1959, 108). 
Moreover, a strict barrier exists between the two: literary expression can only ever 
be seen as the product of culture, a facet of the national spirit. Whether a society is 
mired in feudalism or is on the cusp of socialization of the factors of production, its 
literature will remain true to the emotions of the nation, unaffected by the 
application of new scientific discoveries and industrial technologies. There is no 
room for a distinction between base and superstructure, nor for a dialectic between 
them.  
 The implications of Gökalp’s distinction for the acceptance or rejection of 
foreign elements is clear. The decision must be based on whether a particular 
concept is subjective – in which case it must come from the national culture – or 
objective, and therefore a component of international science and technology. Once 
this determination has been made, the choice of a native creation or a foreign 
import becomes axiomatic; it is apolitical and divorced from ideology. Religion, as a 
system of beliefs and morality, was firmly placed within the realm of national 
culture, and thus the distinction, in Gökalp’s system, was between Islam and 
Turkishness, not Islam and European civilization (Gökalp 1959, 103). Moreover, while 
civilization is clearly a historical concept, culture appears to be ahistorical, or at best 
semi-historical. The core components that make up the culture of a nation might 
change in name and appearance through the ages, thereby acquiring a history, but 
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their essence can be tracked down to the original social group that first emerged as 
the proto-nation (Gökalp 1959, 108).  
 At its heart, then, Gökalpian nationalism is an ideology that is modernist, or 
modernizing, and yet distinctly anti-cosmopolitan. Its view of the world as being 
divided between the subjective and the objective allowed for two-track nation-
building, incorporating both materialist and idealist elements. In many ways, it was 
this ambivalence towards the materialist-idealist debate that permitted the 
exploitation and assimilation of an eclectic body of principles and methods within 
historiography, as shall be seen in the following chapters. Right now, however, the 
distinction between the sources of culture and civilization provide an ideal starting 
point for examination of the final component of Gökalpian nationalism that I will 
examine: the historicity of national culture. 
 
The Endurance of National Characteristics  
  Although Gökalp was critical of the blind imitation of Western cultural 
practices among the Ottoman élite, it was not actually German, French, Italian or 
British cultural imperialism that he blamed for the decline of Turkish national 
culture. Rather, it was the remains of Byzantine, Persian and Arab cultures that had 
caused the dilution and near-disappearance of Turkic subjective norms from the élite 
of Anatolia (Heyd 1950, 101–2). By separating Islam into its cultural components 
(taken from Arabs and Persians) and its civilizational ones (the objective message of 
Islam about the approach of the individual towards God), Gökalp demonstrated that 
the Turks of the 10th century onward had been forced to adopt both halves of Islam, 
and so assimilated cultural products unsuited to their society, or to modernity 
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(Gökalp 1959, 108). The proper means of national education, then, would be to 
socialize members of the Turkish nation in a culture stripped bare of foreign imports, 
the content of which was not congruent with the values and mores of the nation. 
These would be replaced by the true subjective ethics of the Turkic peoples, 
particularly those such as gender and class equality, democracy and solidarity, which 
were most amenable to European forms of modern civilization (Gökalp 1959, 284–
313). 
 The begs the question, however, as to where one might find examples of 
such pre-Islamic customs and beliefs. To be certain, Gökalp encouraged the study 
and popularization of early Turkic literary works, such as the Orkhon inscriptions 
(Gökalp 1959, 95). The inscriptions, however, did not provide enough evidence on 
which to form a complete code of conduct. To complement them, then, Gökalp 
turned to Mahmut Kashgar’s Shajarat-i Turk, as well as the rites, rituals, customs and 
beliefs of the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and Siberia (Gökalp 1968, 115). Despite 
his attachment to Anatolian Sufism, he did not shy away from seeking examples of 
Turkic wedding customs or household dynamics from Christian and Animist peoples, 
such as the Yakut (Gökalp 1975, 202–4). Nor did he exhibit any hesitation in mining 
the practices of the Kazakhs, Salars, Kyrgyz or Turkmen – all of them nomadic and 
relatively untouched by traditional Islamic statecraft – for his conceptualization of 
true Turkic morality and customary law (Gökalp 1975, 143–46). What is important 
here is that Gökalp viewed the culture of these peoples as ahistorical, not unlike 
Marx and Engels. In contrast to the Marxians, however, he valued this positively, 
identifying the nomadic Turkic groupings as repositories of pure Turkic culture and a 
source of regeneration for Anatolian and Rumelian Turks as a nation. His view of 
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human society was at once historical and primordial, attributing the benefits of 
chronological socio-economic development to some, while denying it to others. In 
the following decades, a similar understanding of the world would prove to be 
exceptionally useful in the construction of nation-state symbols and narratives, 
including in the realm of history. 
The implementation of Gökalpian nationalist ideas began in earnest after the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 
1923. This was motivated, in part, by the transition from multinational empire to 
nation-state, and by the desire of the new government based in Ankara to create a 
tangible break with the previous régime. Gökalp died in 1924, thereby limiting his 
contribution to state-formation. His ideas, however, lived on as the basis of the 
State’s plan for the construction of a Turkish nation, and were reimagined by 
successive waves of theorists and politicians (Uzer 2016, 89–90). 
 
Ağaoğlu’s Contribution and Proto-Anatolianism 
During the years of the War of Independence and beginning of the Republic, 
emphasis was placed less on the edification of a loyal citizenry and more on the 
defense of Ankara’s sovereignty against perceived irredentist claims from Greece 
and the Armenians. In line with President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the 
strongest basis for such arguments was perceived as the presentation of long-
standing national presence in a given territorial space (Zürcher 2004, 144–46). The 
Republican government drafted in scholars, many of them exiles from the Soviet 
Union such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu and Yusuf Akçura, to aid in this effort. Ağaoğlu saw the 
nation as being based primarily on common language, followed by a common 
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religion, customs and kinship. This was reflected in a shared history, homeland and 
destiny; a formulation that was largely in line with Gökalpian ideas (Akalın 2004, 63). 
This conceptualization, stripped of its religious component, entered Republican 
discourse early in the 1920s thanks to the work Pontos Meselesi (The Pontos 
Question) penned by Ağaoğlu to refute Greek claims to northern Anatolia. In doing 
so, he relied considerably on 19th century European Idealist sources, projecting 
backwards Turkish identity onto both archaeological remains in Central Asia and the 
land of Anatolia (Erimtan 2008, 157–60). As might be expected, it was from the 
fiercest proponents of the subjective, including Ağaoğlu, that an understanding of 
the nation and its culture began to crystallize. 
Ağaoğlu’s tract was written in support of the government in Ankara as a part 
of its international propaganda campaign, but it did not form part of an official 
narrative at the time. Similar discussions on the nature of the Turkish nation took 
place in a number of different unofficial circles, including Istanbul University. Here, a 
group of students opposed Turanist ideas that the Anatolian Turks’ homeland was in 
Central Asia, proposing instead that Anatolia be seen as the cradle of the modern 
Turkish nation (Tachau 1963, 167–68). The students’ views were therefore counter 
to both the Turanist ideas of a Central Asian origin of the Turks and Gökalp’s “nation 
through education”, stressing instead the formative experience of miscegenation 
during the Seljuk period in Anatolia (Tachau 1963, 168). This is an inherently 
historical approach to nation-formation, eschewing ideas of racial purity, 
essentialism and cultural chauvinism. Although their writings indicate that 
alternative conceptualizations of the Turkish nation did exist among intellectuals in 
the 1920s, their reach must have been exceptionally limited and short-lived. The 
 166 
students’ journal was suppressed under the government’s wide-ranging emergency 
measures introduced in the Takrir-i Sükûn in 1925 (Tachau 1963, 169). 
 
The racialization of Akçura 
This crackdown on dissent did not hinder the activities of intellectuals allied 
to the ruling CHF. Russo-Turkic and Turkish writers were thus able to continue to 
contribute to an understanding of the nation, particularly through the Türk Ocağı’s 
(Turkish Hearth) historical publications (Behar 1992, 93–94). Akçura published his 
Türkçülük (Turkism) in 1928, in which he explained that national feeling emerged 
from the development of the sense of difference felt by every tribe and clan in 
relation to other groupings (Akçura 1978, 34), a sort of inversion of the Othering 
process explored in post-modernist thought. He continued by arguing that the 
nation is “a human grouping that creates unity and togetherness in social 
consciousness thanks to unity on the basis of language and race (ırk)” (Akçura 1978, 
35). Akçura, however, believed that consciousness of this difference emerged 
amongst the Turks only in the 19th century (Akçura 1978, 36). His concept of the 
nation was therefore similar to Anthony Smith’s ethno-symbolism (A. D. Smith 
1987): effectively a modern object, but one based on much older ideas. Together 
with Ağaoğlu, Akçura made explicit the notion of nationality involving bloodlines or 
race. By now, the idea of the nation being the most appropriate basis for dividing 
humanity was firmly in place, but these thinkers had altered the mechanism by 
which such nations would be ascertained. Unlike Gökalp, for whom a nation was a 
matter of education, both Russo-Turkic émigrés insisted on the importance of 
descent as part of belonging. These racialist overtones were strengthened by the 
 167 
writings of the Bashkir exile Zeki Velidi (Togan)1, who introduced European concepts 
of physical racial types into Turkish historical discourse (Copeaux 1997, 47). Through 
these four, both the ontology and the epistemology of the nation were 
strengthened: the nation was a primordial group; those who belonged to it could 
now be identified in theory, and with Togan’s addition, they could also be identified 
in practice.  
 
The State Looms Large 
Akçura was a particularly vocal critic of attempts at incorporating scientific 
endeavours into the apparatuses of the state. His opposition to state control was 
supported by the President of the Türk Ocağı, Hamdi Şüphi (Tanrıöver). Both men, 
however, were overcome by CHF drives to subsume civil society within the one-party 
state. The organization was eventually absorbed into the Party in 1931 and 
converted into the Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Tedkik Cemiyeti, TTTC) 
(Behar 1992, 96). This allowed the Party and Atatürk to exert direct control over 
scholarly activity and to direct it towards the goals of the state. They did this by 
formalizing the TTTC’s role in completing a task that Atatürk had given to Afet İnan, a 
member of the Ocağı, in 1930: the writing of a new historical narrative for the Turks 
                                                      
1 A note on names: Surnames were introduced by law in the Republic of Turkey in 
1934. Citizens were required, at this point, to choose a surname for registration by 
the government and use on all official documentation. I have chosen to follow the 
standard practice in the secondary literature of putting surnames that individuals 
would choose in 1934 inside brackets when referring to events occurring and works 
published prior to this date. In this way, I hope to provide clarity on the authorship 
of works while also representing the name of the author at the time of publication. 
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that would demonstrate the superiority of the Turkish nation, establish its claims to 
Anatolia, and distance it from the Islamicized Ottoman period (Copeaux 1997, 55). 
The new narrative was initially conceived as a means of aligning school 
curricula with the government’s guiding principles. Indeed, the first Turkish Historical 
Congress, held in 1932, was largely attended by school teachers and officials (Behar 
1992, 119). At the Congress and in the textbooks and monographs published up to 
1932, the long history of the Turkish nation was stressed: a fully formed nation was 
claimed as far back at 20000 BCE (Behar 1992, 110). This timeline, similar to the 
exact definition of the nation, was subject to considerable revision and ambiguity. 
The general lack of available documentation or professionalized historical study led 
to nearly blind reliance on out-of-date European sources. This was compounded in 
the early 1930s by little serious debate of scholarly work in public settings (Copeaux 
1997, 56, 67). Many academics were fearful of being perceived as either anti-
scientific or anti-state should they criticize what was taken to be the official line, and 
thus many of the works – which were blatantly skewed towards the State’s preferred 
ideology – went undiscussed and unchallenged (Behar 1992, 124). 
 
The Use of Anthropology and Archaeology 
 The 1930s witnessed a change in the content of the nation, spurred in part by 
developments in Europe as well as those in Turkey.  The First History Congress 
highlighted a more intensive usage of anthropology and prehistory, as well as 
biology and racial studies, as sources of historical knowledge. Gökalp had 
encouraged the usage of textual supports and ethnographic data for the fleshing out 
of a modern Turkish culture, and to these two tools a host of other scientific, and 
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supposedly objective, mechanisms were added. İnan sought to incorporate the 
brachycephalic skull as a physical feature of Turkishness, pushing the concept of the 
Turkish nation towards a racialized and primordialist one and away from Gökalp’s 
voluntaristic ideal (Copeaux 1997, 52–54). This prompted criticism from the 
established scholar Fuat Köprülü, largely because of İnan’s conflation of race and 
physical characteristics with linguistic relations. Köprülü’s criticism was not extended 
to the entirety of the State-supported concept of the nation, but it did point to the 
spurious employment of a myriad of European concepts for its construction (Behar 
1992, 129–32). By the time the Second Turkish History Congress was held in 1937, 
considerable emphasis was placed on the “scientific” determinants, such as 
archaeological data, biology, craniology and anthropology, rather than the 
humanities. This positivistic foundation for the historical sciences was perceived by 
the government as reinforcing its laicist tendencies (Behar 1992, 174), a need that 
Gökalp had not envisioned in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Regardless, 
the ontology of the nation within Gökalpian nationalism had undergone an 
important shift thanks to the onward march of the social and medical sciences: it 
had taken on a biological component that, similar to the “psychological cast of mind” 
for Lenin and his followers, had never been an ingredient in the original system.  
 
Hittites, Sumerians and Anatolia 
 The Second History Congress was also important for the change in focus from 
the origins of the Turks to their continued presence in Anatolia, which required that 
culture and language be used in close reading with both archaeology and physical 
anthropology (Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006, 385). The Sun Language Thesis (Dil-Güneş 
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Teorisi), which posited that Turkish was the oldest language and the root of all other 
languages, provided the first step towards the appropriation of the achievements of 
peoples whose relationship to the Turks had yet to be proven (Behar 1992, 175–77). 
It was combined with a variety of European sources on the origins of the Hittites and 
the Sumerians in order to claim that the Hittites were Central Asian Turkic migrants 
who had settled in Anatolia long before the arrival of other peoples, such as the 
Greeks or the Armenians (W. Shaw 2007, 180). It necessarily implied, however, that 
the original Turkish inhabitants of the region had forgotten their native language, 
culture, religion and kinship ties to related groups in Central Asia. It thus greatly 
altered the voluntaristic understanding of the nation in Gökalp’s original writings, 
already massaged to a certain extent by Akçura and Ağaoğlu, and made it largely 
dependent on physical anthropological studies of skull and blood types. 
  The new idea of the nation and its historicity, nevertheless, served an 
important purpose for the government. It established the bona fides of the régime’s 
claims to Anatolia as the homeland of the Turks, to the exclusion of the Greeks and 
the Armenians (Tanaka 2007, 67). It also legitimized the government’s attempts at 
nation formation through education and cultural policy, returning, in a perverse 
manner, to the original Gökalpian understanding of the nation. If all populations 
resident in Anatolia had originally been Turks, and only the more recent Turkic 
arrivals had retained their native language, then enforcing the teaching and usage of 
Turkish in all domains of public life would not be repression of ethno-linguistic 
minorities, but a means of returning wayward members of the nation to the fold 
(Çağaptay 2004, 93–95). In this process, the concept of the nation had become 
divorced from its roots in the Idealist, Romantic and Positivist traditions of late 19th 
 171 
century Europe. Gökalpian nationalism had therefore become thoroughly nativized 
and reimagined as racialism married to nationalization through education. The world 
was viewed as having always been divided among various nations whose 
characteristics – physical, cultural, social and political – were immutable. It was 
within this framework that the one-party state sought to mould its citizens into ideal 
Turks, incapable of escaping the destiny written in their blood. 
 
Onwards and Upwards 
 The preceding discussion serves as a basis for the main component of my 
project, an examination of historical narratives written about the ancient Central 
Asians in both Turkey and the Soviet Union between 1922 and 1937. Many of the 
claims included in the ideologies outlined above appear outlandish or patently 
incorrect to modern readers, and might raise questions about how readily or widely 
they were accepted by citizens of both polities. This is not the point of my study. 
Rather, the ideologies form the loom upon which historical narratives were woven, 
and it is according to these structures that the narratives must be decoded. As Yasir 
Suleiman has written on the Arabic language and Arabist ideology: 
“[t]reating ideology as discourse, we may say that 
concepts of national identity are subject to varying 
interpretations by members of the (putative) nation. It 
is ultimately they who can act upon it and convert it 
into reality. Whether they do act on it or not, and if 
they do whether their efforts will be met with success 
or not, is epistemologically irrelevant here.” (Suleiman 
2003, 7–8) 
 
In moving forward, then, I will interrogate historical narratives as tools of 
advocacy for these particular ideologies. Their acceptance by Turks or Soviets is a 
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matter of heated debate, and is best left to others to explore. Instead, I will focus on 
just how these views of the world were enunciated in the realm of history, and how 
such enunciations changed as the state adapted its ideology. 
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Turkish Historical Narratives 
 In this chapter, we explore the first of the two metanarratives that I study as 
the core of this project. In particular, I will guide the reader through a tour of 
Ottoman and Turkish historiography with a special focus on the nation, and on its 
pre-Islamic apparition among the Turkic-speaking peoples of Central Asia. As is 
fitting for a historiographic study, I will do this chronologically, beginning with the 
emergence of an interest in Turkic national history in the Ottoman Empire, and then 
follow it through the 1908 revolution, the First World War and finally the birth of the 
Turkish Republic in 1923. The bulk of the material comes from the period 1930 to 
1937, as this is when the state, in the person of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, directed the 
country’s intellectual élite to create a historical narrative for Anatolian Turks. 
Nonetheless, the antecedents of such cultural products will be explored in the run-
up to this sub-section, in order to create the necessary genealogy of Turkish 
historiography and to demonstrate its metamorphoses under the pressure of state-
based actors. The section will end in 1937, a year before Atatürk’s death, in order to 
coincide with the Second Turkish Historical Congress, the last major gathering of 
Turkish historians and foreign Turkologists in Turkey before the outbreak of the 
Second World War.  
Over this period, I will explore the manner in which the historical sciences, as 
they existed at the outset of the Republican project, were rapidly and thoroughly 
transformed from a budding field of scholars interested in national history into an 
arm of the Republican state’s campaign to inculcate citizens with its preferred 
ideology. In doing so, I will focus particularly upon the use of Turkish identity and 
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national belonging – both its ontology and epistemology – as a core component of 
this campaign. Our path to that end begins some seventy years before Atatürk’s 
passing, in an Istanbul mired in the heavy censorship of the Hamidian period.  
 
Ottoman Turkic Studies 
 Interest in a historical Turkic community was a late phenomenon among 
Ottoman thinkers. History was often seen as a means of legitimizing the ruling house 
of Osman and its continued sovereignty over the Empire. Indeed, many of the 
histories published during the latter half of the 19th century bore titles such Osmanlı 
Tarihi  (Ottoman History), the name of the 1887 work published by the Ottoman 
writer Namık Kemal (Boyar 2007, 13–14). Consciousness of a Turkish or Turkic 
people, united by language and descent across a wide swathe of territory, was at 
first limited to linguistic and literary studies. Central Asian members of Sufi tarikats 
resident in Istanbul provided various studies on the Turkic languages of Central Asia 
for Ottoman intellectual circles, but these were largely concerned with the legacy of 
Chagatay as a literary language (Kushner 1977, 13). Ottoman interest in Central Asia, 
in turn, was largely based on a sense of community of faith that united a people 
under pressure from Chinese and Russian advances, rather than ethnic or national 
ties. Namık Kemal’s call for greater Ottoman attention to the plight of the region, 
and to the plight of all Muslims, was based more on issues of religion than on 
questions of nationalism (Özön and Namık Kemal 1997, 87). Indeed, it would be 
difficult to imagine the opposite, given the absence, to a large degree, of an 
ethnonym to describe this imagined community and its members. 
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 Between the 15th and 18th centuries, the term Türk was generally conceived, 
among the Ottomans, as referring to the rurally-based, Turkic-speaking inhabitants 
of the Ottoman realms. 19th century European studies of Central Asian Turkic 
peoples, however, helped to change these perceptions, particularly as Westernizing 
elements of the Ottoman intelligentsia began to follow European scholarly output on 
the languages and history of Turkic peoples (Şen 2014, 82–83). Ahmet Vefik Paşa, an 
Ottoman functionary, popularized the idea that the Turkish language and people 
were older than the Ottoman dynasty through his work on the Chagatay manuscript 
Shajarat-i Turk (Sofos and Özkırımlı 2009, 53). It was the exiled writer Ali Suavi, 
however, who, beginning in 1869, wrote more completely about the pre-Ottoman 
history of the Turks. Suavi’s work presented the Turkic speakers of Eurasia as part of 
a broad linguistic family, with mutual incomprehension a product of borrowing of 
non-Turkic elements by the Ottomans, rather than differing origins of the various 
Turkic languages (Şen 2014, 83–85). 
 
Ottoman Turkic Identity and History 
 The seed had thus been sown for a new identity and historiography to 
flower; one that saw the Ottomans as part of a broader Turkish or Turkic narrative, 
rather than Turks as a tile in the Ottoman mosaic. This was in part encouraged by the 
appearance of European works on the history of the Turks translated into Ottoman 
during the last decades of the 19th century. Treatises by the Frenchman Léon Cahun 
and the Hungarian Vámbéry Armín fed Ottoman interest in the pre-Islamic, Asiatic 
origins of the Turkic peoples (Kushner 1977, 30). Ottoman writers such as Şemseddin 
Sâmî (who would become a proto-Albanian nationalist under the name of Sami 
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Frashëri) argued for the dissociation of the language and culture of Anatolia from the 
House of Osman. Sâmî proposed instead that they be given a more appropriate 
name – Türk – in recognition of the similarities and common origins that they shared 
with the languages and cultures of Central Asia (Doğramacıoğlu 2010, 257). 
 It is only natural, then, that a narrative would be necessary to unite these 
western Turks to their erstwhile cousins further east. Süleyman Hüsnü Paşa was the 
first historian to provide a comprehensive pre-Islamic history of the Turks in his 
Tarih-i Âlem (History of the World), published in 1876 (Sofos and Özkırımlı 2009, 53). 
The true watershed, however, was Necip Asım’s Türk Tarihi Umumisi (General Lines 
of Turkish History) composed together with Mehmet Arif and published in 1909, 
after the fall of the pan-Islamist Sultan Abdülhamit II (Iggers 2008, 199). The work 
was based largely on European Turkological sources, and was concerned primarily 
with the exposition of Turkish greatness prior to the advent of Islam. As such, it was 
concerned more with demonstrating the superiority of the Turks vis-à-vis other 
Muslim peoples, especially the Arabs, rather than Europeans. More importantly, 
Asım linked the ancient Turks to the Mongols, breaking the link between identity and 
faith, and allowing for the conceptualization of an ethno-linguistic, rather than 
religious, sense of belonging (Kushner 1977, 31–37). 
 
Asiatic Pride 
 A contemporary textbook of world history provides an interesting exposition 
of this shift. The Büyük Tarih-i Umumî (The Great General History) was edited and 
compiled by Ahmet Refik Bey and published in 1909. It consisted of six separate 
tomes, the fourth of which was entitled Muhacerat-i Akvam ve Rumalılar 
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(Migrations of Peoples and the Romans) and authored by Hüseyin Kazemzade. The 
history was based primarily on Chinese sources, similar to the histories of Turks 
written contemporaneously in Europe and Russia. Nevertheless, Kazemzade also 
made use of Turkic epics and legends in order to explain the Turkic narratives of the 
genesis of the Oğuz and their emergence from Central Asia. These legends included 
aspects of the Turks’ Asiatic origins, as well as claims that the Oğuz had accepted 
“the faith of Abraham”. The historical narrative thus stressed the Turks’ Asian and 
Islamic bona fides, while tying the modern nation to the European world through its 
acceptance of European epistemology (Kazemzade 1327, 4:263–64). 
 Of greatest importance for comparison to later narratives, Kazemzade, 
similar to Necip Asım, stressed the Asiatic nature of the Turks as a people. In terms 
of their physical appearance “their faces were bony; their foreheads prominent but 
also low; their chins were sharp; their hair black, stiff and shiny; their beards 
pointed; their skin pale; their eyes close to their foreheads, black and a bit sharp; 
their cheekbones prominent; their upper eyelids small; their heads large and round; 
their necks and napes thick; their shoulders wide and solid. Their bodies were 
generally big and thickset; in relation to their bodies, their legs were of short or 
medium length” (Kazemzade 1327, 4:267). Culturally, these early ancestors of the 
Ottomans also shared in common Central Asian traits. Similar to the other peoples of 
the region – the Mongols, Manchus, Hungarians and Finns – the Turks never lost 
their “national” language, despite pressure from other peoples. And like the 
Mongols and the Manchus, the Turks were never really a pious lot; while they 
adopted various faiths throughout their history, eventually settling on Islam, it was 
likely Buddhism that was most suited to the Turks’ “imagination, pride and 
 178 
individuality” (Kazemzade 1327, 4:276–77). The work is striking in its abandonment 
of Islam as the ultimate guide to the identity of the Turkish nation. Indeed, the 
disregard for religion – the Turks were likened to the Christian Hungarians and Finns 
and the Buddhist Mongols and Manchus – demonstrates a break with the Umma as 
a community of belonging in favour of perceived cultural and linguistic similarities. 
Implicitly, the narrative accepts European world views in which culture, language 
and race or physical appearance come together to determine the belonging of a 
collectivity. What is more interesting, however, is the explicit rejection of previously 
dominant Islamic epistemology, in which belief is more important that ethno-
linguistic or racial characteristics; irrelevant differences bestowed by the unitary God 
of the Abrahamic faiths.  
 
Young Turk Turkism and the Rise of Gökalp 
 This focus on the pre-Islamic qualities and merits of the Turks would reach a 
new level of refinement with the advent of CUP rule in 1912-13. It would be a 
mischaracterization to imply that the Committee itself was responsible for the rise of 
Turkist thought and policy. Rather, as Şerif Mardin has argued, the CUP’s lack of a 
cohesive and coherent ideological framework forced its core members to adopt 
independent but sympathetic currents of thought following the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1908 and, more urgently, their seizure of power from the Sultan’s 
government in 1913 (Mardin 1994, 29). While numerous Turkists were present in 
Istanbul, Salonica and other cities during the first decade of the 20th century – 
including Yusuf Akçura and Ahmet Ağaoğlu – it was a middling bureaucrat, poet and 
philosopher from Diyarbakır named Ziya Gökalp who would eventually provide the 
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core of CUP, and Kemalist, thought. Gökalp had been in contact with the early 
members of the Committee when studying in Istanbul in the late 1890s, and was 
influenced by the works of Cahun, Süleyman Paşa and meetings with the Azeri 
nationalist Hüseynzadǝ. (Heyd 1950, 28–29). As we saw in the chapter on ideology, 
Gökalp was concerned primarily with the definition of the nation, particularly the 
Turkish nation, and its adaptation to the conditions of modern life. The transition 
from a confessionally-based empire to a nation-state had plunged the Ottoman 
Empire into crisis. Only the identification of the true characteristics of the nation, 
and its needs vis-à-vis the process of modernization, would help stabilize the 
situation of the Turks (Gökalp 1959, 24). 
 
History and the Gökalpian Nation 
 Where might such characteristics be found? In his Türkçülüğün esasları he 
examined in detail the various components of Turkish culture and society, and the 
“revivals” of ancient Turkic culture that would realign Turkey’s national development 
to its long-term path. The “aesthetic taste of the ancient Turks was very high,” yet 
“the faults of Ottoman craftsmen” had caused it to fall far short of European 
standards (Gökalp 1968, 95). The ethics of the ancient Turks were also based on 
“very strong patriotic morals.” However, they did not concentrate on loyalty to a 
dynasty or autocratic ruler, but rather “the tribe (i.e., nation)” and “equality.” This 
equality was both political and social, as the ancient Turks were the world’s “most 
feminist” ethnic group (Gökalp 1968, 102–4). The Turks had lost such ethics – a loss 
implicitly attributed to the Ottomans – but could attain a degree of modern morality 
by returning to their past, rather than abandoning it (Gökalp 1968, 115). Gökalp 
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conducted similar discussions of law, the economy, politics, philosophy and religion, 
always praising the ancient Turks in comparison to the base Ottomans. A fully-
fledged concept of ethnic identity, based on a return to the values of the Volk, albeit 
a long dead one, had thus come into being. 
Knowledge of this distant past was gleaned from more than just epics and 
Chinese, Byzantine and Iranian chronicles. It was also found in modern examples 
among the Turkmens and other Turkic peoples of Central Asia and Iran. Aesthetic 
values could be learned from Turkmen rugs (Gökalp 1968, 95). Family values could 
be corrected with examples from Yakut and Siberian Turkic families, which did not 
exhibit Byzantine and Iranian-style patriarchy (Gökalp 1975, 202–4). In general, the 
customs and mores of the Turkic peoples of Eurasia would provide as much guidance 
in the re-establishment of a truly national culture as the Chinese, Iranian and Arab 
chronicles.  
This linkage between ancient and contemporary Turkic peoples, and the 
identification of customs and mores asserted to be free of ethnic or racial 
contamination, bear on a wide swathe of Gökalp’s vision of the world. In the case of 
history, it provides us with a clear view to the new mindset of the CUP’s intellectual 
élite. Gökalp’s repudiation of the Semitic and Iranic components of Islamic culture 
ring the final death knell of a supranational, faith-based imagination of collectivities 
and social development, whether in the present or the past. The focus on Turkic 
ethics and social organization in the pre-Islamic period, and their connection to 
contemporary communities, allows for the backdating of ethno-national groupings 
far back into the prehistory of the Turkic peoples. Gökalp remained true to his 
interpretation of the nation as a group based on education and socialization by not 
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defining its members; he had neither positive criteria, as did Kazemzade in 1909, nor 
normative guidelines, as future historians would develop. Nonetheless, his writings 
paved the way for a decisive break with the Ottoman Islamic tradition of 
historiography and for the creation of a new historical science in the service of 
reviving national glory, right at the beginning of the age of nation-states.  
 
Stabilization and Hegemony 
 Gökalp died in 1924, a year after Turkey had formally transitioned from 
empire to nation-state (Heyd 1950, 39). In 1923, the Sultanate was abolished, 
allowing for a Republic to be proclaimed. The following year, the Caliphate was 
eliminated as well, and with this came the subordination of organized religion to the 
government in Ankara. The new régime was not in a position to embark on major 
ideological projects immediately after its formation. Ten years of war – from the First 
Balkan War in 1912 until the end of the Greco-Turkish War in 1922 – as well as 
deaths from associated hardships and mass migrations under the Population 
Exchange with Greece, had made socio-economic stability and development the 
government’s utmost priorities (Zürcher 2004, 164–65). Nevertheless, the state still 
recognized the need to forge a national identity among the remaining population 
and to legitimize itself, vis-à-vis the now defunct Ottoman Empire, in the eyes of its 
own citizens and the world (Ersanlı 2002, 121–22). The issue of the former’s loyalty 
became a serious concern following the Şeyh Sait Rebellion in 1925 and the Izmir 
Incident – in which Mustafa Kemal was targeted for assassination – in 1926 (Zürcher 
2004, 169–74). Added to this was the need to buttress Turkish claims to the land of 
Anatolia in the face of possible Greek and Armenian irredentism. The key to this, 
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particularly through the 1930s, was a focus on the Central Asian origins of Anatolia’s 
prehistoric population (Keyder 2003, 49). 
 The Turkic peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asia were a particularly 
sensitive topic for the Kemalist government. The Soviet Union was the first state to 
recognize the new government in Ankara with a friendship agreement signed in 1920 
(Zürcher 2004, 153). Given Enver Paşa’s activities in Azerbaijan and Central Asia 
during the first years following the First World War (Khan 1929, 43–47; Landau and 
Landau 1995, 55), Ankara’s policy of Yurtta Sulh Cihânda Sulh (Peace at Home, Peace 
in the World) was designed to assure neighbours that it harboured no irredentist 
policies (Oran 2001, 314). Indeed, the government went so far as to expel 
troublesome Turkic exiles to Europe, and it was Warsaw and Paris, rather than 
Istanbul or Ankara, which became centres of Soviet Turkic nationalist activities in the 
1920s (Resulzade 2010, 10).  
Scholars have interpreted this rejection of aggressive pan-Turkism as an 
indication of the lack of political or ideological content within Turkish historical 
narratives (Lowe 2003, 89–90; Tachau 1963, 172). Such assertions, however, are 
based on a top-down approach to the relationship between the ruling Cumhuriyet 
Halk Firkası (Republican People’s Party; CHF) and the historians active in Turkey 
during this period. As shall be seen, many of the individuals who participated in the 
writing of the Turkish History Thesis were either confirmed nationalists or Turkic 
exiles from the Soviet Union who retained an interest in their ethnic brethren to the 
north. Moreover, during the late 1930s and early 1940s, when Turkey walked a fine 
line between the Allies and the Axis, virulently pan-Turkist associations would 
reappear quickly and would make no secret of their interests in the Turkic peoples of 
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the Soviet Union (Landau and Landau 1995, 89–90), leading us to question how 
thorough the purge of the mid-1920s actually was. 
 
Early Government Intervention 
 The CHF remained largely aloof from historiographical enterprises in Turkey 
until the commissioning of a national history thesis in 1929. This helped to ensure 
both the continuance of some degree of eclecticism in history writing, as well as the 
profession’s relative independence from political pressure (Behar 1992, 98). 
Complete freedom from interference, however, was not assured. As early as 1921, 
Ahmet Ağaoğlu was asked by the quasi-state based in Ankara to write a piece on the 
Turkishness of the Pontus region in northern Turkey. The purpose of the work was to 
bolster Turkish claims to the region, according to the Wilsonian Fourteen Points, 
based on the Turanian origins of the Pontus’ first inhabitants, the Hittites (Erimtan 
2008, 156). At the other end of the spectrum, discussions among students at 
İstanbul Darülfünûnu (which would become Istanbul University in 1933) regarding an 
Anatolian ethnogenesis for the inhabitants of modern Turkey, appear to have been 
suppressed under the Takrir-i Sükûn (Law on Order) promulgated in 1925 in order to 
crush the Şeyh Sait rebellion (Tachau 1963, 167–69). Nevertheless, government 
meddling was neither systematic, nor necessarily aimed at altering historical 
narratives per se. 
 
Turkist Publications and Societies 
 In 1920s Istanbul and Ankara, there were a number of forums for scholarly 
discussion of history and historiography. The Turkist periodical Türk Yurdu (Turkish 
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Homeland), founded in 1912, resumed publication after the War of Independence in 
1923. It was pronouncedly Turkist in nature, and it boasted of a membership that 
included future members of the Republic’s Turkist élite, including Akçura, Gökalp, 
Köprülü and the female author Halide Edip (Adıvar) (Üstel 1997, 46; Dumont 1974, 
319).  In addition to the Yurdu’s periodical Türk Ocağı, two more scholarly journals 
appeared between 1925 and 1929, both edited by the historian Fuat Köprülü: 
Türkiyat mecmuası (The Journal of Turkic Studies) and Hukuk ve iktisat tarihi 
mecmuası (The Journal of the History of Law and Economy). A third journal that was 
also edited by Köprülü, Hayat (Life), appeared in 1928-1929 (Ersanlı 2002, 126). 
Apart from the journals, the Türk Ocakları (Turkish Hearths) association provided 
social clubs for intellectuals where ideas could be discussed and debates conducted 
for the benefit of the new nation-states. The Ocaklar first appeared in the Second 
Constitutional Period (1908-1918), the same time as the foundation of the Türk 
derneği (Turkish Support), a non-profit organization founded in 1908 to support 
Turkish linguistic identity along with Ottomanism (Üstel 1997, 25–26).  
 The Türk Ocakları were among the longest lived Turkist organizations of this 
period: they survived from their foundation in 1911 until their closure in 1931 (Üstel 
1997, 51). After the proclamation of the Republic, the Ocaklar were reorganized and 
Ziya Gökalp wrote in the newspaper Altın Yurd (Golden Homeland) that the network 
of social clubs would strive to develop and spread Turkish culture (Üstel 1997, 126). 
However, the literary and cultural orientation of Gökalp and other late Ottoman 
intellectuals was soon challenged by Turkist writers, who argued that the Ocaklar 
should be employed in an analogous manner to that of their counterparts in fascist 
Italy: to champion the causes of the Turkic peoples outside of Anatolia. Although 
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they recognized the plight of Turkic groups in the Soviet Union, the brunt of their 
fury was directed at Iran and its designs on Azerbaijan (Üstel 1997, 130–32). One of 
the Ocaklar’s members, Rüşni Bey, published articles on the Turks of northern Iran 
and Azerbaijan, arguing that the Azeris had always been the ethnic kin of the Turks 
of Anatolia (Manafzadeh 2009, 174–77). The activities of the irredentists in the Türk 
Ocakları did not go unnoticed in Iran and prompted the Azeri-Iranian politician 
Ahmed Kasravi to author a study of the origins of the Azerbaijanis and their 
Turkification under the Seljuks and Mongols (Kasravī 1993, 34). 
 Opposition to the Turkist and pan-Turkist ideas of some of the Ocaklar’s 
members came from Turkish quarters as well. A segment of the intelligentsia, 
including Halide Edip, rejected the idea of a Turkic cultural union that extended 
beyond the borders of the new Republic. Rather, they argued in their periodical 
Anadolu Mecmuası (Journal of Anatolia) that the Türk Ocakları should in fact be 
called the Anadolu Ocakları (Anatolian Hearths), and the organization should seek to 
promote an Anatolian Turkish nationalism, rather than one that embraced the Turkic 
peoples of Eurasia (Üstel 1997, 136–37). Their concept of Anadoluculuk 
(Anatolianism) would eventually win out in the late 1940s, as the state sought to 
incorporate the history of Anatolia into the history of the Turkish people (Tanaka 
2007, 68–69). Such ideas, however, found little resonance among the Türk Ocakları 
organizers of the 1920s, who opted instead for continued emphasis on the wider 
Turkic world (Üstel 1997, 146–47). 
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Who is a Turk? 
 The Ocakları’s embrace of Eurasia, however, was not a sign of its openness to 
the diversity of the Turkic world and the origins of Turkic peoples. During the First 
Congress of the Türk Ocakları, delegates discussed the requirements for 
membership. A commission had suggested two different forms of rules: one similar 
to those of a political party, in which adherence to core values would be the key to 
accession; and one similar to those of a nationalist association, in which membership 
would be decided based on an applicant’s Turkishness (Üstel 1997, 153). Although 
the latter appeared to catch the imagination of the delegates present, they could not 
agree on a suitable means of determining the acceptable threshold of national 
identity. Language was not sufficient, as a Turanist view would have that the 
Hungarians and Bulgarians, who held few ideals in common with the Turks, should 
be considered acceptable. Another suggestion whereby recognition by society as a 
Turk would be enough was rejected because groups of “Turks” who culturally and 
linguistically had assimilated to Abkhazian, Georgian or Laz communities would be 
excluded. However, the reality of centuries of intermarriage and conversion also 
meant that a blood test for Turkishness would likely reveal that most Turks were, in 
fact, not racially pure (Üstel 1997, 154–55). Eventually, the Ocakları decided on 
admitting both members of pure Turkish stock and those who had shown complete 
commitment to Turkism and Turkish culture (Üstel 1997, 162). 
 This discussion points to two factors that would become mainstays of 
research on the origins and spread of the Turks during the 1930s. The first was the 
attempt at defining the characteristics of Turkishness and racial purity. Scholars 
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would disregard the practical difficulties of identifying a pure Turkish type and 
centuries of miscegenation in order to establish, according to anthropology and 
craniology, criteria for the scientific inclusion or exclusion of whole populations from 
the Turkic family. Secondly, in recognizing Anatolia’s historically high rate of ethno-
linguistic diversity, these same intellectuals would devise a means of finding the 
Turkish roots of peoples who did not self-identify as Turks. This trend would be a 
recurring theme of Turkish society until the 1990s, with Kurdish communities 
intermittently referred to as “Mountain Turks” and denied their right to self-
identification (Gunter 1988, 391).  
 
Closure of the Türk Ocakları 
 The announcement of a state of emergency in response to the Şeyh Sait 
Rebellion in 1925 began the process by which the Türk Ocakları would eventually be 
absorbed into the ruling CHF (Üstel 1997, 166). In April of the same year, the 
suggestion that Türk Yurdu, the organization’s official organ, be used as a means of 
educating and enlightening the “outside Turks” was accepted by the Ocaklar’s 
second Congress  (Üstel 1997, 171). The Ocaklar continued to engage in a variety of 
polemics regarding language and culture in Turkey, particularly with regards to the 
inability or refusal of segments of the population to assimilate into a Turkish identity 
(Üstel 1997, 199–200). Meanwhile, members of the Turkist old guard, including 
Akçura and Ağaoğlu, as well as the President of the association, Hamdulla Şuphi 
(Tanrıöver), fought an increasingly difficult battle against government intervention. 
In 1930, the association was dissolved, and a year later a new institute, the Türk 
Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti (Turkish Historical Research Society) was created within the 
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ruling CHF (Behar 1992, 96–97). Over the five years between 1925 and 1930, 
intellectuals allied to the Ocakları continued to be active on matters of history and 
identity, albeit not under the organization’s formal structure.  
 
Of Two Türkiye Tarihleri 
 Historical narratives written during the 1920s were far from abundant, but 
the few that did appear are worthy of note. What might be described as the first 
monograph on history during the new period was published in 1923. The eminent 
Ottoman and Turkish historian Mehmet Fuad Köprülü, descendant of pashas and 
statesmen, penned the work, which was titled Türkiye Tarihi (The History of Turkey). 
This first book of what was intended to be a series was dedicated entirely to the 
period of Turkish history prior to the invasion of Anatolia. Of its 256 pages, the first 
16 deal with the issue of “Race and Language” (Irk ve Lisan), while the next 42 are an 
exploration of the pre-Islamic history of the Turkic peoples. Köprülü’s work is unique 
for its inclusion of a bibliography at the end of each chapter, albeit in prose form, 
rather that the lists to which we are currently accustomed. From these, we see that 
he both challenges established Western Turkology, and is heavily indebted to it: 
“Information given about the Turkic languages and cultures in general Western 
works, such as encyclopaedias, geographies and dictionaries, is quite old and is 
occasionally unbelievably basic or cliché.” To this category, he adds the works of 
Cahun, Berezin and Rompuy, which he labels as being “worthy of criticism.” 
Nonetheless, the recent production of both V. V. Radlov – including his Phonetik der 
Nordlichen Türksprachen from 1883 – and the writings of Jean Dény are identified as 
essential reading for the budding Turkologist. These, of course, are only for the use 
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of the linguist, as works on “the Turkish race” are still not worth citation, despite the 
urgency of their production (Köprülü 1923, 10). It is therefore unclear on which 
works Köprülü based his own study, but one might suspect that it was these very 
same European monographs that he decries. Certainly, the preponderance of 
glossed French or German words, which appear in the original Latin spelling, would 
indicate that this is the case. 
   In terms of content, too, the Tarih does not depart considerably from 
European models. The opening section, on the race and language of the Turks, seeks 
to link them back to peoples of the Old Testament, as well as placing them on the 
same level of historicity and immutability as the Chinese and Iranians. While Köprülü 
does lay the groundwork for later narratives, particularly when insisting upon the 
activity and dispersion of the Turkic peoples long before the advent of written 
historical records, he is relatively conservative in his approach to named civilizations 
within the realm of pre-history. In this vein, the Assyrians, Chaldeans and Sumerians 
are identified as others, before whom Turks had created states in Anatolia and other 
parts of Western Asia (Köprülü 1923, 3). Indeed, he is playful with timelines, placing, 
for example, discussions of Islamic Turkic states founded in Egypt and India (the 
Mamluks and Moghuls, respectively) immediately after his exposition of the Huns’ 
Turkic origins. Although not explicit, this formula allows for a re-enunciation of 
Gökalp’s thesis: miscegenation is clearly recognized and, while not celebrated, is 
taken as a neutral element of human existence. Meanwhile the decontextualized 
listing of Turkic communities throughout history allows for the exposition of 
essential and durable Turkic traits (Köprülü 1923, 4).   
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 The sections of Köprülü’s work that deal with the pre-Islamic history of the 
Turkic peoples are largely in line with European sources and, more closely, with their 
Ottoman adaptations, as seen in Kazemzade’s 1909 history. Parts of the narrative 
are very similar to Gökalp’s writings as well, as they examine the morals, ethics, 
social organization and politics of the pre-Islamic Turks. What does depart from the 
previous model, however, is the author’s explicit use of ethnography, anthropology 
and craniology in order to ascertain the nature of Turkishness, particularly in the 
prehistoric and early historic periods. He blasts those anthropologists and 
ethnologists who divided the world into races tinged with notions of inferiority or 
superiority, and particularly the assignation of the Turkish race to the yellow races, 
found below the white races on the hierarchy of civilization. The study of linguistics 
and the history of the Turkic peoples, however, had helped to rectify this, and to 
remove this misguided conception of race from scholarly literature. His distinctions 
between race, language and culture are clear, but they are not intended to be blows 
struck in the name of miscegenation; rather, they are useful in referring to the 
original Turks as blond and blue-eyed, while those Turkic peoples with Asiatic 
features are merely Turkified Mongols, or other Asian peoples (Köprülü 1923, 6–7). 
This is not a reason for expulsion or exclusion, however, as the it is the linguistic 
history of the Turkic and associated peoples, including the Mongols and Manchus, 
that can provide us with the crucial pieces to the puzzle of pre-historic Turkic socio-
political organization and evolution. This is true of the linguistic fragmentation of 
Turkic languages, which encodes important clues to the human and environmental 
storms that battered Turkic collectivities throughout the ages (Köprülü 1923, 8–9). 
With this, we see the same acceptance of mixing as a fait accompli, as in Gökalp’s 
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work, and the desire to engage in both synchronic and diachronic analysis. Köprülü’s 
eclecticism with respect to race, ethnicity, language and belonging belie Gökalp’s 
practical approach to contemporary Turkic societies, seeking to locate both the 
enduring and the mutable in order to complete the rich tapestry of the national past. 
In 1926, the second component of Türkiye tarihi was published for use in 
schools. The authors of the work, Hamid and Muhsin, altered previous Ottoman 
histories only through their inclusion of material on the foundation of the Republic, 
and otherwise followed a standard European periodization of the Ottoman Empire 
(Ersanlı 2002, 124). Although the text did not contain extensive materials about the 
pre-Islamic history of the Turks, it did incorporate a new interpretation of Ottoman 
history, one that emphasized the importance of ethno-linguistic factors in the 
success of the Empire. As will be seen later in works about the Huns, Hamid and 
Muhsin stressed that the rapid advance of the Ottomans and the establishment of 
the Ottoman state up to the 14th century were due to the lack of intermingling 
between Turkic and non-Turkic elements. It was this purity of Turkish influence that 
“made the formation of a state possible” (Ersanlı 2002, 127). The second tome of 
Türkiye tarihi, despite its reliance on standard European and Ottoman sources of 
history, and Köprülü’s strictly Gökalpian interpretation in the first tome, had begun 
the process of identifying state-formation and Turkishness as intrinsically linked 
categories, and highlighting the corrupting influence of non-Turkic elements in 
Turkish history. Such heuristics would become the mainstays of Turkish 
historiography throughout the Republican period (Webb 2011, 494). 
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Azerbaijan in the Turkish Imagination 
 Two years earlier, in 1924, Cihangir Zeyneloğlu’s published his history of 
Azerbaijan, another component of very early Republican historiography of the Turkic 
peoples. There is no indication that his work was commissioned or encouraged by 
the newborn state, but it does have the hallmarks of later narratives about the 
history of the western Turkic peoples. It seeks to provide an explanation of 
competing theories about the origins of the name Azerbaijan. As such, Zeyneloğlu 
surveys extant ideas on the origin of the Azeris, rather than innovating on 
contemporary thinking. After this, however, he moves to considering the population 
of the region and its origins, arguing that the first peoples to inhabit Azerbaijan were 
the Medes. This, evidently, is not much different from what Kasravi and other Iranian 
scholars had claimed (Rizā 1981). Zeyneloğlu states that although the origin of the 
Medes is unknown, they are believed to have migrated to the region from Turan, an 
implicit argument that they must, therefore, be Turanic and Turkic, not Aryan. After 
the Medes, however, the Massagetae arrived and settled in the Caucasian and 
Iranian Azerbaijan. The Massagetae were a branch of the Ak (White) Huns, and thus 
were the first explicitly Turkic inhabitants of the region, soon to be joined by other 
groups such as the Alans and Khazars (Zeyneloğlu 1924, 14–15). Zeyneloğlu, similar 
to Ağaoğlu before and scores of writers after him, uses the tactic of labeling peoples 
as Turks depite the fact that their ethnic affiliations had yet to be proven to be 
Turkic. It is a mechanism that takes on blind faith the endurance and immutability of 
ethno-linguistic identity and a convenient means of founding the claims of modern 
communities to land and sovereignty. 
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 Miscegenation is not denied, but it is used as the excuse for the clear 
differences that exist between the Azeris and their Turkic cousins in Anatolia and 
Central Asia. Here, fully formed peoples – Kurds, Tats, Laz, Arabs and others – are 
seen as the reasons which the Azeri nation drifted from the purity of its Turkic 
origins (Zeyneloğlu 1924, 17). Nations are understood to be essential and enduring, 
if prone to mixing and debasement, with little contemplation of endogenous 
development or symbiotic cultural adaptation. In establishing one’s claim to land and 
rights, too, it is not residence and participation, but bloodlines and ethno-national 
composition that matter:  
“[A]lthough a portion of true Turks came to Azerbaijan 
during the Babek rebellion that took place between 
190 and 220 AH [, from what has been presented 
above, the Turks’ residence in Azerbaijan from much 
before the Hijra has been established.” (Zeyneloğlu 
1924, 16) 
 
Whatever basis there might have been for Islamic solidarity against Russian 
hegemony and Armenian and Georgian encroachment has now been eliminated. 
What matters is that the land has always been inhabited by true Turks, and their 
bona fides as lords of modern Azerbaijan are established by their resistance to the 
nefarious effects of cultural adaptation and ethnic mixing. The means of identifying 
pure Turkish origins have yet to be identified, but the need for such a definition is 
clearly demonstrated.  
 
Sadri Maksudi’s Legal History 
 Crude racial characteristics and bloodlines were not the only concerns of 
those seeking to cast back the net of national identity. Between 1925 and 1928, the 
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Tatar émigré Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), then a professor of law at Ankara University, 
penned Türk hukuk tarihi (The History of Turkish Law), a detailed overview of legal 
frameworks developed by the pre-Islamic Turks. Much of the work was based on the 
Orkhon inscriptions and the Kudatku Bilig; the former a series of Runic Turkic 
engravings, the latter an Uighur document, both from the first millennium CE. 
Maksudi was particularly interested in issues of language, law and history, and thus 
the work contains a number of different discussions based on etymologies. One, first 
proposed by Maksudi in Paris in 1924, argued that the ethnonym Oğuz or Oğur was 
in fact an Arabic corruption of the plural of Ok, a tribal confederation. Maksudi 
continued by explaining that the Oğuz, the people from whom the Turkmen, Azeris 
and Anatolian Turks originally descended, were not in fact a homogenous ethnic 
group, but rather a political agglomeration of various tribes. In Maksudi’s words, 
“there were no Oğuz Turks, only a Turkic Oğuz [tribal confederation]” (Arsal 2002, 7). 
This is a convenient means of de-emphasizing the importance of linguistic diversity 
among the Turkic peoples, while also stressing the purity of their ethnic origins. 
Other scholars, including Barthol’d, might have cast doubt upon the racial and ethnic 
purity of the Turkic tribes during the Hunnic era by arguing that supposed 
ethnonyms were, in fact, political or social identifiers. Maksudi’s formulation turns 
this on its head and seeks to reinterpret historical texts and endonyms along strictly 
ethnic lines. Yes, the Oğuz might have been a political confederation, but they were 
a political one formed on a solid and pure ethno-linguistic basis, ensuring a clear 
national consciousness in the pre-Islamic era and a case for the ethnic purity of the 
original settlers who came westward, populating Anatolia and the Caucasus.  
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This is a usage of law and social organization in service of nationalist rhetoric. 
Maksudi allows, thereby, for a bridge to be constructed between primordialist views 
of nationhood and belonging, and Gökalp’s nation through education. Law and 
community organization are important components in the socialization of 
individuals, and Maksudi’s location of these deep within the confines of the ethnic 
group allow for admissions of nationalization through education without denying the 
importance of the ethnic component.  
 
The Turkish History Thesis 
 The turning point for Turkish historiography was reached in 1929, during an 
encounter between Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and a secondary school teacher known 
as Afet Hanım (İnan). Afet Hanım complained to the leader of the Turkish Republic 
that European-inspired textbooks had assigned the Turkish people to the “yellow 
races” and pointed out their inferiority with respect to the Europeans. Mustafa 
Kemal assured Afet Hanım that such comments were nothing more than slander, 
and invited her and Turkish historians in general to rewrite the history of the Turkish 
nation. He asked them to stress three key points: the lack of influence of Islam in 
Turkish history; the greatness of the Turkish people despite European 
misinformation; and the inalienability of Turkish claims to Anatolia (Copeaux 1997, 
55). The initial project focused on the creation of a new textbook for history courses, 
Türk Tarihinin Anahatları (The Outlines of Turkish History), which was begun in 1929 
(Ersanlı 2002, 124). However, it would rapidly develop into the Türk Tarih Tezi 
(Turkish History Thesis), an overarching historical framework that sought to recast 
Turkish, and indeed Turkic, history according to the nationalist creed of the new 
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Republic. In broad strokes, the Thesis claimed that the Turks were a white race who 
originated from Central Asia, where they had developed an advanced culture, and 
had been pushed to migrate in all four cardinal directions several millennia before 
the Common Era by a series of ecological disasters. The Turks were therefore the 
founders of all of the great civilizations of the ancient world, including those of 
Anatolia, and were the true aboriginals of Central Asia and Asia Minor (Mansel, 
Baysun, and Karal 1942, 8–10). 
 The Thesis has been interpreted in various ways. Wendy Shaw, for example, 
sees in it an attempt by a former subaltern to subvert European forms of history in 
order to counter European hegemony in the production of knowledge about the 
periphery (W. Shaw 2007, 170). I do not ascribe to this view. First, it fails to take into 
account Gökalpian notions of the division between civilization and culture, as 
outlined in my chapter on ideology. Science and technology – in which linguistics, 
archaeology, paleography and other social sciences were included – were conceived 
of as components of an international pool of knowledge, exempt from nationalist 
claims. Only subjective aspects of the nation, such as aesthetics, philosophy, 
literature and religion, could be seen as truly national, and thus should reflect 
national circumstances and heritage. Gökalpian nationalist understandings of the 
historical sciences, then, would not have permitted the subversion of scientific 
methodologies and technologies, particularly if they were perceived as being crucial 
to the development and progress of the nation. Indeed, the lack of up-to-date 
information on the state of the historical sciences in Europe – the opposite of the 
Soviet case – would lead one to believe that what was at play was adoption and 
assimilation, rather than response and refutation. Many of the works that formed 
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the core of the Anahatları and the Thesis were based on uncritical readings of 
European secondary sources, some of which were already out of date by the time 
the Turkish studies were presented (Behar 1992, 129–30). The target of 
delegitimization attempts within the framework of the Thesis was not European 
science, but rather the Ottoman Empire and specific critics of Turkish greatness. On 
a technical level, historians sought to demonstrate that the new nation-state had 
broken with the Ottoman practice of chronicle-writing and had embraced European 
historiography. With respect to content, they condemned the cosmopolitanism and 
religiosity of the Empire, exalting, in its place, the strength of states founded upon 
national ideas (Ersanlı 2002, 137–38). 
Secondly, the enunciation of the Thesis and its monogenistic components 
helped to resolve one of the core paradoxes of Turkish nationalist historiography. As 
we shall see, a number of prominent historians, including Köprülü, decried Afet 
İnan’s confusion of race, ethnicity and language. Apart from methodological and 
epistemological problems inherent in this approach, it also made the connection of 
the Turks to the Aryan super-race of northern Europe harder to prove. If a people 
remained faithful to its language at the time of ethnogenesis, and the Turks spoke a 
language that was shown to be non-Indo-European (i.e. non-Aryan), then according 
to İnan’s logic, the Turks could not be Aryans. By positing that Turkish and Turkic 
culture were at the root of all languages and civilizations, the dominant 
argumentation of the Thesis could be accepted, without refuting the universally-
recognized distinction between Turkic languages and Indo-European ones. In this 
way, the Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory inserted Turks and 
Turkey into the Aryan family of races, rather than putting them at odds with it. More 
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than this, part of the Turkish claim to superiority rested on the inclusion of the Turks 
in the same racial grouping as Western and Central Europeans, rather than the 
general superiority of the Asian races over the European ones (Birinci Türk Tarihi 
Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 31). Such arguments became common 
in other peripheral historiographies, including Greek histories. They were intended 
to heighten the appeal of a particular national grouping to racialist German 
historians, rather than to counter their theories (Troumpeta 2013, 172; Turda 2011, 
357–64).  
This leads to the third reason for my skepticism. Turkish efforts operated 
within a context of regional competition in addition to core-periphery dynamics.  
Although the Republic’s borders in the west might have been settled by international 
agreement, its eastern frontiers remained somewhat contentious. Ankara openly 
contested Alexandretta and Mosul’s exclusion from its sovereignty, and was ever 
fearful of Armenian and Soviet irredentist claims to the north-east of Anatolia. Iran, 
although now a modernizing régime under the Pahlavi dynasty, was also viewed with 
suspicion. Similar “linguist” claims were made by the Arabist ideologue Zaki al-Arsūzī, 
a native of Alexandretta who is noted for his anti-Turkish streak (Suleiman 2003, 
150–52). Al-Arsūzī’s works are not well known outside of specialist circles, and 
certainly would not have been widely available before the 1970s (Suleiman 2003, 
146–47), but they do give an indication of currents of thought within the Middle 
East. More importantly, Turkish historians and politicians alike had to grapple with 
Iranian writings on the Asiatic origins of the Turks. Ahmad Kasravī’s Azari, ya Zabān-e 
bāstān-e Āzarbaigān (Azeri, or the Ancient Language of Azerbaijan) was first 
published in 1925/26, and was intended to provide clarification of the origins of the 
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toponym “Azerbaijan” as well as the ethnic origins of the Azeris. In it, he argues that 
the Turks arrived en masse with the Mongols and, although he distinguishes 
between the two as separate ethnic groups (Kasravī 1993, 50–52), it is clear that 
both are presented as violent interlopers and usurpers. He does not ascribe to ideas 
of racial purity, but does view the pre-Turkic inhabitants of Iran and Azerbaijan as a 
mixture of indigenous and Aryan stock, inherently different from the Turkic tribes 
who migrated to the region from Central Asia (Kasravī 1993, 38). 
Kasravī’s work was translated into both English and Russian and was 
disseminated by the Royal Asiatic Society in the United Kingdom. He had been made 
a member of the Society in the 1920s, although it is not clear whether he was aware 
of this, and does not appear to have sought actively to use this position for the 
spread of his views (Ridgeon 2006, 7). Nevertheless, Western and Soviet interest in 
his work implied that the Iranian – and, by extension, Persian – view of the racial 
origins of the Turks had received the attention and praise of the scholarly 
establishment in the West (Kasravī 1993, 36). It is already well documented that 
Turkish claims about the origins and ethnic composition of the early Azeris – which 
were clearly skewed towards a millennial-long presence of Turkic or Turanic peoples 
(Zeyneloğlu 1924, 16) -  had sparked considerable consternation in Iranian circles 
(Manafzadeh 2009, 178–79). It is not a far step, then, to see how Turkish historical 
narratives would have been conceived as a weapon against regional rivals, rather 
than European hegemony, particularly given the importance of Western European 
support in disputes with other peripheral nations. 
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Turco-Soviet Relations 
 Insofar as the Thesis and related materials were directed towards the East, 
the major competing narrative came from the Soviet Union rather than Iran. In 1926, 
the Soviet government organized the First All-Union Turkological Congress in Baku, 
capital of Soviet Azerbaijan. In 1929, the Congress was hailed by the then Chairmen 
of the Central Executive Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR, Gazanfar Musabekov, as a 
showcase of a new revolutionary Turkic culture based on the Latin alphabet and 
scientific discoveries (Musabekov 1962, 56). A delegation of Turkish scholars under 
the leadership of Fuat Köprülü took part in the Congress, and was therefore apprised 
of Soviet attempts at organizing Turkological studies (Korneev 1969, 21). The works 
of the famous Russian Orientalist and specialist on Central Asian history, Vassily 
Barthol’d, were well-known in Turkey (Copeaux 1997, 67), and Barthol’d remained in 
contact with a prominent member of Istanbul’s historiographical circles, the Bashkir 
exile Zeki Velidi (Togan) (Barthold 1973, 462). 
Hirst, among others, has pointed out that Turco-Soviet relations remained 
warm and centred around a common opposition to Western hegemony right up to 
the middle of the 1930s. On closer inspection, however, it is easy to see that the 
thrust of this cooperation was economic. What cultural endeavours were 
undertaken were largely focused upon contemporary production, rather than 
historical connections, even when within the ambit of two state visits conducted in 
the 1930s (Hirst 2013). Despite the fact that a number of joint academic and 
archaeological endeavours were planned between the Soviet Union and Turkey over 
the decade 1925-1935, few came to fruition (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 97). 
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This might have been due to inertia on the part of the Turkish side (Barthold 1973, 
464). It is also likely, however, that hostility to Barthold’s – and by extension, Soviet 
– perceived anti-Turkic stance on the history of Central Asia motivated Turkish 
wariness to engage with Soviet scholars (Copeaux 1997, 67–68). 
 What was so unpalatable to the Turkish intellectual establishment? Barthol’d 
was not a scholar of the Turkish Republic, and although there were disputes 
regarding the class structure of Turkish society between Turkish and Soviet scholars 
(Saffet 1930, 71), political issues do not appear to have been the main point of 
contention (Oran 2001, 314). Rather, the source of disagreement should be sought 
in dominant Turkish narratives of the distant Turkic past and the manner in which 
they clashed with Soviet ideas about Turkic nationhood. 
 
Reşit Saffet and the Origins of the Turks 
 One of the first works of the Thesis period to espouse a stridently pan-Turkist 
line was Türklük ve Türkçülük İzleri (Traces of Turkishness and Turkism), written by 
Reşit Saffet in 1930 and published through the Türk Ocakları just before their 
dissolution (Landau and Landau 1995, 84–85). Saffet’s book is not, strictly speaking, 
a history text, nor is it a travelogue. Rather, it is a collection of anecdotes regarding 
Saffet’s meetings with various scholars and academics during his travels through 
Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as an article regarding the Turkic communities 
of Afghanistan and Iran. In the description of his meetings with European and Soviet 
academics, however, a view to the new conceptualization of Turkish history 
emerges, as well as some of the disputes that arose with these historians regarding 
the more problematic aspects of the Turkish History Thesis. 
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 The İzleri begins with a review of sources relevant to the history of the Turks, 
as well as historiographical inspirations. Saffet remarks that Marxist historiography is 
inadequate for narrating the story of the Turkic peoples, as the essentialism of their 
national characteristics as a nomadic community escapes Marxist analysis. In any 
event, most Russian scholars, Saffet claims, reject Marxist historical analysis and 
recognize instead the value of the Enlightenment tradition, including Vico and 
Montesquieu (Saffet 1930, 11). His choice of prominent historians is puzzling, given 
the manner in which he fails to include a century’s worth of French romantic and 
German historicist, idealist and neo-Kantian scholars, many of whom had profound 
impacts on 20th century history writing in Turkey (Behar 1992, 22). Nevertheless, 
historiography is not the crux of Saffet’s work, nor the most interesting component 
of his account. The introduction does provide us, however, with a poignant rejection 
of the supposed dogmatism of Soviet scholarship, and an implicit recognition of the 
role of ideology in the interpretation of historical truth. 
 
Turco-Hungarian Connections 
Saffet’s first stop on his tour of Europe was Budapest, where he was invited 
by the head of the Turan Society, Ferenc József, to speak at a conference held at the 
Hungarian Parliament. This occasion was of particular importance, given that 
Hungary was the “first European settlement of the Turks”:  it was here that the 
Uralic Huns settled. It was also in Hungary that “Turkic” style graves, in which the 
horse is buried with its owner, were found. Nevertheless, Saffet quickly revealed his 
disappointment about the lack of academic interest in Turkish studies among the 
Hungarians, who appeared to have organized the conference for political reasons. 
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Saffet attributed this to “religious fanaticism” spread by the Germans (Saffet 1930, 
17–25). The coolness of the Hungarian delegation is far from surprising. As late as 
1917, the Hungarian Turkologist Vámbéry Ármin claimed that the Hungarian 
ethnogenesis came about from a Turkic ruling class intermixing with Uralic subjects 
(Vámbéry 1914, 61). However, a genetic relationship between the Turkish and 
Hungarian languages had already been rejected by most Uralists by the mid- to late-
19th century (Hajdú and Domokos 1978, 15); Mehmed Fuat Köprülü had said as much 
in his own history of the Turks published in 1923 (Köprülü 1923, 8). Moreover, 
interest in the Khazars, a 9th and 10th century Turkic polity from the Caucasus who 
might have fed into the formation of Hungarian ethnic groups in the Carpathian 
Basin, was focused more on the possibility of Jewish origins and infiltrations, rather 
than genetic links to Turkic communities (Büchler 1910, 105–7). Indeed, as early as 
1910, Bücher claimed that “the Khazar language is not similar to either Turkish or 
Persian, indeed to any other language on earth” (Büchler 1910, 118). It is therefore 
difficult to understand why the author of the current work under consideration 
would have expected a fraternal welcome. Saffet’s claim about conspiracies, 
however, reflects two particularly pertinent aspects of Turkish nationalist 
historiography. The first is the belief that betrayal by an allegedly brotherly nation 
can only be motivated by racial mixing and outside interference. The second mirrors 
the motivation behind the Turkish History Thesis project: a suspicion that Turkey and 
the Turks were surrounded by enemies, eager to see their downfall and subjugation. 
Such paranoia would indeed become a common element of Turkish historiography 
throughout the 20th century. 
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A Rude Awakening on the Hittites 
This suspicion emerged once again during his visit to Prague, where Saffet 
met with Bedrich Hrozny, the Czech historian who deciphered the Hittite language 
and classified it as Indo-European in 1915 (Erimtan 2008, 157). This too, as well as 
other perceived anti-Turkish expressions, was attributed to religious animosity 
spread by the Germans. Hrozny rejected strongly Saffet’s claim that the Hittites were 
related to the Turks:  
“He [Hrozny] was not convinced that the Hittites were 
related to the Turanic peoples. Based on what is 
understood from the artefacts that were discovered in 
Anatolia and that are exhibited in the Ankara Museum, 
among the characteristics of the Hittites’ appearance – 
who ruled over parts of Anatolia, Syria, Iraq and Iran 
3000 years before Christ – were their large noses and 
large foreheads; a type that the Professor believes to 
be completely incompatible with the Turkish type. 
Professor Hrozny says that, among those elements 
living in Eastern Anatolia today, those with foreheads 
and noses that are similar to the faces found on the 
Hittite stones are Armenians and Keldanis 
[Chaldeans].” (Saffet 1930, 43–44) 
 
The obsession with racial type and physical characteristics is seen in other aspects of 
Saffet’s writings. In his account of the German explorer Albert von Le Coq’s 
discoveries in the Uyghur town of Bezeklik, he commented on how the German’s 
translation of Uyghur tablets describes the beys as being not dissimilar in 
appearance from Europeans. This is further confirmed by statues found in a nearby 
township: 
"As in the writings of Ibn al-Nuwwaz, courtier of Harun 
Resit, the types of the Turks that are shown in these 
pictures are considerably tall, well-proportioned, 
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handsome, beautiful. Even as is seen in a statue found 
in Tohar township, there were blue-eyed, blond-haired 
types present among these Turks." (Saffet 1930, 40) 
 
The discussion of race and appearance is even more pronounced in Saffet’s account 
of his travels through the Soviet Union. On the issue of hair and eye colour, the gift 
of a fresco discovered in Turfan and presented to Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) provided 
him with the occasion to discuss the Turks’ Aryan descent (Saffet 1930, 85). The finds 
at Turfan lend credence to this assertion, as they proved “the original type of 
Turkishness, that is its connection to the Aryan race, its ancientness and its 
civilization, in the most unbiased and scientific manner.” Prior to this, “it has been 
alleged that the Turks are a short, nearly hairless yellow race; that is, connected to a 
race that is considered to be second rate – by our enemies who wish to belittle the 
Turks through the spread of these ideas” (Saffet 1930, 88). While Saffet admits that 
the Turks must have mixed with other races, he claims that they were the last to 
leave the original Aryan homeland, and thus “preserved complete Aryanness for the 
longest period” (Saffet 1930, 89). The pressure of Soviet and Persian influence, on 
the other hand, had caused many of the modern-day Central Asians, Azeris and 
Afghans to forget this, or to link their Aryan descent to Persian, rather than Turkic, 
roots (Saffet 1930, 152–53). 
 
Skull Sizes 
 The idea of self-identification is totally absent from Saffet’s conceptualization 
of race and belonging. Despite speaking Persian or another non-Turkic language and 
belonging to a cultural milieu formed through the symbiosis of Turkic and Persian 
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cultures, these people are to be instructed of their connection to the Turkic world 
and, therefore, the Aryan race. This primordialist approach to ethnicity went beyond 
assertions regarding descriptions and paintings of ancient populations. Saffet alludes 
to the cornerstone of the science of identifying Turkic populations in his account of 
meeting the scholar Dr. Kuftin of the Ethnographic Museum in Moscow. Here, he 
discusses Kuftin’s ethnographic research on the Turks of Russia; the Turkmen; the 
Russians of the east and centre of the country; and the Kazakh-Kyrgyz. Of these, the 
Kazakh-Kirghiz were nearly 90% brachycephalic; the Russians of the centre and east 
of the country were 81% brachycephalic; and the Turkmen and Turks of Russia had 
significantly lower incidence of brachycephalic skulls (Saffet 1930, 65). As 
brachycephalic skulls were understood to have been spread exclusively from Central 
Asia with the original Turkic migrations, the implications were clear: the Russians of 
the east and centre and the Kazakh-Kirghiz were largely of pure Turkic origin. These 
two groups provide the ideal populations for exemplary Turkishness: the fair-skinned 
and eyed Russians and the nomadic Kazakh-Kirghiz, noted for the relatively 
superficial acceptance of Arabo-Persian culture and their lighter skin tones than the 
Turkmen (Kendirbaeva 1999, 15).   
 
National Science, Scientific Nationalism 
 Saffet’s primordialism exposed, to some degree, the rift that was opening 
between Soviet and Turkish historical studies. On his participation in the Congress of 
Ukrainian Oriental Studies in Kharkhiv, he remarked that he could not see how 
scientific historical enquiry could be truly international or universal (Saffet 1930, 69). 
Although the concept of the Asian Mode of Production had not been explicitly 
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banned by the Stalinist régime in 1930, it was certainly not a sanctioned concept 
(Sawer 1979, 29–30). Saffet’s claim, then, that Soviet historical sciences were not 
applicable to other societies (particularly Turkey), would not have been roundly 
accepted by orthodox Soviet historians at the Congress.  
Moreover, Saffet’s assertion that Turkey and the Soviet Union’s defeat of 
“religious fundamentalism” would allow for a truly scientific history to emerge in 
both countries was not enough to ensure that the two intelligentsias would agree on 
fundamental aspects of Turkic history (Saffet 1930, 69). Not only did he reject 
Barthold’s claim that the Turkic peoples could not have appeared west of the Volga 
before the 5th century CE, but he also roundly criticized the Russian’s 
conceptualization of the term Turk originally implying personal characteristics, rather 
than an ethnonym (Saffet 1930, 55–56). Barthold’s argumentation was in accord 
with Marxist interpretations of the nation as a product of the capitalist era (Connor 
1984, 7), yet it clashed with the emerging Turkish conceptualization of an 
essentialist, immortal national consciousness uniting the Turkic peoples. 
Perhaps most important is Saffet’s evident obsession with physical 
characteristics and their importance as heuristics of ethno-national belonging. On 
first blush, this appears to contravene the Gökalpian nationalist ideation of nation as 
education. Upon deeper inspection, however, it is congruent with specific aspects of 
Gökalp’s formulation. Gökalp’s works did not leave us with a particular means of 
determining which populations in particular would provide modern Turkish leaders 
with the appropriate data for the creation of a national culture. Saffet, and those 
whose approach to history was similar to his, proposed to fill this gap by 
investigating the historical origins of Turkic populations and delimiting criteria for 
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the identification of their modern-day descendants. Once this had been completed, 
populations to be educated in Turkishness – a Turkishness, and Aryanness, that they 
had forgotten – could be set aside and reintegrated into the modern Turkic 
community. Saffet’s keen interest in brachycephalic skulls, skin coloration and body 
types is informed by contemporary European understandings about racial 
anthropology in addition to European preferences for specific racial types. 
Moreover, its scientific, or pseudo-scientific, nature places it firmly in Gökalp’s 
category of “civilization”, a tool for the rejuvenation of national culture through the 
identification and analysis of the historical and pure national morality of the Turkic 
race. Science and the arts; past and present; Asia and Europe would all soon be 
joined together in an intellectual closed circuit that admitted no other world view. 
 
From Root to Branch 
 The dominance of this approach to Turkic history was aided by a seemingly 
unquestioned acceptance of documentation deemed favourable to its proof. The 
development of a critical attitude towards scholarly materials occurred much more 
quickly when it came to secondary sources, the majority of which were European, 
rather than the original primary sources upon which histories of the pre-Islamic 
Turks were based. Caferoğlu, for example, expressed his skepticism over earlier 
French and German interpretations of the ethnic origins of the Avars in his article on 
titles in pre-Islamic Turkic communities, published in 1931. Rather than conceiving of 
a particular institution as being the product of a given socio-economic milieu, he is 
more concerned with the assignation of the institution of the Qaganate to either a 
Turkic or Mongolic source, ruling out, off hand, the suggestion made by P. Pelliot 
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that it might have originated in Iranian communities (Caferoğlu 1931, 106–7). This 
comes despite the fact that readings of the Chinese sources provided information 
about socio-political formations only, rather than specifically ethnic or racial 
appellations as understood in the modern sense (see Lee 2016). 
 There is a distinct insistence on seeing the appearance and re-appearance of 
particular cultural and socio-economic phenomena as an essentialist component of 
the Turkic identity. In returning to Caferoğlu, we see that he reviews the various 
Qagans’ names from the Tukyu and Uyghur collectivities and notes the repeated 
occurrence of the morpheme ay (“moon” in the Turkic languages). While he 
generally denies that this is a direct influence of the spread of the dualist 
Manichaean religion throughout Central Asia – something that Müller claims to be 
the case – he does concede that Mani might have been influential in reviving old 
Turkic customs. Thus, rather than admitting successive waves of religious and 
cultural influence resulting in a dialectic of cultural change, Caferoğlu prefers to see 
an essential component of Turkic identity that is either revived or repressed in 
response to external stimuli (Caferoğlu 1931, 114–15). Criticism is justified only 
insofar as it might support the ultimate desire to paint the picture of a pure and 
crystalized Turkic identity. Just as Gökalp claimed that there were elements of 
ancient Turkic culture that would be revived and nurtured by the demands of the 
modern era, Caferoğlu sees this as a process that repeats itself throughout history, 
recalling the shamanistic rites and beliefs of the ancient Turks, who, as if 
programmed biologically, respond to them subconsciously. 
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The First Turkish Historical Congress 
 The new characteristics of this immortal Turkic culture and people were fully 
delineated at the First Turkish Historical Congress in 1932. They were forecefully 
enunciated by Afet (İnan), the teacher to whom Atatürk had bestowed the honour of 
creating a new historical meta-narrative for the Turkish nation. As the head of the 
Türk Ocakları at the time of their dissolution, she was a scholar of prime importance 
at the First Turkish History Congress (Behar 1992, 147–48). Much of her research 
was based on the work of the Swiss anthropologist Eugène Pittard, whose student 
and friend Afet would become in the mid-1930s. Pittard had sought to counter 
European prejudices and misinformation regarding the Turks through his knowledge 
of the country and his study of Turkish history and archaeology. His research was 
often based on erroneous or misleading information, and those conclusions that he 
did reach rarely expressed the same degree of certainly about the racial origins or 
relationships of the Turks as the Turkish History Thesis (Copeaux 1997, 53–54). 
Nevertheless, his positive attitude towards the Turks and their place within the 
European family of peoples won him considerable fame and affection among 
nationalist historiographical circles in Turkey, and made his findings a core 
component of the Thesis’ scientific foundation. 
 
Laicism and Rationalism 
 The emphasis on science was of double importance for the Congress and the 
State as a whole. In addition to lending credence to the Turkish History Thesis, it also 
introduced rationality and the values of the Enlightenment into state-sanctioned 
 211 
historiography. It therefore provided a new tool in supporting the laicist campaign 
against which Ankara had already faced stiff opposition (Behar 1992, 174). This drive 
towards a more scientific history had also been a component of Young Turk 
historiography (Kazemzade 1327, 4:264), but it was made explicit by the Minister of 
Education, Esat Bey, in his opening remarks at the Congress (Birinci Türk Tarihi 
Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 6). When combined with the content of 
the actual Thesis, however, it allowed for a two-pronged approach to building pride 
in national identity: proof of the greatness of the nation’s Turkic ancestors during 
the prehistoric period; and proof of the advanced state of Turkish social sciences in 
the Republican period (Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006, 381). In this manner, the weaving of a 
historical narrative that relied on textual analysis, archaeology, anthropology and 
ideological rhetoric was remarkably similar to contemporary efforts related to the 
showcasing of the Roman past in fascist Italy (Arthurs 2007, 35–36). This much is 
clear from the introduction to the volume of speeches and proceedings from the 
First Historical Congress, where the mission of the State with respect to history is 
explained: 
“In order to prove with scientific documents and 
disseminate the history of the Turkish nation, which 
gave the world the first light of civilization, which has 
shown a thousand and one instances of evidence of its 
creative existence on every page of the history of world 
civilization and on every scene of human activities, he 
[Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk)] has taken the Turkish 
Historical Research Society, which he founded, under 
his great protection.” (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: 
Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, v) 
 
This brief introduction ties history, science and nationalism into a tightly braided 
narrative of legitimization, linking the glories of the ancient Turks with the father of 
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the modern Republic and saviour of the nation. Most importantly, through the 
presentations that follow, it allows for legitimacy to flow directly from ethnogenesis 
to contemporary political leaders, without the intercession of the Seljuk and 
Ottoman periods besmirching the righteousness of the Republic. 
 
Afet Hanım’s View of the Ancient Turks 
 Among the most important sciences employed by Turkish scholars in the 
1930s were craniology, geography and archaeology. This scientific trifecta formed 
the empirical basis for Afet Hanım’s presentation to the First Turkish Historical 
Congress, Tarihten evel ve Tarih fecrinde (Before History and at the Dawn of History). 
The creative use of both craniology and archaeology allowed her to claim that, in the 
prehistoric period, there emerged a race of brachycephalic humanoids in Central 
Asia. Research on the historical geography of the region, on the other hand, 
explained that climatic changes occurred 12 000 years ago, ensuring that Central 
Asia was a fertile region cut off from the rest of the world by high mountains of ice. 
The isolation of the steppe provided an ideal environment in which racial mixing 
would be prevented and the brachycephalic race would be able to develop metal 
working and agriculture (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 
1932, 22–24). It was these people – undoubtedly white, and not yellow – who 
brought the seeds of civilization with them when, forced by a natural calamity, they 
migrated out towards Europe and the Fertile Crescent, expelling the original 
inhabitants or mixing with them (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, 
Münakaşaları 1932, 27). 
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 At stake, then, was ascertaining exactly the identity of this advanced race 
that conquered the lesser peoples of Eurasia. In other words, who were the 
indigenous inhabitants of Central Asia? When placed together with another question 
– where is the homeland of the Turks? – the answer became obvious: the Turks are 
not only the indigenous peoples of Central Asia, they are also the direct descendants 
of the creators of human civilization. This latter group spoke proto-Turkish, and 
therefore should be recognized as belonging to the Turkish race. Any attempt to 
associate the Turkic peoples with a non-white race, such as the Mongols, would 
amount to slander (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 
30–31). The confusion of race, ethnicity and language is blatantly obvious from Afet 
Hanım’s argumentation. While archaeology might show that the original inhabitants 
of Central Asia were brachycephalic and even that they practiced customs and rituals 
noted among later inhabitants of the same region, the lack of written evidence 
makes the link between them and later Turkic speakers of the same area tenuous at 
best. Scientific fact is thus massaged and stretched in order to accommodate the 
nationalist ideas of the Republic’s political élite. 
 
Modern Examples of Ancient Prototypes 
 However, in linking modern linguistic data to prehistoric finds, Afet Hanım 
created a new problem: that of explaining why today’s Turkic-speaking Central 
Asians resemble their non-Turkic Asian neighbours much more than Germans or the 
Swiss. In her response, she sought to answer this challenge while still dissociating the 
Turks from the Mongols. While mixing did occur between the Turks and Mongols 
through the long history of Genghis Khan’s empire, the numerical superiority of the 
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Turks led to their name being attached to the offspring produced by miscegenation 
(Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 32). Racial mixing, 
then, contaminated the purity of original Turkic populations, and distanced them 
from the purer groups of Turks, who were clearly of the white race. Moreover, those 
Turkic speakers whose physical characteristic were more Asiatic than European – 
presumably members of Central Asian ethnicities – were merely Tungusic peoples 
masquerading as Turks. Such handy rhetoric allowed Afet Hanım both to praise the 
qualities of the Turkic peoples and to distance the Anatolian Turks from groups 
whose physical attributes would make them unpalatable to the most fervent 
supporters of the racialist sciences. 
 Afet Hanım’s study was not an outlier, but rather an opening salvo that marked 
the new trend in Turkish historiography. It was supported by an even more detailed 
consideration of craniological evidence from archaeological discoveries presented by 
the Turkish Anthropologist Şevket Aziz (Kansu). Aziz presented to the Congress on an 
anthropological study of Turkish and French subjects employing craniological 
methods. Such research does not represent a radical departure from previous theses. 
It does, however, demonstrate a recognition of the need to weave the various 
branches of the social sciences into a coherent and complex narrative linking past and 
present, as well as Europe to Anatolia and Central Asia. Aziz spends considerable time 
explaining the project conducted at İstanbul Üniversitesi, comparing skulls found in 
Anatolia with live subjects from both Turkey and France. The end goal is to 
demonstrate that Turks represent the origin of the Alpine peoples of Western and 
Central Europe, the wellspring of contemporary white superiority (Birinci Türk Tarihi 
Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 274–78).  
 215 
Aziz explained that there were three types of Europeans: Northern, 
Mediterranean and Alpine. The first two groups were dolichocephalic, while the last 
one was brachycephalic. Racist European scholars had originally believed that these 
brachycephalic peoples came from Asia, but that there were two different groups of 
them: a white-skinned one, and a yellow-skinned one. Their “prejudices” led these 
scholars to group the Turks with the latter group, rather than realize that they were 
in fact members of the former. Such a conclusion is evident from the anthropological 
research conducted by two German scholars on the Turkmen of Anatolia – 
descendants of the Hittites and Akkadians – who exhibit a high percentage of auburn 
hair, fair skin and brachycephalic skulls. Moreover, despite being a controversial 
theory, Aziz nevertheless argued that a “yellow race” as such did not exist, but rather 
that it was the product of mixing between white and black peoples (Birinci Türk Tarihi 
Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 48–50). The Turkmen provided an ideal 
means of linking the various components of this argument together: estranged from 
the centres of Ottoman power, they were uncorrupted by the various influences that 
subverted Ottoman culture and society from its Turkic foundations. As nomads and 
semi-nomads, their lifestyles and worldview encapsulated the best of the hardy, 
independent Central Asian Turkic ethic so often lauded by Gökalp and his followers. 
Yet their appearances – fair-haired and blue-eyed – preserved the Turks’ pride of place 
among the upper echelons of European peoples. 
 
A Guide to the Turkish Race 
 It was, finally, the doctor and politician Reşit Galip Bey who provided the 
most eloquent enunciation of the Thesis’ racial component. When transcribed in the 
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record of presentations to the Congress, his speech exceeds 60 pages; by far, one of 
the longest orations. In it, he explains authoritatively the nature of race; the Turks’ 
place within the global categorization of races; and the fate of the proto-Turks 
during the pre-historic period. His presentation is replete with references to the 
superiority of the Alpine race over the other peoples of the world, while stressing 
that the last wave of Alpine migrants to move westward and conquer Europe were 
the Turks, repeating Reşit Saffet’s emphasis on the manner in which the Turks’ 
preserved their “Aryanness” (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, 
Münakaşaları 1932, 112–13). This is not to imply, however, that the first waves of 
Turkic migrants were not skilled. Rather, the evidence uncovered by archaeologists 
at the Ano excavation site, near Ashgabat, showed that the Sumerians had migrated 
to southern Iraq from modern-day Turkmenistan, and that they brought with them 
advanced methods of irrigation (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, 
Münakaşaları 1932, 118). Monogenesis was thus a proven fact, but rather than it 
elevating the civilizations of the ancient Middle East, Reşit Galip Bey pushed the 
origins of human advancement to Central Asia, the Turkic heartland. 
 Turkish historians did more than simply adopt and repeat the European 
concept of monogenism shifted east to Central Asia. The original theory held that 
the Fertile Crescent was the site of the first civilizations, but this had little to no 
bearing on the modern populations inhabiting those regions (Fowler 2008, 110). 
Successive waves of migration had introduced new racial and ethnic groups to the 
Middle East – the last of which was the Arab Conquest – and the contemporary 
populations could be said to bear little resemblance to the original inhabitants of 
Sumer or Akkad (Fowler 2008, 110–11). The Turkish History Thesis, however, argued 
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that the inhabitants of Central Asia had always been the Turks. It established a direct 
line of descent from these first creators to the modern peoples of Anatolia and the 
Turkic populations of Central Asia. Reşit Galip Bey stressed that it was a “blood libel” 
fuelled by Christian extremism against the Turks, as well as Semitic chauvinism, that 
caused European scholars to reject this conclusion (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: 
Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 153–55). His message was clear: the enmity 
between Ottomans and Europeans blinded the latter to the fact that the Volk of 
Anatolia – regardless of their religious persuasions (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: 
Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 134) – were, similar to their Central Asian 
brethren, the genetic heirs of a people far superior to the ancestors of the 
Europeans. 
 
Epistemologies, Ontologies and National Goals 
Similarly, Sadi Maksudi [Arsal], who would provide the closing address at the 
Second Historical Congress in 1937, brought to the fore an understanding of the 
importance of race for national and international belonging. Although he revives 
Gobineau’s ideas of racial superiority and the primacy of the Aryans, he is not 
uncritical in their adoption. He encourages greater focus in the research of the 
Turkish Historical Research Society on the importance of race for Turkishness (Birinci 
Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 348–50). Within this, there is 
an implicit understanding that it is not just race, but which race, that matters in the 
determination of belonging and national history: Galip argues for white Turks, while 
Togan, ever enamoured of the Mongols and Chingisids, parries on behalf of an 
Asiatic ethnogenesis. Reşit Galip was not shy about calling this a political, rather than 
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scientific, debate. He claims that those who espouse a view that drought and 
ecological disaster, rather than socio-economic reasons, forced mass migration from 
Central Asia are those who truly love their co-racials in Central Asia (Birinci Türk 
Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 386–87). The distinction is not 
entirely explicit, but it does bear upon our understanding of the early Republicans’ 
comprehension of authenticity and belonging. If Galip prevails, then it is the 
Gökalpian approach which wins the day, seeking in idealized and now white Turkic 
tribes outside of Central Asia a source of national culture upon which to draw. If it is 
Togan, however, miscegenation and a strictly historical approach to the evolution of 
Turkic society must be accepted, one that denies racial purity and essentialism a 
place in the definition of Turkishness.   
 All of this together is intended to be more than simply the establishment of a 
new, objective and neutral epistemology. While the scholars present are indeed 
concerned with the construction of sciences friendly to Turkish nationalism, their 
end goal is much more than the uncovering of historical truth. An understanding of 
the past is an epistemology in and of itself which leads to ontological certainly about 
Turkish and Turkist consciousness, the undying conviction of the nation as a real and 
tangible component of political, economic and social life. As Şemsettin Bey puts it:  
“If every individual of the Turkic world, every Turkic 
union that was formed, every Turkish state had been in 
possession of and protected their own consciousness, 
one would be able to easily conceive of the 
contemporary Turkic inheritance on the face of the 
earth.” (Birinci Tsürk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, 
Münakaşaları 1932, 423) 
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National consciousness is a core component of the race that, through 
miscegenation, cultural dilution and imitation, has been forgotten. Those present at 
the Congress sought to weave together disparate parts of Gökalp’s philosophy, the 
history of the Turkic peoples and modern political prerogatives into a coherent 
understanding about the modern world. By conflating race and national culture, they 
argue that the modern Turks must recognize their innate duty to the Turkish nation 
and, unlike those who were led astray in the past, show obedience and reverence to 
the contemporary national leadership in its struggle for cultural, political and 
economic independence and glory (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, 
Münakaşaları 1932, 568). 
 
Silenced Opposition 
 As I have alluded to above, the assertions of Afet Hanım, Şevket Aziz, Reşit 
Galip Bey and Sadri Maksudi were far from unchallenged at the First Turkish 
Historical Congress. The historian Fuat Köprülü attacked directly Afet Hanım’s 
confusion of race, ethnicity and language, as well as her reliance on an immature 
science of racial anthropology. Köprülü exposed the manner in which race had often 
been used, both in Europe and Iran, as a propagandistic tool for political ends (Birinci 
Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 42–45). The Bashkir 
intellectual Zeki Velidi (Togan), meanwhile, argued that assertions regarding the 
advanced civilization of Central Asia could not be substantiated by scientific 
evidence, a key component of any historical study (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: 
Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 171–74). Both men cautioned their fellow 
historians on the dangers of specious reasoning and unsubstantiated conclusions. 
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Their calls for self-critical approaches to history, however, were drowned out by 
supporters of the official line (Behar 1992, 134, 147). State control of historiography 
tightened, and dissenting views found fewer and fewer outlets to challenge the 
dominant narrative (Ersanlı 2002, 126). 
 Zeki Velidi and Reşit Bey effectively clashed on methodology and source 
criticism; this confrontation, however, still bears upon issues of ideology when 
placed within the context of the Thesis. The former sought to rely on Russian 
sources, particularly Barthol’d and other well-respected founders of Soviet 
Turkology, while the latter is clearly in favour of a return to Chinese, Uyghur and 
other primary sources, including oral histories (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: 
Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 177–82). Velidi represents, to some extent, a 
universalist approach to the historical sciences, insisting upon the sacrosanct nature 
of European epistemologies; the civilizational component of Gökalp’s culture and 
civilization dichotomy. Reşit Bey, by contrast, argues for a distinct Turkish historical 
science; an epistemology that, while borrowing technical aspects from its European 
counterpart, stays true to the moral and aesthetic values perceived as being core to 
the immortal Turkic nation. Neither one can be said to be more or less Gökalpian; at 
issue is where the line is drawn between culture and civilization. The nationalist 
critics of Togan, in particular, expressed their opposition to his criticism not along 
the lines of scientific rigour or theoretical accuracy, but rather adherence to the 
nation’s morality and national pride. Similar to Gökalp’s formulation of civilization 
and culture both serving the end of improving the nation’s fortunes, this was a 
dispute about improving historical sciences for the betterment of Turkic 
communities, rather than any sort of purely academic advance.  
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Methodology was indeed a key area of concern for all those present, and 
it formed the core of the presentation of one of the founders of Turkist thought, 
Yusuf Akçura, in his closing address to the Congress (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: 
Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 585–607). At the outset, Akçura appears to 
provide us with a prescient call to recognizing the positionality and subjectivity 
of the historian, whose own ethnic, professional, class and other identities will 
bear upon her interpretation of history (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: 
Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 587). This quickly descends, however, into an 
accusation against not only European history, but also Ottoman-era 
historiography, of being anti-Turkish, because of the identities of the historians 
who wrote it and the milieus in which they lived (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: 
Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 597). Once he comes to the need for new 
history texts for Turkish schools, he makes the urgency of replacing such 
histories, which prize European and Semitic achievements over those of the 
Turkic peoples, explicit: “It will be understood from what I have said that history 
is not an abstract science. History is for life; history is for the preservation of 
nations’ and peoples’ existences and the expansion of their strength.” (Birinci 
Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 605) The role and goal 
of history is thus clear, and it is tied directly to the revival of the nation’s 
fortunes, as was Gökalp’s reorganization of society. And, as a tool in service of 
the nation’s benefit, it could not possibly be formulated according to 
universalist or foreign rules. 
Akçura’s is a speech consistent with a young science that has only 
recently come under the protection and watchful eye of a single-party regime. 
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What the pro-Turkist group appears to be engaged in is a purge of perceived 
anti-Turkic bias, rather than the construction of its own epistemology and 
ontologies. Reşit Bey takes aim at Barthol’d and his asserted anti-Turkic 
prejudices, while Ahmet Ağaoğlu, another product of the Imperial Russian 
educational system, launches a broadside at all previous scholarship on the 
Turkic peoples for its racist approach to the Turkish nation (Birinci Türk Tarihi 
Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 262). Little attempt is made to 
stake out new means of uncovering historical truth apart from criticizing the old. 
Positive reinforcement is provided through recourse to the same mechanisms 
employed by Gökalp himself: an extrapolation from contemporary ethnographic 
data about the Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Yakuts, Nogays and others to the pre-Islamic 
populations of Central Asia (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, 
Münakaşaları 1932, 263–65). In the midst of this, Akçura himself reassures the 
audience that this is not revenge or chauvinism in itself, but rather a search for 
unadulterated historical truth: “The most basic attribute of our thesis is that it is 
unifying, not discriminatory; just, not tyrannical; that it advocates peace and not 
enmity. In this manner, our thesis, which is based on objective investigation and 
scientific composition, is lofty from a spiritual and moral point of view.” (Birinci 
Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 1932, 607) There is no need 
for criticism, as, unlike previous European and Ottoman histories, this new 
narrative is objective and fair, aimed at rectifying the festering wounds of 
outdated histories.  
 As the 1930s progressed, the régime sought to put greater emphasis on the 
Thesis’ scientific bona fides. As a result, it imported a considerable number of foreign 
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academics and specialists, often from Germany, as a means of bolstering its ability to 
produce local historians, linguists and archaeologists (Behar 1992, 169–71). In the 
Historical Research Society’s publications and at the Second Turkish Historical 
Congress, historians stressed archaeology, rather than textual analysis, as a crucial 
source of data to inform the Turkish History Thesis (Tanyeri-Erdemir 2006, 385). The 
fact that the State could only sponsor such endeavours in Anatolia, rather than in 
Central Asia, implied that the focus of history writing now switched to Turkic cultures 
in Asia Minor, rather than the Turkic homeland (Ersanlı 2002, 154). Nevertheless, 
some historians – particularly those of a nationalist persuasion – continued to write 
about Central Asia and its early Turkic populations, including the Huns.    
 
Of Drafts and Dogma 
 The work of the First Turkish History Congress was intended to support the 
larger project of enunciating a meta-narrative for the Turkish nation. The 
considerable presence of educators at the Congress, as well as speeches such as 
Akçura’s on the need for new history textbooks, demonstrated the State’s concern 
with a cohesive account of the history of the Turks that could be employed in the 
education and socialization of the country’s youth. As such, in the years following 
the Congress, work began on components of the Türk Tarih Anahatları, or Guide to 
Turkish History. The grand project was never realized, but a number of chapters 
survive in draft form. They are collectively known as the Türk Tarih Anahatları 
Müsveddeleri, or Drafts of the Guide to Turkish History. The chapters that survive 
indicate that work was completed by individual scholars in no particularly organized 
fashion. The typeset and bound works include chapters on ancient Iranian history 
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(No. 7); Ottoman history (Series 3, No. 11); a history of Turkish music (No. 26); and 
an account of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (Series 2, No. 13A). Some of the 
works were completed prior to the First Historical Congress, but the majority were 
produced in the period 1933 to 1936. 
 The surviving drafts demonstrate that the process of writing and collating a 
grand history of the Turkic peoples from their emergence in Central Asia up to the 
20th century was very different those employed in the Soviet Union. A general 
structure was mandated by the CHF or a centralized editorial committee, as the 
works are all identified as subsections of larger components. These subsections are 
duly indexed and ranked, implying that there was some form of prior organization of 
the final product. Research, composition, style and focus, on the other hand, were all 
apparently left to the authors. The monographs are identified as the product of 
individuals, rather than committees or boards, and there is no mention of editors. 
With this, we might assume, at first blush, that they represent, in large part, the 
beliefs, opinions and interpretations of the individual academics. State intervention 
was not nearly as direct as it was in the Soviet system, but this does not imply that it 
did not exist, nor that the State’s ideological agenda did not influence the output of 
those who participated in the project. This was, after all, funded by and 
implemented under the aegis of the Kemalist régime. Moreover, the CHF had 
eliminated open political competition, and opportunities for publishing works that 
ran contrary to the dominant ideology were few and far between. Finally, one need 
only look to the example of Zeki Velidi Togan, who left Turkey for Vienna in 1934, to 
see what possible sanctions might exist for those who transgressed the limit 
established by the Kemalist State. 
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Sumerians and Bulgars 
 The manner in which aspects of Gökalpian nationalism entered into the 
Müsveddeleri can be seen in two of the monographs. The first, Türklerin yazıyı icat 
etmekle medeniyete hizmetleri: Alfabenin de menşei, Sumer Türklerinin yazısıdır (The 
Turks’ Service to Civilization through the Creation of Writing: The Alphabet’s Origin 
too was the Writing of the Sumerian Turks) was written by Ahmet Cevat (Emre) and 
published in typescript form in 1933. It is number 11 of the first series of 
müsveddeleri. The second work I will examine is Bulgar Türklerinin Eski Tarihi 
(Ancient History of the Bulgar Turks), number 26 of the first series, and written by 
Hâmit Zübeyr (Koşay). It was published in the same format, likely in 1932. In both 
cases, the research and narratives presented by the authors is firmly within the 
realm of 19th century European philological and archaeological work. Emre begins his 
account of the unearthing and decoding of cuneiform inscriptions from south-west 
Asia with French and German discoveries (Emre 1933, 3–5). Koşay, on the other 
hand, makes considerable usage of Armenian, ancient Greek and Byzantine sources 
to trace out the migration and describe the culture and social organization of the 
ancient Bulgarians (Koşay 1932, 1–2). In neither case are European epistemologies 
challenged, only the conclusions at which earlier scholars arrived. Far from 
revolutionary or nativist, the historical narratives traced out by both men were 
obviously intended to be firmly within the European tradition. 
 In Emre’s account, considerable stress is laid on the fact that the Sumerians 
were not only Turks, but that they were certainly not Semites. Although he does not 
cite specific sources, he makes certain to point out that many contemporary experts 
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and scholars believed that the Sumerians as a nation (“millet”) and the language that 
they spoke resembled the ancient Turks and their idiom. Moreover, the writing 
system created by the Sumerians was not a product of their residence in southern 
Iraq, but rather was brought with them from their original homeland (“memleket”), 
which is implied to be Central Asia, given that they are clearly identified as Turks 
(Emre 1933, 7). Turkish genius is identified in various ways: the manner in which the 
alphabet was adopted by up to 20 other nations (Emre 1933, 10); the analogous role 
that Sumerian culture played in the eastern Mediterranean to the role of Latin in 
Mediaeval Europe (Emre 1933, 8–9); the considerable influence of Sumer on the 
other peoples of the ancient world, including the Egyptians (Emre 1933, 16). Of 
greatest importance is the manner in which the Sumerians’ invention is perceived as 
a technological advancement, rather than being culturally determined. As a 
component of civilization, alphabetic writing was amenable to being spread to other 
nations throughout the ancient world. By contrast, when this technology arrived in 
Phoenicia, the Semitic Phoenicians adapted it to their own linguistic needs, 
eliminating vowels and degrading the Sumerian alphabet to the level of an abjad 
(Emre 1933, 14). This new, culturally-bound mutant was no longer suitable for 
anyone but the Semites: it entered the parochial realm of the nation, ideal for the 
Phoenicians, Jews and Arabs, but sub-par when applied to other languages.  
The implications of this interpretation are obvious. The alphabet, a 
component of international civilization, is a far better fit for the writing of modern 
Turkish than the Arabic script, which is tainted by the limited realm of Semitic 
culture. The Kemalist régime’s decision to impose the Latin alphabet in 1928 was 
therefore sanctioned by the science of Gökalp’s nationalist sociology. Beyond this, 
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however, the alphabet as a technology was also a return to ancient Turkic wisdom 
and innovation. In this sense, the argumentation is similar to that used by Gökalp in 
his promotion of gender equality. Not only would it mirror trends in European socio-
economic development, it would also allow for a rediscovery of ancient Turkic 
morality and family organization. In this way, the two components of Emre’s 
argument come together. It is not enough to demonstrate that the alphabet is a 
technology and therefore a part of global modern civilization. By emphasizing its 
origins in the Sumerians and Central Asia, the adoption of the Latin alphabet 
reconnects Turks to their roots, the practices of their forefathers, and a means of 
expression that has escaped the nefarious influence of the much-denigrated Semitic 
peoples. The historical narrative, presented in the light of supposedly objective 
European science, thereby becomes a tool for régime legitimization. 
Koşay’s examination of the Bulgars is far smaller than Emre’s account of 
Sumerian writing, but it too contains aspects of Gökalpian nationalist ideology. To 
begin, Bulgar “national” legends are used as sources of historical and sociological 
data. The myth, similar to language and custom, is conceived as a key to the past of 
the nation, its view of the world and its group consciousness (Koşay 1932, 2). This 
approach to oral history and folk literature – both of which were frowned upon in 
Soviet epistemologies – belies the Gökalpian division between culture, which is 
restricted to the nation, and material technological development, which is shared 
between nations. The value placed on morality, ethic and cast of mind, all of which 
belong in the national ambit, is further strengthened by the claim that Turkic 
elements were responsible for the organization of states and state structures in the 
Balkans. Slavic elements are presented as the secondary force in the creation of the 
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polities confronting the Byzantines in the latter part of the first millennium CE (Koşay 
1932, 8). It foreshadows a Turkish nationalist trope about the importance of state 
construction among the ancient Turks; a mainstay of nationalist propaganda 
throughout the 20th century (see Kurat 1992). 
 More importantly, however, Koşay utilizes his description of Bulgar Turks in 
the Italian peninsula to reiterate Gökalp’s nation by education. He claims that “these 
Turks who migrated to Italy lost their language and forgot their origins and spread 
out among foreign tribes.” (Koşay 1932, 7) The nation thus disappears not through 
the dilution of blood, but through a loss of language and custom. This is the original 
Gökalpian formulation of the nation, albeit one that is extreme in its views on the 
possibility of cultural change and assimilation, negating the idea of hybrid part-Turkic 
cultures arising in areas of Bulgar settlement. It is an indication of the unique 
manner in which Gökalpian nationalism informed the historical sciences, keeping 
them from veering haphazardly towards contemporary German conceptions of race 
and nationhood, while also rejecting the universality and historicity of Soviet 
historical studies. Change is presented as an entirely exogenous affair and, even if 
race does not appear in the text, dilution, rather than adaptation, comes as the 
greatest threat to national consciousness. 
 
The Second Turkish Historical Congress 
 In 1937, the TTTK convened a second Congress intended to follow up on the 
first one in 1932. Events of the previous five years made for a considerably different 
affair in both form and content. Among the most important was the gradual 
withdrawal of Atatürk from public political life, leaving the running of the country to 
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the Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü. Atatürk, however, did not become a recluse; his 
attention focused much more on scholarly and pseudo-scholarly activities, 
particularly in the realms of history and linguistics, rather than the administration of 
the government and the socio-economic development of the country as a whole. 
Indeed, he even met with the Soviet linguist Nikolai Marr, whose work was discussed 
in the section on linguistics in chapter 3, during the latter’s visit to Turkey in 1933. 
They apparently spent 12 hours discussing language and history, including the 
campaign to purge Turkish of Arabic and Persian words (Hirst 2013, 48). Atatürk still 
wielded unquestioned power, but his decisions were no longer based on an intricate 
knowledge of the challenges facing the government and the nation; a source of 
considerable tension between the President and the Prime Minister over the 1930s 
(Zürcher 2004, 182–83). On the international front, too, rapid changes were afoot. 
The rise of extremist governments and regimes in Europe, as well as the enmity 
between Germany and the Soviet Union, bore considerably on Turkish policy. While 
the government in Ankara shied away from an open alliance with Nazi Germany, 
preferring instead official neutrality, it was heavily influenced by the trappings of 
fascist Italy and Horthy-era Hungary, basing the newly formed Halkevleri (People’s 
Houses) largely on models from Italy, Hungary and Germany (Yeşilkaya 1999, 70–71). 
Irredentism, too, was far from dead, as the 1930s saw considerable Turkish pressure 
on the international level to address “Hatay Issues.” This referred to the status of the 
former Alexandretta Sanjak, hitherto part of French-mandate Syria; Hatay being a 
name coined by Atatürk with the direct aim of linking the territory to the ancient 
Hittites. The government in Ankara had refused to recognize the territory’s exclusion 
from its sovereignty in 1923, and had long lobbied for its return. Controversy still 
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exists over the manner in which Turks were counted in the French census 
immediately before the elections in 1938 that led to the regional assembly seceding 
from Syria, and eventually requesting absorption into the Turkish Republic (Suleiman 
2003, 141–42). 
Within the Congress itself, such changes manifested in a number of different 
ways. To begin with, the Congress attracted a far greater number of foreign scholars. 
Official delegations from Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Romania, Greece, 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary attended, as well as individual academics 
who were not affiliated with specific governments. It is notable, however, that there 
was no official or unofficial representation from Soviet intellectual circles. This, 
despite the fact that Soviet scholarship often found its way into Turkological studies, 
and that finds within Soviet territory were often the subject of discussion during the 
Congress presentations (Türk Tarih Kurumu 1943, XLI-XLII). In terms of content, the 
Congress focused less on source criticism and philology, and more on the findings of 
the scientific pursuits of archaeology, anthropology and biology. In addition, the Sun-
Language Theory (Dil-Güneş Teorisi), whereby Turkish was posited to be the root of 
all other languages, placed a greater emphasis on theoretical analysis and innovative 
approaches to data, rather than a reverence for traditional methods of scholarship. 
Together, all of this was intended to highlight the manner in which the Republic was 
making up for the inadequacies of the Ottoman period, adopting new technologies 
and scientific discoveries in the pursuit of historical truth and national pride (Â. İnan 
1943, 10). 
 On the issue of national pride, it is apparent from the pronouncements of a 
number of the Turkish delegates that the general feeling of participants at the event 
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was that the connection between the material remains uncovered throughout 
Anatolia and Central Asia, and the glorious past of the Turkish nation, would become 
evident in short order. Âfet İnan, official representative of the TTTK at the Congress, 
said as much during her account of the archaeological activities of the Institution 
during the 1930s. This was a two-pronged approach: first, Turkish scholars would 
demonstrate that Anatolian civilization – in large part, the Proto-Hittites and Hittites 
– rivalled that of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, the two great Hamitic and Semitic 
polities of the Classical world; and secondly, an irrefutable link with the homeland of 
the Hittites in Central Asia would be established (Â. İnan 1943, 12–13). These 
sentiments were echoed by the head of the excavations at Alacahöyük, Dr. Hamit 
Zübeyr Koşay: “One stumbles upon this culture in the nomads who have been given 
the name of Eurasia’s mounted peoples (= Reitervölker) and, undoubtedly, the 
homeland of this first culture [of Anatolia], according to research conducted up to 
the present time, is Central Asia.” (original emphasis) (Koşay 1943, 31). However, it is 
not enough to leave it at that. These peoples, the progenitors of Anatolian 
civilization, have been identified by European scholars as the Altay peoples, who 
imparted their civilizational advances to the ancestors of the Indo-German race. 
They are, certainly, the same as the Turks (Koşay 1943, 31–32). 
 Racial and civilizational superiority set the tone for the conference right from 
the beginning. İnan reminds her audience, both domestic and foreign, that “this 
happy task [the writing of Turkish history] takes its inspiration and its plan from 
these foundations: the Turks are a white race and brachycephalic.” While she does 
assert that the Turks undoubtedly spread civilization from Europe to the Pacific 
Ocean and beyond, the most important aspect of İnan’s speech is that racial 
 232 
continuity is even more prominent than racial superiority. The Hittites and the Turks, 
without doubt, are one and the same, and thus Anatolia has been inhabited 
continuously by the same racial grouping for several millennia (Â. İnan 1943, 8–9). 
When taken together, important political and ideological signposts can be seen in 
both İnan and Koşay’s addresses. Politically, the state’s priority of establishing its 
right to the land of Anatolia, as opposed to Greek and Armenian irredentists, is clear 
from the discussion of endurance and continuity. Many of the components of a 
nation – language, morality, social organization, culture, economy – differ radically 
between the ancient Anatolians and the modern Turks. Nevertheless, by substituting 
racial characteristics for psychological and cultural ones, the intellectual 
establishment applies an innovative mechanism to legitimize continued Turkish 
sovereignty over all of Anatolia. Moreover, the insistence on a white race, as 
opposed to Mongoloid or Negroid, obviates any sort of call for mandatory or colonial 
administration over Turkey. Such systems are suitable for the peoples of Asia and 
Africa, but if the Turks are as white as the peoples of Europe, there can be no 
question of subordinating the government in Ankara to London, Paris or Berlin (Ergin 
2008, 837). 
 On the ideological level, a more nuanced approach reveals considerable 
similarities between Gökalp’s understanding of the nation and modern social 
organization, and the narratives of both İnan and Koşay. First, the insistence on 
Anatolia’s civilizational advancement compared to Egypt and Mesopotamia negates 
any sort of view that the Semitic contribution to Turkish culture might have, in some 
way, enriched and advanced it. Koşay admits that Proto-Hittite and Hittite 
civilizations were in fact influenced heavily by neighbouring societies, but this 
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appears to have been the case after these societies’ highly-advanced cultures were 
transported from Central Asia (Koşay 1943, 28). One then sees the importance of 
learning about the past and the pure Altaic cultures of pre-Islamic Central Asia. If the 
ancestors of the modern Turks were the instructors of the now dominant Indo-
Germanic peoples, then clearly a return to the core beliefs and values of the Altaic 
societies will reverse the corruption and debasement brought about through 
centuries of sustained Byzantine, Persian and Semitic influences. National morality 
and social organization, as in the works of Gökalp, are key to this rejuvenation, and 
the tools with which we uncover them are embedded in the modern, international 
sciences adopted by the new Republic. Culture and civilization, each in its 
appropriate place, aims to rebuild and reinforce the nation as a social construct. 
Gone is the Islamic concept of belonging through belief; here now is belonging 
through being, a society educated about its own pertinence to the Turkish racial-
nation, founder of human civilization.  
 Even Gökalp’s insistence on the voluntaristic notions of language-based 
belonging have been tweaked to meet the needs of the dominant understanding of 
inclusion. The Sun-Language Theory was intended to provide a key to showing the 
superiority and long life of the Turkish language, but it was also a mechanism for 
rooting out racial imposters. Hasan Reşit Tankut’s address to the plenum provides us 
with insight into how this is achieved. He picks up on Gökalp’s claim that race, 
ethnicity and language are unconnected and limits this assertion to the historical 
period only. By employing the methods and discoveries of history, archaeology, 
ethnography, racial anthropology, toponomy and other social sciences, one can then 
see that physiognomy and sound production – the core of language formation and 
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enunciation – are inextricably linked. In this way, people might learn to speak 
another language and assimilate into its related culture, but they will forever be 
doomed to speaking that language incorrectly because of their physical construction 
(Tankut 1943, 221–22). Once the form of the articulatory organs suited to Turkish is 
identified, it is an easy, short step to determining the ideal Turk; a certification that 
does not negate the inclusion of other, Turkified groups, but one that does create a 
hierarchy of originality and imitation. 
“Many intractable phonemes – which have guarded 
their secrets – harken back to a substratum that is 
accepted as lying in the depths of the past, to the 
deepest primordial level of cultural creation. The basis 
of this substratum is racial elements.” (Tankut 1943, 
223) 
 
Far from a conciliatory approach to other languages and borrowings from them, the 
Sun-Language theory then becomes a means of explaining the effects of 
miscegenation on language and culture. Other speech communities developed 
because, according to Tankut, the corruption of the Turkish race made the resulting 
descendants of mixed provenance incapable of properly producing Turkish sounds. 
Their bodies were, literally, unsuited to speaking the purer forms of original human 
speech (Tankut 1943, 223). Similar to their parentage, their tongues, too, were 
bastardized. In many ways, this logic is an extension of the epistemology employed 
by Gökalp. He argued that the purer forms of Turkic creation in morality, esthetics 
and customary law were better suited to the nation’s cultural development. One 
cannot be surprised, then, that the historians of the 1930s, caught up in the general 
excitement for racial anthropology and eugenics, would take this one step further 
and argue that authentically Turkish physiques, too, were better suited to the 
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national language. It is subjective and tautological – pure Turkish is spoken by 
anyone with pure Turkish features suited to the production of Turkish sounds – but 
no more subjective than some of the theories advanced by contemporary European 
scholars. Indeed, when compared with them, Tankut’s primary distinction was not its 
specious nature, but the manner in which it dovetails with state-sanctioned 
ideology.   
 
The Master Speaks 
 The danger inherent in opening the Congress to foreign participation was, of 
course, that foreign academics were far less susceptible to the pressure brought to 
bear upon Turkish and Turkic ones. To be certain, the sort of outbursts and disputes 
witnessed during the First Historical Congress in 1932 are not recorded in the 
accounts of the Second Congress. Nevertheless, the finer details of the narrative, 
including those that caused consternation among the participants at the First 
Congress, proved to be harder to control in the presentations of the foreign guests. 
Hancar’s speech on the importance of Caucasian pre-history for the history of 
Anatolia is instructive in this regard. Although he lauds Turkish achievement in pre-
history as in the modern era, the scholar does not fail to mention the important 
contributions made to Anatolian social, political and economic history by other 
groupings, including Semites and Egyptians (Hancar 1943, 51–52). Immediately 
following the reading of the prepared remarks, Koşay interrupted the Congress to 
provide two clarifications on Dr. Hancar’s analysis. The first was to draw attention to 
the fact that “neighbouring peoples” implied those groups that had clearly moved 
from east to west, and was therefore an affirmation of the links between Central 
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Asian civilizations and pre-historic Anatolia. The second was a correction of the 
timelines included in the Professor’s sketch of Caucasian history. These clearly did 
not correspond to the periodization and chronology inherent in the Turkish History 
Thesis, and therefore created an opening for criticism of the state-sanctioned 
narrative (Hancar 1943, 64).  
 Wayward approaches to the approved chronology and boundaries of 
inclusion were not uncommon among the foreign participants. Sometimes, these 
would be tolerated because they equated the Turks to other communities identified 
as superior. This can be seen in the presentation of the Austrian W. Koppers, who 
argues for the usage of folklore and oral history to demonstrate the lofty place 
reserved for the Turkish and Indo-German races (Koppers 1943, 653–54). Others, 
however, were not as well received. A report by the French anthropologist Henri 
Vallois demonstrates how ambiguities and uncertainties were managed by the 
Turkish organizers. Vallois and the Swiss Marguerite Dellenbach of the University of 
Geneva (Dellenbach 1943) both spoke on the importance of anthropological studies 
for determining the relationship of the Turks to the Alpine race and the racial 
grouping’s history with respect to other groups involved in long-range migrations. 
Vallois, however, made clear that language, race and nation were three distinct 
categories, with race an entirely physical attribute and nation a historical one (Vallois 
1943, 457). These pedantic matters, however, were deftly ignored by the Chair of 
the session, Afet İnan, who instead drew delegates’ attention to the importance of 
Vallois’ tentative conclusions on the relationship between Turkey, Turks and the 
titular nations of the surrounding states:  
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“I would like to thank the Professor for this very 
valuable study. Moreover, I will stress that when we 
observe the races of the regions that surround our 
homeland [Anatolia], only this one [the Turkish race] 
appears to be suitable to be called the Anatolian race. 
In my opinion, they [people from surrounding 
countries] used this terminology [Anatolian race] and 
relied on Sumerian sculptures, noting that they had 
long ears. However, sculptures do not show us exactly 
what the racial type was. On this, I will refer specifically 
to the following point: we are the original Alpine type, 
the Anatolian race cannot be shown to be anything 
different from the European type.” (Türk Tarih Kurumu 
1943, 483) (original emphasis) 
 
İnan steamrolls over both Vallois’ caution in drawing conclusions about the present 
from the material remains of the past, and casts doubt on the validity of archaeology 
as an epistemology. Her flexibility with regards to science, interpretation and 
objectivity are thus laid bare by her determination to connect the ancient peoples of 
an Alpine type with the modern-day Turks, refusing Vallois’ own uncoupling of race 
and nation.   
 An even more overt challenge by one of the most important foreign guests, 
the Swiss scholar Eugène Pittard, proved even more difficult to manage. Not only 
was Pittard present at the Congress, but his historical and anthropological writings 
formed the basis of much of İnan’s own work. As an academic revered by many in 
the Turkish establishment and clearly perceived to be a friend of Turkish nationalism, 
his own departures from the teachings of the Thesis could hardly be dismissed as 
mere errors. For the most part, Pittard delivered information that was hardly 
surprising to those familiar with the core of the dominant Turkish narrative. 
Moreover, he relied on Turkish assessments of material remains from Anatolia in 
order to confirm his hypothesis about brachycephalic skulls, ensuring that the 
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probability of a split with the state-sanctioned discourse was minimal (Pittard 1943, 
67–72). Pittard was forthcoming in his support of the Turkish appropriation of the 
Hittites, and of the demographic connections established between Anatolia in the 
west and Central Asia to the east. In doing so, however, he skewed from the 
approved line and makes the claim that Turkmen, Turks and Iranians, thanks to their 
racial features, can quite easily be seen to be descendants of the same people, the 
original Alpine Turks of Central Asia (Pittard 1943, 72). These racial features include 
dark hair, dark eyes and a shorter stature, in addition to a brachycephalic head 
(Pittard 1943, 82). They match, in large part, the description of the average Turk, but 
are indeed far from the imagined Aryan superman.  
Amazingly, such statements are not refuted by the Turkish delegates present. 
This might be explained in part by the gradual change in Turkey’s geopolitical 
position: no longer is it important for pan-Turkists to reclaim Azerbaijan, which is 
largely in Iranian hands, from the rule of a foreign nation. More important is forging 
the basis of a nationalist ideology legitimizing the state and its continued sovereignty 
over Anatolia. If Turks and Iranians are both descended from the original Alpine 
peoples of Central Asia, this fact has no bearing on Ankara’s claims against Armenian 
and Greeks over Asia Minor. Added to this is Pittard’s understanding of the dynamics 
of cultural and linguistic change. Large armies that move across huge distances, 
particularly in periods of slow transport, cannot possibly overwhelm the existing 
population of a region and dilute its original stock. Even the Mongols, who 
conquered most of Eurasia, were forced to replenish their forces with local recruits, 
the majority of whom were of “Turanic” blood. For this reason, it is foolish to 
assume that successive Greek, Macedonian, Semitic or Mongol invasions had the 
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effect of altering the racial make-up of Anatolia or Central Asia (Pittard 1943, 73–77). 
This is, perhaps, the strongest approbation of the government’s basis for its 
Turkification programs. There is no need to eliminate non-Turkish brachycephalic 
communities by force, as they are only non-Turkish by ethnicity and language, but 
not blood. By constructing the nation through education, it returns them to the fold 
of their original stock and reveals from within their true character. Pittard might not 
have rehashed the Turkish History Thesis verbatim, but his report did provide a 
sheen of scientific rigour to the state’s meta-narrative of Turkishness.    
 
Race: A State of Mind 
 There can be no doubt that one of the distinguishing features of the Second 
Congress vis-à-vis the First is its focus on the social and physical sciences, in addition 
to the humanities. There were presentations devoted to historiography and 
comparative philology, but these were supplemented by explanations of the history 
of the Turks through archaeology, paleography, psychology and even biology. The 
insistence on biological features did not clarify the boundaries between race, 
ethnicity and nation. Rather, by confounding the meta-epistemologies of 
psychology, racial anthropology and biology, the dominant catchall concept of the 
Turkish Historical Research Society was reinforced. In his presentation “Research on 
the Biology of the Turkish Race: Blood Groups and Fingerprints,” Sadi Irmak makes 
this abundantly clear in his definition of race: “Race is a biological and psychological 
unity. This unity is made up of many components. Anthropology, history, sociology, 
psychology and biology can compile these pieces by [working] hand in hand.” (Irmak 
1943, 841–42) If the nation cannot be shown to be entirely essential – a limitation 
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inherent in Gökalpian nationalism itself – then the shifting of psychological and 
spiritual elements, typically conceived of as national characteristics, to the concept 
of race allows for such automatic inclusion to be in-built into the Gökalpian 
nationalist narrative.  
 Irmak’s aim is not to track out the history of the Turks through their biological 
and racial features, but rather to add the health sciences’ contribution to the 
metanarrative of the Turkish state. In doing so, he both identifies biological markers 
of inclusion and exclusion, and seeks to provide rough guidelines for utilizing biology 
as an explanatory tool of the emergence and spread of the Turkish race. He explains 
that the four blood type groups – O, A, B and AB – are representative of lineage and 
racial purity. O marks the purest of the races, and is very common among the Maya, 
the Inuit and other indigenous peoples of the Americas, while A is the predominant 
type of the European or Alpine races. The Yörük of southern Turkey, a nomadic 
Turkic ethnicity, show a higher than average level of type O, especially among those 
Yörük who continue their nomadic lifestyle with little interaction with urban peoples. 
Urban Turks, on the other hand, have high percentages of type A, marking them as 
belonging to European racial groups and distinct from Arabs, Roma and Persians. In 
their fingerprints, too, he identifies a number of typical patterns that tie the Turkic 
peoples to those of northern Europe. Irmak calls for greater study of Turkic 
populations in Central Asia, as well, to confirm this thesis, but his preliminary results 
are clear in their implications for the metanarrative and its epistemology (Irmak 
1943, 843–45).  
Race and nation overlap here, but in a manner that fills out, rather than 
changing, the foundational understanding of the nation proposed by Gökalp. Much 
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as Marx failed to leave us with a comprehensive definition of the nation, Gökalp did 
not provide a means of identifying Turkic communities in the past, or those retaining 
a high degree of pure Turkishness in the present. Irmak allows for the continuation 
of the Gökalpian understanding of a nation by psychology and education, but ties it 
now to the international civilizational tools of biology and racial anthropology, 
constructing the Gökalpian nation on the basis of a modern approach to human 
society. He also confirms the Gökalpian belief that the nomadic Turkic peoples of the 
Middle East and Central Asia form a repository of pure, uncorrupted Turkishness, 
extending it from culture and custom to blood. In this way, the durability of the 
nation is confirmed, while biology and the study of fingerprints allows the researcher 
a quick and easy means of identifying those communities whose customs, social 
organization and economy represent as closely as possible the original Turkic 
civilization of pre-Islamic Central Asia.  
 Irmak is echoed by another Turkish biologist, Nureddin Onur, in his 
presentation entitled “A Study of the Inception of the Turkish Race from the Point of 
View of Blood Groups.” Onur takes a slightly different tact from Irmak with respect 
to the O blood type, one that can be deduced from Irmak’s speech but is not 
necessarily explicit. If the O group is that which is a marker of racial purity, then it 
must also be an indicator of the direct descent of population groupings from the first 
humans to inhabit the earth (Onur 1943, 848). This does not mean that the Inuit and 
Maya are descended from the Turks, but rather ties peoples with high ratios of O-
type amongst their general populations to be traced back to a primeval world. In the 
case of the Yörük, this fact, combined with the historical and anthropological 
evidence presented regarding the early creation of a Turkic civilization, implies a 
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durable link between the Turkic populations of Anatolia and the progenitors of 
human civilization in Central Asia. For those who are of the A-type – particularly 
common among urban Turks – they are not only fully incorporated into the 
European family of peoples, “the Turkish race is the main root that brought the A-
type to Europe.” As the B-type is a marker of the “coloured” races, its low 
occurrence among Turks, combined with the preponderance of A- and O-types, mark 
the boundaries of Turkishness inside those of whiteness, excluding the Semites and 
Iranians as well as the peoples of Africa (Onur 1943, 850–51). Such language is not 
intrinsically dismissive or injurious towards peoples of the B-type, but it does speak 
to two desires: the first, concordant with contemporary concerns about race, shows 
a yearning to be included among the white nations of Europe; the second, by 
contrast, is a wish to connect Turks and Turkishness to a pre-Islamic, pre-historic 
greatness that lives on in the nomadic peoples of the present.   
 
An Ill Wind from the North 
 It was not just the participants’ view of the world that clashed implicitly with 
state-sanctioned Soviet dogma. Soviet research and interpretations of material finds 
in Siberia, too, were challenged explicitly by Turkish scholars who presented to the 
assembled audience. Although no Soviet delegates attended the 1937 Congress, the 
presence of foreign academics from Europe did ensure that at least some of those 
who spoke to attendees were cognizant of, and relied upon, work coming out of the 
Soviet Union. The Finnish professor T. J. Arne made use of standard Soviet ideas 
about the Iranic origins of the Turkmen, who were primarily dolichocephalic. This 
was one of Barthol’d’s theses that was not challenged by the Soviet ethnographers 
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and historians of the 1930s (Arne 1943, 607). Most of the other presenters did not 
provide the publishers of the Congress volume with a list of sources utilized in the 
preparation of their work, and thus it is not possible for us to determine the extent 
to which other scholars made use of Russian and Soviet materials from the 1920s 
and 30s. One startling exception, however, is the report of the Turkish academic 
Abdülkadir İnan, whose presentation, entitled “An examination of the situation of 
horses in excavations at Pazirik in the Altai, from the point of view of Turkic burial 
customs” is a direct response to Soviet scholarship. It represents the only explicit 
and complete refutation of Soviet ethnography, archaeology and historical sciences 
that can be found in the Congress volume.  
 İnan’s work focuses on the discovery and excavation of several graves at 
Pazirik by Soviet archaeologists in the late 1920s. The report he refers to was 
published in 1929 by Rodenko, and although it was printed in the Circular of the 
Soviet Institute of the History of Material Culture, the fact that it predates the 
emergence of the Stalinist historiographic line in 1934 implies that it cannot be seen 
as a hard and fast example of Stalinist scholarship. At the outset, it appears that 
İnan’s problem is with the methodology and rigour of the article. However, it soon 
becomes apparent that his refutation is largely directed at Rodenko’s assignation of 
the remains to an Aryan community, which he defines as being non-Turkic (A. İnan 
1943, 143–44). The presence of ten horses with their tails cut off, as well as the 
accumulated domestic and military artefacts found in the tombs, point directly to 
grouping such as the Scythians, believed to be Turkic by Turkish scholars. Where the 
Soviets preferred to rely on geographically- or artefact-based appellations, İnan 
makes reference to current ethnographic scholarship and contemporary ethnic 
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communities, citing longstanding research into the reverence for the horse that is 
found among the Kyrgyz, Kazakhs and Nogay, as well as the practice of burying 
animals with their owners among the Yakut (A. İnan 1943, 146–49). If Rodenko does 
make the assertion that the Scythians were Aryans, this appears as a historically-
bound statement: they are not proposed to have been the direct ancestors of any 
particular grouping, nor are they assumed to have represented a perfectly formed 
national community. İnan, on the other hand, shows the bidirectional process of 
nation identification: the presence of ancestors legitimizes a contemporary 
community in its rights and privileges, while the back-projection of cultural, 
economic and linguistic traits allows for the nation to claim its past and stamp it in its 
image. While this process was celebrated in Turkey, it was dubious, at best, in 
Europe, and completely beyond the pale for the social scientists of the Soviet Union. 
 
Arsal’s Legal History Returns 
 With the departure of Zeki Velidi Togan from Turkey in 1934, the pan-Turkist 
camp of Soviet Turkic exiles was clearly in a stronger position among the historical 
establishment presenting at the Second Historical Congress. Among them were Sadri 
Maksudi Arsal, a Kazan Tatar émigré who had studied Turkic law in the 1920s and 
who testified, in 1932, to the persistence of disputes between Togan and other 
Russian Turkic scholars from the days of the Russian Civil War. Arsal had the honour 
of being the final presenter at the Congress, an opportunity that he used to deliver 
an address entitled “The Turkish Race’s Role in the Development of the Concept and 
Institutions of the State and Law in the History of Humanity.” The unwieldy title is an 
indication of the complexity of his object of study, as well as his argument. He works 
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within the German tradition that links historiography, culture and law to produce an 
understanding, based on 18th and 19th century German philosophers, of the 
emergence of the state as a function of social organization among nomadic groups. 
Such societies required strict obedience to a central commander because of the 
precarious nature of their existence, and thus the initial institutions of the state were 
to be found in these collectivities. The Turkic peoples, as the famed nomads of the 
Eurasian Steppe, were the ideal candidates for the title of the first creators of these 
structures, and thus should be viewed inventors of the state (Arsal 1943, 1066–68). 
This assertion is not novel, as Arsal is merely quoting German thinkers who first 
formulated it. Instead, he innovates upon it by claiming that coercion and militaristic 
discipline are not enough for the creation of a state on their own, but that 
“civilization”, in the form of the arts, commerce, and science, must be encouraged 
too, in order to convince settled populations of the wisdom of the nomadic state 
structure. The ancient Turks, then, were skilled not only in nomadic raiding parties 
but also in the encouragement and development of sedentary civilization, which 
they imparted onto other races (Arsal 1943, 1070). Arsal, therefore, marries the 
German sociologists’ understanding to the Turkish History Thesis, establishing the 
state, similar to agriculture and metallurgy, as one of the Turkic race’s contributions 
to human civilization. 
 If this were the end of Arsal’s line of argumentation, the use of the word race 
(ırk in Turkish) would appear to be nothing more than a substitute for nation or 
ethnos. The latter part of his presentation, however, demonstrates how Arsal, too, 
accepts the idea presented in Irmak’s work that race is both physical and 
psychological. He makes the distinction clear by insinuating that the nation is merely 
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an apparition of the race: “There are few races, other than the Turks, that have lived 
as a politically independent nation throughout 2000 years without interruption.” 
(Arsal 1943, 1076) What allows for the continuance of this political structure known 
as the nation or the state, or the nation-state, is the inherent discipline that every 
member of the Turkic race shows to leader of the nation. Indeed, it was the core 
element of Turkic state-building skill and genius that allowed for the Golden Horde 
to sweep across Asia once the entity they produced had been “wrenched” from the 
Turks by Genghis Khan and the Mongol race (Arsal 1943, 1071–73). Arsal’s reasoning 
takes the concept of race and allows for it to be integrated into various levels of 
Gökalp’s theorization of the nation. On the one hand, the respect for authority and 
discipline that is apparently inherent in the Turkic race is presented as a cultural 
trait, an aspect of the morality and ethics of the Turkic peoples that is exempt from 
international or civilizational adaptation. Liberalism, anarchism and democracy are 
all systems that are not the hallmarks of an advanced civilization, but rather the 
peculiarities of nations and races to whose moral characteristics they are best suited. 
On another level, strict social organization that subordinates individual interest to 
social interest (as identified by the state’s leadership) – a key component of Gökalp’s 
sociology and solidarist views (see Parla 2009) – are legitimized by the history of the 
Turkish race. The state over the family, society over the individual, and race over 
religion: Arsal has completed the conversion of Gökalp’s originally voluntaristic social 
reorganization into top-down, paternalistic approach to the past, present and future.  
 The main beneficiary of this utmost devotion, however, is not an abstract 
state, but its founder, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself. Arsal takes one final step 
along the path of aligning history with the state’s agenda when he identifies the 
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President as one of a long series of leaders who have always come to the aid and 
salvation of the Turkic race: “throughout the long history of the Turkic race, 
whenever the Turkic nation has fallen into dire straits, a leader appears and protects 
Turkishness.” (original emphasis) (Arsal 1943, 1075) Atatürk’s decisions are not to be 
challenged, not simply because he is the benevolent father of the nation, but 
because he is realigning the laws and morals of the nation to their racial basis. To 
rebel is not merely to reject the kind hand of the state; it is to renounce the genetic 
material from which one is made (Arsal 1943, 1090–91). While there is, undoubtedly, 
a concern expressed by Arsal, İnan, Irmak, Onur and others about the classification 
of the Turks as white or coloured, it is apparent that theirs is not a racism that is 
driven by eugenics. Rather, race is important precisely because it is physical and 
essential: unlike political allegiance, religion or even ethnicity, it cannot be changed. 
If there is paranoia about skin colour, facial features and hair type, it is because 
Europeans have ended up victorious in the colonial race. In order to escape 
European tutelage, and to ward off its neighbours encroachment on Anatolia, 
Ankara must establish its own bona fides as a historic leader of a great race: 
“The role played by the Turkish race in the world, 
particularly in the history of Asia, is the same one 
played by the Romans in the Classical era and the 
English in recent centuries. That is, it is the role of a 
great ruling nation. This role included the provision of 
security, calm and the rule of law over a wide 
geographic area while bringing various nations under 
its discipline.” (original emphasis) (Arsal 1943, 1093) 
 
It is thus up to Turks themselves to understand the historical foundations of their 
destiny, and the promise of the future as encapsulated in the new society to be 
organized by Atatürk and his CHF. 
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Moving On 
 With this final component on the works of Sadri Maksudi Arsal, our period of 
analysis ends. Throughout this chapter, I have charted a chronological course from 
the beginnings of ethno-national historiography during the Hamidian and Second 
Constitutional Periods of the Ottoman Empire, through the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey, the end of multi-party rule and finally up to the last year of 
Atatürk’s life. The texts of this section have demonstrated a gradual hardening of 
ideological components within historical narratives, with a mutation of the original 
ideology of Gökalpian nationalism in order to take into account the practicalities of 
governance as an independent nation, and advances in science and technology. 
 Gökalp’s original ideation of the nation as a community bound together 
through education – informed by enduring and essential customs and ethics – 
formed the basis of an ontology and epistemology elaborated by a new generation 
of Turkish and Turkic historians. In particular, discoveries in the realms of biology, 
anthropology, archaeology and linguistics were assimilated by Turkish academics, 
and the state’s campaign for a national historiography put this concept into practice. 
Meanwhile scholars added to it by utilizing contemporary sciences to answer the 
question to which Gökalp had provided no response: how do we identify Turks in the 
past, and their descendants in the present? Historians’ suggestions and propositions 
were manifold, but they all show a remarkable consistency in picking up on the 
state’s domestic and international priorities, particularly in the realm of forming a 
new citizenry loyal to the state’s worldview.   
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We now move on to a consideration of the development of historical 
narratives in Sadri Maksudi Arsal’s country of origin, the Soviet Union. When taken 
together, this and the following chapter will provide the basis for our final, 
concluding section, in which a comparison of experiences will further elucidate the 
manner in which ideologies caused a wedge between Turkish and Soviet scholarship.  
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Soviet Historical Narratives 
 
 In this chapter, I will track the development of historical narratives about pre-
Islamic Turkic communities in the Soviet Union. Similar to the previous chapter on 
the Republic of Turkey, I will follow a chronological line of approach. The chapter 
begins with a view to pre-Revolutionary ideas of history and identity among the 
Russian Empire’s Turkic communities. This will allow for a greater understanding of 
the shift in perspectives that occurred between 1917, the year of the Bolshevik 
Revolution, and 1922, the end of the Russian Civil War. From this, we are ready to 
jump into the first decade of Soviet historiography, and to examine the eclecticism 
that reigned in the writing of narratives. In order to navigate the complex 
agglomeration of different publications, I will spend some time exploring the types 
of works under consideration, and how they fit into the broader scheme of history 
writing. This subsection will close with an overview of archaeology during the 1920s, 
and its role in the enunciation of historical narratives. Finally, we will come to the 
1930s, and the era of far more organized and targeted histories designed for the 
new national republics, ending in the year of the Great Terror, 1937. We start, 
however, over a century before then, with a familiar topic of study: Azerbaijan’s 
contentious origins.  
 
The Change of Groupings 
 In 1828, the Russian Empire and Persia signed the Treaty of Türkmençay 
following the Russo-Persian War. It established the Russian border south of the 
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Caucasus Mountains, incorporating today’s Republic of Azerbaijan into the Russian 
Empire (Swietochowski 2002, 6). While the impact of Russian sovereignty over the 
region was not immediately felt in the form of direct administration, it did open up 
new opportunities and horizons for various sections of Caucasian society. The 
incorporation of the Qasim Khanate into the Russian Empire in 1681 had introduced 
Russian administrators to the first shock of ruling over Muslim subjects (Meyer 2014, 
51–52), but this was their initial foray into a new realm of the Islamicate world, one 
much more closely linked to the large empires of the Middle East. It allowed for the 
gradual unification of various independent khanates into one administrative unit 
governed by Russian administators (Swietochowski 2002, 3–4). Moreover, Russian 
sovereignty permitted young Muslims from the newly incorporated territories to 
access Russian systems of education. Schools were not immediately established for 
the local populations, let alone universities and institutes of higher learning 
(Swietochowski 2002, 13–14). Some members of the local élite, however, managed 
to pursue scholarship at universities in Russia proper, most notably St. Petersburg 
and Kazan (Rzaev 1965, 4).  
Among the earliest participants in this trend were the Azerbaijanis Aleksandr 
Kazem-Bek and Mirza Fathali Axundzadǝ, also known as Akhundov. The two were in 
correspondence with one another, although their collaboration does not appear to 
have been profound (Rzaev 1965, 44). Kazem-Bek found his niche in universities in 
Kazan and St. Petersburg, where he taught Persian and Arabic from the 1850s 
onward (Rzaev 1965, 13). Here, he was active in shaping the Russian perception of 
Muslim areas recently incorporated into the Empire (Bobrovnikov 2006, 212), both 
by bringing in more Azerbaijani teachers and scholars to Kazan and St. Petersburg, 
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and by reorganizing the Oriental Studies department at the University of St. 
Petersburg (Rzaev 1965, 82–84). He was highly critical of Islam, arguing that it was 
the cause of despotism and economic backwardness in the East (Rzaev 1965, 45). His 
anti-Islamic views, however, did not preclude positive evaluations of the past and 
potential future contributions of Muslim peoples to human civilization (Rzaev 1965, 
99). On the issue of methodology, he encouraged historians to utilize 
anthropological data in order to provide greater insight into the past and the 
development of peoples who had not left written records (Rzaev 1965, 92–94). 
Kazem-Bek was passionate about the investigation and analysis of folk culture and 
dialects in Caucasian and Iranian Azerbaijan, and he believed that the Azeris were of 
Iranic, rather than Turkic origin. Despite their gradual Turkicization, the Azeris had 
long possessed a consciousness of being a separate collectivity existing to the north 
of Mount Ararat, an identity that transcended religious differences and linguistic 
divides. In other words, Kazem-Bek argued that the Azeris, long before the arrival of 
the Oğuz Turks, had achieved a proto-national consciousness (Rzaev 1965, 112–14).   
Axundzadə too was interested in questions of national and ethnic identity. 
Despite being a speaker of the idiom that would be called Azeri Turkish in the 20th 
century, Axundzadə was fiercely proud of Persian culture and history, writing once 
that “supposedly I am Turk, but my race is from the Parthians [Persians].” (Ādamiyat 
1970, 118) He decried the decline of the Persian Empire, attributing it to Arab 
incursions (Ādamiyat 1970, 120), while calling on contemporary Iranian political 
figures to adopt pre-Islamic symbols as signifiers of Persian nationhood (Akhundov 
1976, 33). Finally, in line with his conceptualization of a civic nationalism based upon 
freedom from despotism and superstition (Ādamiyat 1970, 115), he railed against 
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the tyranny of Abdülhamit II’s Istanbul (Akhundov 1976, 7) and urged the 
reconciliation of Muslims and Zoroastrians as one great Persian nation cognizant of 
its glorious past (Ādamiyat 1970, 118).  
In addition to his pan-Iranist views, Mirza Fathali Axundzadǝ also advocated 
the creation of a common Turkic language to be used for education and 
communication among the Turkic peoples of the Caucasus (Swietochowski 2002, 25). 
His proposal was revolutionary, calling for the abandonment of the Arabic script in 
favour of Latin characters (Akhundov 1976, 6). When considered from the point of 
view of Benedict Anderson’s imagined communities based on a common linguistic 
environment (B. R. O. Anderson 2006), Axundzadǝ’s formula creates a conundrum. 
He advocated the use of a language intended to unify the Turkic peoples of the 
Russian Empire, but also sought to spur feelings of solidarity and commonality with 
the peoples of Iran, who spoke a different language. Similarly, the application of 
Ernest Gellner’s theory of nations and nationalism arising during the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism is also problematic (Gellner 1983). With Axundzadǝ’s 
linguistic and cultural bonds pointing in two different directions, his nation could not 
possible have provided the basis for the unification of a single common economic 
unit. Rather, his writings are exemplary of the complex imbrication that constituted 
the identities of Turkic intellectuals. This complexity ran through many of the works 
of Turkic writers through the later part of the 19th and early part of the 20th century, 
and it created fertile ground on which notions of belonging distinct from European 
ones could be articulated.  
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Walikhanov’s Proto-Nationalism 
 While Islam and the merging of religious and political identities were 
important innovations in Russian Turkic intellectual circles, it would be disingenuous 
to insinuate that religion, and indeed the Muslim religion, was of paramount 
importance for all Turkic thinkers in the Russian Empire. A combination of nomadism 
and great distances kept many Kazakh communities, in particular, isolated from 
developments in regions to their south and west (Sabol 2003, 5). Concurrently, 
Russian incursions from the north brought Russian settlers, but not necessarily the 
influence of Tatar notables who were beginning to monopolize state-citizen relations 
in Muslim areas (Meyer 2014, 51–52; Pustarnakov 1990, 14). Rather, the Russian 
invasion induced profound economic changes to Kazakh society, which proved to be 
the most forceful catalyst for the development of a sense of broader community in 
the late 19th century (Sabol 2003, 22–23; Amanzholova 2006, 18). Related to this, 
access to Russian and European-style education created two new effects on the 
Kazakh masses: it convinced some, although not all, writers and scholars of the 
wisdom of Western-style technological development (Amanzholova 2006, 17); and it 
produced growing numbers of literate Kazakhs trained in Russian literature and 
science, including ethnography. 
 One such newly-trained Kazakh writer was the engineer Choqan Walikhanov. 
As early as the 1860s, Walikhanov wrote in Russian about the preservation of 
Shamanistic beliefs among the Kyrgyz (the pre-Revolutionary name applied to the 
Kazakhs). He provided detailed accounts of contemporary practices among the 
nomads, as well as their historical roots and connections to beliefs held by non-
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Muslim peoples of the Steppes, particularly the Mongols (Valikhanov 1985, 4:41–70). 
In discussing Kazakh religious perspectives, moreover, he recognized that religious 
conviction did not necessary imply the immediate connection of a group to a wider 
Islamic community. He noted the impact of Tatar preachers on Kazakhs, encouraging 
the adoption of gender segregation, pilgrimage and ritual previously unknown 
among the nomads. As such, he compared the influence of the Tatars on the Kazakhs 
to that of the Byzantines on the Russians (Valikhanov 1985, 4:71). Despite the 
importance attached to Islam in Kazakh society, Walikhanov saw in the Russians a 
counterbalance to the “fanatics” among the Tatars, an alternative route to 
modernity and civilization that would be no more harmful to Kazakh identity than 
continued cultural appropriate from fellow Muslims (Valikhanov 1985, 4:72–73).  
Similarly, Walikhanov’s ethnographic notes on the Turkmen from the same 
period make explicit the Turkmens’ differing names for those of pure or “clean” 
Turkmen descent and those of mixed Turkmen, Kazakh, Uzbek and Persian origin 
(Valikhanov 1985, 4:165). The very nature of tribal society, including Turkmen 
society, implied a heightened awareness of differences of lineage (Edgar 2006, 17–
18). As such, it is not surprising that 19th century Turkmen nomads would retain 
distinctions based on descent. What is notable is that they referred to “clean” and 
unclean groups based on language and ethnicity rather than religion or tribal 
affiliation. Whether the Turkmen conceived of these three groups as homogenous 
outsiders or distinct ethno-linguistic collectivities is unknown, but it appears clear 
that language and custom were bound up with clan and lineage in a complex 
tapestry of identity. As for Walikhanov, he might not have explicitly described the 
Kazakhs or Turkmens as separate nations, but his writings provided ample evidence 
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of the conception of societies and identities within the Umma that remained distinct 
from one another. 
 
Education Wars 
 Indeed, pan-Islamism and its nationalist interpretations were far from the 
first intellectual innovations in Turkic communities to bring issues of identity and 
belonging to the fore. Rather, the catalyst was education and, related to it, language. 
As early as 1881, Ismail Gasprinski was calling for the Tatar-language education of 
Russian Muslims in order to allow for their integration, rather than assimilation, into 
the Russian population as full and equal citizens (Gasprinskij, Akpınar, and Gasprinski 
2004, 118). The issue of educational reform in the Russian Empire would crystalize 
through the last decade of the 19th century and the first one of the 20th as a battle 
between Kadimists (representatives of the old order) and Jadidists (proponents of 
new methods of teaching) (Pustarnakov 1990, 15–16). The Jadidists argued for a new 
approach to education among the Empire’s Muslim populations, one that would 
promote the spread of knowledge and skills useful in the capitalist market and in 
interactions with state institutions (Khasanov 1977, 148–49). While it was eventually 
agreed by various Muslim notables in 1906 that Russian should be taught in the 
Jadidist schools only at the secondary level, the choice of language for primary 
instruction proved to be a point of lasting contention (Gasprinskij, Akpınar, and 
Gasprinski 2004, 338). 
 257 
 
The Language Question 
 The question of language was more than just an administrative one. 
Gasprinski saw a common language as one of the key components of a nation, in 
addition to a national idea and national education (Gasprinskij, Akpınar, and 
Gasprinski 2004, 329). His proposal for a common language of instruction (and 
therefore printing and communication) for Russia’s Muslims was a modified version 
of Ottoman Turkish (Meyer 2014, 142). It appears that this was largely ignored by 
the Muslim intellectuals of the Caucasian peoples, who saw Russian or their own 
language (in the case of the Kabardians) as the gateway to modern education 
(Turkaev 2002, 183–84; Zul’pukarova 1990, 155; Osipyan and Kind 1957, 162–64); 
similar sentiments were expressed by some Azeri intellectuals as well 
(Swietochowski 2002, 30). Gaspirinskii’s suggestion, however, was also rejected by 
Kazan Tatar circles, who viewed their own version of Tatar to be the most practical 
language of common communication (Meyer 2014, 142–43). After the 1905 
Revolution, opposition was encountered from Kazakh intellectuals, such as Ahmet 
Baitursynov, who advocated the purging of Tatar and Russian elements from the 
Kazakh language, and the development of a Kazakh curriculum for use in Kazakh 
schools (Sabol 2003, 96). Such an objection to Gasprinski’s plans is notable because 
of the context within which Baitursynov was writing. By the end of the 19th century, 
Russian colonization of Kazakh areas had led to the growth of bilingual Russian-
Kazakh schools. Although teachers and materials were scarce, they were leading to 
considerable increases in the number of bilingual and literate Kazakhs – an outcome 
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that almost certainly would have obviated the need for a Jadidist education system 
along Gasprinski’s lines (Sabol 2003, 59).  
 Central Asia, too, remained largely aloof of the political wrangling among the 
rest of the Russian Empire’s Turkic peoples. Although there was a sense of 
community with all other members of the Umma, the recently absorbed territories 
south of the Kazakh Steppe were outside of the general ambit of Muslim politics 
prior to and after the 1905 Revolution, including their discussions of language (Khalid 
1998, 194). Since the Islamicization of the Turkic peoples in the 9th century, two 
distinct literary cultures with two separate literary standards had emerged: Ottoman 
in the West and Chaghatay in the East (Çobanzadə 1924, 81). For the Turkic peoples 
of Bukhara, Samarqand, Khiva and Tashkent, Chaghatay was the source of linguistic 
cohesion, rather than Ottoman Turkish or Tatar. Religious bonds notwithstanding, 
issues of language provided a clear enough barrier to prevent the infiltration of 
Gasprinski’s, Axundzadǝ’s or Tatar attempts of utilizing an Oğuz or Kipchak dialect as 
a means of uniting the Central Asians to other Muslims in the Russian Empire (Khalid 
1998, 190). Yet, locally, language still competed with religious identity for a sense of 
belonging, as Turkic-speaking Jews were referred to as a separate, distinct millet 
(Khalid 1998, 192–93). Central Asian intellectuals, then, were not willing to heed the 
advice of Axundzadǝ to Muslims and Zoroastrians, and to forsake religious difference 
in favour of ethno-linguistic cohesion. 
Thus, while the idea of a Muslim identity among Russia’s adherents to the 
Islamic faith might have been strong, the community’s élites were rapidly warming 
to the idea of language as a marketable form of identity for sections of Russia’s 
Muslims (Bobrovnikov 2006, 222). Within this, consciousnesses of collectivity and 
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difference were being formulated, and historical bases for these distinctions were 
increasingly sought after.  
 
Azerbaijan’s Contentious Origins 
 Questions of belonging and position were also motivated by the flux of 
international politics. The Russian Empire’s southern fringe, incorporated imperfectly 
into the state apparatus throughout the 19th century, proved to be a focal point of 
such influences. In particular, Azerbaijan provided a battlefield for imperial contests 
between Russia, the Ottoman Empire and Persia, with scholars frequently joining the 
fray (Rizā 1981, 7–10). This dispute became acute after 1905, when an easing of 
restrictions on the press gave rise to considerable nationalist agitation (I. Stalin 1913, 
1; Novruzov 1988, 103). The path of the Azeri Ahmet Ağaoğlu is exemplary of this 
competition. He was the first Azeri to receive a European-style education in Saint 
Petersburg and Paris (Akçura 1978, 193) and began his career writing on Persian 
culture and Shiism, core components of Azerbaijan’s cultural make-up (Mübariz 
2007). His time in Paris acquainted him with the Islamic modernist works of Jamal al-
Din al-Afghani and the liberalism of the French Revolution, both of which would 
influence his approach to identity (Akalın 2004, 18). After the 1905 Revolution, 
Ağaoğlu became active in politics, defending the interests of Turkic communities in 
the Caucasus and, true to the works of al-Afghani, promoting sectarian accord 
among Russia’s Muslims, a crucial step in transforming religious reformist 
movements into national ones. His activities in the post-Revolutionary period would 
eventually force him to migrate to Istanbul in 1909, where his conversion from 
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Persianized scholar of religion to Liberal Turkist philosopher would be completed 
(Akalın 2004, 24–26). 
 Inside Azerbaijan, too, the political storm was encouraging a rapid change in 
self-perception among intellectuals. The first head of Soviet Azerbaijan, Nǝriman 
Nǝrimanov, moved between competing identities, eventually throwing his hat in 
with the Soviet authorities. In 1899, prior to engaging in politics, he wrote the play 
Nader Şah, about the 18th century Persian Shah who relied on popular support to 
counter palace intrigues. Nǝrimanov stressed the dangers of sectarian divide and the 
importance of devotion to the nation – albeit a nation that was Persian, rather than 
Turkic (Nărimanov 1971, 7–8). The play was written in Azeri Turkish, which highlights 
the complex interaction of language and identity. In the end, however, Nǝrimanov 
decided to rely on his class identity and work within the Soviet system, rather than 
flee abroad and pursue nationalist politics in exile (Abasova 2007, 162). Again, this 
can hardly be seen as an opportunistic grab at power, as Nader Şah is imbued not 
only with patriotic fervor, but also a conviction of the wisdom of connecting the 
masses with loci of power (Nărimanov 1971, 8). Identity was fluid enough to 
accommodate multiple visions of the world, and it was only when Nǝrimanov, similar 
to other Turkic intellectuals, was forced by circumstance to choose between the 
different elements of his personality, that he focused on one component in 
particular. 
 These individual stories belong to a very different time. They come to us from 
a period in which intellectual activity was restricted to a small subset of the 
population; an era of educationally-segmented communities. The October 
Revolution helped to sweep away the foundations on which such segmentation was 
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based, and to usher in a new society in which the masses, rather than the elites, 
would be the primary targets of historical narratives. Nonetheless, these mass meta-
narratives were not created in a historical vacuum, and indeed many of the debates 
and divides that were highlighted in the preceding paragraphs informed the 
evolution of the historical sciences in the Soviet Turkic world for decades following 
the overthrow of the Provisional Government in October 1917.   
 
Historic Revolutions and Revolutionary Histories 
1917 is actually a year of two revolutions, rather than one. The first, in 
February, saw the overthrow of Czar Nicholas II by a coalition of political forces, and 
the establishment of a Provisional Government under Admiral Kerensky. This new 
government sought to reorganize the Russian Empire and to cope with the massive 
human and financial drain of the First World War. While the reasons for revolt 
among the peoples of Petrograd were many, the sacrifices of the war, and the 
bubbling social tensions caused by half a century of socio-economic development 
were among the most pressing issues. These were the issues that had to be dealt 
with first and foremost (Lohr 2006, 662–64). This was a revolution that was brought 
about thanks to workers and soldiers, and the resulting government largely reflected 
their political representatives. Nonetheless, the Duma also contained factions such 
as the Kadets, who were both liberal and imperialist, in the sense that they defended 
the continued presence of the monarchy and Imperial statehood, as well as ethno-
nationalists from the Empire’s minority groups (S. A. Smith 2006, 115–16). Across the 
country, smaller forms of councils – whether soviets or zemstvos – were popping up, 
and these were either composed of members of revolutionary parties, including the 
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Bolsheviks, or by average villagers and workers who had simply rejected the 
authority of the Tsarist state (S. A. Smith 2006, 117–19). 
In the months following the February revolution, it was the War and its 
conduct that proved to be one of the most important factors in the country’s 
political future. Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries were split between those 
who supported a comprehensive peace and the hawks who argued for continued 
hostilities, while the Bolsheviks benefitted from being steadfastly anti-War. The 
distinction was particularly important in greatly enhancing the profile and fortunes 
of the Bolsheviks among soldiers and peasants (S. A. Smith 2006, 123–27). As both 
the political and economic situations went from bad to worse in the summer and fall 
of 1917, society became much more polarized, with class gaining more currency than 
nationality as a form of identification among ethnic Russians. As Kerensky became 
more and more secretive in his exercise of power, and the popularity of the 
Bolsheviks hit a new high, Lenin and his inner circle decided to launch a full-out 
assault on Kerensky’s government and on remnants of the Tsarist state. Between 23 
October and 26 October 1917, the Bolsheviks seized the reins of power, bringing an 
end to the Provisional Government. Although it took place in November according to 
the calendar in place at the time, this event would be known as the Great October 
Revolution and would usher in more than 70 years of Soviet rule (S. A. Smith 2006, 
133–35).    
In the months following the Bolshevik seizure of power, considerable 
wrangling occurred between the new masters of the state and their two closest 
allies, the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. This, however, proved to be 
the least formative aspect of Soviet statecraft. Instead, it was the Russian Civil War 
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that was most decisive in cementing the foundations of Bolshevik, and particularly 
Stalinist, policy (Raleigh 2006, 140). It would be naïve to act as thought the Civil War 
was something in whose inception Lenin and his party neither had a hand in, nor 
welcomed as a “baptism by fire” (Suny 2011, 5). While bringing about further 
destruction and misery, it also ensured that Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky and others would 
be able to demonstrate their revolutionary bona fides and reorganize in earnest 
both theory and praxis within the parts of the Russian Empire under their control.  
The full history of the Civil War and the triumphs and vagaries of the fledgling 
Soviet state over this period are a subject broad enough for several heavy tomes. 
What is of greatest importance here is that the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, whereby the 
Bolsheviks sought to end Russia’s involvement in the Great War, and the ensuing 
hostilities across Eurasia, caused seismic shifts in all communities and parties across 
the political spectrum. Left and right factions broke away from all parties, 
reorganizing themselves or joining other existing groups. The result was a renewed 
focus on organization and ideological education on the part of the Bolshevik 
leadership. Those institutions of the state that they did indeed control, including the 
newly-formed Red Army, were the focus of intensive educational and indoctrination 
campaigns aimed at rooting out enemies in theory as well as in praxis. This was 
further complicated by the incursions of a handful of foreign powers into Soviet 
territory, whether to seize sensitive installations or to lend support to the anti-
Communist factions, as well as the apparent spread of revolutionary fervour to other 
parts of the world, including Bavaria and Hungary (Raleigh 2006, 143–47). Amidst all 
of this, nationalist antagonisms mixed with local grievances, causing no small 
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headache for the Bolshevik centre in Moscow, and Red Army commanders in the 
field. 
During the Civil War, the Bolsheviks learned two important lessons that 
seemed to pull the Party in opposite directions. One was the need to provide a 
relaxation of revolutionary zeal and to allow for some continuation in the socio-
economic life of a country now ravaged by eight years of war and hardship. From 
this came the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the period of eclecticism that we will 
examine in the coming sections (Raleigh 2006, 157–66). The second lesson had to do 
with centralization; a theme that was undoubtedly far more enduring throughout 
the life of the Soviet Union than flexibility. This was not just an issue of the war 
effort, but also of political, cultural and economic change according to a highly 
theorized imagining of the new Russia. Famine, economic collapse and generalized 
proletarian and peasant opposition to the Bolsheviks reinforced the idea that 
centralization could not be imposed with blunt force. Nonetheless, the need for the 
centre to command and control in order to direct the revolution was painfully 
apparent (Raleigh 2006, 152–57). It is therefore with this intractable dilemma 
between flexibility and control in mind that we move on to the building of the Soviet 
state and, particularly, Soviet scholarship. 
 
Soviet Scientific Reorganization 
With the establishment of Bolshevik hegemony following the Russian Civil 
War in 1922, Bolshevik interpretations of Marxism began to seep into the structure 
and content of Soviet scholarly endeavours. The Oriental Department of the 
Academy of Sciences was reorganized a number of times, with debates raging 
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between various members of the Academy as to whether Oriental Studies was 
mature enough to become more specialized according to academic interest 
(Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 54). Ethnography, long an interest of Tsarist officials 
and scholars, was revolutionized by the advent of Soviet power. In addition to new 
approaches to concepts of ethnicity, culture and nationhood, ethnographic praxis 
was transformed by its close association with centres of power, as ethnographic data 
became a component in the determination of the new national republics in the 
1920s and 1930s (Polyakov 1980, 21; Abashin 2014, 146–48). Linguists, even those of 
a decidedly Marxist bent, did not necessarily repudiate the findings of the pre-
revolutionary era. They did, however, seek to infuse the social sciences with a new 
concern for the social conditions in which language, culture and identity are formed 
and evolve. Some also involved themselves directly in the projects of Soviet 
authorities, forsaking political neutrality in the interests of infusing public policy with 
a scientific sheen (Polivanov 1928, 4–7). Archaeology underwent major alterations as 
well, as those members of the Tsarist intelligentsia who remained in the Soviet 
Union and were committed to Marxist thought sought to purge the science of its old 
worldview. All of these changes were reinforced by the aggressive drive to train new 
scientists and scholars according to Soviet scientific doctrine, ensuring not only that 
the Tsarist epistemology would be destroyed, but that the new Marxist one would 
have its own means of reproduction (Okladnikov 1975, 3–4). 
 By the late 1920s and early 1930s – the period of Soviet history known as the 
“Great Break” – all sciences (applied, pure and social) came under considerable 
pressure from the centres of political authority to incorporate ideological 
components into their supposedly objective laws (Pollock 2006, 4). The smoothness 
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of the transition that is frequently described in Soviet historiographical works of the 
1970s and 1980s is often betrayed by the same authors’ repudiation of the products 
of the era under study. In many ways, this is not much different from the repudiation 
of pre-1945 Western archaeology seen in chapter 3. With respect to history, 
accounts of the period often speak to the “misinformation” contained in the analysis 
of contemporary scholars, particularly on the peoples of the East (Kuznetsova and 
Kulagina 1970, 99; Nusupbekov 1989, 334–35). Nevertheless, the 1920s in particular 
are known to be a decade of eclecticism in terms of Soviet historians’ approach to 
the histories of the non-Russian peoples of the Union, and, at least until 1931, non-
Marxist, as well as Marxist, scholars participated in forming a national historical 
narrative for a number of Soviet nations (Tillett 1969, 38–39). 
 What exactly were the changes that Soviet historians put into place? As one 
might expect in a state dominated by ethnic Russians, Russian historiography 
provides the greatest number of examples of the transformation underway. 
Historical research was largely carried out under the aegis of the newly created 
Soviet Academy, within which a Society of Marxist Historians was formed in 1925. 
This was under the direction of Mikhail Pokrovskii, who believed it to be a bulwark 
against the dominant non-Marxist schools of thought in Russian historical 
scholarship (Enteen 1976, 91–92). Lenin, as we have already seen, warned against 
the dangers of Great Russian chauvinism, and more than a few historians set about 
changing dominant narratives of the creation and expansion of the Russian state 
(Bodger 1991, 566). As such, imperial expansion was no longer presented as a 
glorious or progressive force, but rather a tyrannous one for the benefit of the 
bourgeoisie; a reformulation of the earlier dichotomy between official and popular 
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Russia that had dominated 19th century historiography (Tillett 1969, 10). Within this 
narrative, however, eclecticism reigned supreme. So long as Lenin was alive and 
holding the reins of power, this variety of approaches was permissible, and even 
vaunted. It was not until the rise of Stalin, and the hardening of leadership disputes, 
that Russian scholarship began to focus on a particular epistemology. At this point, 
particularly around 1927-28, the Soviet academic leadership undertook serious 
purges of its academic structures, aimed particularly at eliminating the use of pre-
Revolutionary, bourgeois scholarship and its heuristics. This included the standard 
European periodization of global history into categories such Ancient, Mediaeval and 
Renaissance (Enteen 1976, 95–97).  
Within the Marxist camp, of course, there was only marginally greater 
uniformity than across the discipline as a whole. There were two great historians 
whose views were adopted by the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks respectively: 
Pokrovskii, mentioned above, and Plekhanov. Their dispute was largely one 
regarding the characterization of Russia’s historical socio-economic development, 
but their alignment with different camps led their scholarly production to become 
highly politicized (Baron 1974, 386–87). For the most part, theirs was a dispute that 
was not much different from the one between the Liberals and the Slavophiles of the 
previous century: the former argued for a similarity between Russian and European 
historical development, while the latter favoured a bespoke schema. Both were, as 
one might expect, tinged with class analyses and social elements as well (Baron 
1974, 390). Given the access of both strains to the various nuclei of the Communist 
Party and its affiliate organizations, it is to be expected that this class-infused 
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historical analysis would win out; the triumph of universalism over exceptionalism, 
however, is largely due to the links between Pokrovskii and the Bolsheviks.  
This insistence on a new, class-based and universalist approach to the history 
of peoples did not spread evenly over all Soviet national historiographies. At a 
certain level, there was a split between Russian, Polish and, to a lesser degree, Tatar 
historiography, and that of the other, smaller nations of the new Union. Among the 
historians of Russia, Ukraine and the Tatars, particularly those of Marxist persuasion, 
a new approach was born in which class became a heuristic for understanding the 
past (Enteen 1976, 93). Among those of the smaller nations, however, nation and 
nationality retained pride of place in the dissection of historical development. To 
quote Bodger, “It was argued that this [class-based alliances between the more 
advanced Tatars and backwards Bashkirs] had not come about because at that stage 
their interests clashed over possession of the land. The idea of a deeper community 
of interest based on their common social situations - where it was postulated - was 
held to have been too embryonic to have overcome more immediate material 
contradictions. The development of class consciousness among the subject peoples 
of the empire was held to have been a much later development.” (Bodger 1991, 566) 
Even for those peoples who had reached a level of socio-economic development in 
which signs of capitalist-era discord were clearly visible, then, the same sort of 
analysis afforded to Russian history was not extended to that of the Turkic 
communities.  
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Central Asian Historiography 
 In comparison to Russian historiography, Central Asian history writing 
presented both advantages and challenges to the new Soviet régime. On the one 
hand, the dearth of modern histories written about the peoples of the region 
implied little need to worry about ingrained historical worldviews against which the 
State would have to struggle. On the other hand, the lack of source materials and 
trained local historians meant an uphill battle in assembling facts that could then be 
massaged according to Marxist theory. Among the Russian and Russian-trained 
historians, the most widespread of ideas regarding the history of the region was the 
assumption that Aryans were autochthonous, and that the speakers of Iranic 
languages were their descendants. By contrast, the Turkic peoples were viewed as 
interlopers, new arrivals who had conquered the Iranic peoples and usurped their 
cultural achievements (Bustanov 2017, 46–52). Such hypotheses were rapidly dealt 
with on a Union-wide basis, particularly at the close of the 1920s and beginning of 
the 1930s, as we shall see. This does not mean that they did not persist, or even 
flourish during later periods; indeed, Shnirelman has demonstrated just the opposite 
(V. Shnirelman 2009). Nevertheless, they did cease to occupy the limelight for much 
of the period in question, allowing for other narratives to take centre stage.  
 
V. V. Bartol’d 
In the 1920s, the undisputed master of Central Asian history in the Soviet 
Union was Vasilii Vladimirovich Bartol’d. Bartol’d had begun writing about the 
history of the region in the early 1890s, and his production of scholarly works 
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between then and the October Revolution allowed him to claim a position of 
considerable importance in the new Soviet academy (Kuznetsova and Kulagina 1970, 
60). Bartol’d was also responsible for the organization of training activities for local 
historians at Turkestan University in Tashkent, thereby ensuring that his influence 
would be felt among Soviet historians of Turkic extraction, as well as Russians 
(Auezova 2011, 248). A 1963 collection of Bartol’d’s works contains a long list of his 
various ideological and methodological errors in his scholarship, yet it appears that 
his commitment to historical materialism and social history was sufficient to allow 
his writings to continue to be used and praised throughout the decades following his 
death in 1930 (Barthold 1963, 11–16). 
 In the 1920s, Bartol’d contributed in numerous ways to bettering Soviet 
understanding of the peoples and history of Central Asia. His История культурной 
жизни Туркестана (History of the Cultural Life of Turkestan), published in 1927, had 
originally been commissioned by the Academy of Sciences in 1919. Its purpose was 
to form part of a report intended to inform Soviet efforts to raise the “cultural level 
of Turkestan.” The report was never compiled, but Bartol’d’s contribution was 
published as a separate piece (Barthold 1963, 169–70). Similarly, the monograph 
Киргизы: исторический очерк (The Kyrgyz: A Historical Study), published during the 
same year, was undertaken on the request of the Scholarly Commission of the 
Division of People’s Education of the Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast. It was motivated 
not only by the lack of suitable historical materials on the Kyrgyz, but also by a desire 
among sections of the Kyrgyz population to know about their people’s history 
(Barthold 1963, 473). His 1929 publication Очерк истории Туркменского народа 
(Study of the History of the Turkmen people) was the first Western work written on 
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the history of the Turkmens, and was undertaken to provide the basis of further 
studies by future Soviet historians (Barthold 1963, 547). In addition to these specific 
items, there were a host of other lectures and monographs on the history of the 
Caucasus, the Caspian region and Islam in Central Asia, as well as reports on 
excursions, expeditions and business trips to the region, to Western Europe and 
Turkey. All of these provide a rich view of the development of Turkological studies in 
the Soviet Union in the first decade of Soviet statehood. 
 Bartol’d’s use of primary sources was largely traditional. Many of his studies 
were based on close readings of Chinese, Greek, Byzantine, Arab, Armenian, 
Georgian and Persian chronicles. This practice is evident in his studies of the Kyrgyz 
(Barthold 1963, 474–75), the Turkmen (Barthold 1963, 548–50) and the cultural 
history of Turkestan (Barthold 1963, 171–73). Despite this, his interpretation of the 
data included in these works demonstrates a critical approach to the source material 
that is inflected with aspects of Marxist historiography. As noted above in the 
discussion of Reşit Saffet’s interactions with Bartol’d during a visit to Moscow, 
Bartol’d cast doubt on use of the word Turk as an ethnonym by groups in Central 
Asia. In his work on the Turkmen, he argued that it might be Oğuz which was used as 
an ethnonym, while Turk referred only to a political appellation that was later 
popularized by the Oğuz as they migrated westward (Barthold 1963, 554). Such 
insinuations of political and class divisions among a pre-capitalist linguistic group 
dovetail with orthodox Marxist conceptualizations of pre-national collectivities 
(Connor 1984, 7), although they also appear to retain their currency among non-
Marxist scholars even today (see Lee 2016; Golden 1982). They contradicted, 
however, Turkish assertions of the unity of a classless nation, and of the essentialism 
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of an ethno-national identity. At the First Turkish Historical Congress, Afet Hanım 
claimed that the original populations of Central Asia were Turks, even if they did not 
call themselves as such (Birinci Türk Tarihi Kongresi: Konferansları, Münakaşaları 
1932, 78). In the preceding decade however, Bartol’d appears to have asserted that 
the opposite process was at work: individuals consciously associated themselves 
with a Turkish party, independent of their ethno-national affiliation.  
 
Bartol’d and Race 
 At a deeper level, however, Bartol’d’s writings challenged the very notions of 
Turkic ethno-racial purity and autochthonism on which the Turkish History Thesis 
was based. In The Kirghiz, he points out that the Kirghiz were fair-haired, blue-eyed 
and pink skinned, according to Chinese, Persian and Arab sources. However, the 
sharp differences between these original Kyrgyz and the modern-day populations 
bearing the same name leads Bartol’d to a very different conclusion from Saffet, 
Şevket Aziz and Reşit Galip Bey: “[f]rom all of this, evidently, it is possible to 
conclude that the Kyrgyz were Turkified Yenisei Ostyaks and that they waged war 
against their kinsmen who had kept their earlier language” (Barthold 1963, 480). 
Linguistic assimilation is also highlighted in Bartol’d’s estimation of modern Turkmen 
nomads: “In most recent times, ‘the mixture of dolichocephalic nomadic Iranic 
tribes’ is used to identify the characteristic sign of the Turkmen type; 
dolichocephalism. Aristov had already expressed such an opinion in 1896; the 
anthropological studies of L. V. Oshanniy are now taking the same direction” 
(Barthold 1963, 551). Language, ethnicity and race were therefore three separate 
and bounded concepts in Bartol’d’s view of history. Linguistic assimilation and 
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miscegenation were not processes that diluted or degraded the nation. Rather, they 
were the means by which distinct ethno-national groups were created, similar to the 
Marxist concept of history being the aggregate of the uncoordinated and 
unconscious actions of the individual members of a given society (Fleischer 1973, 
33). 
 
Bartol’d’s Views of Turkic Origins 
 What was perhaps most at odds with the Turkish nationalist historical 
narrative was Bartol’d’s opinion on the indigenous inhabitants of Central Asia and 
Azerbaijan. Central Asia was initially inhabited by Iranic peoples of both sedentary 
and nomadic social organization. Although their origins were unknown, it is likely 
that they only arrived in Persia as a result of pressure from Turkic migrants flooding 
into Central Asia and displacing them from their first homeland (Barthold 1963, 109–
10). The original Azerbaijanis, meanwhile, were likely neither Turkic nor Aryan, but 
rather members of the Japhetic race imagined by the Soviet historian Nikolai Marr 
(Barthold 1963, 775). The most damning condemnation of Turkic claims to Central 
Asia, however, was reserved for Bartol’d’s review of contemporary efforts to install 
Soviet systems of education and governance in the region. After a trip to Turkestan 
in the second half of 1920, he decried efforts by the local élite, who “were under the 
influence of Turkish, or, according to local terminology, ‘Turkic’, nationalism” to 
make their own languages official, to the detriment of “the actual aboriginals of 
Turkestan, the Iranian-Tajiks” (Barthold 1973, 395). Not only did Bartol’d deny the 
duration of Turkic settlement in Central Asia, but he also alleged that autochthonist 
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claims were nothing more than political propaganda encouraged by Ottoman exiles 
and adventurers. 
 Indeed, while later Soviet historians and ethnographers would insist upon the 
distinctions between race, language and culture in order to emphasize that the latter 
two objects frequently travelled far beyond the boundaries of the former, Barthol’d 
appears to be somewhat reluctant on the matter. In a 1925 publication on the Tajiks 
and their origins, he insists on drawing a straight and unidirectional trajectory from 
the two “cultured Iranian peoples” of ancient Central Asia, the Sogdians and the 
Khwarezmis, to the modern-day Tajiks. On closer inspection, however, Bartol’d’s 
own limitations with respect to his analysis of ancient and mediaeval Central Asia 
become apparent. As a historian, rather than an archaeologist, an ethnographer or 
anthropologist, he relies most on written sources and chronicles. The basis of 
continuity, then, is the political power and prestige of the city of Khwarezm, which 
endure the invasions of Alexander the Great, the Greco-Bactrian kingdoms, Muslim 
warriors and Turkic nomads, according to those who recorded its history (Barthold 
1925, 93–94). Material and spiritual culture, when it appears in his works, is 
therefore biased towards that of the upper classes. It is a process that is distinctly 
different from later Soviet historians, who relied on material remains in addition to 
textual ones in order to paint a fuller picture of social organization and economic 
activity, in addition to political and cultural achievements (Bustanov 2017). This lack 
of material evidence combined with hypothesized social dynamics allows sweeping 
statements about Sogdians “losing their language under the influence of 
Turkification” (Barthold 1925, 97). His is therefore a conceptualization of the Tajiks 
as a people who are Turkic in language only, and retain their essentially Iranic racial 
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composition. Absent is intermarriage, social class and commercial migration, all of 
which might have resulted in a demographic reality far more complex than this 
simplistic image. These groups, in other words, appear to be exempt from the same 
processes that brought Turkic collectivities into existence in the pre-Islamic period. 
 The ultimate incongruity of Bartol’d’s analysis with the principles of Stalinist 
nationality policy also become apparent from his accounts of Sogdian cultural 
supremacy in eastern Central Asia. In particular, his reference to the “national 
alphabet” of the Sogdians trespasses on two aspects of the dominant understanding 
of the nation (Barthold 1925, 95). It first casts back the title of nation to a people 
whose socio-economic organization could not have possibly met the requirements of 
a modern capitalist structure under the tutelage of a self-conscious bourgeoisie. 
More importantly, however, his use of the term national to describe an aspect of 
language problematizes the use of this object as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of nation-identification. The use of Sogdian as a language would have, in 
any Stalinist analysis, been a necessary but not sufficient component of qualifying 
the Sogdians as a nation. But what of those people who used a non-national 
alphabet to express themselves? Do they, in some way, forfeit part of their 
belonging to the nation and its purest core? To that end, did the Turkic peoples, 
particularly the Uighurs of the 8th and 9th centuries, compromise in full or in part 
their Turkic-ness by adopting an alphabet based not on their own innovations, but 
on those of their non-Turkic neighbours? While such a question might appear 
arcane, it had real implications for Soviet authority in the 1920s, as the government 
prepared to introduce a new alphabet for Turkic speakers across the Union. The 
insinuation that a particular alphabet might be more suitable than another one for 
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the national aspirations of a given people had the potential to derail the push to 
create Soviet nationalities. As the grandfather of Soviet Turkological studies, 
Barthold’s interpretations could have serious trickle-down effects on the acceptance 
and adoption of new Soviet identities.  
 
Chuloshnikov : a Brief Sideline 
Among those ethnic Russians who joined Barthol’d in his endeavour to 
uncover the history of Central Asia for primarily Russian readers was Aleksandr 
Petrovich Chuloshnikov. Chuloshnikov’s История Киргиз-Казахов (The History of 
the Kyrgyz-Kazakhs) was far from a work of source criticism or historical analysis. 
Rather, it was intended, similar to Barthol’d’s 1924 work on the history of the 
Turkmen, to be a starting point for the study of these two people by trained 
historians and ethnographers. For this reason, there is much space devoted to 
reviews of extant works and their merits (Chuloshnikov 2006, 190–91). Although he 
does make an attempt at refashioning the writings and conclusions of Walikhanov 
along Marxist lines – particularly by correlating the latter’s histories of his people to 
specific stages of socio-economic development – most of Chuloshnikov’s approach 
to Kazakh and Kyrgyz – and indeed Turkic – history is dominated by a dissection of 
the pure ethno-racial components that might have mixed together to give rise to the 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz nations (Chuloshnikov 2006, 197–209). Eclecticism was obviously 
a feature of individual works, as well as the disciplines as a whole. It should not be a 
surprise, then, that Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev, the first native Kazakh to write a 
European-style history of his people, would be so critical of Chuloshnikov’s approach 
in his own 1927 history, as we shall see shortly. Serious fieldwork had yet to be 
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conducted among the peoples of Central Asia themselves, and Chuloshnikov’s 
relegated the oral histories of the region to ethnography and anthropology, rather 
than seeing in them sources of historical truth (Chuloshnikov 2006, 216–17). It would 
therefore take those intimately familiar with the region, its people and their 
languages to provide the basis upon which a new national historiography, 
corresponding to both European and native epistemologies, would be founded. 
 
Of Soviets and Locals 
 This begs the question of how local historians and intellectuals conceived of 
their own national histories. The extent to which such national nomenclature can be 
used for large parts of the Soviet population is a contentious issue that has yet to be 
resolved within the literature (Amanzholova 2006, 15–17; Subtelny 1994, 51). 
Certainly, the desire to be labeled as a Kazakh or an Azeri meant, to some degree, to 
be able to participate in Soviet society. The Bolsheviks believed that the passage 
from pre-capitalist social formations to capitalist nations was necessary for the 
development of socialism in the Soviet Union and were also conscious of the need to 
respect the national sentiments of the “the Tatars and Bashkirs, the Uzbeks and 
Kirghiz, the Turkmens and Tajiks, … peoples retarded in their cultural relations” (I. V. 
Stalin 1957, 110). To this end, they created a number of different national republics, 
autonomous republics and oblasts, all designed to allow for the development of a 
socialist economy and socialist national culture. The process proved to be difficult 
even in those areas in which Imperial rule had long been established, and where the 
cultures and “nations” themselves were fairly familiar for the Muscovite élite, such 
as Belarus (Hirsch 2005, 149–50). In the region east of the Caspian, the initial 
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delimitation of borders occurred in 1924 under the aegis of the Central Asian 
Bureau. The Bureau’s decisions – which led to the creation of Uzbek and Turkmen 
Soviet Socialist Republics, a Kazakh Autonomous Republic within the Russian 
Federation, and a Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast within it – were based on reports from 
local authorities as well as ethnographic data and socio-economic surveys. From the 
outset, these were intended to be provisional decisions which were continually 
updated according to the findings of ethnographers, anthropologists and other 
specialists, as well as petitions from ordinary citizens (Hirsch 2005, 161–65).  
Indeed, between 1924 and 1936, the map of Central Asia continued to 
change, with new entities appearing and others disappearing, while various extant 
Republics or Oblasts changed their names, thanks to modified terminology within 
the discipline of ethnography (Haugen 2003, 165–210; Hirsch 2005, 161). As the 
reality of new nationally-based structures set in, people began to understand the 
very real and practical advantages of belonging to a specific category, no different 
than in other regions of the world in which the state tied rights and privileges to 
citizenship (Haugen 2003, 111–15). Adoption of nationally-inspired endonyms and 
exonyms therefore meant buying into an ideologically-constrained social order that 
continued to eliminate alternative world views as the 1920s progressed. This 
situation was further complicated by the fact that ethno-national identities defined 
by the Soviet authorities were far from clear-cut. Frequent disputes erupted over the 
ethno-national affiliation of various social and kinship groupings (Edgar 2006, 59–
60). In this respect, broad-based Kazakh, Uzbek or Azeri historical consciousness and 
imagination during the 1920s are amorphous and poorly delimited concepts at best 
(Hirsch 2005, 145). 
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Turkic Intellectuals and Their Languages 
 When we talk of intellectuals, however, the picture is slightly different. 
Among the Turkic writers, ethnographers, historians, philosophers and social 
activists whose work I survey, all had long-term and sustained contact with Russian 
and European scholars and scholarly materials. The earliest Russo-Turkic 
ethnographers and orientalists who were regarded as such, including Aleksandr 
Kazem-Beg and Choqan Walikhanov, often worked within Russian Imperial 
structures. The Azeri aesthete and dramatist Axundzadǝ was employed as a 
translator in negotiations between the Russian and Persian imperial courts. I do not 
believe, therefore, that it is problematic to use national designations for the later 
generation of Turkic intellectuals, many of whom left us documentary evidence as to 
their preference of ethno-national identification. Some even participated in the 
state-sponsored drive to popularize and routinize the use of approved ethnonyms. In 
those rare cases in which controversy about a writer’s affiliation persists, I will make 
note of it; otherwise, I will not seek to work against the grain of mainstream 
scholarship. 
 While I do not consider writers’ ethno-national belonging as a fruitful point of 
discussion for the elaboration of my thesis, their choice of language, I believe, does 
warrant further scrutiny. Russian, as the international language of the USSR – both in 
terms of relations between the USSR and sovereign states, and in communication 
between national groupings within the Soviet Union – was assured a privileged place 
in the social sciences. In the 1920s and 1930s, Russian was used, therefore, by 
linguists, historians, ethnographers, archaeologists and others who hoped to access 
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Union-wide and international scholarly publications (Hirsch 2005, 316). It was also 
the language to be used for political messaging destined to all but the most parochial 
of audiences, including Communist party organs and multi-national gatherings of 
Party members and citizens (Bromlei 1983, 363–64). All of the Turkic scholars 
studied in my project wrote at least some of their works in Russian, particularly 
those destined for academic and intellectual milieus.  
 At the other end of the scale are works in vernacular languages that do not 
have a long tradition of scholarly or literary production for mass consumption. These 
include the lects upon which Kazakh, Crimean Tatar, Tatar, Turkmen, Uzbek and 
Kyrgyz were based. For centuries, Ottoman Turkish and Chagatai were the two 
vehicles of literary production for western and eastern Turkic communities 
respectively. They were non-vernacular languages that changed far more slowly than 
the vernacular dialects spoken by non-élite communities across Eurasia. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, issues of vernacular-medium education and 
publication were highly controversial around the start of the 20th century. After the 
Bolshevik rise to power and defeat of counter-revolutionary forces in 1922, 
vernaculars cemented their position as the only vehicles of education in the Soviet 
Union (Shneer 2003, 198–99). These dialects, which would soon be elevated to the 
status of national languages by Soviet linguists and politicians, were perceived to be 
lacking in the terminology necessary for the elaboration of scientific works about the 
history and archaeology of Central Asia. They were therefore used largely for 
persuasive purposes. Works written in Kazakh, Uzbek or other languages tended to 
be geared towards convincing speakers of the languages’ abilites to express modern 
concepts, of the new vocabularies created by central planning committees, and of 
 281 
the worldview espoused by the Soviet authorities, including its historical 
components (Shneer 2003, 200). We will see such trends in many of the works under 
investigation in the following sections. As such, cultural production in these lects 
found a ready home in the various periodical publications issued by the Soviet 
authorities, such as Yer yu’zi (Worldwide, Uzbek); Yeshil Ada (Green Island, Crimean 
Tatar); Oqu Işleri (Reading Matters, Crimean Tatar); Temir Qazaq (Iron Kazakh); Qyzyl 
Qalam (Red Pen, Azeri); Tyrkmen Medenijeti (Turkmen Civilization); and Maorif va 
Uqutg’uvchu (Education and the Teacher, Uzbek). 
 Finally, the non-vernacular Turkic means of written communication did not 
cease to be used in the 1920s. A modified version of Ottoman Turkish, quite close in 
its structure and lexicon to modern Azeri Turkish, was employed by writers from the 
western Russo-Turkic world, as well as some Kazan Tatar authors. The works written 
in this language, which was preferred by Ismail Gasprinski in his own writings, 
tended to be aimed at an audience between the cultured élite and the masses. 
Although some works were argumentative or persuasive in nature, there was also 
expository scholarly production in the language. The Crimean Tatar Bekir Çobanzadǝ 
is a notable example of the linguists who wrote in this medium. His most frequent 
topics of dissection were the structure of the Turkic languages, their relationship to 
one another, and the prospects for linguistic modernization. Given the limitations of 
writing in such a language for either mass distribution or dissemination within 
international scholarly circles, I believe that these types of products were destined to 
the restricted community of Turkic intellectuals. These individuals had previously 
participated in the debates on language, identity, political representation and social 
organization in the Ottoman and Russian Empires. Many such monographs were 
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produced in advance of the 1926 All-Union Turkological Congress in Baku, in which 
both Soviet and foreign – including Turkish – delegates participated.  
 
Soviet Ethnography 
As Soviet power became entrenched, such expressions of language and 
ethno-national belonging, however, became much more controlled among both 
intellectuals and the masses. From the mid-1920s onward, the process of converting 
the Stalinist concept of the nation from theory to practice was pursued in earnest. 
The Soviet state sent out teams of ethnographers to the far reaches of the Union in 
order to determine which nations existed and who belonged to which group (Hirsch 
2005, 236). This was not a typically colonial exercise of assigning tribal, ethnic or 
national affiliation to subject populations, but rather a far more complicated process 
that involved negotiations of power between individuals, local élites, scholars and 
the central government (Hirsch 2005, 174). At least until the early 1930s, national 
identity was not seen as primordial, but rather the conscious choice of the individual 
(Martin 2000, 354). Individuals were therefore asked to describe their ethnicity to 
census takers, who would then have to evaluate the truthfulness and accuracy of the 
statement.  Meanwhile, local élites had learned, during the decade prior to the 
October Revolution, the usefulness of appealing to national interests in affecting 
Moscow’s decisions on local matters and in securing greater authority for 
themselves vis-à-vis rivals (Hirsch 2005, 161). 
Ethnography, local culture and language were all bound together in the very 
sticky question of language standardization and reform. In particular, given the 
importance of language as a necessary but not sufficient condition for nation 
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formation, it is understandable that the selection of a particular dialect as the basis 
of a standard language – which would then become the official language, alongside 
Russian, of the Soviet Republic bearing the name of the group who spoke it – would 
generate heated debates regarding the characteristics of given lects. In discussions 
on Uzbek dialects, for example, the issue of synharmonism or vowel harmony was of 
particular importance, given its absence in many of the urban dialects in Soviet 
Uzbekistan. This would not be a question of importance for my study, were it not the 
manner in which linguistic diversity and change were framed in historical and 
identitarian terms. Specifically, the loss of synharmonism was explained as the 
gradual Iranicization of the urban dialects of Tashkent, Samarqand and Bukhara. The 
explanation therefore carried an implicit judgment on the possibility of phonemic 
change brought about by endogenous pressures, as well as the authenticity of 
speech patterns and speech communities. This does not necessarily mean that such 
dialects were perceived as being less worthy of becoming national languages; in the 
case of Uzbek and the interpretation of the Uzbek writer Abdullo Alavi, quite the 
opposite. The loss of synharmonism was perceived as one component of the lect’s 
history as encapsulated in its current form (Alavi 1926, 40). Valorization of change, 
variation and cultural mixing, therefore, could be a tool for use in two arenas: 
political jockeying of local and regional élites for influence vis-à-vis Moscow; and the 
historiographic fight between ethno-nationalist purists and Marxist-influenced 
proponents of the Soviet régime. 
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Finding Local Histories 
 Since the mid-19th century, language and history had been perceived by 
intellectuals as keys to protecting or improving the lot of their constituents in the 
face of demands by other groups across Central Asia (Kendirbaeva 1999, 15). Kazakh 
intellectuals, in particular, saw the writing and teaching of history as a means of 
ensuring the socio-political unification of Kazakh speakers and the preservation of 
cultural and linguistic peculiarities in the face of assimilationist pressures by both 
Uzbeks and Tatars (Kendirbaeva 1999, 21). The works of a writer such as 
Bökeikhanov – a member of the nationalist Alash Orda movement and supporter of 
a Westernized Kazakh identity (Amanzholova 2006, 37) – could have provided the 
basis for a Soviet Kazakh history in the 1920s. His association with the “bourgeois 
nationalist” Alash Orda made Bökeikhanov politically suspect, however, and thus 
disqualified him from writing an acceptable historical narrative (Malikov 1972, 203–
5; Auezova 2011, 247). An indication of why his writings might have met with 
suspicion can be seen in the article “Tarikh kerek” (“History is necessary”), published 
in the journal Qyzyl Qazaqstan in 1922. Here, Bökeikhanov argues that nations have 
lifecycles similar to those of humans, rising, maturing and dying in due course. He 
infuses the ethno-national grouping with a sense of historicity, claiming that it is 
written history that assures the preservation of the nation in the modern world, not 
oral culture (Bȯkeĭkhanov 2013, 169). On the whole, historicity is in line with Marxist 
orthodoxy, even if it is not explicitly tied to socio-economic development. It is 
therefore not necessarily grounds for censure.  
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 It is later in his article that he begins to stray from sanctioned wisdom in both 
interpretation and methodology. To begin, he recognizes that “the basis of history is 
class struggle”, an essential component of any Marxist narrative. However, he also 
believes that history is a critical apparatus with which the nation views and corrects 
its faults, thereby ensuring its regeneration (Bȯkeĭkhanov 2013, 170). The nation’s 
success and survival, therefore, are seen as historically contingent, but the nation as 
an object might, in fact, be eternal and primordial. Placement of the nation at the 
top of social priorities is the essence of nationalist thought (Breuilly 2007, 2), and 
such prioritization clashed fundamentally with Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Moreover, 
written history is mandatory; but history based on written documents is not. 
Bökeikhanov understood that the Kazakhs possessed a rich tradition of oral history 
and literature upon which historians would have to draw if the people were to 
participate in the writing of their own narrative: “Up to this day, the Kazakh has no 
written history. History is passed from mouth to mouth.” Alternative methods of 
data collection and analysis would have to be utilized in the construction of a Kazakh 
national history; methods that might conflict with the widely-accepted rules of 
source criticism employed by Western historians (Bȯkeĭkhanov 2013, 171). Within 
the context of a system that placed greater and greater emphasis on materiality and 
scientific rigour, the call for employing oral sources and folklore would be met with 
skepticism at best, and charges of anti-Marxist idealism at worst. As we saw in 
Chapter 4, Gramsci perceived of folklore as a useful key to the overall worldview of a 
society; but Gramsci had not influenced Stalinism, and thus only a scientific 
approach could be tolerated in the dominant system that would be espoused by the 
state.  
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At this point in time, however, eclecticism still ruled supreme in Soviet 
historiography, and continued to guide historians of both Russia and the peoples on 
its periphery. The use of history – particularly oral history – was understood by those 
involved in agitprop for the Soviet authorities to be crucial in convincing the nomadic 
peoples of Central Asia of socio-economic reforms. A 1923 article about the Kazakh 
land question in the periodical Qyzyl Qazaqstan (Red Kazakhstan) pressed readers to 
accept that oral history would enable the Kazakhs to demonstrate their long-
standing relationship to the land and their social customs surrounding its usage 
(“Qazaq zher meselesi” 1923, 33–35). A piece from later that year entitled “Tarikhi 
Maghlumatdary” (“Historical Information”) encouraged the use of the traditional 
sources of historical knowledge by native historians in order to write the narrative of 
the people themselves, and to separate this from works of “literature” that made up 
the body of pre-Revolutionary historical accounts. This emphasis on nativist and 
objective historiography is proposed as a counterbalance to Russian and European 
efforts to racialize the Turkic peoples of the Steppe as Turkified Aryans, and thereby 
to deny their indigeneity or the validity of their Turkic identity. This anti-colonial 
approach to historiography, which makes use of Arab, Chinese and Persian 
chronicles, is aimed at placing the Kazakh and Kyrgyz on the historical map as 
longstanding nations, in contradiction to classical Marxist teaching (“Tarikhi 
maghlumatdary” 1923, 76–79).  
The overall reshaping of history by local historians, then, was a two-step 
process. The first, demonstrated by this article and others like it, was the infusion of 
European objectivity and professionalization, without an attempt at enforcing 
ideological rigour. So long as recourse was made to scholarly research, it was 
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deemed acceptable to argue that the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz were fully-formed nations 
long before the appearance of capitalism, or that ethno-national identity could be 
conceived of as pure or diluted (“Tarikhi maghlumatdary” 1923, 89). It was only 
later, once Stalinism became an ideological force to be reckoned with on all levels 
and in all disciplines, that interpretation, as well as sources, would be reorganized 
and purged by the state. The second was recourse to local sources of knowledge, 
marrying national content to a universal form. This brought the definition of the 
nation and its evolution firmly within the grasp of native élites, who balanced 
between nationalist rhetoric and the Stalinist orthodox in the name of advancing 
their constituents’ interests. 
 
Azeri Hangovers 
Similar trends can be found among other Turkic communities whose literati 
and scholars of the Revolutionary period sought a place for themselves once 
Bolshevik hegemony had been established. A 1925 article entitled “Azǝrbaycan 
haqqında” (“About Azerbaijan”) in Maarif İşçisi (The Education Worker) written by 
Hüsǝyin Mırzacemalov provides us with insight into the acceptability of historians 
who would later be tarred as bourgeois-nationalists throughout the 1920s. In his 
introduction to the history of Caucasian Azerbaijan (as opposed to the Iranian region 
south of the Arax River), Mırzacemalov refers his readers to a work written by Ahmet 
Ağaoğlu (called Ağayev in the note) during his studies at the University of Jena in 
Germany (Mirzacemalov 1925, 23). Ağaoğlu would later be accused of “poisoning 
workers’ slogans with nationalism” (Köçərli 1976, 88); of being a proponent of 
Islamic solidarity – rather than class consciousness – among the Turkic speakers of 
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the Caucasus (Köçərli 1976, 112); and of working with the Qazan Tatar Yusuf Akçura 
to further the cause of pan-Turkism from their base at the Türk Ocakları in Istanbul 
(Pustarnakov 1990, 21). For the time being, however, he was an example of native 
scholarship on the history and development of the Azerbaijani nation. More 
substantially, Mırzacemalov sought to push back the beginnings of Turkic 
colonization in Azerbaijan to the arrival of Hunnic emissaries keen on commercial 
links with Byzantium and China in the 6th century CE. Diplomatic relations evidently 
began the slow and steady (“aqın aqın”) settlement of the region by Turkic peoples. 
(Mirzacemalov 1925, 25). Although this builds upon readily accepted contemporary 
scholarship, and is therefore not terribly different from Zeyneloğlu (whom we saw in 
chapter 5) and his history of Azerbaijan published in Istanbul in 1924, it extrapolates 
from mainstream theses in order to comment on the ethnicity of the Huns and of 
the length of a substantial Turkic presence outside of Central Asia, core components 
of the Turkist nationalist creed. 
Maarif işçisi, it should be noted, was not wed to a particular non-Marxist 
view of Turkic influences in Azerbaijan. A 1927 piece by Fathali Melek Mehmetzade 
on the ethnography and demographic history of the Quba governorate traces out 
the various groups present in the region in the 1920s. Of these, Russians and 
Armenians are dealt with summarily, while there is considerable space devoted to 
the history and development of the Tat (Iranic) and Lezgi (Caucasian) communities. 
After this, a brief exposition of the Turkic groups is provided in which these are 
identified as the soldiers of the Mongol army that arrived with Tamerlane. Although 
they are ethnographically classified as Turks because of their customs and language, 
the prevalent Lezgi myth about their arrival with Tamerlane’s army means that they 
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continue to be known as “Mongols”. The periodical’s editorial board explains that 
although this article should have appeared in the ethnographic section, its 
incorporation of important historical information led them to publish it in the 
regional history chapter (Mehmetzade 1927, 70–71).  In many ways, Mehmetzade’s 
brief account of the region’s ethnographic diversity provides us with an indication of 
the flexibility in approaches to history and belonging that characterized historical 
writing in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. No mention of physical features or racial 
types is made, and in this no attempt is made to meld this cacophony of opinions 
and ontologies into a cohesive and coherent view of the world and its past. 
On the issue of methodology, a 1926 article in the Azeri journal Maarif işçisi 
on the Uday ethnic group, however, demonstrates that a lack of source criticism or 
hypothesis testing was not a universal characteristic of all writing at the time. The 
language of the article is closer to that of Ottoman Turkish than modern Azeri, 
indicating that its author was likely schooled in the Ottoman literary language and 
aiming at an audience with a similar background. In it, Mirbağırzade, a frequent 
contributor on matters of ethnography and anthropology, traces out the history of 
this community, their customs and their language. Much of the article is concerned 
with the ancestors of the Uday, the Albanians and the Erranians. The author makes, 
in a passing comment, the claim that the Albanian nation (millet) was of Turanic 
origin, while the Armenians – widely believed to be of Aryan origin – were late-
comers to the region of the southern Caucasus (Mirbağırzade 1926, 88). This picture 
of the Albanians is completed with a brief description of their moral and 
psychological life and their physical appearance. “Albanian society, from the point of 
view of its ‘character’, was a clean-virtue, pure-hearted nation [temiz hasiyetli, saf 
 290 
yürekli bir millet].” (Mirbağırzade 1926, 96) This is followed by speculation that the 
exonym “Albanian” comes from the Latin word for white (albus), as the Albanians 
were known to have “hair that was white [as] in the colour of a rose.” (Mirbağırzade 
1926, 97) These statements are not anathema to Stalinist doctrine in their entirety, 
as character or cast of mind was part of the Stalinist definition of a nation, and 
physical characteristics were here used not to prove superiority, but rather to 
explain historically-contingent exonyms.  
The later exposition of relationships between Uday and the Caucasian 
languages of Daghestan, rather than Turanic languages (Mirbağırzade 1926, 104), 
would indicate that linguism was not a feature of Mirbağırzade’s writing. Nor can 
linguism be detected in an earlier article in the same publication about sources of 
Azerbaijani history written by Pokhomov and translated into Azeri by Efendizade. 
This particular piece returns to the issue of cuneiform clay tables found in Eastern 
Anatolia around the modern city of Van and dated to the period of the Assyrian 
invasions. Pokhomov explains that the tablets are in a language that is neither 
Semitic nor Aryan, and that is believed to be Japhetic by the linguist Nikolai Marr 
(Pokhomov 1926, 76–77). No assertion is made, however, that there is any 
connection between the language in which the texts have been composed, nor, for 
that matter, the ethnicity of the composers, and modern populations and languages 
of the same region. Rather than a presentation of a cohesive nationalist view of the 
world, these articles are collections of contemporary scholarship on the ethnic 
groups of Azerbaijan, with little concern for ideological rigour. They demonstrate the 
eclectic nature of the scholars who focused on the history of this part of the Union, 
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and of the intense desire for historical information to fill the pages of all forms of 
publications. 
 
Effusive Epistemologies 
 Nonetheless, Soviet authorities appear to have been active in ensuring that 
whatever activities were undertaken by these amateur historians and local leaders 
did not spill over into hostile nationalist opposition to Moscow. These efforts were 
complicated when it came to non-Russian publications, particularly those in 
vernaculars rather than literary languages, because of the dearth of Marxist 
terminology. The abundance of materials in Russian on historical materialism, 
dialectical materialism, Marxian thought, nationality questions and economic 
analysis meant that there was no particular problem in rendering complex Marxist-
Leninist analysis in language that, while erudite and at times esoteric, was not wholly 
foreign to monolingual Russian readers. In the lects that would form the basis of 
Crimean Tatar, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Uzbek and other Soviet Turkic languages, 
however, such vocabularies were not in existence. Moreover, the borrowing of a 
Russian word might spark confusion at best and accusations of Russification at 
worst. For this reason, articles by such famed theorists as Bukharin were translated 
from the Russian into Uzbek, Azeri, Kazakh and others, and supplemented heavily 
with linguistic notes (see Bukharin 1926a; Bukharin 1926b; Bukharin 1926c; 
“Bajshylyq, ultshyldyq salt-sanagha qarsy attanys” 1929; “Ult tuwraly qysqasha 
maghlumat” 1928). Terms were coined and explained, often with their Russian 
equivalents in brackets. This had the advantage of portraying the language of 
Marxist analysis and theory as modern and progressive in the fight for mother-
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tongue literacy. It also allowed for the theoretical basis upon which Soviet social 
sciences were based to seep into non-Russian intellectual culture, and nativized the 
epistemologies and ontologies of Stalinist national histories among communities 
with their own traditions of historiography. 
 These epistemologies did not die in 1917. The eclectic nature of Soviet 
planning during the 1920s meant that some pre-Revolutionary trends continued 
after the change of regime. This can be seen easily in the examples above. 
Moreover, the Civil War deprived Moscow of sovereignty over large parts of the 
country. The anti-Bolshevik forces were not always sympathetic to nationalist 
causes, although they did indeed tolerate them when beneficial to the anti-Soviet 
cause (Bennigsen 1979, 25; Ryskulov 1984a, 153). Tolerance of those involved in 
such causes continued after victory in 1922, at least for a short period. 
 Whatever traditions existed, however, they were in constant competition 
with Soviet orthodoxy. In a 1923 issue of the Crimean Tatar journal Yengi Çolpan, 
both Stalinist interpretations of the nation and non-Marxist understandings of a 
specific nation are on display. The latter appears in Aqçoqraqlı’s exposé of Qazan 
Tatar literature. He recognizes that the majority of Crimean Tatars have only become 
acquainted with the Tatars of Central Russia and Siberia in recent years, thanks to 
the expansion of commercial opportunities and political activity following the 1905 
Revolution. They are thus poorly informed about the Qazan Tatars’ origins, culture 
and customs. In a brief outline of their lineage, he provides the opinions of a number 
of experts, including pre-Revolutionary Russian scholars who link the Tatars to the 
Volga Bulgars and thence to the Huns; Arab chroniclers who believe them to be a 
mixture of Turks and Slavs; and unnamed historians who claim them to be the 
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Islamized remnants of a Turco-Finnic union (Aqçoqraqlı 1923, 42–43). Aqçoqraqlı 
does not overtly espouse a nationalist or idealist approach to the historicity of 
national groupings, but the absence of any sort of historically contingent component 
in his analysis leads us to believe that Stalinist nationalities doctrine was not 
necessarily a priority for him. 
 In contrast to the article on the Qazan Tatars, a piece in the same journal 
entitled “Rusiya’da millet meselesi ve onuñ surt-i hallı” (“The national question in 
Russia and the form of its solution”) is a shining example of Soviet dogma. Although 
the piece, written by Osman Zeki, is ostensibly a history of national relations within 
the framework of the Russian state, it begins with a definition of the concept of the 
nation. A brief review of the ideas of Springer and Bauer are soon followed by a clear 
definition of the nation, printed in a bold-faced type that is larger than the rest of 
the text: 
“The nation is a community of language, territory, 
economic life and psychological structure (which you 
see in a civilizational community) that is formed in a 
historical framework. That is to say, this community is 
not a union of race or tribe. Historical community, 
unity is necessary. Today’s Anatolian Turks, Italians, 
English, French and others like them are nations that 
are formed from various races and tribes and that 
came about in response to historical circumstances.” 
(Zeki 1923, 27) 
 
Although no citation is given, there can be no doubt that this particular formulation 
of the definition of a nation bears an uncanny resemblance to that found in Stalin’s 
1913 essay on the national question. It is a forceful and explicit rebuttal of 
nationalist ideations of the nation, while retaining the idealist component of a cast 
of mind. The reinforcement is negative, as well as positive. In addition to a clear 
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definition of the nation, Zeki refutes the idea that the Crimean Tatars form a 
common nation with the Krymchaks and the Karaim, two Jewish groupings that 
speak ethnolects of the Crimean Tatar language (Zeki 1923, 27). In doing so, he 
transgresses the most important of nationalist precepts: that language and culture 
are more important than confessional differences. The result is not an absolute 
negation of pan-Turkic or nationalist ideology, but it does lay the groundwork for a 
reformulation of nationhood and belonging within Turcophone communities. 
Part of this process required breaking down existing threats and identity 
movements. Pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism were two obvious targets of the 
authorities, and efforts were taken to convince non-Russian citizens of the need for 
loyalty to Moscow rather than other centres of power. In the Crimean Tatar journal 
İleri (Forward), Editor-in-Chief M. Nedim discussed the differences between national 
culture (“milli kultura”) and class culture (“sınfi kultura”) as early as 1926. The article 
starts with a quote from Leon Trotsky on the intimate connection between national 
culture and the ideology of the dominant class (Nedim 1926, 33). What follows is a 
somewhat contradictory account of nations and national culture that demonstrates 
the tension between Leninist and Stalinist ideas. After quoting Lenin, Nedim applies 
the Leninist concept of two cultures within one nation – that of the bourgeoisie and 
another of the proletariat – to the Islamic world, claiming that “to present the 
Tatars, Turks, Arabs and Acems [Persians] of the East each as a unified grouping is 
nothing more than to perform a service for the petit bourgeoisie and the 
bourgeoisie.” (Nedim 1926, 34) As such, there is no specifically “national” culture to 
which a people might belong, but rather a class-based one. In the West, the 
distinction is between bourgeoisie and proletariats, but in the East it is between the 
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dominant petit bourgeoisie (including the clergy) and the pastoral or peasant classes 
(Nedim 1926, 36). 
 The problem with this analysis is that it ignores the historically-contingent 
aspects of class and nation formation. If the peoples of the East and West have 
different dominant and dominated classes, it is, according to Marxist-Leninist 
interpretations, because they have reached differing points of socio-economic 
development. Those of the East have yet to transition entirely into capitalism, and so 
their “nations” cannot have been fully formed in the same manner as those of the 
Russians, Germans or Poles. Capitalism is a sine qua non for the Turkish, Tatar or 
Arab bourgeoisies to impose their own cultures on dominated classes through the 
creation of “national cultures”. Nedim therefore uses Leninist doctrine to encourage 
a break with pre-Revolutionary conceptions of a wider Islamic communities as well 
as parochial systems of belonging, replacing them with class-based ideas of inclusion 
and identification. He also, however, has recourse to Stalinist laxity in the application 
of the national model to non-European groups. Similar to Stalin’s approach to the 
Georgians and their formation of a nation prior to the arrival of capitalism, as seen in 
the discussion on ideology in chapter 4, Nedim’s call for the abandonment of 
national cultures among the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union fudges the historical 
limits of the nation, and brings the Crimean Tatars into the Stalinist worldview of 
peoples and groups. Although it is lacking in any sort of historical dimension, this 
article and others like it routinized the usage of the concept of the nation and thus 
naturalized it among Turkic communities. 
 The use of terminology such as “national” was far from circumspect in even 
more politicized contexts, including the materials published for the 1926 
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Turkological Congress in Baku. A speech on the Latin alphabet by the representative 
of the Uzbekistan government to the Congress, Xorezimli Mulobekjon Rahmonog’lu, 
demonstrates the level of mixing that occurred in official Communist Party writings, 
albeit those in languages other than Russian. The speech was delivered in what 
appears to be Azeri or a related Oğuz dialect, rather than Uzbek, and addresses the 
development of writing among the Turkic peoples. Rahmonog’lu describes how the 
Turkic inhabitants of Central Asia were introduced to the Arabic script through the 
Arab invasions of the seventh and eighth centuries CE. The Turkic communities had 
their own “national” writing, which competed with that of the Arabs, but the latter 
eventually won out, thanks to the overwhelming influence of the Islamic faith and 
the centrality of the Qur’an to it (Rahmanog’lu 1926, 9). His interpretation, 
therefore, bestows national status on two groups that would otherwise be labelled 
as tribes because of their lack of feudal or capitalist organization of the factors of 
production. Nevertheless, the use of the word “nation” – to be contrasted with the 
modern division of Turkic-speakers into “peoples” (xalqlar) (Rahmanog’lu 1926, 10) – 
indicates not only a departure from Stalinist orthodoxy, but also a refusal to elevate 
socio-economic factors above idealist and ethnic characteristics in determining 
belonging. Even those with an interest in preserving and expanding Soviet power 
over Central Asia were evidently far from averse to the usage of what would later be 
termed reactionary language in the description of their parochial constituencies.  
 
Professionalization and Objectivization 
 Part of the process of naturalizing quasi-nationalistic forms of speech resided 
in introducing Turkic populations to the hierarchical epistemological structures of 
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Western scholarship. The occasion of the First Turkological Congress in Baku in 1926 
provided a propitious opportunity for this, and various scholars were involved in the 
campaign to inform literate citizens of the goals and benefits of such a gathering. 
Foremost among the proponents was Bekir Çobanzadǝ, the Crimean Tatar linguist 
who spent much of his working life in Baku. Çobanzadǝ wrote for both the Crimean 
Tatar periodical İleri and the Azeri-language Maarif İşçisi, as well as penning ad hoc 
monographs. In “Şarkçılık Müesseseleri” (“Orientalist Institutes”), published in 
Maarif işçisi in 1926, he provided a detailed overview of the history of Orientalist 
scholarship in Europe and Russia, its uses and abuses, and the importance of the 
gradual refinement and specialization of scholarly disciplines (Çobanzadə 1926a, 8–
10). Most importantly, he highlighted the need for the new generation of Western- 
and Soviet-educated Turkic youths to take up the cause of Turkological scholarship in 
the spirit of objectivity and scientific rigour. Only in this way would the untruths fed 
into European studies for the purposes of supporting colonialism and interest-based 
foreign investment be unmasked, and scholastic endeavour reoriented towards the 
benefit of the Turkic nations (Çobanzadə 1926a, 15–16). Çobanzadǝ was careful to 
make intention and integrity the criteria for evaluation, rather than language and 
ethnicity. This permitted him to make judgments on the worthiness of Turkic and 
non-Turkic scholars’ works without concern for a nationalist credo about blood and 
patriotism, and to embrace Western writers while disparaging pan-Turkist ones from 
Istanbul. 
 The importance of Western-style institutions, hierarchies and epistemologies 
was about more than simply establishing the credentials of individuals who might 
appear to be tainted by their work with the Soviet authorities. It was about re-
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ordering the world in such a way as to encourage buy-in to the Soviet means of 
cultural curatorship and reproduction. Apart from Çobanzadǝ’s writing, Uzbek 
journals also carried a series of articles about the new efforts undertaken by the 
Soviet authorities in Central Asia to conserve and protect the ancient monuments of 
the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods. These efforts were portrayed as both 
preservation and education, stressing the manner in which class enemies had failed 
to incorporate such physical remains into the construction of an educated and class-
conscious society of Central Asian Muslims (Nichkin 1926b, 1926a; S. Ayni 1926). 
One such article defined archaeology as “a modern science (buryng’y zaman … fann) 
that has studied and informed [us] about the antiquities left over from spiritual life 
and exposed to the elements.” “With the archaeologists’ experienced hands,” the 
author goes on to claim, “they [archaeological excavations] began to give up unseen 
artefacts that had been dug out from the belly of the earth … they are making the 
artefacts of old rise up and are informing [us] of their secrets, of the ideas kept in 
their hearts, and of their histories of development and inhabitation.” Asia, in 
particular, had benefited from modern archaeology’s advances, especially in the 
post-World War One (and thus Soviet) period (R. Ayni 1926, 50). Archaeology and 
the forward march of modern, European science, therefore, was not a threat to the 
cultures and histories of the peoples of the East; rather, it had helped them to claim 
their rightful place in world history.  
Obviously, there was much that still needed to be done, and problems did 
exist. Emphasis was laid on the lack of resources, both physical and human, that 
hindered the immediate undertaking of serious scholarly work on the history, 
ethnography, literature and language of the Turkic peoples. The renowned 
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Turkologist Ismail Samoilovich himself was engaged to write of the problems he 
faced in order to deliver lectures on Turkology in Baku and Central Asia in the first 
five years after the end of the Civil War. Here blame is laid on the ancien régime and 
the solution to the situation is clear: until the Soviet authorities have built the 
necessary infrastructure for educational and scholarly endeavours, research and 
discussion will continue in Leningrad and be diffused out towards the periphery 
(Samoilovich 1926). Turkic Soviet citizens are to put their faith in the emissaries of 
the Soviet régime and their pronouncements while a fair and functional society that 
enables their desires to explore their own pasts, presents and futures is being 
constructed.  
 Such trust was important for Çobanzadǝ. His articles in other periodicals 
sketch out views of the world that do not accord with nationalist or pan-Turkist ideas 
about language, belonging and authenticity and would have required some force of 
scholarly authority to be accepted. In an article for İleri in 1926 on the role of Turco-
Tatar intellectuals in civilizational creativity, his conception of the Turkic world is one 
that jars considerably with the ideas of both the nationalists and the Stalinist 
hardliners of the 1930s. Here, no distinction is made between writers who would 
later be considered Turks, Azeris, Crimean Tatars or Qazan Tatars, a grave crime 
against Stalinist orthodoxy. However, it is not the indivisible and eternal unity of a 
Turkic brotherhood that is on display, for the Albanian nationalist Şemseddin Sami 
(Sami Frashëri) is included in the list of Turco-Tatar intellectuals (Çobanzadə 1926b, 
6). This, then, is a Turkic or Turkish society of thinkers, a belonging based upon 
voluntary linguistic traits and a willingness to participate in a given socio-cultural 
milieu. Consciousness and cast of mind are obviously not of prime importance, as 
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both Sami and the Azeri intellectual Axundzadə opted to identify with non-Turkic 
collectivities (the Albanian and Persian respectively). Blood and lineage, too, are 
ignored, as it is the product of the mind, rather than descent from a common 
ancestor, that motivates inclusion and exclusion from Çobanzadə’s collection of 
Turkic minds. 
 Indeed, even when authors make a specific claim regarding the study of 
Turkic history, general calls to ethnic pride or racial cohesion are entirely absent. A 
1927 article from Maorif va Uqutg’uvchu, “On Uzbek History” (“O’zbek tarixi ustida”) 
is remarkably practical in its approach to the topic. Histories based upon the works 
of Léon Cahun, the well-known 19th century French scholar of the Turkic peoples, are 
seen as not only outdated, but also irredeemably tainted by the political and 
ideological biases of their times. New, modern histories need to be written, 
especially given the stress placed on the study of history by the People’s Commissar 
of Education. Of greatest importance is the infusion of materialism into the analysis 
of history, a key component of any narrative that departs from the mysticism of 
mediaeval historical texts. The author, Rahim, engages in many of the same 
complaints found in other articles on the topic – the need for infrastructure; the 
need for money; the need for state-support of those who are committed to the 
study and interpretation of history – but he also introduces a new element into the 
mix. He recognizes that the Uzbeks are part of the broader group of Turkic peoples, 
but that they are, essentially, a separate collectivity. He argues that the process of 
creating a new Uzbek history will be far easier than it might first appear, thanks to 
the considerable volume of material collected for general Turkic history, especially 
with reference to Azerbaijan and Tatarstan. However, this material needs to be 
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translated, reorganized, and most importantly re-interpreted – with emphasis placed 
on Uzbek history during the period of Genghis Khan – according to the principles of 
materialism (Rahim 1927, 44–45). It is important for our study, because it recognizes 
the implicit conclusion that the Uzbeks are a separate Turkic people (qavm), and 
because it explicitly calls for an abandonment of the idealist understanding of 
national history, so dear to Turkish historians, in favour of a materialist paradigm. 
This materialist structure can only be a dialectical one within the bounds of Marxist-
Leninist orthodoxy, given Rahim’s insistence on highlighting the Uzbek role in the 
Russian Revolution of 1917. 
 
Uzbekistan the Urban, Uzbekistan the Rural 
 The next issue of the same periodical gives us an example of how a new type 
of Turkic history might be written. Bulon Soliyev, an author of historiographic articles 
in previous issues, responds in this piece to the criticisms of Aziz Abdullin about 
Soliyev’s earlier article entitled “O’rta Osiyo Tarixi” (“The history of Central Asia”). 
Abdullin’s remarks centre on four different topics: “(1) sources; (2) Marxist theory’s 
lack of importance; (3) the probability of feudalism’s influence over that of 
capitalism; (4) Timur and the Mongols” (Soliyev 1927a, 41) On the first count, 
Abdullin’s criticism of Soliyev arises from the latter’s usage of Russian, rather than 
Arab and Persian, sources. Soliyev admits that the Arab and Persian sources are 
useful, especially when studying the Mediaeval period, as they reveal the extent of 
social, political and economic development in both the cities and the countryside. 
Russian sources, however, provide a different view, as they are based upon the 
chronicles of the ancient Chinese and Greeks, and therefore add to the scant 
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information available on Central Asia before the Islamic period. Soliyev is particularly 
keen to laud Bartol’d, whose attention to detail and sharp analysis make his works 
more valuable than those of Vambéry and other Western scholars (Soliyev 1927a, 
41–42). Of interest to us is the manner in which the two sets of sources are treated 
differently. The Arab and Persian sources are seen as primary accounts of life in 
mediaeval Central Asia; a window onto the reality of the 12th to 16th centuries. Their 
content is to be taken at face value and then analyzed as appropriate. Russian 
sources, however, as secondary works of scholarship, are to be taken as completed 
analysis to be accepted without the application of source critique methodology. This 
is not a matter of Western versus Oriental knowledge, as Soliyev explicitly criticizes 
the work of 19th century European scholars. Rather, it is a tacit suggestion of the 
importance of revolutionary epistemologies, a reordering of the world according to a 
Marxian, rather than religious, understanding. 
 The issue of sources leads us to the next two points, the value of Marxist 
science and the influence of capitalism versus feudalism. Soliyev still recognizes the 
usefulness of the Arab and Persian sources, as they include accounts of both city life 
and of rural and tribal societies, and particularly the socio-economic relations that 
arose between town and city. Through them, as well as the Russian sources, a 
balanced view of social organization in the vastly diverse region of Central Asia can 
be reconstructed and a careful account of the social history of Central Asia can finally 
be written. In this endeavour, revolutionary Marxism, focused as it is on materialism, 
is far superior to the bourgeois idealism and its historiographical methods. Marxism 
concentrates on what was and what happened, rather than on what is imagined to 
have been. Marxist history, however, is unduly biased towards the city and urban 
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development, according to Abdullin. As such, its application to Central Asia as a 
historical region has resulted in the over-valuation of capitalism’s influence, when 
feudalism was a much more powerful force in the development of Central Asia’s 
institutions and social structures (Soliyev 1927a, 42–43). The relative strength of 
capitalist and feudalist impulses is a crucial question in determining the emergence 
of national groupings, given the Stalinist scheme of historical socio-economic 
development of ethnic communities. In the case of Central Asia, however, it is not 
the simple transition from feudalism to capitalism with which we are dealing, but 
rather something far messier.  
 In Europe, the boundary between feudal social structures and capitalist ones 
might have been blurry, but it was only two distinct modes of production about 
which Marx was writing. In the Turkic regions of Transoxiana, another element – 
nomadism – had to be considered. In truth, it appears that Soliyev’s understanding 
of feudalism versus capitalism was much more akin to trade versus subsistence, as it 
is the commercial activities of Sassanian, Khwarezmi and other urban centres that he 
contrasts to the autarkic economic activities of peasants on the land. Still, it is 
evident that a problem exists for those who would claim that all peoples – those of 
the cities, those of the countryside, and the nomads of the steppes and the deserts – 
formed a unified nation. As Soliyev himself notes, the Turkic tribes who first entered 
the region in the 7th century were not the same groupings as the tribal nomads of 
the 12th and 13th centuries, implying that different collectivities had experienced 
socio-economic change at different rates (Soliyev 1927a, 44). If anything, different 
modes of production engendered different socio-economic structures, which implied 
different ethnic and possibly linguistic boundaries. The situation was far too complex 
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to characterize Uzbeks or Central Asians as a whole, even if religious and possibly 
political allegiance bound them to one another.  
 Soliyev’s conclusions become apparent as he moves to describe the Seljuks. 
They emerged in the 9th century, at a time when trade throughout the Islamic world 
was growing substantially. The Seljuks, according to Soliyev, “were from among the 
old peoples of the Caspian [Sea region]. They were a people organized as a strong 
state.” As such, they were able to capitalize on the increase in trade through the 
region and, similar to the other polities in Transoxiana, managed to accumulate 
capital in substantial amounts. The proof of this is the importance that they played in 
the geopolitical strategizing of the Sassanians, the Qara-Khitays and the Karahanids, 
as well as the respect their leaders had from the Caliphs of the period. The leaders of 
the Seljuks, however, were not considered to be a proper bourgeoisie in traditional 
scholarship, despite their motivations for capital accumulation. This is because the 
past and current biases of Orientalists and Turkologists have led to a prevailing belief 
that the Turkic peoples, including the Seljuks, were nothing more than savages, 
constantly in conflict with the sole creators of civilization in Central Asia, the Iranians 
(Soliyev 1927a, 44). Indeed, Soliyev is adamant that nomadic peoples of all ethno-
linguistic groups – including the Mongols – be accorded the dignity of civilization and 
progression. In answering Abdullin’s final point about Timur and the armies of 
Genghis Khan, here too he seeks to polish off the tarnished name of non-Aryan 
collectivities and colour them with a civilizing hue by refusing the standard narrative 
of the Mongols’ barbarism and anti-civilizational attitude (Soliyev 1927a, 45). 
Together, Soliyev’s criticism of Abdullin’s four criticisms seeks to break down 
traditional narratives of the development of Central Asia, as well as newer 
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nationalist ones, in favour of a Marxian interpretation. A sedentary life, although the 
hallmark of European feudalism and capitalism, need not be seen as a sufficient 
condition for the development of capitalist socio-economic dynamics. Moreover, the 
usage of a wide variety of sources, both Marxian and non-Marxian, allows for a 
richer picture of the history and emergence of Central Asian collectivities, none of 
which should be based upon religious, socio-economic or linguistic identities alone. 
Soliyev’s Marxist historical interpretation was flexible enough to stretch onto Central 
Asian realities, granting the Turkic peoples of the region access to the title of 
“nation” without resorting to the idealism of the bourgeois-nationalist historians, or 
their typologies. Similar to the Turkish models, European chauvinism is challenged; 
not from the redoubt of idealism and essentialism, but from a strictly Marxian 
interpretation adapted, rather than simply adopted, to the peculiarities of Central 
Asia.   
 
Uzbek Origins 
 Any idea that Soliyev might be a misguided, but nonetheless sincere, 
adherent to the Stalinist thesis is scuppered by his following piece on the history of 
Khwarezm. Soliyev appears to have been a specialist on Mediaeval Central Asian 
sources, and he therefore is quite comfortable in the use of Arabic and Persian 
materials from the period. He employs an account by Ḥamawī, first, to describe the 
foundation of the city of Khwarezm. The information reported by Ḥamawī comes 
from an oft-repeated legend, and tells of a Persian king who sent a group of people 
to found a settlement in modern-day Turkmenistan. A few years later, a messenger 
is dispatched to bring news of the pioneers, and returns with tales of the progress 
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they have made in agriculture, fishery and urban planning. As a reward, the king 
sends to them various gifts, including forty Turkic concubines. In a footnote to the 
text, Soliyev explains that the description of the concubines as Turkic (“turkî jariye”) 
should not be taken as a later addition to the story, as there is ample evidence of the 
historical existence of Turkic peoples throughout the region (Soliyev 1927b, 47). The 
purpose of the footnote is two-fold: first, it aims to stem the narrative that the usage 
of the word “Turkic” in Central Asia is a mediaeval or modern invention; it also helps 
to establish the ethnic bona fides of the people of the region. If their progenitors 
were originally Turks by ethnicity, then there is no basis for the claim that they were 
Turkicized Persians or other non-Turkic peoples. Racial purity may not be assured, 
but at least language can be accompanied by ethno-national belonging in the 
narrative Soliyev seeks to establish.  
 Next, the author turns to Russian scholarship on the same source material. 
He explains that a Professor Veselovskii has searched Al-Birūnī’s history of Khwarezm 
and established up to twenty different names of individuals present in the city prior 
to the advent of Islam. Soliyev reviews a number of them and explains how they are 
etymologically Turkic, in addition to the various modern appearances of the names 
among the Kazakhs, Nogays and Uzbeks. From this evidence, he concludes that, 
although the exact origins of the Khwarezmis is unknown, his hypothesis that they 
are Turkic is well-founded (Soliyev 1927b, 48). The Turkic ethno-national identities 
are thus cast backwards and assumed to represent, at their core, the original culture 
and social structure of pre-Islamic Khwarezm. From his earlier complaint about the 
boorish nature forced upon the ancient Turks by modern Orientalists and 
Turkologists, we may assume that it was particularly important for Soliyev to 
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demonstrate their high level of civilizational achievement. The only means of doing 
this is to defy both mainstream interpretations – whereby the Iranic elements of 
Khwarezmi culture would be identified as loans into Turkic ones – as well as the 
Stalinist paradigm whereby neither Turks nor Iranians could exist as contained and 
bound national groupings in pre-capitalist societies.  
 The issue that confronts us, however, is that Soliyev’s Turkic collectivities are 
never fully defined. When describing them, he makes ample use of both the 
adjective Türkî “Turkic”, as well as names that contain socio-economic, linguistic and 
tribal elements, such as Türkmen and Og’uz. Rather than using the word millet 
“nation”, he uses xalq “people” (Soliyev 1927b, 50). Even when he has recourse to 
racialist discussions of the origins of the Khwarezmis, there is no sense that physical 
attributes correspond to linguistic or ethnic boundaries. He mines the works of 
Maqdisī to find descriptions of the peoples of the region, noting that their heads, 
and particularly foreheads, were wide but the sides of the head narrow. These 
features, Soliyev claims, correspond to the physical appearances of the Og’uz and 
Turkmen, but not other Turkic groups. The Turkmen and a portion of the Og’uz 
remained nomadic communities for the large part, building only those structures 
that were required for transhumance. Another portion of the Og’uz eventually 
settled into fixed communities, pushed to this new socio-economic structure by the 
vagaries of the hunt for water and fodder (Soliyev 1927b, 52). Thus, if the people of 
Khwarezm were indeed originally Turkic, and the Turkic settlements in the region 
had been recorded as early as 200 BCE (Soliyev 1927b, 49), then one can only 
assume that Turks, as such, were a loose grouping of peoples with a common 
language, but not many other shared characteristics. 
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 Soliyev’s two articles highlight another interesting aspect of Soviet Turkic 
historiography during the 1920s. His conclusions and paradigms might not be 
ideologically Stalinist, even in the loosest of senses, but they do appear to be so 
politically. Soliyev ends his article on the history of Khwarezm by emphasizing that 
both Iranic and Turkics peoples – generally the Og’uz and Turkmen – had important 
roles to play in the development of the great civilizations of Central Asia (Soliyev 
1927b, 53). He is not terribly concerned with the idea of proving the existence of a 
fully-formed Turkic nation in the first millennium BCE, but he does hammer home 
the indigeneity of the Turkic peoples in their current areas of residence. At a time 
when borders continued to be challenged, and sub-union governments across the 
region were vying for the right to claim their allegedly ancestral lands, such a 
narrative was crucial in bolstering Turkic claims against Tajik plaintiffs before the 
central authorities in Moscow. Such narratives were repeated in other forums too, 
including readers and literacy materials produced in the new alphabet propagated 
by the Soviet government. Here, the Uzbek, Turkmen, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik 
nations are all allotted their specific national homelands, described as if they were 
the natural habitats of exotic species (Ataçan 1928, 176–77). Such examples of the 
naturalization of national histories and boundaries are an indication that even before 
Stalin had cemented his grip on supreme power, historians and other scholars were 
actively engaged in bending their writings to the requirements of a supposedly 
scientific and objective system.  
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Turkic Hands, Russian Tongues 
  As mentioned in the section on the language of periodicals and journals, 
Russian was seen, in many respects, as the international language of science and 
cooperation. In addition to Turkic languages, many of the authors and scholars 
mentioned above also wrote works in Russian, usually for audiences that were 
considerably different from those of the Turkic magazines and journals. Translations 
that appeared in the Turkic journals were usually from the Russian, but those found 
in Russian-language media were occasionally produced in German, French, English or 
other languages used outside of the Soviet Union. Russian-language published 
materials, therefore, can be seen as a conduit through which some ideas, 
hypotheses and theories from non-Soviet sources entered Turkic intellectual circles. 
 Baku, as the site of the First Turkological Congress and the only university in a 
Turkic-majority city with a Turkology department (including a history section), was a 
particularly rich source of Russian-language materials. Azerbaijan State University 
printed an Orientology Journal edited by Bekir Çobanzadə and A. V. Bagriia beginning 
in 1926. Among the articles in the first volume concerned with Turkish and Turkic 
history there is a review of the work entitled “On questions of the formal study of 
the poetry of the Turkish [sic] peoples,” written by T. Kowalski of the University of 
Krakow. The ideas encapsulated in the book are obviously those of an academic 
outside of the Soviet Union, and thus cannot be attributed to state-sponsored 
Stalinist ideology. Nevertheless, the selection of this particular book and the 
approval or refutation of its main points are telling of Baku’s scholastic 
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establishment’s acceptance of certain attitudes towards the study of the Turkic 
peoples and their histories. 
 Given the fact that the article is a translation, it is difficult to tell whether the 
use of the term турецкий (turetskiĭ, “Turkish”) instead of тюркский (tiurkskiĭ, 
“Turkic”) was on the part of the author; an error in translation; or a deliberate 
decision by the editors of the journal. For this reason, I will not concentrate on this 
particular aspect of the piece. Instead, when we turn to Linin’s brief review of 
Kowalski’s history of the Turkic peoples and their culture, we see a far clearer affinity 
between the author’s approach to the Turkic peoples and the views of the Gökalpian 
nationalists, rather than Soviet Turkologists. Kowalski notes that the Turkic peoples 
migrated westward in two waves: one going to the north of the Caspian and Black 
Seas, and the other to the south, through Iran and into the Middle East. The remains 
of the former wave – the Huns, Avars, Pechenegs, Cumans and others – were 
absorbed into the Slavic and Magyar communities of Eastern Europe by the 18th 
century. There are therefore no ethnic, linguistic or cultural remnants of these 
peoples to be found. Those that passed along the southern route, however, 
“preserved their own independent language and ethnic characteristics.” (Linin 1926, 
141) Turkishness, or Turkicness, is therefore marked off as entirely foreign, not 
something that might be identified as a component of an otherwise “European” 
people such as the Hungarians or the Bulgarians.  
 This is not to say that the Turks of Turkey or the Middle East and Rumelia – 
those that came with the southern branch of the migration – are examples of pure 
Turkicness either. Rather, their culture was tainted by Arab civilization through the 
imposition of Islamic ideas and values. Turkish – and for that matter, native Iranian – 
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aspects of creativity were wilfully ignored by Western scholars who saw these as 
imports, rather than indigenous ethnic cultures bubbling to the surface of an 
otherwise alien soup (Linin 1926, 143). By far, however, the purest of Turkic traits is 
to be found among the Central Asian nomads, whose customs and language bear a 
striking resemblance to those of the ancient Turkic peoples recorded in the pre-
Islamic inscriptions of the Orkhon River and western China. The reviewer is quick to 
point out that creativity and ahistoricity are two very different concepts: the peoples 
of Central Asia might not have changed drastically since the first millennium CE, but 
that does not mean they were passive in their development of their own cultures or 
in their adoption and adaptation of foreign elements (Linin 1926, 142). 
 Of course, Soviet ethnography, anthropology and history were characterized 
by plentiful examples of the importance of miscegenation and ethno-cultural cross-
pollination throughout the pre-capitalist history of all peoples. Within the orthodox 
paradigm of Soviet historiography, the aforementioned mixing would have been 
taken as a statement of fact, a fait accompli intended to underscore the irreversible 
differences between the Turks of Anatolia and the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Salars and 
Yakuts. The reviewer, however, chooses a different path of interpretation, stressing 
instead the commonalities of Turkic poetry, and seeking within them a route to the 
pre-Islamic unity of Turkic culture: “Therefore, if in these four points [the Altai; the 
environs of Turfan; Qazan; and the Ottoman Empire] – which do not directly abut 
one another – we find the same principles of versification, then one cannot speak of 
borrowing. We must evidently seek out the reasons for this considerable 
resemblance in the common origin of the residents of the aforementioned regions; 
and from this the conclusion follows that these foundational principles of poetics 
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must be pan-Turkic.” These similarities could not be due to the unifying influence of 
Islam, as they are most pronounced in those small communities that did not accept 
the faith (such as the Yakut) and because Turkic poetry is “anathema” to Islam (Linin 
1926, 146). Rather than floating the hypothesis that such versification might be the 
effect of Turkic phonemic structures, and comparing them to the poetry of language 
groups with similar structures such as the Mongolic or Uralic ones, Linin prefers to 
bring the Turkic peoples one step closer to pre-capitalist nation formation. Within 
the isolated communalities of Turkic speakers scattered throughout the Eurasian 
landmass, there lie cues to the primordial moral and aesthetic beliefs of the earliest 
Turkic peoples, united in a cultural union, waiting to be discovered by the modern 
scholar.   
 Thus, a general pattern of selective assimilation is adopted vis-à-vis Western 
stereotypes of the Eastern peoples. The chauvinist’s view of indolent and 
unintelligent nomads is denounced as “false” (Linin 1926, 142). The ahistoricity 
thesis – endorsed by Marx himself – is, however, readily adopted and even adapted 
to the needs of the modern Soviet Turkic scholar. While Marx saw ahistoricity as 
proof of a community’s inability to pass into capitalism and thence socialism as a 
cohesive grouping, Kowalski and Linin perceive it to be a point of strength, an 
assurance of the continuity of untainted cultural traits. History is, of course, a core 
component of the Stalinist definition of a nation, and thus one wonders if such a 
proposition would have been censored had it been written a decade later. 
Nevertheless, it does demonstrate that Soviet Turkic writers were not unfamiliar 
with the type of reasoning central to Gökalpian nationalist thought. Indeed, far from 
 313 
ignorance, they seem even appear to have welcomed it as a tool against the 
misguided conclusions of earlier Orientalists.  
 
Race, the Superstructure Supermodel 
 My division of works according to language and ethnicity of the authors is not 
intended to create the impression that Turkic intellectuals strayed from orthodoxy, 
while Russian and European ones held fast. There are, of course, examples of 
prominent Turkic Turkologists who did eschew nationalist tropes in favour of 
Stalinist ones, as we have already seen. Agazade and Karakashly’s 1928 history of the 
Latinization movement among Turkic communities provides us with another 
example of the manner in which ethnicity is interpreted as being less important in 
belonging than conscious choice and belief. Agazade was a journalist, pedagogue 
and linguist active in Azeri public affairs until his death in 1931 (Abasova 2007, 20). 
Üzeyir Hacıbǝyov’s encyclopedia of Azerbaijani civilization has no entry for 
Karakashly, and neither does there appear to be biographical information about him 
in other sources. In their history, they take aim at European accusations of Turkic 
racial inferiority based on the community’s emergence from Mongoloid peoples; the 
same accusations that would lead Afet İnan to approach Atatürk about anti-Turkish 
“slander” in 1929. Agazade and Karakashly, however, pursue a radically different tact 
from the Turkish establishment, denying the importance of race as an explanatory 
mechanism in its entirety: 
“The current cultural backwardness of the Turco-Tatar 
world is the direct result of the agro-economic 
backwardness in which it found itself – or better yet, in 
which it was forced to find itself – throughout long 
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centuries because of the mis-development of historical 
circumstances. 
 
“Meanwhile, some bourgeois writers find the reason 
for this backwardness in the fact that the Turco-Tatar 
nationalities [национальности], as representatives of 
the Mongoloid race, are deprived of the capacity to 
assimilate to the spirit of contemporary European 
culture. 
 
“First and foremost, people are white or black not 
because they belong to the white or black race, but 
because the geographic environment makes its imprint 
on the life forms of humans who live within it.” 
(Agazade and Karakashly 1928, 46) 
 
With this argument, Agazade and Karakashly attack European racialist attitudes from 
the left, rather than the right. Instead of the aggressive attempts to demonstrate the 
whiteness of the Turkic peoples, and their ultimate connection to the Aryans – a 
feature of the First Turkish History Congress in 1932 – they apply dialectical 
materialism to vitiate race as a meaningful component of identity. The pages 
following the quote provide an alternative explanation for their scientific and 
educational backwardness of the Turkic peoples: their low levels of socio-economic 
development. Of the Turkic communities of Central Asia, many remained in the pre-
feudal form of social organization, clinging to nomadism and only occasionally 
settling and constructing urban communities. This left them vulnerable to the 
despotism of the dominant class and the fatalism of the Sufis. Even the arrival of 
Western missionaries, such as Il’minskii, the original transcriber of Qazan Tatar into 
the Cyrillic alphabet, did not introduce them to the material truths inherent in 
Socialist progress (Agazade and Karakashly 1928, 47–48). 
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 Agazade and Karakashly hammer home the importance of dialectical 
materialism as a tool for the analysis and explanation of all manifestations of the 
human existence. Even physical appearance is said to hold no inherent value, as it is 
a component of the superstructure, a derivative effect of the factors of production 
(especially land and environment) and a phenomenon liable to change as climatic 
conditions are altered. Under these circumstances, there can be no value in seeking 
out original populations of specific ethno-linguistic groups and tying them to 
contemporary residents of any given region. What is important is the development 
of a society, its reactions to the world that surround it, and its ability to transform 
itself as class conflicts emerge; in essence, its history. There can be no sense in the 
attachment of idealistic qualities to particular physical manifestations, as identity is 
produced through doing, rather than being.   
 
The First All-Union Turkological Congress 
 Domestic opposition or a plurality of opinions, of course, were seen as very 
much distinct from siding with the dominant ideologies of foreign nations. In 
Russian-language publications, we see that many of the Turkic authors wrote of the 
benefits of Soviet society, even if they espoused a particularly idealist view of the 
nation. Çobanzadǝ wrote in Azeri on both the importance of the scholarly 
endeavours regarding historiography, and of the draw of Moscow versus Ankara for 
Crimean Tatar youth (Çobanzadə 1926c). An Azeri writer, Agamali-Ogly,  explains in 
his article about the importance of objective and scientific rigour, with particular 
emphasis placed on the fact that practical use must flow from science, rather than 
science being directed by practical consideration (Agamali-Ogly 1926, 2). Ethnic and 
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linguistic affiliation are no match for the march of history and socio-economic 
development, as Stalinist ideology would insist, given that the national idea is tied 
exclusively to the capitalist stage of development, while it is the worldview of 
Socialism that is the gateway to man’s final destiny. 
This does not mean, however, that foreign powers were not considered by 
those who wrote about the history and ethnography of the Turkic regions. In his 
contribution to the edited volume of essays regarding the First All-Union Turkological 
Congress, Mikhail Pavlovich writes more pointedly than Çobanzadǝ, accusing directly 
exiled nationalist politicians such as Mehmet Emin Resulzadǝ and the remnants of 
the Azeri nationalist Musavat party of orchestrating campaigns against Soviet 
Turkological studies. As the Congress was held two years before the switch to the 
Latin alphabet in Turkey, one of the most controversial aspect of the Congress was 
its endorsement of Latinization (Frings 2005). On this, and other social, cultural, 
economic and political issues, Pavlovich makes clear that it is the Soviet Union that is 
the leader in improving Turkic communities’ standards of living and qualities of life, 
and a true beacon of enlightenment among the peoples of the East. Material 
improvement, not oppression, is the key to Soviet influence among Turkic-speakers 
from Ukraine to Siberia (Pavlovich 1926, 6).  
However, there is also a veiled threat against the Republic of Turkey, warning 
it that the only means of guaranteeing its continued relations with (but not influence 
among) the Turkic peoples of the USSR is to toe the ideological line enunciated by 
Moscow. Coupeaux has already analyzed Stalin’s desire to utilize the Baku Congress 
as a showcase of Soviet Turkological studies, and it appears, from Pavlovich’s article, 
that it was also intended to be a guide to orthodox interpretations as well. Of 
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interest is the fact that, while the Turkish historian Köprülü is lauded for his positive 
report on the state of education amongst Soviet Turkic peoples (Pavlovich 1926, 6–
7), it is the exiles – many of whom had found refuge in Turkey – who come under 
sustained criticism. The change in tone from the Leninist era is remarkable. A 1923 
Kazakh-language article on “The National Question at the 3rd International”, 
published in Temir Qazaq, criticized Menshevik opposition to Soviet-Turkish 
cooperation, rather than nationalist politics. The author, Turaqulu, reminded his 
readers that anti-colonial politics in the East far outweigh any concerns about 
nationalism and its connections to the nascent Turkish, Persian or Chinese 
bourgeoisie (Turaqulu 1923, 5–6). Of course, this article is immediately followed by a 
detailed account of the manner in which the Soviet authorities have fully realized the 
hopes and aspirations of the national minorities, ruling out the possibility that the 
Turkish model might be more suitable for the Turkic speakers of the Union (Ghaybas 
1923). The change in attitudes over three years – from paternalistic exposition to 
strident denunciation – demonstrates what might be seen as a gradual cooling of 
Soviet enthusiasm for the Turkish project, and of Turkish ideology, as Stalin 
cemented his grip on power. It begs the question, therefore, of just how concerned 
Soviet authorities might have become about the roles such exiles played in the 
writing of historical narratives in the Republic of Turkey, given the heavy 
representation of former political leaders from the Bashkirs, the Tatars, the Azeris 
and others among the new Turkish intelligentsia.   
The second volume of the Organizing Committee’s Bulletin contains another 
example of non-Turkic approaches to the reform of Turkic languages and their 
connection to trends in the Republic of Turkey. Written by Artur Rudol’fovich Zifel’d-
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Simumiagi, an Estonian who was best known for his studies of the Tats of Azerbaijan 
(Vasil’kov and Sorokina 2003b), the article provides a class-based approach to the 
language reform issue. Zifel’d-Simumiagi identifies three different trends in the 
modernization of Turkic terminology; a crucial stage in the preservation of the 
spoken languages of the Turkic world as well as their adaptation to the demands of 
contemporary Socialist society. He links those who seek neologisms in Arabo-Persian 
sources with the feudal past, while at the same time tagging borrowers of European 
terms as lackeys of the capitalist order. These latter reformers show nothing but 
contempt for the people of the East and their languages, and therefore can never be 
seen as their allies (Zifel’dt-Simul’iagi 1926, 9–10). The pan-Turkists, by contrast, fall 
into one of two groups depending on the source of their inspiration. For the majority 
of pan-Turkists, the model of a common language is to be sought in the literary 
idiom of Istanbul. This particular variant is tainted by its association with the 
Ottoman court and the Arabized and Persianized culture of the ruling classes, and 
thus those who espouse its generalization are clearly hangovers of a feudal past. The 
minority wing of the pan-Turkists are utopians: specialists who wish to create a 
single Turkic language that can be understood “from Constantinople to Kashgar.” 
Such an endeavour is “doomed to failure,” as it purposefully ignores the specifities 
of speech that have arisen because of the unique socio-economic conditions of the 
Uzbeks, Ottomans, Kirghiz, Crimeans, Tatars and Azeris (Zifel’dt-Simul’iagi 1926, 13). 
Zifel’d-Simumiagi hammers home this point by explaining that only those 
groups of languages belonging to the same sub-group of the broader Turkic family 
have a chance of merging into one common idiom. Thus, Ottoman (or Republican) 
Turkish, Gagauz, Azeri and Turkmen, all of which are members of the Oğuz sub-
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group, are possible candidates for convergence. However, each of the four is unique 
in its own way; a uniqueness induced partly by political realities, but mainly by the 
socio-economic conditions within which the speakers live. Indeed, it is only Azeri and 
Turkmen that have a reasonable chance of merging, as the great progress embodied 
by the Soviet march towards Socialism will undoubtedly level the difference 
between the two groups’ socio-economic statuses, and enable their speakers to 
develop a common means of communication (Zifel’dt-Simul’iagi 1926, 12–13). While 
these arguments might appear to be a boast about the superiority of Soviet planning 
compared pan-Turkist utopias, they are also a recognition of the revelatory power of 
socio-economic, rather than essentialist or racist, explanations for language change. 
This is put into relief by an earlier passage on the initial spread of the Turkic 
languages westward:  
“The Turkic language in Azerbaijan and in Turkey, the 
Slavo-Russian language between the Don and the 
Neva, the Arabic language in North Africa, Syria and 
Mesopotamia: none of these were, at the beginning, 
the languages of the entire population of these 
countries. They were the languages of small garrisons 
of tribal warriors or commercial settlements. They 
became, through the power of historical 
circumstances, the mandatory languages of inter-tribal 
relations for the multilingual defeated populations of 
these countries. With every generation, the circles of 
people who spoke and understood them widened, and 
gradually they dispersed the weaker indigenous 
languages. The autochthonous people remained, but, 
forgetting their earlier language and assimilating the 
language of inter-tribal communication, they 
mechanically lost their earlier nationality [прежняя 
национальность] and entered into the composition 
of the victorious nation. In racial terms, contemporary 
Great Russians are more Finnish than Slavic; ‘the Arabs’ 
of North Africa are more Kabylo-Berber than Semites; 
the Azeris and Ottomans are more Japhetids than 
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Turkic. Nowhere in the world do the borders of race 
and language coincide.” (Zifel’dt-Simul’iagi 1926, 8) 
 
What is described in both sections, then, is not history repeating itself so much as 
the process of the development of social forces at work. Nations are not made from 
homogenous racial, linguistic and ethnic groups, but rather are constructed through 
changing socio-economic and political situations. Peoples enter into new nations not 
through some ancient predisposition to one group or another, but because they are 
drawn into new forms of social and economic organization, and are forced to adopt 
the language and culture of the dominant class. It is a strong statement of Stalinist 
orthodoxy regarding the formation of the nation. Its application to the history and 
future of the Turkic peoples is clear: you have not always been part of a Turkic 
nation, nor will you be part of one forever. With time, you too will merge into the 
Soviet nation, just as your history has proven your ancestors once assimilated to a 
Turkic one.  
 While such a strict Stalinist interpretation of the nation might have been 
difficult to refute, the means by which one understood the process of the 
emergence of a Turkic nation – or its demise – was certainly up for consideration. In 
the same volume, Il’ya Nikolaevich Borozdin, a Russian historian of the Crimean 
peninsula (Vasil’kov and Sorokina 2003a), repeats the call for a more intensive 
investigation of the origins of the Turkic peoples and of their ancient history, 
especially that of the (Crimean) Tatars. Of prime importance, of course, is the use of 
archaeology and “archaeography” (the gathering of manuscripts), to investigate the 
pre-history of the “Khazars, Volga Bulgars, the Turkic tribes of Central Asia, etc.” 
Trade routes and socio-economic relationships, rather than political ones, must be 
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understood in greater depth; a result achievable only through the “sociological” 
approach. Given the emphasis on economic relations, “sociological” in this context 
likely implies a Marxian analysis based on social forces, i.e. the base. As an end 
result, such studies will “[bring about] the crash of the old legends. [They will 
produce] new data for the rejuvenation of the economic, social and political 
structure and culture of the [Crimean] Tatars.” (Borozdin 1926, 19)  
The Kazakh intellectual Baitursynov, however, hit back at these calls for the 
usage of European epistemologies that effectively devalued knowledge culled from 
native Turkic sources. At the end of the Bulletin’s second volume, he writes of the 
importance of returning to the Volk for sources of linguistic, and therefore social, 
reinvigoration. He notes that while some Turkic communities suffered from diglossia 
and a split between the culture of the dominant and the dominated, the Kazakhs did 
not. The appeal to folk sources of new words – and, by extension, other means of 
comprehending and understanding modern life – was, in Baitursynov’s eyes, a 
profoundly democratic process. The march to the people ensured not a “patriotic-
nationalistic” reaction to Socialist science and progress, but rather the 
enfranchisement of the masses and their persuasion of materialism’s benefits 
(Baitursunov 1926, 22). We know from other environments that Baitursynov, similar 
to Bökeikhanov and other Kazakh intellectuals of the early Soviet period, was a 
strong proponent of popular involvement in the modernization and codification of 
Kazakh history and culture. His short contribution to the Bulletin may be, nominally, 
a work of linguistics and language reform, but it speaks to the divergence in 
approaches to dialectical materialism as an epistemology. It also exemplifies the 
process that Hirsch has explored at depth in her study of Soviet ethnography: the co-
 322 
option of Marxist and Soviet language by Central Asian intellectuals and politicians in 
order to advance their own agendas.  
 
Planned Science 
 The masses were, evidently, not the only ones in need of persuasion 
regarding the usefulness of the State’s scientific endeavours. Bureaucrats and 
apparatchiks too were targeted by the propaganda surrounding the Congress. In the 
Organizing Committee’s first bulletin, Gubaidulin provides a listing of the various 
actions that must be undertaken by the Soviet authorities to ensure that indigenous 
Turkic scholars are able to author meaningful and well-researched histories of their 
peoples. These include paleographic support through the translation of ancient texts 
into the modern Turkic languages, as well as a concerted push to introduce non-
traditional methods of primary-source collection: 
“The ancestors of many contemporary Turco-Tatar 
peoples in our Soviet Union either did not, effectively, 
keep written sources, or, if they did, such sources are 
of remarkably small quantities. On this basis, only the 
remains of the monuments of material culture can be 
used as sources for the study of the ancient period of 
these peoples, as well as oral folk culture. Thus, on the 
one hand, archaeological excavations must be 
strengthened, and, on the other side, a more intense 
collection of oral folk culture is essential, before it has 
been lost under the onslaught of culture and the 
elements and all-obliterating time.” (original emphasis) 
(Gubaidulin 1926, 14) 
 
Gubaidulin’s warning clearly highlights the importance of material remains in the 
quest for a comprehensive history of various Turkic peoples. However, it is also quite 
telling that there is an implicitly teleological explanation to the presence of such 
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remains and their ownership. Rather than assigning them to the populations who 
lived in the various areas under consideration (the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia), 
they are immediately linked to modern collectivities whose most defining feature is 
language rather than areal dispersion. This is remarkable, given the general trend 
among Soviet archaeologists to refrain from connecting pre-historic and modern, 
especially in areas with highly contested claims to indigeneity (Bulkin, Klejn, and 
Lebedev 1982, 275). 
 The appeal for the preservation of oral folk culture and its valorization as a 
source of historical truth is echoed in the following piece, on the current state and 
future requirements of the ethnography of Turkic communities in the Caucasus. 
Here, Chursin states that “in scientific [relations], it [ethnographic study] assists in 
the explanation of the origins and formation of the Turkic peoples, their history and 
cultural relations with other peoples.” (Chursin 1926, 15) Both Gubaidullin and 
Chursin assume that the ahistoricity of Turkic peoples limits their ability to adopt 
“culture” from the more advanced Europeans, to borrow the wording found in 
Gubaidullin’s piece. The continuity and permanence implied in this view of folk 
culture conflicts with the general Stalinist understanding of national culture being 
fluid and responsive to the changing demands of the economic base. Both might 
have understood the importance of not adhering to a fetishistic materialism and 
allowing for study of the meaningful impact of the superstructure (as in Stalin’s 
inclusion of cast of mind in the definition of a nation), but it is the dialectic that they 
have yet to grasp. Nonetheless, what we see here is a general conviction of the 
importance of the immaterial, as well as the material, in the search for historical 
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truth. Aspects of Stalinist theory might be in place, but they fail to subsume all other 
lines of thought. 
Baitursynov, Borozdin, Zifel’t-Simumiagi, Gubaidulin and Chursin might all be 
convinced of the desirability of the State’s end-goal – the creation of a Soviet society 
with uniform levels of socio-economic development regardless of language and 
ethnicity – but the manner in which they get there differs greatly. Top-down versus 
bottom-up; nomothetic versus organic; technocratic versus democratic: the 1926 
Congress obviously attracted a plurality of opinions about uncovering historical truth 
and its relationship to the present, as well as the role that Turkic nations would play 
in their determination of their own identities.     
 
Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev 
 Away from the intellectual foment of early Soviet Baku, a native historian did 
arise from the Kazakhs during this formative period.  Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev 
was a railway engineer and an amateur lover of history, after having studied briefly 
under Bartol’d at Turkestan University. Given his academic genealogy, it should not 
be a surprise that he was not ashamed of demonstrating the mixed heritage of the 
Kazakh nation. Along the same lines as Russian historians, including Bartol’d, and 
quite in contrast to Turkish scholars, he identified the absorption of Mongolic and 
other elements into the Kazakh tribes by the 17th century as a formative element in 
their ethnogenesis (Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev 1991, 83). Such wording does not 
imply that there had not existed, at some point, an ethnically or racially pure 
grouping. However, it is the manner in which this fact is analyzed, as a simple step 
along the route to national consciousness rather than a form of corruption, that 
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marks the difference between his own works and those of the nationalists. Indeed, 
he tarred their Kazakh representatives with accusations of collaboration with and co-
option by the wealthy landed classes who supported the Tsar and Russian 
chauvinism. His vociferous denunciation of the Alash Orda and Bökeikhanov in a 
1921 issue of Zhizn Natsional’notsei (The Life of Nationalities) is indicative of his 
refusal to be seen as a member of the nationalist intelligentsia long before the start 
of the Stalinist terror (Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev 2009b, 67–68). 
 This is not to say that Tynyshpaev had fully assimilated a Marxist view of 
nationalities and their historicity. In his История Тюрко-Монголов (History of the 
Turco-Mongols), published in 1925 in Tashkent, he repeats the Marxist concept of 
ahistorical nations, positing that only the western European nations, and their 
colonial offshoots, are worthy of being categorized as historical nations. This 
assertion is not uncritical, as Tynshpaev argues that the developed peoples 
considered the underdeveloped ones no better than “animals”, allowing the former 
to exploit the latter. For the Kazakhs, then, history is the key to determining their 
place in the world and their ability to withstand the vagaries of time. Here, he is not 
much different from Bökeikhanov, as we saw in the latter’s articles in Qyzyl 
Qazaqstan. What is novel, however, is his decision to divide the history of the Turco-
Mongolic peoples – who, he claims, emerged from the ancient Turkic peoples – 
according to political events rather than socio-economic ones (Mukhamedzhan 
Tynyshpaev 2009a, 196–97). 
 Tynyshpaev might not be bothered about racial purity, but he is keen on ties 
of descent, religion and idiom. His anti-capitalist bent in earlier accusations against 
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the Alash Orda soon takes on more of an essentialist, rather than Marxist, tone, as 
he combines notions of an idealistic and eternal brotherhood of peoples: 
“These peoples [the Muslim Turkic peoples of Eurasia] are united by 
blood, by language and by faith. No matter how differently they live from 
one another, they can speak with one another and explain themselves 
without a translator. The peoples related to the Turco-Mongols are the 
present-day Mongols, Manchurians, Yakuts, Finns, Magyars [and] 
Bulgars. All of these aforementioned peoples are called the peoples of 
Turan.” (Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev 2009a, 198) 
 
There is little difference between Tynyshpaev’s explanation of the deep origins of 
the Turkic peoples and those of the Turkish nationalists and 19th century European 
scholars. His opposition to the nationalists of Alash Orda, then, can be interpreted as 
politically, rather than ideologically, motivated. 1925, of course, is a full three years 
before Stalin’s rise to power, and nine years before the announcement of a new 
historical science. That Tynyshpaev was able to espouse such clearly essentialist and 
nationalist views, and still go on to publish another work, is a clear indicator of at 
least tacit acceptance by the authorities of a plurality of approaches to history during 
the heyday of Soviet eclecticism.  
 
Kazakh Ethnonyms 
In 1927, Tynyshpaev published История Казахского народа (History of the 
Kazakh People) (M. Tynyshpaev 2002, 11–12). The work begins with a scathing 
criticism of Chuloshnikov’s 1921 History of the Kazakh-Kirghiz. Here, Tynyshpaev 
finds Chuloshnikov’s work to be lacking on a number of levels: its failure to explain 
the relationships between the Kazakhs and non-Turkic neighbours; its continual use 
of the incorrect ethnonyms Kyrgyz and Kara-Kyrgyz; and Chuloshnikov’s insistence 
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on the ethnogenesis of the Kazakhs occurring in a socio-economic dispute with their 
Uzbek fellow travelers (M. Tynyshpaev 2002, 50–56). From his critique of 
Chuloshnikov’s history, it is already apparent that Tynyshpaev was still not focused 
on the racial or ethnic purity of the Kazakhs. Indeed, similar to Walikhanov before 
him, Tynyshpaev made ample use of the oral history and folklore of the Kazakhs, in 
addition to Bartol’d’s sources, in order to track the symbiotic relationship of the 
Kazakhs and their neighbours (Auezova 2011, 251–52).  
 Among the most important issues to be dealt with in this pursuit is the origin 
of the ethnonym Kazakh. Tynyshpaev surmises that its sporadic and inconsistent 
usage in various chronicles until the 15th century implied that it was applied to a 
variety of different groups, not just the nomadic Kazakhs (M. Tynyshpaev 2002, 114). 
Between the 15th and 17th centuries, both Turkic and Mongol sources, according to 
Tynyshpaev, used the terms Kazakh and Uzbek interchangeably, indicating that, at 
least to outsiders, the difference between the two groups was not immediately 
apparent (M. Tynyshpaev 2002, 116–18). His claims of ambiguity regarding the exact 
definition of Kazakh populations before the 17th century defied the dominant theme 
of continuity and authenticity that ran through the various components of 
nationalist historiography, including the Turkish History Thesis.  In Tynyshpaev’s 
view, ethnonyms, languages, socio-economic structures and even territories were all 
mutable, and it was exactly this mutability that afforded the Kazakhs their 
particularity within the tapestry of Central Asian peoples.  
 Suddenly, then, we see a new appreciation of the base and socio-economic 
factors, rather than bloodlines, in the writing of Kazakh history. Tynyshpaev’s work is 
hardly a paragon of Stalinist historical interpretation, but it does indicate a shift in 
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focus and a sharpening of intellectual lines. For the time being, this would create 
uncertainty within the community of historians, an uncertainty motivated in no small 
part by the political wrangling of the latter half of the 1920s.  
 
Political Motivations of National Identification 
To pretend that this ambiguity was motivated solely by scholarly integrity 
and a critical approach to sources would be disingenuous. Throughout the 1920s, the 
Soviet authorities were continually addressing the concerns of local populations 
regarding the borders of Central Asian republics drawn in 1924 (Hirsch 2005, 164). 
Tynyshpaev’s work was one aspect of the scholarly information that was taken into 
account during such instances of arbitration, and his attempts to render the 
distinctions between Kazakhs and Uzbeks fuzzy was intended to help bolster Kazakh 
claims to lands included in the Uzbek SSR (Auezova 2011, 252). A similar process 
occurred between Tajik and Uzbek representatives when the former petitioned 
Moscow for a separate Tajik SSR to be formed. In this case, Uzbek politicians argued 
that Tajik speaking populations were in fact Persianized Uzbeks who had lost their 
mother tongue because of the Emir of Bukhara’s state language policies. Tajiks, in 
turn, claimed that they were the indigenous inhabitants of the region and that large 
numbers of Uzbeks were in fact Turkified Tajiks (Hirsch 2005, 175–80). Far from 
being a mark of shame or denigration, miscegenation and cultural appropriation was 
promoted as a normal process in Central Asia by the various nationalities’ 
intellectuals, one that did not preclude the inclusion of multilingual populations into 
a single national grouping. 
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Within this horse-trading, the supposedly objective social sciences and 
humanities were often called upon to provide clear evidence of one position or 
another. It was no coincidence that this occurred at a time when these disciplines 
were themselves the beneficiaries of direct state support and intervention. Among 
the best patronized in the fight for recognition and territory was archaeology, thus 
far a neglected discipline in Central Asia. 
 
The Material Past 
 Similar to the other historical sciences, archaeology in the 1920s was marked 
by an eclecticism of method, organization and interpretation. Marxist ideology was 
certainly present, but so too were other schools of thought, including those that had 
been dominant in the pre-1917 period. Unlike in Turkey, where archaeology during 
the Ottoman period and the first decade of the Republic were largely Western 
European affairs, in the Soviet Union there was a long and established tradition of 
Russian and non-Russian expeditions and excavations throughout the 19th century 
(Tekin 1926, 34; Bulkin, Klejn, and Lebedev 1982).  
 Archaeology and, in particular, the archaeological excavations that were 
undertaken in Turkic-dominated parts of the Soviet Union were promoted as 
examples of the scientific and materialist quest to uncover and understand the past. 
An article in the Crimean Tatar journal İleri from 1926 cheerfully recounts the 
proceedings of an archaeological congress held in Kerch in honour of the city 
museum’s centenary. A precursor to the Stalinist historical thesis enunciated in 1937 
– in which all nations’ histories were to be woven into one grand narrative beginning 
with prehistoric societies and ending at the Soviet Union – is visible in the account of 
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the reports presented to the assembly. Great emphasis is placed on the manner in 
which excavations in Kerch and across the Crimean Peninsula have resulted in 
important finds that will further our understanding of the history of human 
civilization (Akçokraklı 1926, 43–45). “Archaeology,” Aqçoqraqlı explains, “is engaged 
today in finding and studying the oldest works of the history of human material 
civilization.” (Akçokraklı 1926, 45) Crimea and the Crimean Tatars thus have a role to 
play in humanity’s saga, one that ties them to other men and women around the 
world, rather than penning them in the tight boundaries of the national grouping. 
 The Stalinist view is not the only one on display in this brief article. 
Aqçoqraqlı continues on to describe one of the most pressing questions of 
contemporary European scholarship: “Should the Scythians – who have not been 
investigated as they should be by today’s historians of the world – be considered as 
Aryans, or as Turanians?” In order to resolve the issue, he notes that Nikolai Marr, 
whose theory of Japhetism was discussed briefly in chapter 3 (on linguistics, 
archaeology and anthropology), has reinvigorated the debate: “To this end, the 
academic Marr has thrown a new theory by the name of Japhetism into the mix. By 
investigating the Scythians according to this theory, he is working to determine 
which nations today came from the Scythians.” (Akçokraklı 1926, 45) This appears to 
be a perversion of Marr’s late theories, as he specifically refuted the “bourgeois-
nationalist” approaches towards historical linguistics that were espoused by Western 
European scholars. It also provides a counterpoint against which to evaluate how 
seriously Stalinist concerns with countering Nazi propaganda were taken during the 
1930s. Here, there is unabashed identification of Europeans with the Aryan race 
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(ırq); as Hirsch has examined, such ideas would soon be censored in the race to 
disprove German racialist anthropology (Hirsch 2005, 231–33).  
 The point of the matter, however, is that conjecture about race and 
belonging was largely left to speculation about bones and skulls rather than material 
culture. While later Nazi scholarship and propaganda might have been quick to 
proclaim a race not advanced enough to produce a given level of art or industry, 
Soviet scholars seem to have been concerned with categorizing and typologizing 
physical features. Thus, in an article about a new treasure trove of artefacts from 
northern Mongolia in the 8th issue of İleri, the author, Tekin, limits his comments 
about ethno-national connections to descriptions of human remains found in graves. 
These, he says, “demonstrate [that they are of] a type [cins] that is different from 
that of the Chinese and Mongols.” When it comes to the gold artefacts found with 
the human remains, speculation is about “relations” with the Mongols, Chinese, 
Iranians, or Greeks, not about the ethnic origins of the people who built these 
particular structures. Most interesting, perhaps, is the complete lack of mention 
about Turkic or Turanic connections, even when Tekin speaks of the Scythian-style 
artefacts and the heavy presence of horse-themed items (Tekin 1926, 36). Race, 
then, was not to be confused with anything other than physical characteristics, 
congruent with the Soviet proposition that it was an accident of nature, rather than 
a meaningful component of human differentiation. Whatever might be said about 
the physical remains of cultures past, nothing could be gleaned about the racial or 
ethno-national affiliation of the people who produced the artefacts.  
In returning to Aqçoqraqlı, whatever his intentions might have been in 
making statements about race, he was evidently not concerned with connecting 
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contemporary Turkic communities to ancient peoples through his discussion of 
Scythians. Rather, the exposé of Turco-Tatar archaeology and Turkology was kept as 
a distinct part of the article, in line with the creation of a new Turco-Tatar section for 
archaeological pursuits at the Conference. This department appears to have been 
composed of archaeologists, ethnographers, musicologists and other social 
scientists. The bulk of its work was focused either on modern practices and customs 
among the Crimean Tatars, or on the Turkic settlements of the Peninsula between 
the eleventh and eighteenth centuries. The closest that one comes to discussion of 
Turkic or Tatar ethnogenesis and relations to other groups is a presentation on the 
use of seals (tamğalar) to determine that some Crimean Tatars resident around the 
lakes of Crimea’s interior are the descendants of Uzbek and Kyrgyz migrants 
(Akçokraklı 1926, 46–47). A distinct line had clearly been drawn between the realm 
of prehistory, suitable for hypotheses based upon material remains and their 
reconstruction; and history, to be elucidated with the help of written 
documentation. The former was a field in which only loosely-identified groupings 
featured, while only in the latter would ethno-national designations, tied to linguistic 
trends, be tolerated. 
Certainly, even if they did not espouse orthodox Stalinist interpretations, 
many of the historians of ancient cultures and archaeologists who contributed to 
these periodicals did not share publicly the dominant themes of Turkish historical 
narratives. In a piece on recent discoveries in archaeology published in the Uzbek-
language Maorif va Uqutg’uvchu in 1926, Ayni waxes poetic about the value of 
archaeology in elucidating the various ancient cultures of Eurasia and North Africa. 
He speaks of the Sumerians, a mysterious people who inhabited the south of 
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Mesopotamia and who had achieved a high degree of socio-economic development, 
without once mentioning Turks or a connection to Turan or Central Asia. More 
importantly, he highlights the case of the Hittite civilization of Anatolia as a cause for 
hope in studies about the Sumerians. Ayni explains how modern archaeological 
excavations, including those conducted by the French Mandatory authorities in 
Syria, have helped accumulate material evidence about the economy, politics, 
culture and social structure of Hittite society. No emphasis is laid on the ethno-
linguistic affiliations of the Hittites, or their racial type, but instead they are 
described as being an anti-colonial bloc inhibiting the expansionary drive of 
Pharaonic Egypt. This, of course, represents considerable socio-economic progress in 
Near Eastern history, until the Hittites themselves descended into barbarism 
(vahshat) and their civilization collapsed (R. Ayni 1926, 51). Race, blood and 
belonging might not have entered into the equation, but politics certainly did. The 
term “colonialist” (mustamlakachilik) was undoubtedly reminiscent of Soviet 
propaganda directed at colonial and semi-colonial societies in Asia and Africa. If 
colonialism as understood in the modern sense of the word could have only arisen in 
capitalist societies, then the process by which the Hittites confronted the Egyptians 
could not have been analogous to British or French expansion in the 18th and 19th 
centuries; a paradox I explored briefly in chapter 3. Nevertheless, it was a powerful 
tool for authorities to encourage a view of history based on social group conflict, 
rather than ethno-national antagonism. 
As for Central Asia, the Turkic regions appear to receive short shrift. Despite 
the fact that this is an article written for Uzbek speakers, it does not provide 
information on the excavations undertaken and the finds made on the southern 
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fringes of the Soviet Union. Rather, it focuses on the rich material remains of 
northern India. Again, there is no attempt to link material culture to ethnicity, 
language, race or nationhood. However, this is important for more than just the way 
that it deprives the nationalist of a scholarly basis for claims of ethnic or racial 
superiority. It also refocuses the search for the wellspring of human civilization from 
Central Asia – the preferred location of 19th century European scholars – to northern 
India. Ayni quotes a Professor Vavilov as arguing, on the basis of plant cultivation 
and historical geography, that the Sindh and Punjab regions are the most likely areas 
in which human civilization first emerged. This, despite Ayni’s pronouncement on 
the need to continue the study of Nikolai Marr’s thesis on Yaphetism and a pan-
Eurasian ethno-cultural unity (R. Ayni 1926, 51–52). Whatever the case may be, Ayni 
gives his readers no reason to believe that their forbearers are either connected to 
them through an unbroken racial link, or that they were the first in the world to 
harness the power of agriculture and social organization for the good of the 
community.    
 
Russian Preferences 
When it comes to Russian-language works by Russian authors, there appears 
to be even less sympathy to the idea of Turkic continuity in the material landscape of 
Central Asian civilization. A 1925 article by A. A. Semenov in a collection about the 
Tajik ASSR makes this point from the outset. Entitled “Материальные памятники 
арийской культуры” (“Material monuments of Aryan culture”), it contains the 
statement that the “Tajiks… are the descendants of the ancient aborigines of the 
country [Tajikstan and Central Asia], the Aryans of Asia.” (Semenov 1925, 113) There 
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is no mention of Turkic peoples for the first ten pages of the article, despite the fact 
that Semenov outlines material remains from Issyk-Kul and the Fergana Valley, 
regions that are currently inhabited by large Turkic communities, and where there 
are long-standing Turkic settlements that have been recorded by Chinese and other 
chroniclers (Andreev 1925, 152). The first mention comes of Turkic nomads in 
Zhetysu (Semirech’e) in the 7th century CE. Here, however, Semenov claims that the 
opening of a trade route between China and Western markets (particularly 
Byzantium) brought about a massive influx of “Aryan-Sogdian” colonists who settled 
the Turkic nomads and taught them agriculture (Semenov 1925, 121). The 
implications of this account are clear: nomadic civilization in Central Asia is to be 
associated with Turkic peoples, while sedentary and urban civilization was the 
exclusive domain of Aryan Iranic ones. When extrapolated from Zhetysu to the rest 
of Central Asia, a clear picture of the ethnic and racial implications for region’s 
material history emerges. Architectural, agricultural and artisanal accomplishment 
are now wholly dependent on connection to the Aryan races, effectively 
dispossessing Turkic speakers of their current residence’s material past.  
The most remarkable aspect of Semenov’s writing is that, unlike Bartol’d, he 
appears to be consistent in his confusion of race, language and culture. While it is 
true that the Tajik language belongs to the Indo-European (previously Indo-Aryan) 
language family, there is no means of determining if the current speakers of Tajik are 
in fact related to the original speech communities that used the Indo-European 
languages. Nevertheless, the author does not shy away from proclaiming that “Its 
[Kasan’s] Aryan population has been preserved to the present: Kasan is even now 
inhabited by Tajiks.” (Semenov 1925, 122) The same study’s ethnographic report on 
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the Tajiks, compiled by Andreev, provides some indication of the process whereby 
Turkic peoples spread into formerly Tajik lands. While assimilation took place at the 
start of the 20th century through the gradual acceptance of Turkic dialects by 
previous Tajik speakers, the groundwork for this was laid in previous centuries, when 
Turkic political leaders cleansed large swathes of land of Tajiks and gave them to 
Turkmen allies instead. Iranic language and culture were preserved only in the 
valleys and mountains, where Tajiks and related peoples remained isolated from the 
Turkic onslaught (Andreev 1925, 155–56). This is further confirmed by the physical 
differences between the mountain and valley Tajiks: “Thanks to their greater 
preservation of Aryan blood, the mountain Tajiks in general coincide more with 
European types of peoples than do the valley dwellers.” Their skin, eyes and hair are 
lighter, their stature greater, and their bodies broader, than the nomadic Kyrgyz of 
the region (Andreev 1925, 158–59). Racial purity and linguistic purity combine with 
civilizational advancement – in terms of a preference for settled versus nomadic 
existence – in order to paint a clearer picture of the origins of Central Asians.  
The materiality of archaeology – concerned as it is with the study of material 
remains from the past – was no guarantee of the abandonment of earlier, pre-Soviet 
idealistic views about race, language, ethnicity and continuity. Times were a-
changing, however, and soon the simplistic, uncritical approach adopted by both 
Semenov and Andreev would be dropped for a more sophisticated view of sources, 
both written and material. 
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Ethnography, Anthropology, Sociology 
 As explored in chapter 3, history and archaeology, far from being isolated 
from other aspects of the social sciences, were increasingly combined with 
ethnography and historical anthropology over the 1920s and 30s in order to 
elucidate the construction of past societies. In pre-Revolutionary and Republican 
Turkish sources, it was common to see historical aspects of social structures ignored 
or wiped out of the analysis. For Soviet scholars – as explained by Çobanzadǝ in his 
piece on Turkology – the various branches of the social sciences were combined to 
provide greater insight in a more holistic manner. Maksimov’s brief study of 
totemism in Siberia is an example of such a trend. Written in 1928, a year before 
Stalin would defeat Bukharin, his final ideological adversary, it is noteworthy that he 
chooses a geographic region – Siberia – rather than ethno-national groupings. The 
study effectively covers five linguistic groups: Samoyeds, Turkic peoples, Uralic 
speakers, Mongols and the Tungus. Nevertheless, areal features and cultural 
appropriation are taken as foundational assumptions, and thus it is the people who 
inhabit a given region, rather than a nation regardless of where it lives, that becomes 
the focus of the study.  
The bulk of the study, however, is concerned with Turkic communities, 
including the Yakuts and the Kyrgyz. An overview of totemistic practices – the 
reverence of and identification with a particular animal as the representative of a 
tribe or familial group – is conducted of contemporary Siberian groupings, in order 
to flesh out the ethnographic component of the study. This is followed by recourse 
to the Rashīd al-Dīn’s history of the Mongols from the 13th century in order to 
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provide a means of diachronic comparison. The result is the creation of a thoroughly 
historical approach to the phenomenon of totemism among the Turkic peoples, and 
its gradual loss as social conditions changed (Maksimov 1928, 6–7). It is not sufficient 
to assume that the socio-economically backwards peoples of the vast Siberian 
landscape are ahistorical; modern representatives of an ancient culture untouched 
by European civilization, the only form of modernity. Rather, their societies, too, are 
understood to have developed over time, with culture responding to the needs and 
exigencies of the economic base. 
 Historicity, however, is not the only departure from traditional scholarship on 
the nomadic and pastoral peoples of Siberia. Maksimov also employs a critical 
approach to both the sources and the epistemology at play in earlier studies in order 
to problematize purportedly totemistic phenomena and their relationship to the 
social structure. By using Rashīd al-Dīn’s detailed account of the Oğuz and their 
system of identification based on the elements and animals, he outlines a complex 
and seemingly tribal mode of social organization. He then contrasts this with other 
accounts of Mongol military structures, pointing out that divisions similar to those 
catalogued for the Oğuz arose in response to organization and discipline of large 
military units (Maksimov 1928, 8–10). No definitive conclusion is reached, and 
Maksimov does admit the need for further study of both contemporary 
ethnographic data and classical sources. Nevertheless, his questioning of the nature 
of appellation, rank and social order strikes at the heart of nationalist assumptions 
about the cohesiveness of early Turkic communities. If these phenomena are indeed 
totemistic, then they likely belie the early tribal roots of the Kyrgyz, Oğuz, Yakuts and 
other Turkic groups. In other words, descent from a common ancestor is highly 
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likely, and so claims of racial purity or corruption can be maintained. If, however, 
they are indicators of military organization, then there is no a priori basis for the 
assumption of common descent. Military titles and divisions might have been re-
imagined at a later date to be indicators of familial lines, but at their origin they had 
no connection to kinship relations. The nationalist myth of descent from a common 
stock implodes, and racial characteristics are explained solely through 
miscegenation, not obeisance to national morality.  
 
A Decade of Eclecticism 
The preceding overview of a variety of articles and publications on Turkic 
history, intellectual life, ethnography and linguistics should make one aspect of the 
period under examination clear. The 1920s were characterized by a plethora of 
epistemologies and worldviews when it came to categorizing and understanding the 
populations of the new Union. To be certain, there were elements of the Russian- 
and Turkic-language writings on these topics that foreshadowed the more rigid 
approaches of the 1930s, but these were not the only options available to writers or 
readers. Continuity with the scholarship of the pre-Revolutionary period; non-
Marxist endeavours of a new generation of academics; and Marxist-Leninist 
orthodoxy-infused studies all competed for space and attention in the writings of 
early Soviet intellectuals. At this point, we can certainly speak of the agency and 
personal initiative of many of the writers; theirs is not an era that can be 
characterized by a command and control system of cultural production. Articles and 
books were frequently published with just the names of authors, many of whom are 
easily recognizable as established academics. As we shall see, this trend of individual, 
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if not individualistic, production was curtailed sharply in the 1930s, providing fertile 
ground for a rigid structure of centrally-planned history writing. 
 
The Vise Tightens 
In 1927, Stalin began his most aggressive push to dominate the Communist 
Party, at first expelling Trotsky and Zinoviev, and then Bukharin in 1929. Five years 
after the death of Lenin, Stalin had ended up on top, and was free to begin reshaping 
the Soviet Union according to his own worldview. Socio-economic crises, including 
famines, prevented him from directing the full force of his power against perceived 
and real ideological enemies within the Academy at the very beginning of his reign. 
Collectivization efforts across Central Asia, often involving the sedentarization of 
nomadic populations and the mass exodus of peoples out of the Soviet Union 
resulted in turmoil in many Turkic communities (Payne 2011).  
In scholarship, any expression of characteristically human complexity became 
highly unpalatable over the course of the 1930s. With the decision to denounce the 
Asian Mode of Production as Trotskyist in 1931, a new era of official intolerance 
towards interpretative diversity in history began (Sawer 1979, 31). Among the first 
Central Asian victims were those intellectuals who had been tied to the pre-
Revolutionary and Revolutionary-era nationalist organizations, such as the Alash 
Orda or the Musavat Party. Those who had made their peace with the Bolsheviks 
and entered into the service of the Party – including men such as Baitursynov – were 
summarily rooted out and eliminated in the early 1930s (Ryskulov 1984c, 210). In 
1934, the Communist Party, under the direction of Stalin, Zhdanov and Kirov, 
explicitly intervened in the writing of history for usage in schools, enforcing a strictly 
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chronological approach to all narratives used in the Soviet Union. Moreover, they 
insisted that histories of individual republics and peoples be suppressed in favour of 
histories of the USSR as a whole (Tillett 1969, 40–41). This was not immediately 
achievable, given the generalized paucity of resources in the social sciences, and was 
put on hold once war broke out with Germany (Yilmaz 2012). Before that point, 
however, change was slow but noticeable in the writing Central Asian scholars. 
For those Turkic citizens who continued to read historical narratives – now in 
Latin script instead of the Perso-Arabic one – the Stalinist view of nationalities was 
largely on display. The number of such publications from this period appears to be 
exceptionally smaller than those of the 1920s. This is to be expected, given both the 
economic crises of the period as well as the move towards state-controlled and 
directed production. Whereas the writings of the 1920s were produced by individual 
authors, those of the 1930s were increasingly organized by groups of scholars, 
including editorial boards. Some of the periodicals published during the 1920s 
remained in existence, while new publications began circulation. In many cases, both 
the drafts of those works composed during this time and the final published 
narratives are still in the process of being discovered, as governments open up their 
previously sealed archives to researchers, and previously banned works are 
catalogued and investigated by scholars. 
 
Turkmen Linguistic Unification 
In those items that remained available to readers, gone were the attempts at 
explanation and justification of Marxist chronologies of nation-formation, and 
instead the link between socio-economic status and national conscious was simply 
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assumed. In the article “Tyrkmen edebi diLiniꞑ esaasь jaƣdajLarь” (“The 
fundamental situations of the Turkmen literary language”), published in the journal 
Tyrkmen Medeniyeti (Turkmen Civilization) in 1930, K. Bөөrijif writes that “the 
Turkmen tribes, who lived in a variety of feudal-tribal conditions wherever they 
were, were unable to form a nation after their socio-economic status failed to pass 
into capitalism.” (Bөөrijif 1930, 3) By 1930, then, it was taken for granted that 
nation-formation was a function of bourgeois statecraft, a means of capturing a 
defined market and exploiting it for the benefit of capital holders. Such statements 
were not uncommon in other contexts, including Communist Party discussions of 
sedentarization and industrialization in Kazakhstan and other parts of Central Asia 
(Ryskulov 1984b). Bөөrijif continues by arguing for the construction of a national 
literary language for the Turkmen, one that satisfies the needs of the modern era. 
His suggestion is that it be created scientifically, through the survey and synthesis of 
the particularities of the various tribal dialects, rather than on the basis of a single 
dialect (Bөөrijif 1930, 3). This provides insight into Soviet nationality policy in two 
ways. The first is that it shows how Moscow and its allies in the Republics sought to 
engineer what had previously been accomplished by historical accident, as in France, 
Russia, England and other nations with established common languages. The second 
is that the new national language would be tied definitively to the core constituent 
social groups identified as Turkmen. Unlike in Italy, where the selection of Tuscan as 
the basis of the national language would allow Dante and Boccaccio to be absorbed 
into Italianità, the decision to spurn a specific dialect as the basis of standard 
Turkmen would cut off pre-Revolutionary literary figures from the pantheon of 
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national heroes. All that was pre-capitalist was also pre-national and, indeed, anti-
national through its association with a specific tribal dialect.   
 
Karakalpakia and the Travails of the Undocumented 
 Of course, those communities that could call upon written resources, even 
tribal ones, were still luckier than those without such fonts of historical knowledge. 
Smaller Turkic peoples, such as the Turkmen, the Nogay or the Karakalpaks, were 
inhibited in their production of national histories because of the general lack of 
written sources. As we have seen, even Western sources on the history of the 
Turkmen were limited until Bartol’d’s volume on the topic was published in 1929. 
While the Uzbeks, Azeris and Tatars had, for one reason or another, come to be 
versed in the practice of recording events, other Turkic groups had not left written 
records of their pasts. In the case of the Karakalpaks, this dearth of materials meant 
that much of their existence prior to the 16th century remained a mystery for 
historians in the 1930s. None of this is novel, given the discussions about 
methodology and objectivity conducted by the historians of the 1920s. The 1930s, 
however, were characterized by a much greater reticence to make definitive 
statements based upon oral history. In the case of the Karakalpaks, the bulk of what 
could be used was oral history, often described as “quasi-legendary”, based upon 
connections between past and present tribal and familial links. Genealogies were 
seen as clues to socio-economic organization over previous centuries, allowing for 
some level of Stalinist interpretation of Karakalpak history (Ivanov 1935, 9). 
Nonetheless, in Ivanov’s 1935 study of the Karakalpak past, some of the confidence 
noted in the histories of the 1920s has clearly faded. The author erred on the side of 
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caution regarding the use of both traditional epistemologies and contemporary 
material as the basis of theories extrapolated into the past. Moreover, the Arab, 
Persian and Chinese chronicles no longer held the same weight that they once did, 
as Ivanov overtly values any form of Karakalpak written or oral font over those 
created by non-native elements. 
 The fact that sufficient sources for a definitive history of the pre-Islamic 
Karakalpaks do not exist does not mean that other scholars had not theorized about 
it. Ivanov notes that there are two camps present: one that believes there to be a 
link between the Karakalpaks and the Pechenegs, who migrated west into Eastern 
Europe around the start of the second millennium CE; and the other, which believes 
that this question is “unresolved”. If any conclusion is to be reached, of course, it will 
take the combined effort of “orientalists, together with Russian historians, 
ethnographers, archaeologists and linguists” (Ivanov 1935, 10). One can only wonder 
if the use of the ethnonym russkiĭ was intended to imply that non-Russian, i.e. Turkic 
or Tajik, scholars were suspect in their writing of Turkic history, not least because of 
possible nationalist leanings. Whatever the case, the entire account of the 
contemporary situation within Turkology with respect to the Karakalpaks is typical of 
post-1920 trends in scholarship: an ambivalence towards possible results; a fear of 
independent analysis; and a preference for joint works as opposed to writings 
authored by a single individual.  
 In terms of the Karakalpaks themselves, Ivanov returns to the Pechenegs in 
order to provide an account of their eastern branch, which remained in southern 
Russia following the migration of the western branch in the 9th and 10th centuries. 
The picture painted is one that is much more in accordance with Stalinist 
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understandings of the nation than previous Turkic histories had been. Ivanov writes 
of a proto-feudal social organization divided along lineages, with recurrent class wars 
– between the dominant aristocracy and low-born familial leaders – ending in the 
domination of the Pechenegs by the Oğuz. Gradually, a change in socio-economic 
conditions, most notably sedentarization, produced a widening of the ethnonym to 
allow for Karakalpak to apply to the entire community of mixed Pecheneg-Oğuz 
descent, and a more cohesive polity with feudal as well as tribal elements began to 
form. The neighbouring Kipchaks, too, influenced this community thanks to their 
overwhelming political and military strength, although this was a process of gradual 
and mutual cultural borrowing, rather than aggressive assimilation (Ivanov 1935, 12–
15). The word “nation” is not once used in this context, and indeed the concept of a 
collectivity is not even brought into play until some sort of sedentary social 
organization is shown. It is largely social and material factors that are employed in 
the determination of group existence and demarcation of boundaries between 
ethnic groups. Physical appearance in particular is unimportant: whether the 
Karakalpaks bear physical resemblance to the descendants of the European 
Pechenegs does not factor into their development as a people, the way that shared 
social organization with the Oğuz or Kipchaks does.  
 
The Return of Çobanzadǝ 
The distinct flavour of Ivanov’s study of Karakalpak history might be taken as 
an indication of the new forms of education arising after the October Revolution. 
Without definitive information about his educational background, it is difficult to say 
how or when such an influence might have entered his writings. We can, however, 
 346 
glean insight into the changes that were undergone by other authors thanks to a 
1934 article by Bekir Çobanzadǝ in the periodical Inqilab vǝ Mǝdǝniyyǝt (Revolution 
and Civilization, published in Baku from 1925 until the mid-1930s). Entitled “Lenin vǝ 
Dilcilik” (“Lenin and Linguistics”), it explores the application of Marxist-Leninist and 
Stalinist theory to the study of language. In particularly, Çobanzadǝ begins the article 
noting that a strictly dialectical materialist approach to the discipline of linguistics 
has yet to be adopted by a number of scholars in the field, requiring that their 
mistakes be noted and corrected in his article (Çobanzadə 1934, 15). From the start, 
then, we see that it is not a question of engaging with alternative views, but rather 
of correcting the incorrect, as only one specific interpretation of either linguistic 
data, or, for that matter, dialectical materialism, is tolerable. Marr, too, finds a place 
in Çobanzadǝ’s exposé, but only insofar as his writings confirm Lenin’s ideas 
(Çobanzadə 1934, 17). Much of the article is dedicated to the theoretical plain: an 
explanation of Lenin’s dictates on language and grammar, and the manner in which 
such interpretations might be enacted. Only in sporadic parts do we see Azerbaijan 
and its linguistic history emerge as topics of study. 
What does Çobanzadǝ say about Azeri? There is little in the article about 
Azeri historical linguistics; a topic on which we have already seen the author is an 
expert. Rather, here we find brief references of the application of this new Marxist-
Leninist interpretation, in its Stalinist iteration, to the history of the Azeri language. 
We see that there can be no talk of a single, national language existing prior to the 
October Revolution, given the linguistic class differences encouraged by the 
bourgeoisie during the 19th century (Çobanzadə 1934, 16). We learn that Arabisms 
were introduced by the intellectual lackeys of the feudal and bourgeois upper classes 
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as a means of “mocking” the workers and peasants (Çobanzadə 1934, 17). The 
insistence on a socio-cultural divide within ethno-national groupings is typically 
Leninist, but the force with which it is applied within the article is clearly something 
new, especially given our knowledge of the author’s more nuanced touch on 
ideological matters in previous works. The focus on criticism of Bukharin’s writings, 
as well as those of Plekhanov, smacks of Stalinist academic preferences. Indeed, this 
becomes much more strident in the final column of the article, where we are 
informed that “formalism, dominant nation chauvinism, pan-Turkism and local 
nationalisms” are all aspects of bourgeois ideological theories. The “national in form, 
socialist in content” formula, instead, will help to fill libraries and schools with the 
works necessary to encourage a materialist approach to the social sciences, and this 
is all thanks to the great work of Comrade Stalin. Çobanzadǝ reminds us that 
implementing Stalin’s plans in Azerbaijan is essential, if Azeris are to root out the 
remaining hangovers of pan-Turkist, nationalist and bourgeois science (Çobanzadə 
1934, 18). 
This article is not a historical narrative, and neither should it be stretched into 
one. Nonetheless, given our knowledge of the author’s penchant for using language 
and linguistic studies as a starting point for historical investigation, it is instructive in 
a change of perspective with respect to the social sciences and their guiding 
principles. In the mid-1920s, Çobanzadǝ wrote effusively about the importance of 
professionalization and specialization, aiming to convince readers of the value of 
self-contained Turkological studies for the discovery of historical truth. In 1934, 
however, he espouses the political writings of men who are quite obviously not 
specialists in linguistics or anthropology as a foundation upon which the new 
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linguistics should be based. While extrapolation into historiography is unwarranted 
on the basis of a single article, the strength with which this one-time avid supporter 
of pan-Turanist views (Çobanzadə 1920) now flogs Marxist-Leninist and Stalinist 
dictates of socio-cultural and linguistic development is instructive in and of itself.  
 
Asfendiiarov and the Kazakh Experiment 
 Similar trends toward orthodox Stalinist interpretations of history and the 
social sciences can be seen in Kazakh narratives as well. What Mukhammadzhan 
Tynyshpaev might not have assimilated from Marxist ideology, his successor Sanzhar 
Asfendiiarov applied in earnest. Asfendiiarov was an avowed Bolshevik who 
combined an interest in history, Islam and Soviet philosophy to produce a number of 
works on the history of Kazakhs, Kazakhstan and Muslim social thought. He cannot 
be seen as a confirmed Stalinist, however, given his approval and citation of the 
works of the early Soviet historian Mikhail Pokrovskii. Nevertheless, unlike 
Tynyshpaev, Asfendiiarov’s critical eye was turned upon both the Kazakh nationalists 
of the Alash Orda movement and the pre-Revolutionary and Western scholars of 
early Turkic history. While Tynyshpaev spoke of nations as if they were fully-formed 
historical entities long before the emergence of capitalism, Asfendiiarov was careful 
to employ a strictly Marxist schema in the development of Kazakh identity, insisting 
upon the historicity of ethnogenesis and its close links to the socio-economic status 
of any given people (Asfendiarov 1993, 14–15). 
 His faith in social constructs and formations belies both a Marxist approach 
to the study of history and a clear and forceful rejection of the racialist ideas 
encapsulated in the works upon which Tynyshpaev and earlier scholars had based 
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their writings. Indeed, Asfendiiarov chastised these academics for “wasting twenty 
years” of study of Central Asia by trying to “stress that the reason of all the greatest 
historical events in Asia were ‘the white-skinned, European, brachycephalic race of 
the Tinglings.’” Combined with this, they sought to associate the Mongoloid peoples 
with nothing but “desertification and destruction.” The Turkic nationalists, too, were 
guilty of racial supremacist theories in their own right, albeit by attempting to prove 
the very opposite of their European counterparts (Asfendiiarov 1993, 16-17). By 
contrast, Asfendiiarov argued that the presence of a Kazakh nation could be 
ascertained not from racial or ethnic identifiers, but rather through the study of 
socio-economic “survivals” (пережитки). These would lead scholars to a deeper 
understanding of the social organization of pre-Revolutionary Kazakhs and Kyrgyz 
and, in the process, elucidate the exact stage of historical development to which the 
Kazakhs had arrived on the eve of 1917 (Asfendiarov 1993, 19).  
By claiming that nomadism was a form of feudal social organization, 
Asfendiiarov was able to cast a form of national consciousness and early 
ethnogenesis on the Kazakh peoples without having recourse to racialist discourse. 
Indeed, rather than denying the Marxian approach of five stages of socio-economic 
development, he sets out on a recharacterization of the socio-economic conditions 
of the Kazakhs over their history. If the mountain will not come to Muhammad, then 
Muhammad must go to the mountain. His interpretation is similar to Soliyev’s 
reading of the Seljuks and their adoption of proto-capitalist tendencies, albeit with a 
much more stridently ideological tone. 
 Asfendiiarov’s approach to historical truth is not wholly opposed to the 
methods employed by Tynyshpaev in his own studies. Etymologies and legends are 
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seen as being out of bounds, because of their unscientific nature and their usage to 
support a racialist view of the nation’s origins. Nevertheless, traditional 
understandings of history, including oral histories, are important in reconstructing 
the socio-economic structure of populations, and their economic relations within the 
group and with other groups (Asfendiarov 1993, 24–25). A people, for Asfendiiarov, 
was “not a biological, but above all a social” concept. For this reason, there was no 
sense in trying to determine either the physical attributes of a given collectivity, or 
their production through miscegenation, as racial categories were entirely fictitious 
(Asfendiarov 1993, 25). This allows him to accept, in large part, the standard 
historical narratives about the Huns, the Turks and other nomadic peoples of the 
Eurasian Steppe and to incorporate them wholesale into Marxist historical praxis. 
War, discord and broken alliances between the Oğuz, the Uyghurs, the Kyrgyz, the 
Huns and other collectivities are explained entirely along socio-economic lines, 
rather than through tropes of national or racial solidarity and betrayal (Asfendiarov 
1993, 27–32). Without an emphasis on the racial bases of belonging, it is 
unimportant to Asfendiiarov whether those who rebelled or those who remained 
loyal were of particular physical types.   
 The competition between Turks and Iranians, a feature of much of the 
scholarship that came from early Russian Soviet scholars as well as the Turkish 
historians of the 1930s, is noticeably absent from the writings of Asfendiiarov. 
Indeed, he goes so far as to propose that it was the symbiotic relationship between 
Turkic speakers and Iranic ones – particularly the Sogdians – that gave rise to the 
unique culture and socio-economic organization of the people of the Kazakh Steppe, 
including those who self-identify as Kazakh in the 20th century (Asfendiarov 1993, 
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35). This is perhaps the strongest attack on the essentialist position held by previous 
Turkologists, despite its outwardly benign character. By refusing to point to the 
Iranic peoples or the Turkic ones as the true autochthones of the Central Asian 
region, Asfendiiarov makes clear that he views ethno-national belonging as an issue 
of culture and society, rather than appearance or language. It is an insistence on a 
Marxist view of history that posits that socio-political collectivities and their 
trappings, including the rules of inclusion and exclusion, react to deeper socio-
economic forces in a dialectic, rather than a being the driving force in the history of a 
grouping.  
 In short, Asfendiiarov provides us, at the end of the period under study, with 
an approach to the nation that is Stalinist in content and Kazakh in form. The 
historicity of the nation is clearly attuned to Marxist precepts, but the peculiarities of 
passage from one stage of development to the next are tied to a distinctly Central 
Asian pattern of history. This allowed for Asfendiiarov’s chronology to be in line with 
the 1934 intervention described at the start of this section. It is therefore similar to 
Stalin’s application of the development of nationhood to the Georgians. National, or 
proto-national, characteristics can be read into specific aspects of Kazakh history 
thanks to a creative approach to socio-economic developments. Meanwhile, the 
insistence on agency in the grouping and regrouping of Turkic communities 
demonstrated, to some degree, a “common cast of mind”; in other words, a 
consciousness about communal interests and a shared means of acting upon them. 
With this, the shaping of a Kazakh nation could be cast long back into the past, 
without recourse to racially-charged descriptions, or indeed a break from Stalin-era 
historiographic dictates. 
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Stalinist Repression 
 Asfendiiarov was the last representative of his generation among the 
Kazakhs. He was arrested, convicted, and executed for supposedly anti-Soviet and 
pan-Turkish tendencies during the wave of repression that was unleashed in 1937-38 
(Auezova 2011, 256; Yilmaz 2013b, 530; Kozybaev 1992, 16–17). The impact of the 
“Red Terror”, to paraphrase a work by the Kazakh writer Gülnar Nurbetova, was 
more than simply an interruption of the intellectual and scholastic life of a 
generation of Soviet citizens. It suffocated the very notion of free thought, critical 
analysis and plurality of opinions: 
“Freedom of thought, thinking differently and criticism 
of the ruling party were limited increasingly by the 
limits of legitimacy of Soviet ideology and of the Party 
itself. The high price of Marxism, as a social theory and 
epistemology adopted by Russian [NdT: российские 
Russian citizens, not ethnic Russians] Marxists, 
particularly Bolsheviks, began to metastasize into 
pretensions towards the monopolistic control of truth 
and the perfection of all interpretations of Marxism. 
Analysis and the suggestion of mistakes were ignored.” 
(Nurbetova 2003, 93) 
 
Totalitarianism was not simply a process of killing off those who opposed, it was also 
a means by which the search for truth was channeled towards service and survival of 
the Party, with Stalin at its head. Education and, by extension, history were both of 
great importance in this respect. The lack of generalized literacy and schooling in the 
pre-Revolutionary period implied that many were incapable of participating in the 
arenas in which this epistemic and ontological management took place. By using 
education as a tool, historical narratives were converted into a useful and fruitful 
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mechanism for modeling the minds of citizens in a manner most befitting to the 
preservation of the state (Nurbetova, 94). 
 The head of Kazkraikom, the Commissariat tasked with the organization and 
administration of the Kazakh regions, Goloshchekin, emphasized what was to be 
replaced in his estimation of the challenges facing the Komsomol: 
“‘Ideological bias in the [ethnic] Russian part of the Komsomol is 
[attributable to] Great Russian chauvinism; in the Kazakh part, it is the 
influence of the Alash Orda, a nationalistic bias. The chauvinist is an 
uncultured person, even though he might be literate, even though he 
might be educated and have an engineering diploma. He is an 
uncultured, ignorant person.’” (Nurbetova 2003, 96) 
 
It was therefore not simply a matter of making peasants, workers and nomads 
literate. They were to be taught how to be good Communists and Soviets, and part 
of this teaching necessitated stamping out the remnants of pre-Revolutionary 
nationalist ideas. Indeed, one can only wonder if Goloshchekin’s comment about “an 
engineering diploma” is a veiled reference to Mukhammadzhan Tynyshpaev, one of 
the clearest examples of the post-Revolutionary Kazakh adoption of earlier European 
narratives.   
In 1937, Nikolai Mikhailovich Lukin, Editor of the journal Историк-
Марксист (Historian-Marxist), heralded the new, Stalinist view of world history. In 
it, the non-historical nations would have their appropriate role, but those of the 
Soviet Union would be overshadowed by the great achievements of the Russian 
people in their drive towards establishing the world proletarian revolution (Lukin 
1963, 449). With one article, the Stalinist régime had managed to collapse attempts 
to locate the history of the Central Asian peoples within regional dynamics and their 
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own traditional sources of information. In its place, the State left a reorientation of 
historiographical endeavours towards a teleological history of the Soviet people. 
 With this, we close the chapter devoted to the development of historical 
narratives in the Soviet Union over the 1920s and 30s. Although it would be an 
oversimplification to pretend as thought there was a clear, linear trajectory from 
chaotic pluralism to rigid centralization and ideological monotony, a broad trend can 
be established. The 1920s were characterized by a burgeoning of historical writings 
about the Turkic peoples from a variety of viewpoints. While some authors espoused 
a distinctly Marxian approach to the socio-economic history of the region, others 
were faithful to pre-Revolutionary narratives and nationalist ideas. This gradually 
gave way to the 1930s, a decade in which the cheap and easy medium of 
communication – periodicals – appears to have trailed off, and the more disciplined 
and bureaucratic process of monograph production reigned supreme. In this period, 
Stalinist orthodoxy, while not always painfully evident, is nonetheless palpable in 
many of the historical narratives. Gone are the stridently nationalist and pre-
Revolutionary interpretations that carried on right up to 1927-28.  
 In the next, and final, chapter, these strands will be brought together and 
matched with their Turkish counterparts. In it, we shall how just how much these 
two paths diverged over the two decades, and the extent to which each of them 
bear the hallmarks of the respective state-sponsored ideologies under which they 
were written.   
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Conclusion 
 In the preceding chapters, I have provided an overview of the development 
of linguistics, archaeology and anthropology over the 20th century; a discussion of 
Soviet and Turkish ideologies; and a detailed view of intellectual and cultural 
production on the history of the Turkic peoples Turkey and the Soviet Union. The 
collection of articles and theses culled from periodicals, bulletins, drafts, and printed 
books is intended to be a guide to general trends; the full extent of views and 
opinions put down as ink on paper will only be known at some time in the future, 
once scholars have had the opportunity to go through all of the materials held in 
previously closed archives in both Turkey and the former Soviet Union. In this final 
chapter, I will utilize the material presented in the previous two chapters in order to 
draw conclusions about the interaction of ideology and historiography in the two 
countries, and to compare them to one another on three specific points: 
(1) The historicity of the nation; 
(2) Markers of identification and inclusion;  
(3) History as a guide to social and political cohesion. 
These three aspects will form the bulk of the chapter. At its conclusion, I will draw 
broad lessons to be learned from the corpus of both historiographies. This will take 
the form of general comments, intended to look back at the core aim of the project 
and its implications for our understanding of the period in question, and its lasting 
effects on the states in question. 
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The Historicity of the Nation 
 In both Turkey and the Soviet Union, authors and representatives of the state 
failed to reach water-tight consensus on the historical appearance and continuity of 
the nation. Nonetheless, in both countries, broad-based agreement was reached on 
how and when to locate this particular concept along the temporal spectrum. 
Gökalpian nationalist thought would have that the nation was constantly being 
reimagined and reconstituted through education, and thus had always existed. From 
the final days of the Ottoman Empire, up to the end of the Second Turkish History 
Congress, most writers espoused the view that a Turkish or Turkic nation, defined in 
one way or another, had been in existence since the dawn of human civilization. For 
the most part, this was achieved through a reading of classical sources that stressed 
group names as ethnonyms, rather than socio-economic or political appellations. 
Gökalp’s own understanding of the nation and its presence throughout history 
proved to be far more flexible than might have been expected, particularly given the 
later iterations of nationalist ontology. Gökalp imagined it to be a grouping united 
around a core collection of aesthetic, moral, political and socio-economic beliefs, 
with membership fluid and defined through socialization, rather than blood. As such, 
nationality was essential but voluntaristic. 
 Over the course of the 1920s and 1930s, greater stress was placed on the 
former characteristic, rather than the latter. Authors, particularly Afet İnan, Reşit 
Saffet, Şevket Aziz and Sadri Maksudi Arsal, and others, insisted upon the durable 
and primordial characteristics of the nation, confusing socialization with race and 
biology. As pluralism in opinion was watered down, and the State cemented its grip 
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on the centres of cultural and intellectual production through sponsorship and 
coercion, the identifiers of the nation were described more and more frequently as 
being unchanging and hard-wired into the minds and hearts of those identified as 
Turks. Gökalp believed that nations could disappear and be resurrected through re-
education. Later Turkish scholars took this view to an extreme, arguing that the 
biological makeup of the members of a particular nation made them predisposed to 
that nation’s morals, mode of economic organization and language. Whereas Gökalp 
believed in unconscious disappearance and conscious revival, the scholars of the 
1930s argued for conscious dissimulation and reflex rediscovery. The nation could 
not disappear entirely, it could only go underground, awaiting a great leader to 
reawaken it to its divine calling.  
 In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the intellectual climate proved to be 
less and less tolerant of immortal nations as time passed. Stalinist doctrine on the 
nation, which was enunciated in 1913 in response to the challenges of the Austrian 
Socialists, clearly identified the nation as a product of the capitalist era. Although 
this became part and parcel of Soviet nationalities policy after 1917, it was not 
implemented uniformly in the first decade of Soviet hegemony. Some authors, 
including those who wrote in Turkic languages and for Turkic audiences, appear to 
have toed the line fairly carefully. Others did not, and from the October Revolution 
in 1917 until Stalin’s elimination of Bukharin from the Soviet Communist Party in 
1929, it is not hard to find references to the pre-capitalist nation in all forms of 
historical narrative. These were not just popular histories, but also political 
statements, school texts, conference presentations and scholarly articles meant to 
accompany materials that were produced for the First All-Union Turkological 
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Congress of 1926. The nation as a pre-modern, pre-capitalist apparition was taken as 
given by no small number of writers, as is reflected in many of the works seen in 
chapter 6. 
 Bartol’d, Baitursynov, Çobanzadǝ and others all managed to incorporate, to 
some degree, an idealist view of the nation during periods of nomadic or feudal 
social organization, albeit not to the degree expressed in Turkish nationalist writings. 
Bartol’d’s death in 1930 allowed him to escape the beginnings of Stalin’s cleanse of 
the historical sciences, while Baitursynov met a similar fate at the hands of state 
security. Çobanzadǝ, on the other hand, continued to produce works for public 
consumption through the 1930s, and these provide us with a view to the shift in 
state tolerance following Stalin’s entrenchment at the top of the Communist Party. 
We saw that, by 1930, “national” languages would be denied to peoples such as the 
Turkmen until their society had been reorganized according to Soviet lines. In 1934, 
Çobanzadǝ gave us a masterclass in the re-writing of the historical linguistics of 
national lects, denying the sort of linguistic unity required by national groups until 
the advent of socialist, rather than just capitalist, power. And of course Asfendiiarov, 
the last scholar under study, demonstrated the ultimate acquiescence to ideological 
rigour: the massaging and creative interpretation of historical circumstances in order 
to fit the rigidity of the Stalinist timeline of nationhood.  
 In our two cases, the dynamics are similar and yet intensely different. On the 
one hand, in both the Soviet Union and Turkey, the hardening of ideological 
positions is reflected, with a lag, in the coalescence of ideological positions within 
dominant historiography. Ideology and politics act within a dialectic, with the first 
informing the conduct of individuals in the second, and the latter in turn feeding 
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back into the former to adapt it to contemporary situations. Both Gökalp and the 
early Stalin could not have foreseen the challenges of the 1930s, and it is only to be 
expected that they or their successors would tweak or stress different aspects of 
their worldviews as the circumstances around them changed. In both countries, 
historical narratives became much more strident in their insistence on the historicity 
or ahistoricity of the nation as the 1930s wore on. In Turkey, however, the focus was 
on proving an inalienable right to the land of Anatolia, and this involved an emphasis 
on the early formation of nationhood in Central Asia and its exportation to Asia 
Minor before the arrival of other peoples. In the Soviet Union, where parochial 
nationalisms and inter-ethnic conflicts were of greater concern, it was the 
ephemerality of the nation, and the importance of universal human dynamics, that 
won the day. The long and short of the matter is that narratives of nationhood in 
Central Asia split along the border between Turkey and the Soviet Caucasus, with no 
attempt at reconciling the two to each other, or to extant research on social 
formations among the pre-Islamic Turkic people.  
 The nation, then, was either temporally and spatially indelible, or merely skin 
deep. The same might be said of the means of individuals’ inclusion in the nation, 
and the characteristics that might be key to drawing a line in the sand between Us 
and Them.  
 
Markers of Identification and Inclusion 
 The historicity of the nation was an issue of disagreement between Turkish 
and Soviet historians, but it could hardly be called a bone of contention. The same, 
however, cannot be said of the means of determining who might be counted as part 
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of a given nation, and who not. Gökalp dismissed the idea of bloodlines. No small 
number of his compatriots opted for the same line in discussions in the Türk Ocakları 
and the two Historical Congresses, as we saw throughout chapter 5. Nonetheless, 
there remained a receptiveness to primordial, racialized interpretations of Turkish 
nationhood and belonging, which paved the way for the full-blown use of craniology, 
biology and racial anthropology to bolster historical narratives right up to the of the 
period under study. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, an aggressive stance 
against the use of physical attributes, and particularly race, as means of determining 
the belonging and identification of an individual began in earnest in the 1920s. 
Agazade and Karakashly, in particular, provide us with a robust example of the Soviet 
belief that outward appearance and race were nothing more than historical and 
geographical accidents, of little explanatory power beyond elucidating the 
environment within which an individual’s forbearers had lived.  
 In many ways, both Turkish and Soviet scholars began from the same 
circumstances. In terms of foundational texts, neither Gökalp nor Stalin provided a 
clear means of determining how one might be labeled a member of a particular 
ethno-national grouping. In Gökalp’s own writings, this seems to have been a 
question of best-fit: into which nation had the individual been socialized, and where 
might her own ideas and worldview accord with the priorities of the community? For 
Stalin, as we have seen from the work of both Francine Hirsch and Terry Martin, the 
early years of Soviet power were ones in which auto-identification was de rigueur. 
Citizens were free to choose the collectivity to which they belonged, although they 
were encouraged, in some respect, to consider what the historically and materially 
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most appropriate answer might be. In neither case did the progenitors of the two 
ideologies espouse a litmus test for bringing in or throwing out groups of people. 
 On another level, too, both cadres of historians began from the same corpus 
of historical texts upon which to determine the ethno-national belonging of the 
Turkic peoples. Both had access to the Chinese, Greek, Armenian, Persian and Arab 
chronicles, as well as the various Runic inscriptions in Old Turkic. Both read and 
discussed the works of Radlov, de Guignes, Cahun, Vámbéry and other early 
Turkologists. And both were aware of scholarly production coming out of Germany, 
the United Kingdom, France, Switzerland and other European academies throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s, albeit with various delays. What mattered, then, was 
interpretation and collation of data, as well as the conscious choice to omit or 
include specific studies in the broader corpus of secondary materials.  
 In the Soviet Union, omission and suppression were imposed selectively, as 
the denunciation of particular scholars as bourgeois, nationalist, Islamist, or all three 
was seen as just effective in discouraging future scholars from reviving their theses 
as was a simple and silent funeral. While De Guignes, Cahun and others from the 
period prior to 1917 were roundly criticized by Turkish and Soviet scholars alike, the 
Soviet case presents us with greater evidence of internal criticism and censure, as 
well as revision. Turkish scholars appear to have respected the use of race and racial 
anthropology as a meaningful heuristic in the determination of group identification 
and belonging, while Soviet scholars gradually came round to the idea that these 
were without explanatory power. First, Bartol’d challenged the idea that some, 
although not all, descriptions of race and appearance were tied to auto-
denominations and ethnic communities. His characterization of the word Türk as a 
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political appellation rather than an ethnonym was in opposition to those historians, 
including Turkish ones, who sought a direct bloodline or biological link between 
contemporary communalities and closely-knit ethnic communities in the past. 
However, Bartol’d and his followers, including scholars such as Semenov, clearly 
believed the Tajiks to be direct descendants of ancient Iranic racial groupings, while 
native Turkic scholars such as Soliyev and Tynyshpaev tried to flip his logic to apply it 
the other way around.  
 As the 1930s progressed, the spread of racial anthropology, biology and 
eugenics through Western European scholarship produced polarized reactions in 
Turkey and the Soviet Union. Turkish historians, influenced in part by European 
sources, intensified their adoption of physical and biological markers as means of 
identifying historic Turkic communities. In order to make these meaningful and 
coherent within the dominant worldview, they tied them to the identifiers of 
Turkishness outlined by Gökalp: bone structure and stature determined suitability 
for specific socio-economic pursuits; skull sizes facilitated or hindered the proper 
production of language; blood types encoded a likelihood to remain loyal to leader 
and race. Those scholars who disagreed, refuting the links between race, language 
and ethnicity, were either forced to go abroad or fell into the background of 
historical endeavours during this period. Foreign historians, on the other hand, were 
routinely reinterpreted in order to ensure that their conclusions matched the 
dominant Turkish view.  
 In the Soviet Union, descent, appearance and blood were played down either 
implicitly or explicitly. Some of the aforementioned historians who had proposed 
racial means of identifying historic communities were partially or wholly refuted and 
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their findings deemed unsuitable for further scholarship. Other narratives appeared 
that stressed the unimportance of race in the face of individual and communal 
interest and politicking. Asfendiiarov in particular demonstrated this manner in 
which the much vaunted racially-motivated loyalty or betrayal that appeared in 
Turkish narratives was explained away through socio-economic developments and 
political machinations. Çobanzadǝ highlighted distinct intra-national divisions 
between the various class elements of the nation, while reminding readers of Marr’s 
view of langauge evolution and mixing as a product of class warfare and socio-
economic advancement, rather than miscegenation. And Popov, in turn, refused to 
endorse the direct links between Kipchaks and Karakalpaks, breaking the link 
between language and lineage that was so important for Turkic nationalist 
narratives. All of this was intended to decouple descent and nation, and to insist 
upon the four Stalinist characteristics as the only means of identifying the nation, 
rather than any sort of biological marker.  
 Race, then, came to be either supremely important, or supremely 
meaningless, on either side of the Turco-Soviet border. Nationhood was identified 
either by examining an individual, or by listening to her explanation of her own 
identity, but never a mix of the two. Underlying this, of course, was a deeper and 
much more fundamental aspect of state-sponsored history and education in general: 
the creation of a unifying myth, and the means of binding citizens to states in the 
march of human development.  
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History as a Means of Social and Political Cohesion 
 Social cohesion and loyalty to a particular regime or even political system can 
be interpreted as intensely political phenomena: choices to be made within a matrix 
of given options, based on one’s own values and beliefs. Ideology, we might say, will 
tell us how individuals make those choices – that they are inherently selfish beings, 
or that altruism is an important factor, or even that they are pushed by the invisible 
hand of a higher being – but the content of that choice is inherently political. In the 
case of both the Soviet and Turkish systems, however, social cohesion and political 
loyalty were seen as core components of the ideological system, dictated quasi-
deterministically through a variety of mechanisms. This determinism, or at least a 
form of sub-conscious inclination, found its way into historical narratives, too. As 
such, the narratives themselves were not simply influenced by the dominant 
ideology of the state, they were also important tools in legitimizing and reinforcing 
it.  
 In the Turkish case, Gökalp’s solidarist leanings, and his belief in the nation as 
the ultimate modern form of social organization, made for a strongly normative 
element in the Gökalpian nationalist view of how society ought to be reshaped. 
Gökalp was in favour of a hierarchy of needs and interests in which the individual 
was subordinated to society, with the corporation acting as a possible mediator 
between the necessities and desires of the masses and the ultimate goals of the 
nation (see Parla 2009). In describing historically-bound societies in the distant past, 
no small number of Turkish historians sought to replicate this formula in their 
studies of pre-historic Turkic communities. The Huns, in particular, were a favourite 
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topic of analysis, from Köprülü through to Saffet and Arsal, as a prime example of 
strength of social cohesion among the Turks, and the supremacy of political and 
ethnic loyalty, with dire consequences for any of those Turks who betrayed their 
ethnic kin. The lesson was therefore clear: loyalty to leadership is a component of 
Turkishness, which is in turn a marker of inclusion and belonging. To defy the 
nation’s leaders is to defy the nation.  
 Towards the end of the 1930s, greater and greater emphasis was placed on 
this, especially as one-party rule went from the exception to the norm both in Turkey 
and Europe. The introduction of racial and biological markers into the identification 
of pre-historical Turkic communities and the ahistorical duration of nationality 
allowed for a new means of carrying this historical narrative into the present. The 
usage of skull sizes, physical appearance, fingerprints and blood types in order to 
categorize Turks according to their racial purity was now linked to the moral and 
legal traditions of the nation. Gökalpian nationalism allowed for national 
characteristics – including political allegiance and social cohesion – to be classified as 
immortal and essential qualities, and the new biologically and anthropologically 
informed history metamorphosed them into inalienable, quasi-deterministic 
elements of every Turk’s psychological make-up. History became a morality tale, 
elucidating citizens on the futility of straying from the flock by insisting upon the 
circular nature of human social development.  
 At the other end of this spectrum was the Soviet Union, where ideology was 
founded on more than a century’s worth of philosophical study insisting upon the 
linearity of human progress. While not explicitly part of the Stalinist view of the 
nation, the vision of history as a unidirectional path from primeval quasi-socialized 
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communities to futuristic Communism underpinned all Soviet, and indeed Marxian, 
thought. This, combined with the ephemerality of the nation, and the categorical 
refutation of race as a meaningful heuristic, implied that the Stalinist historians, and 
indeed most Soviet historians, could not and would not espouse a view of social 
cohesion and political loyalty as being hardwired. Although loyalty to Moscow and 
the Soviet Socialist system was a crucial component of the reimagining of the social 
sciences, it was expressed in a very different manner in the Soviet historical 
narratives about pre-historic Turkic peoples. 
 Already in Bartol’d’s histories of Central Asia, we can clearly see the 
implications of an insistence on Turk as a political designation, rather than an ethnic 
one. Here, individuals, or at least groups of individuals, are described as having 
affiliated themselves with particular leaders and wider communities out of self-
interest. As time passed and the period of eclecticism in Soviet historiography came 
to a close, such explanations took on greater class connotations. Soliyev, in 
particular, provides us with a view to this with his descriptions of the differences 
between town and country – implying that socio-economic conditions, rather than 
ethno-linguistic ones, were crucial in the formation of identities – and his insistence 
on the capital accumulation of the Oğuz and the Seljuks. This latter aspect allowed 
him to claim allegiance through the base; that is, the creation of socio-economic 
bonds, rather than biological or racial ones, that tied these people together in the 
beginnings of a national structure. Soviet historians might have insisted on national 
loyalty and cohesion in the late pre-Islamic period, but they did so on the basis of 
economic development and social advancement, rather than any sort of 
predisposition to elevating the group’s interests over the individual’s. 
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 By the 1930s, the call for loyalty to the centre was both implicit to the 
narratives and explicit. On the implicit side, class consciousness was infused into a 
variety of the components of historical narratives. The only enduring component of 
these stories was the presence of a dominated class, whose coerced cohesion to a 
national idea was the product of a bygone capitalist age. With the message that 
Turkic peoples had, in the past, chosen to ally themselves with a number of different 
rulers based on ostensibly misguided analyses of self-interest, it was a short leap for 
the reader to understand that the current period, in which workers, peasants and 
nomads were educated as to their proper class interests, would feature adherence 
to a new leader, one who had their welfare and advancement at heart. On an explicit 
plane, the decrees of 1934 and 1937 made clear that all histories were to become 
exercises in teleology, directing those interested in history to the quasi-deterministic 
linear path that leads all peoples towards the glorious victory of Socialism and the 
establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat – to which all proletariats owe 
allegiance – with its capital in Moscow. While Turks were told that their destiny was 
written in blood, Soviet citizens were informed that those who failed to act in 
accordance with the inevitable march of human development would be left in the 
“dustbin of history”, to paraphrase Leon Trotsky.  
 
In the introduction to this study, I stated that I would contribute to answering 
a number of different questions: to what degree is history, and indeed epistemology, 
responsive to the dictates of ideology? Is historical truth accessible through 
intellectual investigation, or are all scholarly activities tainted by the demands of the 
present? How malleable are our visions of ourselves, our families and our 
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communities in the face of intrusive state-directed pedagogy, patronage and 
propaganda? Although I have not been explicit in answering these questions 
throughout the body of this work, responses can be gleaned from the preceding 
chapters.  
The thrust of the project has provided ample examples of the degree to 
which history, and indeed all social sciences, can fall prey to the vagaries of 
ideologically-based demands. In both Turkey and the Soviet Union, the 1920s and 
1930s are replete with narratives and individuals who were forced to change, or 
forced to disappear, in response to the dictates of the state’s policy and worldview. 
The most powerful stories are those of historians who, similar to Çobanzadǝ, 
Asfendiiarov, and Baitursynov, were murdered at the hands of the Stalinist state. 
Slightly less egregious are the cases in which scholars were forced into exile, as in the 
case of Zeki Velidi Togan – who left Turkey for Vienna in 1934 – or Ahmet Ağaoğlu, 
who opted for silence, rather than continued participation in public and scholarly 
life. More interesting, however, is the diachronic change that can be traced, like an 
arc, through the writings of historians and academics throughout the period. Such 
trajectories can be seen in the works of Bartol’d, Marr, Tynyshpaev, Çobanzadǝ, 
Ağaoğlu, Arsal, and a host of other intellectuals who retained the ability to produce 
throughout the period in question. Here I hesitate to place agency in the hands of 
either the state or the individual, but rather point to the symbiotic relationship that 
developed, or was coerced, by the prevailing structure of the social sciences at the 
time. Did these individuals undergo considerable change in their own worldviews, 
and seek to align their writings with the dominant ideology of the period? Were they 
coerced by a state capable of the cruelest of punishments for those who 
 369 
transgressed its red lines? Or was the truth somewhere in the middle, a pull-push 
combination in which the draw of the idea, together with the thrust of the state’s 
monopoly on the use of violence, warped previously enunciated opinions and 
theories beyond recognition?  
The answers to such questions are beyond the scope of this study, and 
require intensive research into the personal papers of the individuals concerned. 
What can be said, however, is that ideology clearly did influence the interpretation 
and receipt of historical narratives in both countries. While some narratives require a 
look beyond the timeframe of this study – particularly into the pre-Revolutionary 
period in the case of Russian writers – some of those who produced historical tracts 
between 1923 and 1937 only demonstrate a marked shift in their interpretation and 
enunciation of historical narratives. Çobanzadǝ, for one, provides us with a poignant 
example of an individual who, having espoused a clear interest in the ethno-
nationally tinged interpretation of early Turkish writers immediately following the 
Revolution, appears to have fallen into step with the régime’s desired view of 
ethnogenesis. More often, however, it is the rise and fall of fortunes within one 
particular component of the drive for national histories that grants the clearest 
portrait of state-sponsored ideology influencing the process of history writing. In 
that case of Kazakhstan, the fall of Tynyshpaev and Baitursynov, who were replaced 
by Asfendiiarov – who was to meet an untimely demise himself in 1938 – 
demonstrates that personal conversions themselves were not enough to satisfy the 
demands of the Party. Similar, too, is the trajectory of the Turkish intellectual 
community. Here, the heavily Eurasian Turkic intelligentsia made its mark on early 
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academic pursuits, only to be sidelined or exiled in the early 1930s, replaced with 
more reliable figures, including Atatürk’s protégée, Afet İnan. 
In both the Soviet Union and Turkey, therefore, the agency of the individuals 
writing these narratives is a clear feature of the history writing process. Rather than 
the “editorial committees” that would become quite common in Soviet academic 
publishing from the 1940s onwards, real people, with real subjectivity, were involved 
in the production and dissemination of historical narratives on behalf of State-
sponsored organs. Their individuality allows us to demonstrate the manner in which 
the state, as acting through its various agents and bodies, sought to control and 
influence these individuals in order to implement its ideological aims. The methods 
were varied – the tantalizing opportunity of participating in building a new society, 
as well as expulsion, threat, withdrawal of funding, execution, disappearance, – but 
the end was largely the same: a shift in the creation of history in order to reflect 
more closely the ideological dictates of the state. In doing so, these historians 
became members of that second tier of the state apparatus, the softer and more 
human mechanism for interaction between ordinary citizens and institutions. Far 
from monolithic, the State acted through individuals and upon individuals. 
With this, we come to the end of my study. The success of the narratives 
under consideration can be measured by their endurance in national historiography. 
In Turkey, they live on stripped of their most blatantly racist elements and imbued 
with a new-found respect for the Ottomans and Islam. In the former Soviet states, 
they too proved to be enduring, although recently attempts by government from 
Gagauzia and Azerbaijan across to Kazakhstan have seen many of their elements 
replaced by calques on the Turkish History Thesis. In both cases, however, it is 
 371 
content, rather than production, that is cause for praise or concern; little interest is 
shown in the manner in which these theses came about, or the context in which they 
were necessary. The 1920s and 30s were the formative years of Soviet and Turkish 
historical scholarship, and the period’s actors and sagas should not be forgotten. 
Theirs was a struggle to balance the search for historical truth with personal 
convictions and the needs and demands of sometimes insecure, sometimes 
overbearing state apparatuses. Their own individual successes are difficult to 
measure, but their efforts should not be forgotten, nor their roles in the 
establishment of contemporary scholarship across the Turkic world be ignored.  
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